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Abstract 
 
Changing the behaviour of firms to take environmental concerns into account is seen as 
unlikely without effective regulations. However, corporations are increasingly keen to 
represent themselves as ‘green’, including those in the world’s largest manufacturing 
sector: the car industry.  Given rising concern for the environment and environmental 
sustainability since the 1990s this thesis asks: what motivates car firms to actually make 
environmental commitments?  Answering this question has implications for whether these 
commitments are ‘real’ and if so whether they are occurring in response to material factors 
(e.g. state regulations and consumer demand) versus normative factors (e.g. social attitudes 
and internal company strategies).  In order to answer it, the thesis applies the insights of the 
institutional varieties of capitalism approach to the German, United States and Japanese car 
industries, and specific firms within them, in respect of the environmental issue of climate 
change from 1990 to 2004.  Empirical national data is analysed, as well the environmental 
reporting of individual firms and interviews with key personnel. 
The main findings are that what leads the car industry to see environmental issues as 
central to their business interests hinges on the impact of differing national institutional 
factors.  Specifically, it is a matter of whether firms have a liberal market economy (LME) 
as their home base, in the case of US firms, or a coordinated market economy (CME) as 
their home base, in the case of German and Japanese firms.  US car firms react more to the 
material imperatives of consumer demand and state regulations.  German and Japanese 
firms are more mindful of normative factors for their initiatives, such as social attitudes 
(especially for German firms) and internal company strategies (especially for Japanese 
firms).  They have more of a partnership approach with government.  Therefore, car firms 
have very distinct ‘lenses’ through which they see the environmental performance of the 
cars they produce.  As such, the thesis concludes that the variety of capitalism of nations 
has implications not just for the type of products that economic actors such as car firms 
produce, and the competitive advantages they develop, but also the way they address 
related issues arising as a result of their activities, including environmental issues.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
 
Changing the behaviour of firms to internalise environmental externalities (costs to the 
environment arising from economic activity that are not borne by those engaged in the 
economic activity and are not reflected fully in prices)1 is seen as unlikely in the 
absence of changes in market forces or effective state regulation.2  However, 
corporations are increasingly keen to represent themselves as ‘green’.  In the case of the 
car industry there is evidence that concern for the environment may be more than just 
rhetoric.  This is because significant commitments have been made to incorporate 
environmental concerns in business strategies.3  The car industry is dominated by 
multinational corporations (MNCs), and the world’s largest manufacturing sector.  It 
also produces a product that has major environmental impacts.  Therefore, any 
behavioural change occurring within it is central to the debate on addressing the 
environmental impact of business. 
This thesis does not so much ask whether the environmental initiatives of car 
firms represent a real belief in the importance of the environment.  It asks a more 
fundamental question: what motivates car firms to actually make environmental 
commitments in the first place?  The reason for asking this question is that if one 
understands the key motivators of economic actors such as these car firms, one has the 
basis for answering questions of whether or not the commitments made are likely to be 
real or simply ‘window dressing’.  The issues raised by the question are complex.  
Multiple interrelationships are involved between states, business, markets and society.  
Business to business relationships (e.g. inter-firm competitive pressures) and the effect 
of international regulations are also relevant.  Theoretically, there are also multiple 
perspectives for considering the puzzle.  Disciplinary boundaries will inevitably be 
crossed and readers with an interest in government, international business and 
management, global environmental politics and the role of civil society, among others, 
should be particularly interested in the findings.   
The thesis takes as its starting point the dichotomy between material factors and 
rationalist ways of viewing the world, versus normative perspectives that view 
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institutions as important.  A belief that states remain central, rather than the view that 
global markets are now in charge, also informs the analysis because firms remain 
embedded in their home markets.  They are therefore subject to the normative factors 
that constitute capitalist relations that become institutionalised over time in their home 
states.  Recognising this, the thesis employs the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) 
approach.4  The findings demonstrate that car firms’ motivations for taking the 
environmental impacts of their behaviour into account, and how they do so, is 
fundamentally a question about differences in capitalist relations.  Specifically, in this 
thesis, it is one about the different capitalisms of Germany (and to some degree the 
European Union), the United States (US) and Japan. 
This introductory chapter first highlights the global economic and environmental 
importance of the car industry.  Addressing the environmental damage resulting from its 
activities is then considered in the light of the contrasting theoretical perspectives on 
addressing environmental externalities resulting from the actions of economic actors.  
The mainstream rationalist liberal economic perspective, which focuses more on 
material factors, is described and contrasted with institutional perspectives, which focus 
on normative factors.  The idea that the influence of firms’ home states remains 
important, for both material and institutional reasons, is then introduced along with the 
VOC approach.  Finally, the contribution of the thesis and the research questions it 
seeks to answer in light of the actions of the car industry and contrasting theoretical 
perspectives are presented.  The chapter concludes with the working hypothesis for the 
thesis.  It is that both material and institutional perspectives are relevant to 
understanding and explaining the car industry’s environmental initiatives, but state-
specific institutional variations in capitalist relations, as suggested by the VOC 
approach, are crucial for understanding what might motivate such initiatives in firms of 
different nationalities. 
 
The Global Economic and Environmental Importance of the Car 
Industry 
 
The car industry has been described as “the economic sector most emblematic of 
modern times and of the polluting consequences of modernity”.5  Its economic and 
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environmental significance mark it as a crucial case for study because, more than any 
other manufacturing sector, it possesses the material capabilities to either reduce or 
increase global environmental damage.  This section outlines some key aspects of the 
industry’s global economic significance.  In light of its economic significance, the 
manner in which the industry’s products are a major cause of global environmental 
damage is then introduced.  This provides background information for the subsequent 
discussion of alternative approaches to addressing the environmental impacts of the 
fundamentally environmentally damaging products produced by the industry. 
 
Economic Significance 
 
MNCs are perhaps the most important economic actors shaping the contemporary 
global economy.  The car industry is the archetypal example of an industry sector 
dominated by MNCs.  It manufactures and distributes its products on an integrated 
global scale and today is often taken as the paradigm case of a globalised industry.6  
Most of the largest car manufacturers have over 40 percent of their production outside 
their ‘home’ state,7 and in addition to the finished product being produced and traded 
internationally the international dimension of the product is embedded in its production.  
This is because various parts and components are produced in different countries, so 
that the final product itself is global in character.8  Furthermore, collaborative 
agreements between firms of different nationalities, and often cross-ownership, mean 
that a ‘global connectedness’ exists in research and development, the dissemination of 
new production techniques and other advances.9
The car industry dominates global manufacturing.  Vehicle production is the 
largest manufacturing sector in the world, with five of the top ten largest businesses in 
the world by sales being accounted for by car manufacturers, and another three in the 
top 45.10  The industry contributes four to eight percent of total GDP for Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and leads all other 
industries, including information technology, in research and development 
investment.11
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Table 1.1: Turnover, Investment and Production Volumes for Cars in 2003 in Germany, the US and Japan 
Country Turnover (cars 
and commercial 
vehicles in 
€million) 
% 
total 
Investment (cars 
and commercial 
vehicles in 
€million) 
% 
total 
Car 
production 
(units) 
% 
total 
Germany 204,043 13 12,300 19 5,145,403 12 
US 363,050 23 13,060 20 4,509,565 11 
Japan 365,604 23 5,309 8 8,478,328 20 
Germany, US and 
Japan Total 
932,697 59 30,669 47 18,133,296 43 
WORLD TOTAL 1,598,951 100 66,052 100 42,011,951 100 
Source: OICA (2004a), The World’s Automotive Industry: Some Key Figures, 
http://www.oica.net/htdocs/Main.htm, accessed 13 January 2006.  Car production accounts for 69 percent 
of all vehicles produced. 
 
Table 1.1 presents turnover, investment and production figures for the global car 
industry and the top three countries in the world where this is undertaken: Germany, the 
US and Japan.  It shows that the industry’s total turnover in 2003 was almost €1.6 
trillion, its investment totalled over €66 billion, and it produced over 42 million cars 
worldwide.  By location of economic activity, Germany, the US and Japan account for 
59 percent of the industry’s turnover, 47 percent of the industry’s investment and 43 
percent of production.  Therefore, it is clear that in addition to the industry’s global 
economic significance, it is of particular significance to the world’s three largest 
industrialised states where around half (or more on the basis of turnover) of its total 
economic activity is located. 
 
Environmental Damage 
 
Given the economic dominance and importance of the car industry, plus the 
concentration of its economic activity in the world’s three largest industrialised states, 
there is also ample evidence of the environmental damage caused by cars.  Here is a 
brief summary.  Transportation accounts for around 25 percent of total carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions, with up to 85 percent of this accounted for by road transport.12  This is 
exclusive of related activities linked with transportation such as fuel extraction, 
processing and transport, and the manufacturing process.  If these are included, 
passenger cars alone are responsible for around 33 percent of the OECD’s CO2 
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emissions.13  The implication is that just a 10-15 percent reduction in passenger cars’ 
contribution to CO2 emissions would meet half of Germany or Japan’s greenhouse gas 
emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.14  In terms of exhaust emissions other 
than CO2, cars contribute 90 percent of all carbon monoxide emissions, and are a major 
cause of acid rain through the sulphur oxides they emit.  Road transport also accounts 
for 48 percent of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions in OECD countries on average, and 
around 60 percent of this is accounted for by cars.15  In fact, of all land-based modes of 
transport, cars are the most energy intensive, with petrol-powered cars consuming in 
aggregate more energy and producing more greenhouse gas emissions than any other 
type of vehicle.16  In addition, cars are a prime cause of the depletion of the world’s 
resources,17 and the international car industry produces over 3 million tonnes of scrap 
and waste every year.18  Based on current growth rates, the number of vehicles 
worldwide is projected to increase from around 700 million at present to 1.1 billion by 
2020, so the environmental problems caused by cars will get worse, not better, unless 
dramatic changes are made.19  It is not surprising that the US Environmental Protection 
Agency declares that driving a car is “the single most polluting thing that most of us 
do”.20
Given their economically powerful position, car firms have historically put 
strong political pressure on governments against environmental regulation.  They have 
supported national lobby groups such as the Coalition for Vehicle Choice in the US, and 
international lobby groups such as the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) and the Climate 
Council.  These consistently lobbied governments against emission controls to reduce 
greenhouse gases on the basis that this would lead to severe economic impacts.21  
Although US firms resigned their membership of lobby groups like the GCC prior to its 
ultimate demise in 2002 in favour of openly embracing (or at least declaring) support 
for environmental commitments,22 and firms now announce their support for, and 
membership of, environmentally-motivated industry organisations such as the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD),23 there remains vast scope 
for improvements in efficiency and thence environmental sustainability within the 
industry.  For example, the big three American firms of Ford, General Motors and 
DaimlerChrysler make most of their profits from the sale of light trucks, primarily in the 
form of pick-up trucks and sports utility vehicles (SUVs), the latter of which are 
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particularly notorious for their size, weight and high fuel consumption.  In the US, light 
trucks account for over half the total passenger vehicle market.  Far from seeking to 
differentiate themselves from the production and sale of these vehicles, European and 
Japanese manufacturers are producing similar gas-guzzlers to compete for market share 
in this sector, albeit primarily in the US market.24
Therefore, the industry’s size and global economic significance is mirrored in 
the environmental damage caused by its products.  Without action these problems will 
inevitably worsen based on current market trends. 
 
Addressing Environmental Externalities 
 
Environmental problems are usually characterised as cases of market failure due to 
externalities.  Environmental externalities arise as a problem due to the intrinsically 
public good nature of the environment caused by ill-defined property rights.  These 
terms, and the ideas behind them, deserve a brief explanation. 
Putting it simply, externalities occur when factors that should be taken into 
account by markets are left external to them.  The primary reason for this is that 
property rights in respect of the environment are often ill-defined – i.e. it is not clear 
who ‘owns’ the environment, and so it is often the case that economic actors responsible 
for environmental damage are not clearly made responsible for the environmental 
impacts of their actions.  Due to ill-defined property rights, the environment is often a 
public good – i.e. it is in the public domain and can be jointly consumed by several 
agents simultaneously.  The result of environmental externalities arising from a lack of 
property rights because of the environment’s public good nature is that the prices of 
goods and services do not reflect the environmental impacts of their production and 
consumption.  This is known as market failure.  Far from market failure being the 
exception, due to the public good nature of the environment, “environmental 
externalities are pervasive”.25  Therefore, the environmental costs of economic activity 
are incorrectly priced by markets, and economic actors can ignore the negative 
environmental effects of their actions.  In fact, in being ignored or incorrectly priced by 
markets, the cost of environmental externalities is often borne by those who were not 
responsible for them.  Specifically, they are often borne collectively by those not 
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directly involved in their creation.  And when the public good attribute of the 
environment is a global or transborder phenomenon, as is often the case, the 
environment is said to be in the realm of the “global commons”.26
Ameliorating the problem of pervasive, often global, environmental externalities 
can be approached in two ways.  Mainstream liberal economic perspectives are 
challenged by institutional perspectives.  Both are considered in the following sections, 
along with the major divide between them: rational choice versus norms as the basis for 
action. 
 
Mainstream Liberal Economic Perspectives 
 
The liberal economic perspective is the mainstream view that informs analysis in the 
business/government/environment debate.  Liberal is a somewhat ‘rubber’ term to the 
extent that it has been given different definitions by different commentators, but it is 
used here to refer to approaches in economics, political science and international 
relations that apply the ideas of individual autonomy, freedom and rationality to firms, 
the state, interstate relations and global economic relations generally.27  Broadly 
speaking, it refers to those theories in which “people behave in self-interested and 
broadly rational ways”.28  Firms are viewed as rational profit maximisers and states as 
“rational egoists” that maximise their individual prosperity on the international stage.29  
There are two clear implications.  First, without state intervention environmental 
externalities will never be internalised as firms responsible for them can rationally 
ignore the cost of them.  States’ intervention is required to increase the price of 
environmental resources so that “trade can take place on the basis of prices reflecting 
true social costs”.30  Secondly, international organisations are needed to coordinate 
states’ intervention because without some cooperative mechanism states face a 
collective action problem where each has the incentive to opt out of regulating firms 
within their jurisdiction and appropriate the benefits for themselves from so doing.31
The key assumption in the liberal economic approach is the rationality of actors, 
whether they be individuals, firms, states or in respect of international relations between 
states, and the self-interested manner in which they make rational choices to further 
their ends.   For firms, this is therefore also fundamentally a materialist perspective in 
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which they act instrumentally to make profits in markets, subject to the constraints of 
state regulators.  They may also act to increase their power, but it is their material power 
in terms of power in markets.  This is the basis on which rationality is assumed:  
rational choice defined in terms of materialist profit and power maximising outcomes.  
Such a perspective has proved to be a parsimonious way of explaining firms’ behaviour.  
However, there are four inherent epistemological foundations contained within it that 
are relevant to the analysis here.32
First, rational choice models are ahistorical.  Rationality is assumed to apply at 
all times, and therefore questions such as path dependency, timing and sequencing of 
events are not considered as important determinants of outcomes.  Secondly, rational 
choice models aim for generalisability.  ‘Rules of the game’ are examined and 
equilibrium solutions posited that result from these.  It follows that in addition to such 
solutions applying at all times (i.e. ahistorically), they apply in all cases.  Thirdly, 
rational choice models exogenise the interests, identities and preferences of actors.  The 
limited understanding of actors’ motivations that results means that their behaviour is 
constrained to certain utility (in terms of profit or power) maximising assumptions.  
Fourthly, rational choice models focus on methods with the research agenda set by the 
model.  By incorporating ahistoricity, generalisability and exogeneity of actors’ 
interests, identities and preferences, parsimony is certainly more likely and one can also 
say that any resulting model will be widely applicable in theory (or more accurately by 
definition).  However, the end result is that most of what remains to argue about is 
methods.33
The first three foundations of rational choice models mean that approaches 
employing rational choice mechanisms are static.  This limits their ability to explain 
behavioural change.  The fourth limits the questions that can be asked to address this 
drawback of the first three assumptions.  However, perhaps most importantly, by 
making a priori assumptions about the motivations of economic actors they postulate a 
universal source of behavioural change.  If firms are taking environmental concerns into 
account, it must be because it is in their interest to do so, with this interest defined in 
materialist instrumental profit seeking terms.  Although such a clear causal path is 
intuitively appealing and logically plausible, such a simplistic rendering in the case of 
firms has clear limitations that must be acknowledged in addition to the intuitive appeal.  
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The risk in constructing them as purely instrumental profit-maximisers is that the range 
of possible explanations for firms taking more environmentally-friendly courses of 
action is constrained: it must, by definition, be because it is profitable for them to do so.  
Ergo, it must be that consumers’ revealed preferences indicate that firms should take 
such a course of action or regulations leave them no choice.  The risk is therefore what 
Katzenstein colourfully terms “vulgar rationalism” as it “infers the motives of actors 
from behaviorally revealed preferences”.34  Therefore, the risk is over-simplification, in 
the sense that the result may be tautological explanations that “succeed in explaining 
everything and so explain nothing”.35
While not necessarily rejecting the usefulness of such simplifying abstractions, 
alternative institutional perspectives do not constrain explanations to the same extent.  
The different foundations for institutional perspectives are considered in the following 
section. 
 
Institutional Perspectives 
 
Institutional perspectives have been promoted by scholars such as North, March and 
Olsen, Ruggie, and even Goldstein and Keohane.36  They do not assume actors are 
‘rational’ or, more accurately, they do not define actors’ rationality in terms of a priori 
assumptions ascribing actors’ motivations.  Instead, their starting point is that actors are 
motivated by certain norms that prescribe and proscribe appropriate action.  That is to 
say, rationality is contingent on norms of behaviour.  When such norms become 
institutionalised, they have a taken-for-grantedness about them so that behaving in a 
manner commensurate with them may be taken for ‘rational’ behaviour, but not 
necessarily rational behaviour in the liberal economic sense.   
Before discussing the implications of institutional perspectives, a simple and 
clear definition of the terms is required.  North defines norms as “shared common 
beliefs” that give rise to institutions defined as “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally.…the humanly devised constraints that shape interaction”.37  A more 
specific definition of the institutions to which norms give rise is provided by Hall and 
Soskice who say institutions are “a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally 
follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons”.38  Institutional 
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perspectives thus challenge the rational choice mechanism in the liberal economic 
model by seeing the role of ideas, beliefs and the resulting norms of behaviour – i.e. 
socially appropriate ways of behaving - as providing richer explanations of how 
decisions are made and institutions constructed.   
Liberal economic versus institutional perspectives are therefore delineated by 
the manner in which the rational choice mechanism is applied in the former versus the 
role of norms of behaviour in the latter.  Followers of the mainstream liberal economic 
perspective understand the world in terms of material interests, based on a logic of 
consequentialism (the outcomes of taking certain courses of action), whereas 
institutionalists accentuate the role of ideas and social behaviour (i.e. norms) based on a 
logic of appropriateness (i.e. that there is an appropriate way to act not necessarily 
contingent on the outcome of such behaviour).39  Institutionalists “focus on the role of 
ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in politics, stressing in particular the 
role of collectively held or ‘intersubjective’ ideas and understandings of social life” and 
assert that: “(a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply 
material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or 
‘intersubjective’ beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared 
beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors”.40  Furthermore, 
institutionalists apply an “ideational” ontology in a holistic rather than specific way.41
Taking an institutional approach does not mean that the fundamental problem of 
pervasive environmental externalities is irrelevant.  What it does mean is that 
approaching solutions to the problem of environmental externalities becomes more 
complex.  For example, Paterson rejects the idea that states in a liberal international 
economic order can ever make the required interventions to effectively address 
environmental problems because “existing political, social and economic structures are 
part of the problem”.42  Elsewhere he notes that the focus for analysis should be on the 
structural power of capital and how it relates to/with the state.43  Whether or not such 
structures are part of the problem necessitates an examination of norms and the manner 
in which they are diffused within states, organisations and groups of individuals 
responsible for environmental degradation to become institutions.  Viewed this way, the 
liberal economic view is more an ideology, or the result of institutional embedding that 
says markets and governments must operate in certain ways.44  Alternative and often 
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more successful approaches for internalising environmental externalities may be 
suggested.  Indeed, they may be essential if one accepts the view that “preventing 
situations such as global warming requires more than just market mechanisms that 
simply assign economic value to intangibles”.45 That is to say, behavioural change is 
about more than just changing material returns.  It requires normative change in the 
light of prevailing institutions. 
A key implication is that rather than economic actors taking ‘rational’ decisions 
in the sense of operating purely with a priori assumed instrumental profit maximising 
goals, one must admit the possibility raised by Ostrom that individuals are: 
fallible, boundedly rational, and norm-using.  In complex settings, noone is able to do a complete 
analysis before actions are taken, but individuals learn from mistakes and are able to craft tools – 
including rules – to improve the structure of the repetitive situations they face.46   
This does not mean that irrationality is the alternative, but that rationality is not defined 
by such a priori assumptions as employed in the mainstream liberal economic model.  A 
key implication is that at some stage self-regulation may be effective for normative 
reasons, as opposed to the traditional liberal economic view that it cannot for rationalist 
reasons. 
This builds on work by commentators such as Florini, Ostrom, Cutler et al., and 
Prakash, but perhaps the neatest outline of the normative approach is provided by 
Finnemore and Sikkink who conceptualise the norm lifecycle outlined in Figure 1.1.47  
In stage one ‘norm entrepreneurs’, such as NGOs and often radical activists, advocate 
for a new approach to be taken that embraces a new norm.  By raising the profile of the 
new norm, a ‘tipping point’ is reached after which the norm is taken up in stage two by 
states, international organisations and other actors who intervene to promote the norm 
and construct rules flowing from its implementation.  This leads to the new norm 
‘cascading’ through other states and organisations.  Finally, in the third stage norms are 
so habitualised that they become part of how actors in professions, the bureaucracy and 
the public at large behave, almost without them knowing that they are there.  They 
become institutionalised (e.g. few people today would recognise women having the vote 
or abolishing slavery as issues worth discussing for their pros and cons).  The norm 
lifecycle model therefore implies that behaviour is actually the result of institutionalised 
norms that change over time and form the basis of what is seen as ‘rational’ 
behaviour.48
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Figure 1.1: Norm Lifecycle 
     Tipping point 
 
  Norm Emergence            Norm ‘Cascade’  Internalisation 
 
  STAGE ONE      STAGE TWO  STAGE THREE 
 
Mechanisms: Persuasion   Socialisation  Habit 
      Institutionalisation Institutionalisation 
      Demonstration 
 
Motives: Altruism   Legitimacy  Conformity 
  Empathy   Reputation 
  Ideational Commitment  Esteem 
 
 
Actors:  Norm entrepreneurs  States   Law 
      International Orgs Professions 
      Networks  Bureaucracy 
 
Source: M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (1998), ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization, Vol.52, No.4, pp.896-898. 
 
In practical terms, in terms of the car industry, such a model as that proposed by 
Finnemore and Sikkink suggests that if firms are to change their behaviour in respect of 
the environment, this behavioural change will be a product of institutions that constrain 
certain types of behaviour and promote others.  The former chairman of the WBCSD 
appears to agree in declaring that business in general is changing its behaviour because: 
A paradigm shift has clearly taken place.  Business used to be depicted as a primary source of 
the world’s environmental problems.  Today it is increasingly viewed as a vital contributor to 
solving those problems and securing a sustainable future for the planet.49
However, whether or not a “paradigm shift” has taken place necessitates an analysis that 
goes down to the firm level to see what political, economic and structural forces, and 
the institutionalised norms that inform their interpretation, are at work.  In other words, 
it is necessary to tell an ‘insider’s story’ to make sense of what events and actions 
mean.50  A key part of so doing is recognising the importance of firms’ home states, for 
both material and institutional reasons.  This is the subject of the following section. 
 
The Material and Institutional Importance of Firms’ Home States 
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Despite the picture painted earlier of the car industry as a global industry dominated by 
large MNCs, there is a tension between conceiving the industry as truly global, versus 
the idea that it is represented by companies with national bases that operate 
internationally.  This reflects a larger debate about the extent to which a shift in power 
has occurred from states to markets and the forces of transnational capital, versus the 
enduring relevance of states in international capitalist relations.  The former may be 
thought of as a global perspective, the latter an international perspective.  The global 
perspective is held by authors such as Strange, Ohmae, Friedman and adherents of the 
neoliberal view that markets are increasingly in command as a result of globalisation, 
with states having diminished power to influence market outcomes.51  The international 
perspective is a view that sits more comfortably with scholars of international relations 
in the more traditional vein who see commerce as based in national territories, with 
interaction between states and their major corporations occurring internationally.  They 
include Doremus et. al., Weiss, Hobson, Vogel, Boyer, Wade and those who subscribe 
to the VOC approach.52
In this section, the case is made for why, on the basis of both material and 
institutional factors, car firms’ home states remain important.  Therefore, whatever the 
theoretical perspective adopted, car firms’ behaviour is more a product of their national 
home bases than global markets.  As such, an international perspective in respect of the 
car industry, and thus an approach based on a comparative national analysis, is more 
appropriate.  Evidence will also be presented that the industry’s activities are 
concentrated in a handful of firms from each of these three territories that dominate their 
markets.  From an institutional perspective, the relevance of the VOC approach for 
analysing the industry is then introduced.  The insights of the VOC approach deserve 
much more explanation than they are given here, as they are central to the empirical 
analysis conducted in this thesis.  With this in mind, the purpose here is to introduce the 
reader conceptually to the VOC approach, before a more detailed overview in Chapter 
2. 
 
The Material Importance of Firms’ Home States 
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Although the car industry is characterised by global networks for production and 
distribution, this is not the case for ownership, the geographical focus of firms’ 
activities and the location of their key markets.  National/regional contexts for the 
industry and individual firms remain important, especially those of Germany/the 
European Union (EU), the US and Japan.   
Turning to ownership first, while cross-ownership linkages may characterise the 
industry globally, some firms own others, or have a controlling stake in them, rather 
than being owned themselves.  Of the eight major German, US and Japanese firms, 
General Motors and Ford are wholly US-owned; Toyota and Honda are wholly 
Japanese-owned; and Volkswagen and BMW are wholly German-owned, with 
Volkswagen also being the largest European firm.53  However, cross-national 
ownership is the case for DaimlerChrysler and Nissan.  DaimlerChrysler was formed 
through the merger of Daimler Benz (a German firm) and Chrysler (a US firm) in 1998 
in what was supposed to be partnership of equals, but which in practice was a takeover 
of Chrysler by its German partner.  Although this means it is culturally somewhat of a 
‘two-headed beast’, with operations and a history that is half German and half US, the 
nature of the takeover and the subsequent setting of corporate policy and strategic 
direction in Germany mean it is in fact a German firm.  Despite Chrysler’s long history 
as a US company and its continuing operations there, the firm’s Chrysler operations 
report to a “German-based parent” with the whole company being a “German-controlled 
group”.54   Nissan has been part-owned by Renault since 1999 when Renault acquired a 
37 percent stake in the company, now increased to 44 percent.  Rather than a merger or 
takeover, Renault acquired a substantial minority shareholding.  The result is better 
characterised as a strategic alliance, because both brands have retained separate 
identities, separate operations and undertake separate reporting.  Thus, while there is 
undoubtedly sharing of ideas and the fact of Renault’s part ownership is inescapable, 
the cultural separation of the firms in practice is more evident than for DaimlerChrysler.  
In short, both, in different ways, retain their respective national identities to a significant 
degree.55  
Observations on firms’ ownership structures are important because they have 
implications for how strategic decisions are taken and implemented, in the sense that 
strategic decisions are more likely to be taken by firms that own others rather than ones 
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that are themselves majority controlled by other manufacturers.  And when the major 
firms that own or strategically control others are identified, it is clear that in addition to 
their economic activity, by the location of their headquarters and board membership the 
largest firms are all of European (mainly German), US or Japanese nationality.  Their 
headquarters where strategic decisions are made remain in their home states, and the 
nationalities of their board members reflect firms’ nationalities.56
On the geographical focus of firms’ activities, although the point has been made 
that the industry is global in its reach and significance, this masks important national 
specificities.  Table 1.1 demonstrated that turnover, investment and production are 
concentrated in Germany, the US and Japan where almost half or more all activity still 
takes place.  In fact, if one includes all European countries, four fifths of world car 
output is produced in the ‘triad’ of the US, EU and Japan.57  In each of these territories, 
the industry has a magnified significance due to its concentration in them – e.g. in 1998 
five of the seven largest US industrial firms produced either cars or their fuel.58  On a 
firm-by-firm basis, Table 1.2 presents passenger car production by manufacturer for the 
eight largest manufacturers in these territories.  It demonstrates that over half of total 
world production (62 percent) is concentrated in the hands of these eight firms.  This is 
a symptom of the increasing concentration of the industry generally, from 52 
independent firms in 1964 to only 12 now as a result of takeovers and mergers between 
firms.59  Therefore, these eight firms also represent two thirds of the independent firms 
currently operating worldwide.60  The industry is therefore not just concentrated on a 
state (and regional) basis, but also in terms of the number of firms from each of these 
states. 
 
Table 1.2: Passenger Car Production by Manufacturer in 2004 in Germany, the US and Japan  
Firm Nationality (by 
ownership) 
Car production (units) % total 
Toyota Japan 5,869,629 13 
Volkswagen Germany 4,892,529 11 
General Motors US 4,502,680 10 
Ford US 3,497,334 8 
Honda Japan 3,183,269 7 
Nissan Japan 2,423,893 6 
DaimlerChrysler Germany 1,913,693 4 
BMW Germany 1,250,345 3 
Total for Firms Shown Here  27,533,372 62 
WORLD TOTAL  44,435,199 100 
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Source: OICA (2005), Motor Vehicle Production by Manufacturer: World Ranking 2004, 
http://www.oica.net/htdocs/Main.htm, accessed 13 January 2006. 
 
In addition to the car industry’s concentration in terms of economic activity and 
ownership, the car industry’s production hubs of the US, Japan and the EU are also 
where its key markets are.  Seventy five percent of all cars are sold in these three 
territories, with Germany the largest market in Europe.61  Despite growth in emerging 
markets such as China, it is still the case that only around 8 percent of the world’s 
population are car owners, and most of these remain in the industry’s three traditional 
markets.62  Furthermore, Table 1.3 demonstrates that firms continue to dominate their 
home markets where they have their headquarters.  US and European brands hold a 63 
percent share of their home markets.  In the case of European manufacturers, the 
German car industry is of critical importance because in addition to dominating their 
home market with a 71 percent share, German firms hold nearly half the market for new 
car registrations in the EU.  The only possible emerging exception to this rule is the 
Japanese industry whose products penetrate markets outside Japan more than their EU 
or US counterparts, especially in the case of the US where they have taken a 28 percent 
share of the market.  Even so, they dominate their home market more than German and 
US firms do theirs with a 94 percent share of the Japanese market.  The implication is 
that although firms should be concerned with global market trends and regulations, 
those corresponding to their own nationalities should be of critical importance because 
these are the markets they dominate and where they make most of their sales.63
 
Table 1.3: Market Shares for Major EU, US and Japanese Firms, 2002 
 Share of EU Registrations 
(%) 
Share of US 
Registrations (%) 
Share of Japanese 
Registrations (%) 
US Brands 21 63 0.6 
Asian Brands 14 33 0.3 
Specifically 
Japanese Brands 
11 28 94 
European Brands 63 6 5 
Specifically 
German Brands 
46a 
 (71 percent share of 
German registrations) 
6  4 
a German brands are the market leaders in Europe. 
Sources: VDA (2003), Annual Report 2003, Frankfurt: VDA, 
http://www.vda.de/en/service/jahresbericht/files/VDA_2003_EN.pdf, accessed 17 March 2004, p.24, 35 
and 45; JAMA (2003), 2003: The Motor Industry of Japan, http://www.jama.or.jp/eng/pdf/MIJ2003.pdf, 
Tokyo: Japan, accessed 18 January 2004, pp.6-7; and CCFA (2003), Analysis and Statistics, Paris: CCFA, 
http://www.ccfa.fr/pdf/2003eng.pdf, accessed 10 January 2004, p.13.   
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In a nutshell, the car industry embodies aspects of both global and international 
ways of operating in that it is an industry with globally networked operations in 
investment, production and distribution, but national strategic bases.64  These 
observations in respect of the car industry are mirrored in the observations of authors 
such as Wade who note the enduring importance of national differences in the world 
economy more generally.  He says: 
The world economy is more international than global.  In the bigger economies, more than 80 
percent of production is for domestic consumption and more than 80 percent of investment by 
domestic investors.  Companies are rooted in national home bases with national regulatory 
regimes.65
Wade’s comment on the world economy also have implications for states’ different in 
institutional frameworks, a point made by authors such as Boyer who notes the 
following: 
Firms and sectors are clearly integrated within the international economy and, nevertheless, 
display very different institutional forms to cope with the same challenge of structural 
competitiveness.  Even if the economic performances are quite similar, there is no one best 
way.66
Therefore, a national comparative analysis on the basis of firms’ home states is 
appropriate for a thesis that is focussing on the car industry’s actions in respect of the 
environment from a strategic perspective, with implications beyond this to other 
industries more generally.  Hence the relevance of the VOC approach. 
 
The Institutional Importance of Firms’ Home States: The Varieties of 
Capitalism Approach 
 
Dicken observes that MNCs are “produced through an intricate process of embedding in 
which the cognitive, cultural, social, political and economic characteristics of the 
national home base play a dominant part”.67  The evidence on the material importance 
of car firms’ home states, despite their global operations, suggests that this perspective 
is especially relevant to them.  Rather than ‘placeless’ entities, they are likely to be 
institutionally embedded in their home states.  Although it would be an over-
simplification to say that all MNCs from one home state are the same, firms from the 
same home state should share certain national characteristics.  In this light, the VOC 
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approach is an institutional approach which says that different capitalist states have 
different histories, cultures and structures that inform the nature of their capitalist 
relations, and that far from convergence on a liberal economic model globally, national 
differences persist.  That is to say, the persistence of different institutional potentials 
gives rise to the persistence of different capitalisms.68
Given their different institutional potentials, the VOC approach uses a 
dichotomous classification to categorise capitalist states as liberal market economies 
(LMEs) versus coordinated market economies (CMEs).  Broadly speaking, firms in 
LMEs coordinate their activities via hierarchies and competition in markets.  Firms in 
CMEs are characterised by more non-market cooperative relationships to coordinate 
their endeavours and develop their core competencies, so that it is not primarily the 
market and its price signals that determines firms’ behaviour, but rather relationships 
based on these cooperative networks.  This has implications for the success or otherwise 
of policies aimed at addressing environmental problems because of the underlying idea 
that “in any national economy, firms will gravitate towards the mode of coordination for 
which there is institutional support”.69  Following this line of thought, firms in LMEs 
are happier with formal contracts and decisions based on market signals that define 
shorter-term profit levels, and they will usually prefer deregulation over heavier state 
guidance and intervention.  Firms in CMEs tend more towards consensus decision-
making between a range of stakeholders internal and external to the firm based on long-
established networks.  In regulatory terms, firms in LMEs will react more efficiently to 
clearly specified regulations, especially those aimed at altering price signals in the 
market, whereas firms in CMEs will react more efficiently to regulations based on 
negotiated and agreed rules and standards.70  In other words, while these are all 
capitalist countries, their institutions establish different ‘rules of the game’. 
Hall and Soskice categorise OECD countries as follows.  LMEs include US, 
UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland, or what are often referred to as the 
Anglo Saxon economies.71  CMEs include Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Austria.  States that fall 
somewhere in between include France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey.72  As 
such, Germany and Japan are CMEs, the US is an LME, and most European countries 
fall into either the CME category or somewhere between the two.   
 32
Obviously, the point about firms favouring cooperative coordination in CMEs 
versus deregulated market competition in LMEs is a very broad one.  Underlying this 
divide are a myriad of aspects, the nuances of which are discussed by Hall and Soskice 
and others.73  The ones most applicable to the analysis in this thesis are: state-business 
relations; the role of product markets; the role of financial markets; the organising 
principles of firms; the role of technology; the relationship between exogenous versus 
endogenous factors impacting on firms; and the centrality of historical context.  These 
are explained in detail in Chapter 2.  However, the relevance here is that, as the 
WBCSD notes, institutions determine how environmental issues are addressed in 
different states, the extent to which corporations take the lead in encouraging change 
and the type of action they take.74
 
Contribution of the Thesis 
 
This thesis represents a step in redressing the gap that still endures, despite growing 
interest in environmental sustainability, between international relations theory and 
ecological approaches.  This gap means that voices and approaches that may be more 
appropriate and successful in tackling the challenge of international environmental 
degradation tend to be ignored in favour of the nation state.75  This is because, with few 
exceptions, it is still true to say that “it is striking to note that there are no typologies 
where other actors [besides government] with their instruments (companies, consumers, 
environmentalists) are included”76 which is a problem because as Cutler et. al. note, “in 
an era when the authority of the state appears to be challenged in so many ways, the 
existence of alternative sources of authority takes on great significance, especially when 
that authority is wielded internationally by profit-seeking entities”.77  The author is 
therefore sympathetic to Hall and Soskice with their desire “to bring firms back into the 
centre of the analysis of comparative capitalism”, in recognition that firms are “the 
crucial actors in a capitalist economy”.78  By focussing on the international car industry, 
including firms within it and the stakeholders surrounding it with whom it interacts 
(including states), this thesis attempts to redress the imbalance that sees the state as the 
sole actor in addressing environmental degradation. 
 33
However, this does not mean that the state is irrelevant.  After all, employing the 
insights of the VOC approach as the theoretical basis for analysis demonstrably leaves 
the state ‘in’ the analysis.79  The key point to stress is that it does so in a way that 
moves away from the traditional liberal model where the state and its intervention is the 
focus of analysis, to one which sees a networked approach as more appropriate, because 
it recognises that the process of interaction between the state and sub-national actors is 
increasingly important.80  The former approach is demonstrated by Figure 1.2, whereas 
the latter approach is demonstrated by Figure 1.3.  Figure 1.4 illustrates the case in 
which the network is international in nature, where actors in one state are interlinked 
with those in other states.  This thesis takes the approach suggested by Figures 1.3 and 
1.4.81
 
Figure 1.2: The State as Central 
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Figure 1.3: The State as Part of a Network 
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Figure 1.4: States and Actors within Them as Part of International Networks 
STATE 
 A 
  B 
  D
  C
  E 
STATE 
STATE 
  B 
 C 
  B
 A 
  C   A
 
 
Substantively, empirical evidence will be gathered to explain what might 
motivate the car industry to behave in a more environmentally concerned manner.  The 
author is unaware of any empirical study exists that has done this comprehensively via 
an in-depth case study analysis down to the level of individual firms from an 
institutional perspective.  The only publication that comes close is the UNEP’s recent 
report Industry as a Partner for Sustainable Development – Automotive, which the 
UNEP describes as “the first document to provide information on economic, social and 
environmental performance in a compact form”.82  The suggestion is that seeing the 
international car industry as one which proactively addresses environmental 
sustainability within its business strategies is new, and so this report has proved 
invaluable as a starting point for the research to be undertaken.  It presents examples of 
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“numerous activities related to sustainable development”83 that have been initiated by 
car manufacturers who the UNEP finds have embraced “sustainable entrepreneurship” 
as an overall objective.84  However, rather than being a critical analysis it represents a 
summary of these activities.  Therefore, greater in-depth empirical analysis is required 
to ascertain what might motivate car firms to embrace such an objective. 
The research is empirically important because given that the car industry’s 
record shows its products to be a major cause of worldwide environmental damage, if 
such an industry can improve the environmental impact of its operations, then any 
industry can.85  In addition, its linkages with independent firms in other industries that 
supply components and parts means that there is a strong multiplier effect from any 
behavioural change it initiates.86  Furthermore, given its visibility and the magnitude of 
its responsibility for environmental damage, any progress made in this industry is likely 
to have a strong demonstration effect in terms of bringing about cultural change in other 
less directly related industries.    In short, the centrality of the international car industry 
to the business/environment debate marks it out as a “crucial case” and a “least likely” 
case for environmental sustainability.87
Turning to the VOC approach, as Coates notes, the approach taken by those 
applying the VOC approach is one of “talking about social embededness, path 
dependency and comparative institutional advantage”.88  This is certainly the approach 
taken in this thesis.  In doing so, it will also address a major drawback of the VOC 
approach so far identified by Hay, which is that its relatively recent arrival on the scene 
has not yet produced secondary literature that evaluates its core theoretical and 
substantive contributions.89  The thesis will do so because it will add to institutionalist 
literature from an international perspective, rather than a global one.  It will do so by 
bringing the firm back in to the analysis, yet recognising the institutional embededness 
of firms in their home states.  In addition, while the insights of the VOC approach will 
support the empirical analysis to be conducted in respect of the car industry and the 
environment, the converse is also true: the empirical analysis will support the insights of 
the VOC approach.  It will do so because in all the VOC literature, it is striking that 
there is little in-depth analysis of particular industry sectors, and certainly none that I 
am aware of from an environmental perspective.  For example, related issue areas such 
as education and industrial relations feature, but not environmental ones.  Thus while 
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Hall and Soskice want to make firms central to the analysis, this is not done in any 
analysis as much as they would seem to desire, except at the most macro of levels.90
Finally, given the two contrasting approaches to environmental externalities - 
one based on a rationalist material framework (the liberal economic model) and the 
other on a normative institutional one (the VOC approach) - the aim of this thesis is to 
assess whether the liberal economic model is universally applicable, and therefore 
enough to explain the behaviour of firms, or whether it is a special case contingent on 
certain institutional foundations that may vary from state to state.  It will be shown that 
the latter is the case.  In taking a view that the nationality of firms matters, this thesis 
contributes to the VOC literature that promotes the view that rather than isomorphism in 
the motivators for economic action globally, states’ institutional differences persist.  
The new insights it will provide in this light are that the VOC of firms’ home states 
impacts on whether they are more or less disposed to take environmental initiatives, and 
the form these initiatives are likely to take.  Thus, it will be shown that car firms’ 
environmental initiatives are a product of the institutions of their home states’ VOC. 
 
Research Questions 
 
The perspectives and issues outlined in this chapter give rise to three over-arching, 
related questions.  The first, and central question, is: what institutional factors are likely 
to motivate firms in the car industry to see environmental issues as central to their 
business interests?  This is a more precise rendering of the question posed at the outset 
of this chapter.  The second question, related to the first one, is: are the motivators for 
firms embracing environmental improvements universal, or specific to firms based on 
their nationality or, possibly, individual cultures?  Depending on the answers to the first 
two questions, the third is: why should the car industry be concerned about the 
environment, particularly given its global economic significance and resulting political 
power? 
There is a dichotomy in how the questions are approached.  On the one hand is 
the liberal economic perspective that says if environmental externalities are being 
internalised, this must be because firms are rationally responding to material exogenous 
factors: market forces and state regulation.  On the other hand is the institutional 
 37
perspective of the VOC approach which says that institutional factors at the state level 
(i.e. the persistence of different varieties of capitalism) are relevant for how material 
factors are interpreted and their significance. 
 
Conclusion: Working Hypothesis 
 
It is not unreasonable to say that there is more than just rational profit maximisation 
going on in the car industry because “the world does not fit the Panglossian belief that 
firms always make optimal choices”.91  Indeed, both rational profit maximising 
motivations and behaviour based on institutionalised norms may explain the car 
industry’s actions.  Although the two are often presented in a way that makes them 
appear mutually exclusive, this need not necessarily be the case.  Theoretically, Hall 
similarly sees the attraction in “occupying the middle ground” which permits the 
possibility “that human beings have values, but that equally they are purposive 
calculators” and that to lean too much one way or another is to lean towards “false 
extremes”.92  Legro too argues that neither of what he terms the “polarised positions” is 
sustainable, and that a balancing point somewhere between the two extremes is more 
likely to pertain.93  March and Olsen, discussing the logic of consequentialism inherent 
in rational-choice approaches versus the logic of appropriateness inherent in 
institutional approaches, say: 
Any particular action probably involves elements of each [logic].  Political actors are constituted 
both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules 
embedded in their identities and political institutions.  They calculate consequences and follow 
rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle.94
This suggests a more holistic explanation in which aspects of the liberal economic 
rational choice model still hold to some degree but preferences are tempered by ideas, 
norms and practices that may lead to a concern for the environment, and therefore must 
be taken into account too.  It fits with the idea that firms must face material political and 
economic realities, and alter their behaviour in order to sustain competitive advantage, 
but that there are also other normative dynamics at work.   
The working hypothesis adopted in this thesis may therefore be expressed as the 
following statement made by Haufler: “corporate management obviously responds to 
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market signals, as in the neoclassical model, but the character of that response is not 
equally obvious [because] corporate preferences are driven in part by norms about the 
appropriate approaches to business”.95  The author similarly agrees with the observation 
of Levy and Rothenberg on the car industry in respect of climate change, that: 
The formulation of strategy is generally treated as a rational process of matching corporate 
capabilities to market demands.  But this does not always account well for the heterogeneity 
observed in corporate strategies towards complex environmental issues.96
These authors, like the author of this thesis, believe that while both material and 
institutional factors matter, the former is always predicated on the latter.  In fact, 
“market trends are themselves subject to institutional construction”.97  By employing 
the insights of the VOC approach, it will be shown that state-specific institutional 
variations in capitalist relations are crucial for understanding how firms of different 
nationalities approach the question of making environmental commitments given the 
material factors they face. 
In Chapter 2, the insights of the VOC approach are outlined in greater detail as 
well as how the research will be operationalised by focussing on the environmental 
issue of climate change, and the car industry’s contribution to it via the CO2 emissions 
of passenger cars in use.  Chapter 3 outlines the actual environmental product 
development initiatives being undertaken by the car industry in respect of the CO2 
emissions of passenger cars in use, and highlights the different national emphases 
placed on these initiatives by firms depending on their ‘nationality’.  This sets up the 
analysis to be conducted in Chapters 4 to 7, the four empirical analysis chapters.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the key material factors of state regulations and market 
forces.  What is found is that the institutional insights of the VOC approach provide 
greater explanatory power than the rationalist perspective of the liberal economic 
model, and that the latter is sufficient only in the case of the US car industry because its 
LME attributes are themselves institutionally determined.  The analysis then focuses 
down to the level of individual car firms in Chapters 6 and 7 by qualitatively examining 
their environmental reports and the results of interviews with key personnel.  The 
analysis in these chapters encompasses institutional factors at the state level, but 
endogenous institutional factors at the level of the firm are also brought to bear.  As 
such, not only do these latter two chapters represent an analysis of the first-hand 
perspectives of firms, they also serve as a way of uncovering endogenous factors in 
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greater detail that are not revealed in an analysis of exogenous state regulations or 
market forces.  Chapter 8 presents the conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: The Varieties of Capitalism Approach and 
Operationalising the Research 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1, the key questions to be addressed in the thesis were posed.  They bear 
repetition before discussion of the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach and how the 
research will be operationalised in the light of it.  The first, and central question, is: 
what institutional factors are likely to motivate firms in the car industry to see 
environmental issues as central to their business interests?  The second question, related 
to the first one, is: are the motivators for firms embracing environmental improvements 
universal, or specific to firms based on their nationality or, possibly, individual 
cultures?  Depending on the answers to the first two questions, the third is: why should 
the car industry be concerned about the environment, particularly given its global 
economic significance and resulting political power?  In discussing how these questions 
will be answered, the importance of institutional as well as material factors was 
highlighted.  The assertion was made, to be proved on the basis of the empirical analysis 
to follow, that although material factors are important, institutional factors are crucial 
for explaining why firms of different nationalities approach making environmental 
commitments – i.e. internalising environmental externalities – in different ways. 
In Chapter 1, the enduring importance of firms’ home states in terms of 
production and key markets, as well as ownership and headquarters, led to the 
identification of an institutional analysis on the basis of firms’ home states via the VOC 
approach.  The VOC approach suggests insights into specific institutional differences in 
capitalist relations between states, and thus is applicable to a comparative analysis of the 
industry’s activities in its three hubs of Germany, the United States (US) and Japan.  
Although the broad divide between liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the US, 
and coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany and Japan, was 
introduced in Chapter 1, this chapter describes key aspects of the divide in greater 
detail.  By employing the VOC approach, the contribution made to the VOC literature is 
that its insights are applied in a novel way to the environmental motivations of firms. 
The application is novel in the sense that rather than examining the competitive 
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advantages of states’ industrial bases, or the operation of their product and financial 
markets etc., what is shown is that a state’s variety of capitalism has implications for 
traditionally less ‘core’ considerations such as the environment. As environmental 
questions increase in importance for business, the point is that institutional differences 
in capitalist relations between states have implications for whether, and how, firms from 
different states address the environmental impact of their operations. 
After outlining the insights of the VOC approach in detail, this chapter then 
turns to how these insights are methodologically brought to bear in operationalising the 
research.  First, the question of environmental sustainability, or indeed simply ‘concern 
for the environment’, is defined.  Secondly, the case is made why the environmental 
issue of climate change, and its related concern of fuel economy for passenger cars in 
use, will be central to the analysis.  Thirdly, the timeframe for analysis is specified.  
Finally, a chapter outline is provided. 
Insights of the Varieties of Capitalism Approach  
 
As intimated in Chapter 1, the VOC approach speaks to two debates.  The first is 
whether the imperatives of free trade and neoliberal capitalism mean that all capitalist 
economies are converging on the neoliberal model resulting in privatisation, minimal 
government regulation, deregulation and free markets.  The power of states is being 
transferred to markets, or more specifically internationally mobile capital.  The major 
adherents to this line of thought are authors such as Ohmae and Strange, the latter of 
whom sees states as increasingly “merely the handmaidens of firms” and characterises 
the state as “a kind of landlord for the enterprises inhabiting the national territory”.1  On 
the other side of the argument are authors such as Weiss, Hobson and Vogel2 who say 
that this misrepresents what has happened.  Rather than saying that “states are now 
virtually powerless to make real policy choices” with all states “forced to adopt similar 
fiscal, economic and social policy regimes”,3 they argue that states still do have power, 
but that some are better able to exercise it than others because state power is taking new 
forms.  This new power is not so much coercive power, but institutional power.  The 
VOC approach says that because there are different varieties of capitalisms that reflect 
the different institutional capacities of states, this occurs in different ways. 
 49
The second, related, debate regards the power that multinational corporations 
(MNCs) possess.  One perspective is that MNCs have incentives to standardise their 
products to reap economies of scale from their global investment, production and 
distribution networks.  Alternatively, there is the view that MNCs use their international 
reach and information networks to tailor products for local markets.4  The VOC 
approach walks a line between these two arguments by saying that while MNCs may 
operate both globally and tailor their products to satisfy local market conditions, there is 
another factor to be considered.  This is that the products they offer in the first place are 
very much determined by the institutional framework of their home territories. 
Fundamentally, the VOC approach therefore says that firms are institutionally 
embedded in their home states for economic, political, social, cultural and historic 
reasons, and that capitalist states possess historically institutionalised norms which 
endure over time.  Rather than isomorphism as a result of the forces of globalisation, 
national institutional variations produce different outcomes in terms of competitiveness, 
the types of goods and services produced and the ways these are produced.  The 
capitalisms of different states also suggest different propensities for change and how 
change occurs.  The contention of this thesis is that it therefore has implications for non-
economic outcomes such as environmental performance, and that such outcomes are 
directly related to the institutional framework of different capitalisms discussed in the 
VOC literature.5
As noted in Chapter 1, in perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the VOC 
approach, Hall and Soskice define institutions as “a set of rules, formal or informal, that 
actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons”.6  
Starting from this point, they see capitalist economies as coming in a variety of forms.  
They are shaped by the institutions that underpin them which provide different 
“capacities for the exchange of information, monitoring, and the sanctioning of 
defections relevant to cooperative behaviour among firms and other actors”.7  As noted 
in Chapter 1, the contention is that this perspective leads to the categorisation of the 
institutional framework of states as tending more towards LMEs versus CMEs.  It was 
noted that firms in LMEs coordinate their activities via hierarchies and competition in 
markets.  Firms in CMEs are characterised by more non-market cooperative 
relationships to coordinate their endeavours and develop their core competencies, so 
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that it is not primarily the market and its price signals that determines firms’ behaviour, 
but rather relationships based on cooperative networks between them and the state.  
Furthermore, firms in LMEs are happier with formal contracts and decisions based on 
market signals that define shorter-term profit levels, and they will usually prefer 
deregulation over heavier state guidance and intervention.  By contrast, firms in CMEs 
tend more towards consensus decision-making between themselves and between them 
and states based on long-established networks. 
It was also noted in Chapter 1 that underlying the LME/CME divide are a 
myriad of aspects.  Those most applicable to the analysis in this thesis are: the nature of 
state-business relations; the role of product markets; the role of financial markets; the 
organising principles of firms; the role of technology; the relationship between 
exogenous versus endogenous factors impacting on firms; and the centrality of 
historical context.  This is not an exhaustive list, but one that would seem to describe 
the institutional relations most pertinent to the analysis here.8  The following discussion 
is a distillation of a growing array of texts by authors identifying themselves as writing 
on the VOC approach specifically,9 as well as authors who believe that institutions 
matter in describing similarities and differences between industrialised capitalist states, 
and thus may be said to precede or be writing in the VOC tradition in a related 
capacity.10  This is because they analyse the institutional aspects of states’ economic 
performance based on the idea that “institutions are embedded in a culture in which 
their logic is symbolically grounded, organisationally structured, technically and 
materially constrained, politically defended, and historically shaped by specific rules 
and norms”.11  They therefore speak to the LME/CME divide identified by VOC 
authors.12
 
State-Business Relations 
 
The major divide between LMEs and CMEs in respect of state-business relations is the 
extent to which the state and business cooperate to achieve mutual objectives.  Firms in 
LMEs tend to pressure their governments for deregulation.13  They believe in free 
markets that operate on laissez faire principles unless there is a clear case for state 
intervention due to market failure.  By contrast, firms in CMEs expect the state to be an 
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activist one, a partner in the market with them.  As a result, in addition to being 
strategically coordinated by markets, firms in CMEs are to a large extent also state 
coordinated.14
As the archetypal LME, the US has long had an ideology of non-intervention in 
markets.  This means the US government has never had an effective industry policy.  It 
has taken the more indirect approach of creating an environment for business to succeed 
in markets.  The distinction is important because it means that when it comes to 
regulation, the US has taken the LME perspective that the state should only intervene to 
internalise market externalities.  Of course, this is not to say that one should caricature 
US industry as a paragon of self-reliance operating in some vacuum free from 
government intervention, assistance, or protection from time to time.  However, relative 
to other states there is certainly a stronger ideology that this is a virtuous state of 
existence, and there is the reality of less state coordination of business in an atmosphere 
of greater state-business conflict.15
Following from this last point, when intervention does occur, it does not occur 
so much in a coordinated manner, but is highly pluralistic in nature, occurring at many 
levels and with many ‘voices’ taking part.  Consensus is hampered by competition for 
representation of views by industry and others, and a tendency to reject compromise.  
The result is an adversarial relationship between the state, industry and other 
stakeholders, with the observation that “the most characteristic, distinctive and 
persistent belief of American corporate executives is an underlying suspicion and 
mistrust of government”.16  The ideology underlying this belief is characterised by 
Wilks as follows: 
The dominant value is an emphatically and sincerely articulated support for the ‘free enterprise 
system’ and associated with that is the practical norm of rejecting any action that inhibits 
management autonomy.  More specific to government is a parallel value that wholeheartedly 
rejects the legitimacy of state intervention in the economy and a norm that is suspicious of the 
competence and the motives of public officials.17
Given such a relationship between the state and markets, state-business relations are 
often characterised more by industry lobbying and attempting to “capture government 
agencies”, rather than working with or following the agenda set by those agencies.18  
The aim is that business should have its ‘head’ as much as possible to pursue its profit-
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motivated interests, so individualism and market orientation in business is promoted 
over collectivism and national spirit.19
In contrast, German state-business relations are generally conceived as more 
amicable and constructive.  It is not a laissez faire economy, but one in which there is a 
national approach to economic development with the state playing a “passive, 
facilitative role”.20  Thus, the state’s role has been more one of support for industry and 
working with industry to further its objectives, and help coordinate its activities.  The 
German state is thus an “enabling state”.21  State-business relations in Japan go even 
further to exhibit an almost symbiotic, or ‘organic’, relationship.  An ‘iron triangle’ of 
business-bureaucracy-government relations means that a type of “corporatism without 
labour” exists, in the context of a belief that “capitalism needs the visible hand of the 
state”.22  Though not a centrally planned economy, Japan can still be thought of as a 
‘developmental state’ where the government has a vision for the goals of the private 
sector, arranges preferential allocation of capital to targeted industry sectors and key 
firms, and has a bureaucratic architecture designed specifically to consult and work with 
firms and industry sectors - e.g. the Ministry for International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), now renamed the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI).23  This 
leads Broadbent to label Japan a “nationalist-paternalist capitalist state”.24  However, 
this potentially overstates the role of government if it is taken as simply meaning the 
government takes decisions and business implements them.25  Instead, a more ‘organic’ 
relationship is implied by Redding and Whitley who characterise Japanese state-
business relations as “subtle but indirect strategic guidance and only limited use of open 
suggestion”,26 or Wilks who emphasises the Japanese preference for harmony and 
consensus via accommodation, consultation and conflict avoidance wherever possible 
that leads Japanese bureaucrats to be able to issue legally non-binding instructions.27  
The result is “reciprocal consent” between the state and business, such that industry 
groups are involved in developing policies with the state setting stringent yet flexibly 
implemented regulations that are constructed with industry consultation.28
Overall, whatever the difference in emphasis between the German and Japanese 
CMEs, the line between business and government interests is more blurred than in the 
US.  Business and nationalism are thus to some extent conflated.29  While US firms 
desire deregulation and hands-off laissez faire market operations, German and Japanese 
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firms operate more on the basis of consensus-oriented negotiation with the state.  While 
‘cooperation’ with government has as its goal the ‘capture’ of government agencies to 
meet the goals of the firm in the US, the state sets the agenda more in Germany and 
Japan, and coordinates firms or informally suggests what should be done.  Instead of 
what is basically a lobbying and conflict model in the US, German and Japanese firms 
operate within a collaborative and consensus model for cooperating with the state to 
develop regulations, agree on targets to be met, and establish priorities and goals to be 
achieved. 
 
The Role of Product Markets 
 
Differences in the role of product markets (i.e. markets for goods and services) revolve 
around the degree to which they drive firm strategies in LMEs, versus being one among 
a range of motivating factors in CMEs.  This is a question of the priority accorded 
market forces, with the observation being that they are accorded higher priority in 
LMEs.  A related question is the degree to which markets drive firm strategies in LMEs, 
as opposed to reflect them in CMEs.  This is a question of causality, with the suggestion 
being that firm strategies reflect market forces more in LMEs, whereas market forces 
are to some extent a reflection of firm strategies in CMEs. 
Hollingsworth notes that in LMEs such as the US, “a market mentality tends to 
become pervasive”, the result being that “the dominant institutional arrangements for 
coordinating a society’s economy tend to be markets, corporate hierarchies, and a 
weakly structured regulatory state”. 30 Concomitant with the preference of firms in 
LMEs for the state to be ‘in the background’ rather than interventionist,31 a market 
mentality comes to dominate firms’ strategic thinking.   Competition in markets is held 
to be of paramount importance because it is seen as necessary for ‘efficient’ outcomes.  
Markets thus play the role of organising economic activity and are a primary determiner 
of production and strategy, with the goal being shorter term profits via competition in 
them.  Indeed, even when the state does intervene in LMEs, Hall and Soskice find that 
they “should find it more feasible to implement market-incentive policies that do not put 
extensive demands on firms to form relational contracts with others, but rely on markets 
to coordinate their activities”.32
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Markets play less of a strategic organising role in CMEs.  It is not that markets 
are unimportant in CMEs like Germany and Japan, but other factors are just as 
important, possibly moreso at times, so that market forces are not the driving force they 
are said to be in LMEs such as the US.  In their place, communitarian obligations (e.g. 
to the state and society) and higher levels of trust and coordination between economic 
actors, rather than competition, are more the norm.  Indeed, there tend to be institutional 
arrangements that facilitate cooperation between competitors rather than competition.  
Rather than focussing on short term gains and profits in markets, this also facilitates a 
longer term view when it comes to strategic planning because if ‘winning’ in the market 
is not the aim, but coordinated action with competitors and the state to be more 
competitive on a larger scale, then short term financial gains are less important than 
longer term ones.33
 The difference in emphasis on the role of product markets has direct 
implications for non-economic outcomes.  In CMEs, concepts such as reputation and 
standing have heightened importance, and in addition to market success there is the idea 
of firms possessing a social contract with society.  By contrast, in LMEs non-economic 
action34 is seen as ‘philanthropy’ – i.e. an ‘add-on’ to the core purpose of making 
profits.35  Putting it bluntly, the division is between the firm serving society in CMEs 
and the firm serving itself in LMEs.  By way of illustration, Wilks notes in the case of 
Germany that government support for industry’s interests is reflected in private 
entrepreneurs often seeing themselves as embodying principles of “good citizenship”, 
with public obligations as important as “the private concerns of selfish individuals”.  
Thus, private enterprise sees itself as serving societal interests as well as amassing 
private wealth.36  In the case of Japan, he notes that paternalistic authority on the part of 
the state is reflected in a broader desire to act for the greater good.  In sum, “the fear of 
letting down the side, of breaking with consensus, of not meeting expected standards 
provides the main psychological drive for generating what must be the most impressive 
political and social power in Asia”.37
The above observations also have implications for relations between firms as 
much as within them.  LME inter-firm relations are characterised by competitive market 
relationships and enforceable formal contracts.  In the US, market competition is 
enshrined by law in rigorous anti-trust legislation.  Anti-trust laws, for which there have 
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been largely no equivalents in Germany of Japan,38 work against oligopolistic 
competition in theory, if not necessarily always in practice, to promote the belief that 
market competition between firms is to be favoured.39  Thus, reputation building is 
more market contingent than founded on close business networks or associations.  
Indeed, it is estimated that as little as one percent of research and development funds 
spent in the US private sector is devoted to collaborative research.40  For US firms this 
inability to act collectively, or at least a predilection to not do so, reflects an institutional 
framework that generally favours shorter-term and more competitive relations based on 
market forces.41
Inter-firm relations in CMEs are not so much seen in competitive terms as in the 
need for coordination through large, organised firm groupings that present views to 
government.  In the case of Germany, competition is not so much seen in terms of 
competing with other firms, as a focus on product differentiation and niche production, 
given an overall goal of harmonious inter-firm relations.42  Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars observe that Japanese markets are characterised by deep relationships 
between firms and their customers and suppliers, and that Japanese firms are reluctant 
“to break relationships with those particular partners who keep them supplied and 
informed”.43  Instead, they cultivate “deep relationships over time with clients [because] 
you do not switch customers or suppliers day by day on the basis of price 
calculations”.44
On the whole, a preference for deregulated competition in product markets, and 
the primacy of competitive market forces as a motivator for action, is a feature of LMEs 
such as the US.  By contrast, market forces are one factor among many for firms in 
CMEs such as Germany and Japan, with a preference for coordination, cooperation and 
longer-term relationships based on trust as organisers of economic activity in markets. 
 
The Role of Financial Markets 
 
Reflecting differences in the role of product markets in LMEs versus CMEs, are 
differences in the role of financial markets (i.e. mechanisms for accessing investment 
finance).  Specifically, reliance on stockmarkets and the interests of shareholders is a 
(possibly the) major focus for firms in LMEs, whereas a broader range of stakeholders 
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are the focus for firms in CMEs.  This is because the latter have relied more on debt 
rather than equity finance.  As with differences in the role of product markets, this 
produces shorter term perspectives in LMEs and longer term perspectives in CMEs. 
US capitalism has been labelled “stock market capitalism”45 because US firms 
rely heavily on equity finance and shareholder support for their ongoing operations.  
Indeed, stock market capitalisation is of a magnitude two to three times grater in the US 
and other LMEs by comparison to CMEs such as Germany and Japan.46  There is thus a 
reliance on “market modes of coordination in the financial sphere”.47  US firms’ access 
to finance is more contingent on shareholders’ access to publicly available financial data 
and payment of financial returns in the form of dividends in the current period, and this 
means that they are encouraged to “focus on the publicly assessable dimensions of their 
performance that affect share price, such as current profitability”.48  Shareholdings are 
volatile and often held by smaller portfolio investors so market sentiment can lead to 
firms’ ownership changing hands if their stock price falls.  Firms are expected to pay 
dividends reflecting their profitability in the current period and are judged on their 
ability to do so.  Shareholder value is the primary goal of the firm, because diversified 
portfolio investors seek higher short term returns than stable institutional investors, 
meaning that firms must adopt a short term, shareholder focussed strategy or risk being 
starved of the capital they need to invest and survive.49   
In Germany and Japan debt finance has been more the norm.  In Germany, banks 
are often represented on major companies’ boards and are regarded as strategic industry 
partners rather than simply financiers.50  In Japan, the major financial groups are also 
often attached or closely affiliated with large corporations, and it is common for large 
firms to rely on one bank for all their capital requirements.51  More than half the equity 
of Japanese firms is held by “stable shareholders”: banks, insurance companies and 
related companies with which the firm trades or has joint ventures.52  Therefore, in 
Japan and Germany the shareholder is the investor, rather than the controller, and 
dividends are not so closely related to profits.  Reciprocal trust between firms is also 
increased in the case of Japan where cross-firm stable shareholdings are the norm, and 
in Japan the board is this appointed from management ranks, not outsiders (i.e. not the 
largest shareholders).53  Therefore, rather than being monitored by shareholders on the 
basis of their short term financial performance, firms in CMEs such as Germany and 
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Japan rely more on their reputation for solid performance in the longer term, and trust 
and support from their stable shareholders and financial partners based on their 
reputation.54  A “stakeholder model” rather than a “shareholder model” is often said to 
describe the difference because a wider variety of constituencies have “voice” in the 
firm, including employees, suppliers and customers.55
There are some differences in the stakeholder model between Germany and 
Japan though.  The major difference is the location of key stakeholders.  For Japanese 
firms, key stakeholders are located within the “enterprise community”, largely within 
the firm.  Therefore, concern for stakeholders beyond the firm is very much a function 
of how they affect the inner community of the firm itself.  A large part of the reason for 
this is the long term nature of employment in Japanese corporations and resulting strong 
feelings of belonging to the firm, as if to a family, traditionally for the whole of an 
employee’s working life.  Thus, for management “decent treatment of customers and 
concern for suppliers affects the reputation of the firm in the society at large; hence it 
affects the ‘standing’ which the manager himself has when he goes to seminars and 
meetings of his business federation, as somebody who is identified with, and identifies 
himself with, his firm”.  For German firms the key stakeholders are primarily located 
outside the firm.  A sense of responsibility to society in particular is stronger for 
German firms.  Even if they are majority privately owned and operated, they are to 
some degree regarded as public institutions in their responsibilities to society, certainly 
moreso than in the case of Japanese firms.  Thus, while Japanese firms look inwards to 
fulfil their responsibility to their stakeholders, German firms look outwards to society as 
a whole.56
Whatever the differences in the stakeholder model for Germany and Japan, the 
implications in terms of timeframe by comparison to US firms are clear.  US firms must 
be more focussed on shorter term profit maximisation because they are “dependent for 
raising capital on liquid financial markets rather than on banks” and in so doing are 
“dependent on the whims and strategies of stockholders and bond owners”.57  By 
contrast, German and Japanese firms’ reliance on debt finance means they have a longer 
term perspective because their major banks and other debt financers have a stake in the 
company’s fortunes at a more strategic level.  Such close interlinkages produce more 
stable business relations, and mean firms are more “immune” to short-run sharemarket 
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fluctuations than LME-based US firms.58  German and Japanese firms are thus more 
willing to focus on strategic goals such as increasing market share and postponing short 
term profits to achieve this, as opposed to US firms which cannot afford the luxury of 
incurring the disapproval of equity investors for too long. 
 
Organising Principles of Firms 
 
A picture starts to emerge of what motivates firms in LMEs versus CMEs.  In LMEs, 
the separation of the states from business characterised by more adversarial relations 
leads to support for free markets with state intervention only in cases of market failure.  
Markets are in the lead in coordinating economic activity, and this is true for both 
product and financial markets.  A shorter term perspective is the result as firms seek 
profits on the basis of current market forces, particularly driven by the imperative of 
paying dividends to shareholders.  By contrast, CMEs are characterised by closer state-
business relations for coordinating economic activity.  This means markets are less 
important, with greater prominence given to cooperative, relational factors.  This is true 
in product as well as financial markets.  The result is a longer term perspective. 
Authors in the VOC mould relate these observations to the organising principles 
of firms at a micro level.  This is because firms’ different perspectives on the role of the 
state, markets, and the strategic timeframe this produces have implications for how they 
organise themselves internally.  Some key implications are summarised in Table 2.1. 
On the shareholder (or market) versus stakeholder model divide between LMEs 
and CMEs, the point about mergers and acquisitions is largely the one already made.  
Differences in the role of financial markets mean that mergers and acquisitions are far 
more common in LMEs than CMEs.  In addition, in the case of Japanese firms the 
enterprise community aspect of stakeholder concern is reflected in a view that firms 
possess individual cultures that cannot easily be merged.  More on this is said below, 
but for now the point is that this puts a ‘brake’ on mergers and acquisitions in addition 
to the different role played by financial markets. 
Management objectives reflect differences in the role of markets, especially 
financial markets.  In LMEs, management is concerned with making profits and 
delivering these to shareholders in the form of dividends in the short term, whereas in 
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CMEs they are more concerned with the longer term prosperity of the firm and their 
reputation within it.  Concomitant with this observation is the fact that share price as an 
indicator of firm performance is the main preoccupation of managers in LMEs, but in 
CMEs the longer term prospects of the firm in the broader sense of market share, sales 
margins etc. is also considered.  Thus, while managers in LMEs are accountable to 
shareholders via the share price, managers in CMEs are accountable in a more holistic 
sense to stakeholders within and external to the firm. 
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Table 2.1: Organising Principles of Firms in LMEs versus CMEs 
 LMEs (US) CMEs (Germany and Japan) 
SHAREHOLDER/MARKET VERSUS STAKEHOLDER MODEL 
Mergers and acquisitions Common, including hostile takeovers, and therefore a major 
preoccupation of top managers and the financial press. 
Exceedingly rare, and of low concern to top managers and the press.  Also inhibited (in the case of 
Japan) by a view of the firm as an entity with a specific culture that cannot easily be merged with 
another. 
Management objectives Delivering profits to shareholders, thereby enhancing personal claims 
on increased financial rewards, and maintaining the share price.   
Working for the long term prosperity of the firm, and their reputation within it.  Other factors such as 
market share, sales margins, value added per employee, growth in all of these plus sales growth are 
important, as well as the share price.   
Disciplinary constraints 
on managers: 
accountability 
The share price, because a fall in it can lead to dismissal by 
shareholders at the annual general meting, or hostile takeover. 
Managers are responsible to the firms’ stakeholders: their bankers and committed shareholders; and 
peers and juniors within the firm.  This is where managers’ reputations lie. 
INTRA-FIRM RELATIONS 
Social perception of the 
firm and nature of the 
employment contract 
The place where, at the moment, one earns a living.  A legal entity to 
which one owes obligations under an employment contract.  The firm 
can be conceived of as a web of contracts prescribing and proscribing 
behaviour for individuals who work for it.  Therefore, the employment 
contract is for a certain salary/wage for a certain job function, with 
promotion through an internal labour market via bids for vacant posts. 
For Japanese firms, a community of people that is slowly renewed as people retire and new 
employees are recruited.  It has an identity that is greater than the sum of its parts.  CEOs can talk 
about “the future of our great firm” much as a nation’s leader might talk about the state, without 
being regarded cynically.  For German firms, a public institution with social responsibilities, and 
relationships between managers and between managers and employees codified by law.  The nature 
of the employment contract is more in the nature of a career contract.  Shedding labour is rare/seen as 
extremely undesirable (Japan), or legally difficult (Germany). 
Response to economic 
pressures: recession (short 
term cyclical) versus 
industry sector decline 
(long term structural) 
Recession: Strenuous efforts to maintain profitability to maintain 
dividend payments and the share price, mean that costs are quickly cut 
to match falls in sales.  This often entails labour shedding. 
 
Industry sector decline: Rapid liquidation of loss-making divisions, 
usually by labour shedding. 
Recession: Strenuous efforts to increase/maintain sales with the prime objective of maintaining 
employment and financial rewards to employees, even if this means a temporary drop in profitability 
and dividend payments. 
 
Industry sector decline: Gradual withdrawal and diversification to other areas to seek new markets 
and products in growth industries that can capitalise on the firm’s existing technological skills or 
market expertise.  Employees are internally transferred accordingly. 
Wages and salaries Clear distinction between wage and salary earners.  For both, the 
‘market rate’ for the job and ‘equal pay for equal work’ are key 
concepts.  Large reward dispersion between managers and workers. 
Little wage/salary distinction, with predictable pay-rise trajectories related to job functions, period of 
service and educational qualifications.  Small reward dispersion between mangers and workers. 
Effort-inducing incentives Mostly individual, in the form of cash, and short term. Rewards are less cash based and more long term through building up reputation for appointments 
over the next 20 years. 
Workers’ interests Workers’ interests are seen as antithetical to shareholders’ interests.  
Unions seek to protect their members’ wages and conditions. 
Lower-ranking members of Japanese firms speak up to protect their rights against arbitrary managers 
and for their wage claims.  In German firms employees are represented on the board via state 
legislated co-determination laws. 
Nature of authority 
relations 
Relations between managers and workers are adversarial and based on 
contracts.  The hierarchy of the firm is seen as more one of licence to 
command obedience than one based on technical competence. 
For Japanese firms, a sense of membership of a community, with authority more on the basis of 
technical competence (e.g. there are more PhDs and engineers on German and Japanese boards than 
accountants).  German managers are more collective in their relations with employees than their US 
counterparts, but slightly less so than the ‘organic’ form of management relations in Japanese firms. 
Sources: R. Dore (2000a), Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany versus the Anglo Saxons, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp.26-32.59  See also S. Vitols (2001), 
‘Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK’, in P. Hall and D. Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; L. Pauly and S. Reich (1997), ‘National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behaviour: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalisation’’, International Organization, Vol.51, No.1, pp.1-
30; P. Doremus, W. Keller, L. Pauly and S. Reich (1999), The Myth of the Global Corporation, Princeton: Princeton University Press; and C. Hampden-Turner and A. Trompenaars (1993), The Seven Cultures 
of Capitalism: Value Systems for Creating Wealth in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands, New York: Currency Doubleday. 
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The imperatives of making profits and paying shareholders dividends in the 
short term mean US managers need to possess evidence that investment in new products 
is likely to provide tangible returns in the near future.  However, the present value of 
investment in something which might produce returns in the distant future is often 
minimal due to the risks and uncertainties involved.  German and Japanese managers 
are more willing to take a ‘bet’ on products that might produce some benefit 10 of 15 
years down the track, because they can strategise more for growth and market share, 
rather than focussing on profit now.  Hampden-Turner and Tompenaars use the analogy 
of a ‘train’ to illustrate the point.  US managers want to catch it before it leaves the 
station, whereas German and Japanese managers are more willing to invest in a process 
of learning and development for a train that may never come, but if it does they hope 
they will already be on board when it reaches the station.60  Thus, German and Japanese 
firms have much longer timeframes than US ones.61
Of course, US managers are not solely driven by making profits and maximising 
shareholder value, but these are their “dominant touchstone objective”.62  They may 
also focus on employees, customers, suppliers and (by inference) the environmental 
impact of their firm’s activities, but rarely at the expense of the bottom line, increased 
earnings and thence raised share prices.63  However, for CMEs, the quality of activity is 
as important, if not moreso, than the rewards it brings.  Thus, Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars say German and Japanese firms focus more on the value of the activity, 
rather than on the end of profits.  Profits are the means of generating further activity 
rather than an end in themselves.  Their focus is on enduring, growing, gaining market 
share, and making an excellent product via a customer/stakeholder focus, rather than 
market focus.  The difference is that a customer/stakeholder focus has to do with more 
intangible notions such as service, quality and timeliness, while a market focus has to 
do with profits and margins.  A focus on the latter means that, for LMEs, the focus isles 
on where one’s profit comes from than the fact and level of the profit itself: $3 million 
dollars in profit from currency speculation is as good as that from the sale of advanced-
technology products.  The notion of value in production is replaced by notions of value 
in the market.64
Turning to intra-firm relations leads to the question: what is a ‘firm’?  Given the 
narrower shareholder/market focus of LME firms, US firms are not so characterised by 
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close-knit cooperative networks.  The firm is a legal entity, a place where one works for 
the moment, where hiring and firing occur in response to changed market (i.e. 
profitability) conditions, where management has the power to do this and is expected to, 
and where there is a large gap between managers and workers in terms of their rewards.  
Top management and the board tend to exert control over the firm, and in-keeping with 
external relations, especially with regulators, relations between management and 
employees tends to be more adversarial, including a willingness to shed labour for 
economic gains when the firm faces profitability pressures.  Thus, firms are 
characterised by shorter job tenures and “fluid labour markets”.65
By contrast, cooperation and collaboration are terms that apply more to CME 
firms.  In the case of Germany, this leads to a “structural bias towards consensus 
decision making”,66 or what this author would call negotiated consensus.  This reflects 
a stakeholder model of relations in German capitalism that reinforces the importance of 
supporting long-standing business networks, both internal and external to the firm, 
rather than focussing on short term profitability.67  Long term, cooperative product 
development and productivity growth are emphasised.68  For example, large German 
firms must have union and worker representation on their boards by law.  The German 
Codetermination Act of 1976 mandates that all companies of more than 2,000 
employees must have supervisory boards with employee as well as shareholder 
representation on them.  The result is that 48 percent of the seats on the supervisory 
boards of the 100 largest German industrial corporations are held by union or employee 
representatives.69  All companies with more than five members must also have a Works 
Council through which managers are reminded on a daily basis about group morale and 
opinion on productivity and specific issues in the workplace.  As a result, by law 
managers are obliged to consult and take into the account of employees and 
shareholders in a cooperative fashion.70  Thus, cooperation and consensus-building are 
legislated.71
In a Japanese firm, workers and management share a sense of relationship with 
it closer to that of a soldier’s sense of loyalty to her/his regiment.  The firm’s top 
management are closer to the status of elders than shareholders’ principals.72  Indeed, 
the point has been made by many commentators that traditionally an employee joins a 
Japanese firm for life.  There is no external market for executives in Japan, or at least it 
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is a very small one largely the preserve of foreign firms operating there.  Japanese CEOs 
are appointed from within their firms, and the sense of “enterprise community” referred 
to earlier means there is a smaller distance between managers and staff.  In contrast the 
US LME model where firms hire and fire employees in the face of economic pressures 
that threaten the share price, nobody really ‘owns’ a Japanese firms but the firm itself 
(at least in the sense of who determines its destiny).73  In times of economic trouble, the 
“sense of responsibility for managing difficult processes of restructuring within tight 
traditional constraints is palpable”.74
In practical terms, in a survey of 15,000 managers from European, American 
and Asian companies, 74 percent of US managers saw a company as a system designed 
to perform functions and tasks efficiently (i.e. make profits), but only 41 percent of 
German managers and 29 percent of Japanese saw their companies in these terms.  
Instead, they saw a company as a group of people working together, dependent on 
social relations with others inside and outside the company.  Similarly, while 40 percent 
of US managers saw the prime goal of a company as making profits, only 24 percent of 
German managers and a miniscule 8 percent of Japanese managers saw their companies 
this way.  Instead, they had a more holistic view in which a company, besides making 
profits, is focussed on the well-being of a wide range of stakeholders and endures on the 
basis of attending to their needs.75
The implications for effort-inducing incentives and workers’ interests are 
therefore as follows.  Japanese employees see achievement as coming from a 
commitment and length of service with the company that is not so strongly favoured by 
their German and US counterparts.  While 99 percent of US managers surveyed said 
they had a relationship of limited duration with their company, only 41 percent of 
Japanese managers saw their relationship in such a short term.  German managers were 
somewhere in between at 83 percent.76  Achievement as a concept thus requires 
qualification.  In the case of the US it is strongly linked to individual achievement, with 
cash rewards for success, and winning through a competitive process, whereas in the 
case of Japan it comes from bonds of family, a cadre of juniors and seniors within a 
firm and a cooperative approach to success over a longer period of time.  The result in 
the case of US managers is that they are far more mobile and footloose than their 
Japanese counterparts who will tend to see their future as more tightly linked to that of 
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their colleagues within the company for which they will work in the long term, 
traditionally the duration of their working lives.  Thus, achievement in the case of 
Japanese firms is more likely to be ascribed to teams and groups than the heroic 
individual. 
The Japanese preference for achievement by teams and groups is reflected in the 
organic ordering within Japanese companies that mirrors the relations they have with 
the state externally.  Junior team members bring information to their seniors in the 
context of a goal of creating harmony within the organisation so that the vision at the 
top is one that is agreed widely at all levels.  Therefore, it is not so much a matter of top 
management giving orders and junior staff carrying them out as reaching a broadly 
agreed position within the entire company.  Reflecting this, Akio Morita of Sony has 
said: 
Our encouragement of long-range plans from up-and-coming employees is a big advantage for 
our system, despite all the meetings…It enables us to create and maintain something that is rare 
in the West, a company philosophy…Even if a new executive takes over, he cannot change that.   
In Japan, the long-range planning system and the junior management proposal system guarantees 
that the relationship between top management and junior management remains very close.77
Thus, a system that is based not on the rule of the individual but the communitarian 
whole, is more likely to produce a long term and enduring company vision than in, say, 
a US firm.   
Something similar happens in German firms, but reflecting their legally 
mandated negotiated consensus approach to coordination, rather than the organic 
ordering in Japanese firms, even if initiation comes from top management, “formally 
structured mutualities between suppliers, industries, unions and customers” are the basis 
on which this initiation is made real.78  In the US, the direction of initiation is 
downward, with the vision coming from the top and spread through the lower levels of 
the organisation.  In US firms, ideas come from the top and it is the responsibility of 
those lower down to initiate them.  This reflects a culture which is more a function of 
the individual driven by profits and the need to ensure shareholder value in a position of 
power.  This puts key senior individuals very much in the drivers’ seat in developing 
and promoting a company vision.   
Finally, this brings us to the nature of authority relations within firms.  
Commensurate with the idea of a firm as a network of contracts, relations between 
 65
managers and workers in US firms are generally more adversarial than in German or 
Japanese firms.  Managers have more distance from their employees and more power to 
act unilaterally of them.  By contrast, CME firms are more communitarian, in the 
Japanese case, and more collective, in the German case.  Japanese firms turn to the 
informal bonds of the enterprise community whereas German firms have formal 
systems for coordinating internal collective action.  If one was searching for metaphors, 
one might say that German firms are well-oiled machines (i.e. all the parts are put 
together formally to form the whole efficiently operating machine),79 Japanese firms are 
organisms (i.e. they operate on the basis of communitarian obligations and 
understandings as much as rules and regulations)80 and US firms are mechanisms (i.e. 
they are designed on a more contractual basis to produce certain outcomes).81
On the organic nature of Japanese firms, versus German firms, Dore notes the 
following: 
Japanese firms are inhibited only by their unions and employee sentiment: the business and 
political community and the whole of the press cheer on restructuring efforts.  By contrast, 
opposition to surgical restructuring is more vocal in Germany, and it is mobilised on the political 
level.82
The implications are clear.  While Japanese firms are communities where sentiment and 
mutual respect and sense of purpose define strategies, German firms operate more on 
the basis of negotiated consensus mandated by law and supported at the political level.  
Another aspect to the difference is that membership of Chambers of Commerce is 
required by law in Germany, but not in Japan where membership of equivalent 
organisations is more a matter of course.  In Germany, these chambers are also expected 
to perform a role in respect of the needs of society, as much as for their members 
themselves.  This, while the national interest figures strongly for industry in both states, 
in Germany it is a more formal requirement, whereas in Japan it is more informal on 
what Dore terms an “ad hoc basis”.83
Overall, the difference in the organising principles of firms between Germany 
and Japan is summarised by Soskice as one of “industry coordination” for European 
CMEs versus “group coordination” for Japan.  The divide is between the extent to 
which coordination occurs at an industry level, across firms, for German firms versus 
coordination across the company group for Japanese firms.  Thus, while unions tend to 
be industry-based in Germany, they are company-based in Japan.  While technical 
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standard setting occurs at an industry level in Europe and Germany, it occurs at a 
company level in Japan.  German firms are likely to be more outward looking in their 
strategic vision, whereas Japanese firms are likely to be more inward looking, to be 
more focussed on the company group and the community of the firm, in developing 
strategies.84  
However, whatever the nuances, Dore summarises Germany and Japan’s 
similarities as follows: 
They remain economies in which the stock market plays a much less central role, and the state a 
larger one; in which the financial sector is less dominant; and manufacturing industry 
correspondingly more important; in which engineers tend to have the edge over accountants; and 
the doctrine of the supremacy of shareholder value is still a much weaker element in determining 
company goals.85
Although their differences are not irrelevant, it is their common CME institutional 
framework that should be stressed more and contrasted with the LME institutional 
framework of the US. 
 
The Role of Technology 
 
The role of state-business relations, product and financial markets, and the organising 
principles of firms themselves have been discussed above.  General points have been 
made in respect of each.  However, when discussing improvements in firms’ 
environmental performance, one is often implicitly discussing something quite specific 
related to each of these: technological improvements.  Although it is not impossible to 
imagine car firms encouraging alternatives to the car (e.g. more bicycle use), they are 
more likely to develop technological solutions to reduce the environmental impacts of 
the products they sell.  Therefore, the role of technology is a key consideration.  Based 
on the factors already discussed above, the VOC approach observes that LME firms 
tend towards more radical technological innovation, whereas CME firms tend to 
innovate more incrementally. 
The institutional framework of LMEs supports radical, rapid change and 
innovation because firms have a short term market focus, can buy and sell subsidiaries 
without concern about long term stable shareholdings, and top management possesses 
greater power  to make decisions and implement them relatively unilaterally, including 
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the ability to hire and fire labour.  Taken together, these characteristics mean that they 
can move quickly to exploit opportunities in markets and thereby rapidly embrace new 
ideas and opportunities.  Being less ‘weighed down’ by long term networks based on 
mutual cooperation, they are more able to adjust rapidly and act opportunistically.86
CMEs are better at supporting incremental innovation over the longer term by 
virtue of their denser corporate networks that facilitate a more gradual, less market-
focussed, diffusion of new technologies.87  They focus better on more traditional, well-
developed markets in consultation with suppliers, workers and other stakeholders.  
Thus, Soskice notes the following of German firms’ predisposition to incremental 
technological change: “Germany is the undisputed leader in improving and upgrading 
technology in fields in which its industry is established, but there are weaknesses in 
newer fields”.88  In a similar vein, Hollingsworth notes that “Germans have placed less 
emphasis on developing entirely new technologies and industries than in applying the 
latest technologies to the production of more traditional products”.89   
Japanese firms share these characteristics, but there is an added dimension to 
state-business relations in Japan that amounts to a shared over-arching goal of economic 
independence.90  This manifests itself in a national drive to develop the latest 
technology and thereby have a competitive edge in so doing.  This is labelled 
“technonationalism” by Pauly and Reich.91  In-keeping with the technonationalist 
version of Japan’s CME, Japanese firms in aggregate spend a higher percentage of their 
resources on research and development than any other country.92  Their aim is to be at 
the technological forefront in every industrial sector in which they participate. 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs on Germany and Japan seem to 
confound any clear distinction regarding the role of technology in LMEs versus CMEs, 
or at least between the three territories considered in this thesis.  But perhaps Vitols 
offers a clue to a key distinction when he notes that LME firms are radical in their 
innovation and entry into new industry sectors, but behave more conservatively in 
established ones where they compete more on the basis of price.  By contrast, CME 
firms compete more via non-price competition through incremental innovation.93  
Therefore, the distinction is one that revolves around the role of price competition in 
markets in established industries.  For established industries, such as the car industry, 
the implication is that CME firms will compete more through non-price product 
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innovation than LME firms, which will tend to place greater emphasis on price 
competition in markets.  For Germany, competition via non-price product innovation in 
mature industries is likely to be more incremental.  For Japan, competition via non-price 
product innovation means technological innovation with the goal of always leading 
competitors and pushing technological frontiers.  This may produce radical innovation 
even in established industries. 
 
Exogenous versus Endogenous Factors 
 
The preceding discussion also has implications for the role of exogenous versus 
endogenous factors that, while not explicitly addressed by the VOC approach, are 
nevertheless implied by its insights.  Exogenous factors are those factors external to 
firms that impact on their activities.  They are exogenous in the sense that they derive 
from outside firms and impact on them.  They may be conceived as both material and 
institutional factors, encompass market forces and state regulations, but also the 
institutional context of these as illuminated by the VOC approach that affects how 
market forces and regulations are constructed in terms of both their fact and importance.  
Endogenous factors arising from within firms affect how exogenous factors are 
interpreted and addressed.  These include the actual material facts of the situation in 
which individual firms find themselves, such as their product line-ups and the 
competencies these represent, but also normative questions about internal company 
strategies such as corporate policies and leaders’ visions.94
How does the intersection of exogenous and endogenous factors relate to the 
VOC approach?  The following observation of Dicken’s is a good starting point: 
As US companies, Ford and GM are quite distinctive from Toyota, Volkswagen, Fiat or Renault.  
But they are also different from each other.  Similarly, Toyota and Nissan are distinctive, but not 
identical, Japanese automotive firms; the same point can be made about the French auto 
producers and so on.  However, there are generally greater similarities than differences between 
firms from the same national base.95
The point Dicken makes is that while it is an over-simplification to say that firms of the 
same nationality are identical, national characteristics are nevertheless predominant.   
Therefore, although Hall and Soskice raise the caveat that the “point is that institutional 
structure conditions corporate strategy, not that it fully determines it”,96 firms of the 
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same nationality are still more similar overall than firms of different nationalities.  
Hence, “organisational forms tend to become remarkably uniform within societies 
dominated by particular institutional conventions”.97  The value of the VOC approach, 
in terms of facilitating comparative analysis, is that it points allows us to concentrate on 
these broad differences in organisational forms between states’ capitalist institutions. 
Given the broad national differences, the VOC approach suggests some national 
variations in the importance of exogenous versus endogenous factors.  For US LME-
based firms, a preference for market forces and adhering to government regulations with 
material goals in mind suggests they should be more exogenously motivated.  However, 
the distance between management and workers, the ability of managers to act more 
unilaterally and hire and fire labour also suggest that the vision of a firm’s leader may 
carry considerable weight from an endogenous perspective.  Of course, even then 
environmental concerns are likely to be seen in more materialist terms along the lines of 
making profits and addressing state regulatory requirements. 
As the VOC of German and Japanese firms leads them to be less profit-
motivated, less market driven and more long term in their perspective, a greater role for 
endogenously derived strategies is suggested.  This is especially the case for Japanese 
firms because their focus on the enterprise community suggests a very strong role for 
internal strategies as a motivator for action, rather than exogenous forces.  German 
firms occupy the middle ground, operating on the basis of negotiated consensus with a 
range of stakeholders both exogenous and endogenous to the firm, with an eye to their 
social responsibilities by both convention and law. 
 
Historical Context 
 
Finally, it should be stressed that the institutional insights of the VOC approach, and the 
implications of them in terms of the role of technology and exogenous versus 
endogenous factors, are the result of historical processes.  Indeed, the VOC approach is 
fundamentally a historical approach that focuses on the institutional results of 
structures, processes, necessities and cultural imperatives that have historical roots.  For 
example, the Japanese drive to techno-nationalism has its roots in the Meiji Restoration.  
The industrial conglomerates that this spawned, along with the drive for education and 
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skills development, industrialisation and the competitive drive for market share were 
then further (re)interpreted through the lens of the aftermath of the second world war.  
Similarly, the Prussian state’s drive to unite Germany, the impact of Nazism and the 
aftermath of the second world war helped to shape its VOC, including the cartelisation 
of industry, the role of unions on company boards, the role of banks in financing growth 
and the incremental, inclusive, consensus-approach to decision making.  For the US, the 
establishment of the stockmarket as a prime driver of perceptions of company worth and 
endurance was already evident in the 1920s when the separation of management from 
ownership of major corporations was entrenched.98
There are many implications of such a historical approach, but fundamentally 
the point is that the mainstream approach to understanding capitalist economies (i.e. 
market forces and the role of government, including with respect to environmental 
externalities) is a particularly LME one derived from historical specificities.  However, 
Germany and Japan’s different histories have produced institutions that “deviate from 
the prescriptions of neoclassical textbooks”.99  This raises two key implications.  First, a 
degree of path dependence is built into the institutions and norms that underpin them in 
each society considered here.  Although commentators like Hall and Soskice point to 
economic actors gravitating to modes of action and coordination that are most efficient 
given particular institutional environments, this should not in any way imply that the 
institutions and norms of individual states’ capitalisms are necessarily efficient of 
themselves.  They are the results of historical processes and so are ‘sticky’: how they 
start off to a large degree endures or ‘colours’ future trajectories.  States’ institutions are 
not “plastic” or “open to opportunistic adoption and combination” on the whims of 
either policy makers or firms, but possess an “inertia” once in place.100  Secondly, and 
in opposition to the first observation, because they are the product of history, norms and 
institutions change and can be changed over time.  Therefore, although it would be a 
mistake to believe that a certain state will always have the same institutions, or that it 
always has because that is what it has at present, change is constrained and enabled by 
what has gone before, and current institutional arrangements.101
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Summarising the Varieties of Capitalism of Germany, the US and Japan 
 
At the core of the VOC approach is the belief that there is no universal rationality that 
describes firms’ strategic priorities across all states.  Individual states have developed 
particular institutions over time that underpin their different varieties of capitalism.  As 
such, “standards for evaluating organisational performance and prevalent criteria for 
judging firms’ strategic priorities vary significantly across institutional regimes and 
cannot be derived from a single universal market rationality”.102    From the above 
discussion, it is possible to distil five key linked drivers of firms’ strategic priorities in 
LMEs versus CMEs.  They are as follows: 
1. Closer state-business relations in CMEs versus a separation of the state and 
markets in LMEs.  For Germany, a coordinating role for the state is the case, 
while for Japan a more organic, symbiotic relationship is suggested based on 
mutual understanding. 
2. A resulting priority for markets as organisers of economic activity in LMEs, in 
both the product and financial spheres, versus markets as one among a variety of 
mechanisms for organising economic activity in CMEs on a more relational, 
cooperative basis.  In the case of Germany, the role of society and a feeling of 
responsibility towards it is particularly important, as well as negotiated 
consensus between a range of stakeholders often prescribed by law.  For Japan, 
the enterprise community, and the relationship between stakeholders within it, 
plays a stronger role. 
3. The firm may be conceived of as a network of contracts with significant power 
invested in management in LMEs, that acts on market signals to make profits in 
the short term and pay dividends to shareholders, versus the firm as collective 
(Germany) or community (Japan) in CMEs, that acts to enhance its reputation 
through close relational ties with stakeholders.  US firms are ‘mechanisms’ (of 
profit), German firms are ‘well-oiled machines’ and Japanese firms are 
‘organisms’. 
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4. US firms are likely to be more focussed on exogenous material factors, but with 
more power in the hands of management to act unilaterally in devising strategies 
to respond to these.  Because Japanese firms are more internally driven 
strategically, endogenous factors have greater prominence.  German firms are 
somewhere in between, but with prominence given to (exogenous) social 
responsibilities. 
5. A preference for non-price competition via product innovation in established 
industries in CMEs via incremental technological change, versus price 
competition in established industries in LMEs.  Radical technological change is 
favoured in new industries in LMEs, however in the case of Japan a preference 
for technonationalism may produce quite radical technological advances over 
time even in established industries. 
Taken together, these drivers of firm strategies imply a shorter-term perspective 
for LMEs versus a longer-term perspective for CMEs.  This is because in the latter there 
is less focus on markets, profits, paying shareholders dividends, and competing in 
established industries on the basis of price.  A clear preference for materialist 
perspectives on the part of LME-based firms is also implied.  This is the result of the 
institutional basis for capitalist relations in LMEs, whereas institutions in CMEs lead 
firms to focus more on responsibility to society rather than shareholders, responsibility 
to fellow employees rather than economic pressures, market share and influence rather 
than short term profit. 
Given the differences identified, the VOC approach also says that firms gravitate 
to those modes of behaviour and action that have institutional support and are therefore 
most efficient.  This has implications for traditionally less ‘core’ considerations such as 
the environment and suggests a further lesson, which bears explicit identification here.  
It is that universal prescriptions for the ‘best’ institutional foundations miss the point.  
Different cultures within firms and the societies that give rise to them mean that similar 
actions have different ramifications.  If anti-trust laws were removed in the US would 
this lead to greater cooperation and collaboration to the benefit of society as is the case 
in Germany and Japan?  The result is surely no, because the LME form under which 
capitalist relations operate in the US would surely increase the propensity for 
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exploitation of the market to the detriment rather than the benefit of consumers.  Should 
the US adopt the elaborate codification process for workers' and managers' rights and 
responsibilities, and the regulatory framework between the state and business as it exists 
in Germany?  This would surely tie the US system up in more disputation and litigation 
than it currently has and potentially rob the US of its key advantage over the Japanese 
and Germans: the ability to act rapidly to respond to market challenges.  Therefore, this 
author takes the view that value judgements as to whether different VOCs are ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ are largely futile.  The institutional features of these states are what they are.  
They may change over time, or they may not.  It is hard to tell.103  Rather than declaring 
which variety of capitalism is better, the point is to tease out the implications of these 
institutions. 
 
Operationalising the Research 
 
Given the insights of the VOC approach, the way in which these will be 
methodologically brought to bear in operationalising the research is considered in the 
remainder of this chapter.  The concept of environmental sustainability, or indeed 
simply ‘concern for the environment’, is defined, and the reason for focussing on the 
environmental issue of climate change is explained, along with its related concern of 
fuel economy for passenger cars in use.  The timeframe for analysis is then specified as 
1990-2004.  The chapters to follow are outlined, and how the theoretical perspectives of 
the thesis are to be applied via the empirical analysis undertaken in them. 
 
Concern for the Environment and Environmental Sustainability 
 
While the concept of the environment itself is obvious, ‘environmental issues’ and 
‘concern about the environment’ are less clear.  Inevitably, one ends up discussing 
‘sustainability’, a somewhat ‘murky’ concept because “everyone knows what this word 
means; it’s just that noone knows exactly what it looks like in practice”.104  However, 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) notes that a 
broad distinction is possible between absolute indicators of sustainability, versus 
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relativist indicators of movement towards sustainability.105  This thesis will take a 
relativist approach in the sense of actual action aimed at moving in the ‘right’ direction.  
The question is therefore also whether there is a real shift in attitude rather than mere 
‘greenwashing’, and what is motivating it.106  The question is not one of what the 
appropriate level of environmental protection should be, but rather whether firms are 
proactively disposed to action and taking it, plus how they are doing so and why.  Thus, 
in this thesis, environmental issues and concern about the environment are defined in 
terms of the actions taken by the international car industry and the motivators for them. 
 
The Relevance of Climate Change and Fuel Economy 
 
Environmental issues are complex.  This makes it difficult to analyse them holistically.  
For example, it may be possible to speak of attitudes to the environment, but in terms of 
action and data in respect of such attitudes, something tangible must be the focus for 
analysis.  For the sake of manageable analysis, the focus in the following chapters is 
primarily on the issue of climate change and the fuel economy of passenger cars in-use.  
There are three main reasons for this: the growing international visibility of the climate 
change issue from the 1990s onwards; the relationship of fuel economy to carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions; and the resulting visibility of the issue to consumers of the 
industry’s products.  The reason for considering passenger cars in-use is explained on 
the basis that this is the stage at which most environmental damage is done, as opposed 
to other stages in a car’s lifecycle such as manufacturing. 
The issue of climate change has been the most visible environmental issue 
internationally over the last decade.  The profile of climate change and how to address it 
has been growing since it was first brought to the attention of corporations, 
governments and civil society through the “crucial event” of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio do Janeiro in 1992.107  
The subsequent Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997 by over 180 states and subsequently 
ratified by all industrialised nations with the exception of Australia and the US, has 
been described as “the most conspicuous policy step” in terms of environmental 
regulation impacting on the car industry.108  The major greenhouse gas contributing to 
climate change, CO2, is also the major greenhouse gas produced by industrialised states, 
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and is responsible for the majority of their contribution to climate change.109  Car CO2 
emissions account for up to 20 percent of all CO2 emissions in the European Union 
(EU), US and Japan, hence the relevance of the issue to the car industry in particular.110  
The result is that policy makers, the general public and the car industry are widely 
aware of the issue, and that addressing it critically depends on the actions of the car 
industry in respect of the products it develops.  Indeed, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) finds that the transport sector must make a greater contribution to reducing CO2 
emissions than the proportion for which it is accountable: 
Whilst over a quarter of total carbon dioxide emissions in the group of IEA countries comes 
from transportation, it is too simplistic to argue that roughly one quarter of abatement ought 
necessarily to occur in this sector.  Transport is today implicated at the core of many social and 
environmental problems.  There is intense pressure within the policy process in many IEA 
countries for radical changes in transportation.111
As such, with climate change the issue is not just visible in itself, but for the pressure it 
brings to bear on the car industry to address it. 
Car CO2 emissions are the result of fossil fuels being combusted in internal 
combustion engines, and a fixed amount of CO2 is emitted as fuel is combusted in a 
standard petrol or diesel engine.  For example, a typical petrol engine that uses a litre of 
petrol will combine 635g of carbon from the petrol with 1,702g of oxygen from the air 
to produce 2,337g of CO2.  Thus, CO2 emissions expressed in grams per kilometre 
(g/km) have commensurate fuel economy measures in litres per hundred kilometres 
(l/100km): the lower the l/100km measure of fuel economy, the lower the g/km of CO2 
emitted.112  In fact, virtually everything emitted from a car’s exhaust is CO2.  This 
makes climate change a fundamental issue for the car industry, and it faces major 
challenges in addressing its contribution to the problem.  This is because the fleet of all 
vehicles in use worldwide is growing by 16 million vehicles per annum and is forecast 
to reach one billion by 2025.  If nothing is done, it is projected that the contribution of 
CO2 emissions from cars will also grow significantly, at around 2 percent per annum in 
absolute terms.113  In OECD countries alone, if no action is taken, transport sector CO2 
emissions are projected to increase by 30 percent by 2010.114  Therefore, dramatic 
improvements in fuel economy are needed if the contribution of cars to CO2 emissions 
is to remain constant, let alone reduce their contribution.  For the industry to stabilise 
CO2 emissions at current levels, based on current conditions and trends fuel economy 
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improvements of around 32 percent will be required for the whole fleet of cars in use by 
2020.115  It therefore is a major focus for the car industry and regulatory authorities in 
the industrialised states where its major firms are headquartered.116
Finally, fuel economy is arguably the most visible aspect of a car’s 
environmental performance.  Consumers are widely informed of fuel economy figures 
which are provided by manufacturers and regulatory authorities, and they are made 
aware of their car’s fuel consumption every time they refuel.  Some consumers will 
know that fuel economy is related to CO2 emissions, but all will know that a fuel 
efficient car is more environmentally-friendly than a ‘gas guzzler’.  While 
improvements in manufacturing processes and in reporting environmental activities are 
important, it is cars’ actual fuel economy that governments and consumers will be most 
aware of, and therefore this is a ‘spotlight’ environmental issue for the car industry 
above all others.117
Given the relevance of the issue of climate change, and the direct relationship 
between of CO2 emissions and fuel economy, the focus for analysis will be on 
passenger cars in use.  The reason for focusing on passenger cars in use is that as Figure 
2.1 shows, around 75 percent of CO2 emissions over the lifecycle of a car occur in use.  
It dwarfs all other CO2 emission sources – e.g. the assembly of a vehicle in the 
manufacturing process accounts for only 2 percent of total lifecycle CO2 emissions.  
Therefore, the focus for analysis is on industry initiatives that reduce the CO2 
emissions/improve the fuel economy of their cars in use.   
Overall, the issue of climate change is one that has global significance, and 
particular significance to the industrialised states where the major car firms are 
headquartered – i.e. Germany and the EU, the US and Japan.  It is of direct relevance to 
the car industry because of its contribution to the problem, it is of concern to states as 
they must legislate to address the problem, and it is the most visible environmental 
attribute of passenger cars’ environmental performance in use because of its relation to 
fuel economy.  This makes it especially visible to consumers. 
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Figure 2.1: CO2 Emissions in the Life Cycle of a Typical Vehicle 
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Source: Deutsche Bank (2004), The Drivers: How to Navigate the Auto Industry, Frankfurt am Main: 
Deutsche Bank AG, p.58. 
 
Timeframe 
 
This thesis will primarily consider the period from 1990 to 2004.  On occasions, this 
may vary on the basis of the availability of comparable data at the time of writing, but 
in all cases the timeframe considered is within these boundaries.  There are five key 
reasons why this timeframe is appropriate. 
First, international organisations have significantly raised the profile of 
environmental concerns over this period.  For example, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) views the 1992 Rio Earth Summit118 as a watershed in the 
discussion of environmental sustainability from which sustainable development 
initiatives have sprung, such as the high profile Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 and 
subsequently ratified by nearly all its signatories.119  Even economically focussed 
international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) recognised 
that through the 1980s, and going into the 1990s, “environment, gender and labour 
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concerns are on the agenda in ways that would have been deemed illegitimate in the 
1970s”.120  They realised that ignoring the views of often noisy and angry protestors, 
and the broader social movements they represent, undermined the agendas they were 
attempting to further.  The WTO’s answer was to established a Committee on Trade and 
Environment in 1995 at its inception.  Throughout the 1990s, a series of international 
agreements with business also emerged such as the United Nations’ (UN) Global 
Compact, announced in 1999.  This brings companies together with UN agencies, 
labour and civil society to support nine principles in the areas of human rights, labour 
and the environment.  Another such agreement is the Global Reporting Initiative, started 
in 1997 by the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) and now 
an official collaborating centre of the UNEP that works in cooperation with the Global 
Compact.121
Secondly, in terms of business attitudes and societal expectations, commentators 
such as Florini identify corporate social responsibility (CSR) as having come to the fore 
as an ideological shift that started in the 1990s.122  CSR includes environmental 
sustainability among a range of initiatives in labour standards, human rights, disclosure 
of information, corporate governance, public safety, privacy protection and consumer 
protection.  There is a growing body of research that shows environmental sustainability 
and other socially responsible behaviour on the part of MNCs, such as those in the car 
industry, to be voluntary initiatives.  Such initiatives are further identified as being a 
global phenomenon.123  For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) was established at the same time as the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit and has been working ever since to be at the forefront of the business response 
to sustainable development.  It is a coalition of 165 companies drawn from 30 countries 
and 20 industry sectors.  It also links a network of 43 national and regional business 
councils and partner organisations in 39 countries.  It includes all the major car firms in 
its membership,124 and has been regarded as a manifestation of a broader acceptance of 
the importance of environmental issues by corporations generally that commenced in 
the 1990s.125
Thirdly, outspoken critics of international capitalism vis a vis the environment 
suggest that we are actually witnessing a fundamental change in how firms do business 
worldwide as they incorporate environmental sustainability concerns in their operations.  
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For example, before the mid-1990s Hawken et. al. find there is not much evidence of 
the car industry proactively addressing environmental concerns, with any gains the 
result of social activism or government regulations.126  Indeed, in 1993 David Suzuki, a 
strident critic of capitalism, globalisation and the environmental degradation in which it 
results worldwide, declared: 
Environmentally responsible corporations may seem like an oxymoron.  But as pressure by 
ecologically aware consumers and activists increases, more and more businesses are cloaking 
themselves in green rhetoric.  How genuine is it or can it be?127
His answer in 1993 was that it was not genuine, and that “the ground rules of profit 
make it hard to be a friend to the environment” so that “amid…the suicidal demand for 
steady growth, happy stories are few”.  He singled out the international car industry for 
the enormous social and ecological costs it imposes on societies above all other 
industries.128  But by 2002 he notes a philosophical shift within corporate hierarchies 
manifested in attitudinal changes, such as General Motors supporting a 50 per cent tax 
on petrol for environmental reasons!129  He applauds the attitudinal change within Ford 
quoting its Chairman who said in his speech to a Greenpeace business conference on 5 
October 2000: 
We’re at a crucial point in the world’s history.  Our oceans and forests are suffering; species are 
disappearing; the climate is changing…Enlightened corporations are beginning to…realise that 
they can no longer separate themselves from what is going on around them.  That, ultimately, 
they can only be as successful as the communities and the world that they exist in….I personally 
believe that sustainability is the most important issue facing the automotive industry in general 
in the 21st century.130
Within the space of one decade, Suzuki’s attitude changed from pessimism to a 
decidedly more optimistic view of the possibilities for change, with the car industry at 
the forefront of moves by big business towards environmental sustainability.131
Fourthly, environmental reporting by car firms largely commenced in this time 
period.  US firms have been producing such reports for the longest time, with Ford first 
in 1989 and General Motors since 1994.  German firms have been doing so since the 
mid to late 1990s, and Japanese firms are the most recent with reports released since 
1998.  Such reports represent a desire by firms to represent themselves as 
environmentally concerned (whether in image or fact), and report on their 
environmental commitments, suggesting the rise in prominence of environmental 
considerations as of strategic importance in this timeframe.132
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Finally, while considering the environmental initiatives of the industry from 
1990 onwards, the timeframe for analysis stops at 2004.  The main reason for this is that 
material factors in terms of the price of oil are reasonably constant over this time, but 
change dramatically thereafter.  For most of the 1990s the spot price for crude oil was 
US$15-20 per barrel.  From 2000 to 2003 there is a slight increase to US$20-25 per 
barrel.  However, after this there is a price shock that sees the price per barrel nearly 
double to almost US$50 per barrel by 2005.  Therefore, a ceteris paribus analysis based 
largely on fuel economy and the cost of running a car in terms of fuel purchased is only 
meaningful prior to, and up until, 2004.133
 
Details of the Chapters to Follow 
 
The car industry in Germany, the US and Japan, and in-depth analysis of a small 
number of individual firms from each, will be the focus of analysis for this thesis.  The 
environmental impact of their products in the form of passenger cars is considered.  The 
primary environmental impact considered is CO2 emissions because of its contribution 
to the issue of climate change.  In general, the analysis will be characterised by what 
Pierson and Skocpol describe as “theoretical eclecticism, multiple analytic techniques 
and a broad comparative and historical purview”.134  Therefore, although one specific 
industry is studied, and individual firms within it in Chapters 6 and 7, as is generally the 
case with research of this nature it is expected that the total number of observations will 
be large.135  This is because, as Eckstein notes, the purpose is intensive study “to 
capture the whole individual”.136
The points made in the previous paragraph suggest the research will take a 
strongly qualitative approach, and indeed it will.  However, where possible a balance is 
sought between qualitative and quantitative approaches, in the manner discussed by 
Adcock and Collier.  The aim is not so much one or the other, as an analysis that 
ensures measurement validity: “whether operationalising and the scoring of cases 
adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure”.137  Thus, it will be seen 
that a mixture of quantitative and qualitative analysis is suited to the data gathered in 
respect of state regulations in Chapter 4, quantitative statistical analysis is most suitable, 
indeed essential, to the survey data analysed in Chapter 5, and qualitative content 
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analysis is most suited to the analysis of firm reports and interviews in Chapters 6 and 7.  
A description of the empirical analysis to be conducted in the chapters to follow is 
provided below. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
In Chapter 3, a brief summary is presented of the product development initiatives of car 
firms aimed at reducing the CO2 emissions of passenger cars in use.  This is done to 
provide some background on the types of technologies and product developments that 
are relevant to the question of addressing the environmental problem of climate change 
for the car industry.  However, most importantly, it is shown that there are clear national 
differences in the initiatives being undertaken by the industry.  This suggests that firms’ 
nationalities matter, and hence that institutional factors pertaining in firms’ home states 
affect their strategies, the environmental initiatives they choose to stress, and how they 
do so.  Prior to detailed empirical analysis in Chapters 4-7, reasons for the national 
differences are shown to be suggested by the VOC approach that are further explored in 
these following chapters. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 address the two key material factors of state regulations and market 
forces, and the manner in which the institutional differences of firms’ home states 
suggested by the VOC approach affect firms’ perceptions and actions in respect of 
them. 
In Chapter 4, regulations in the EU, US and Japan are the focus.  Regulations in 
each state (and territory in the case of the EU) are presented and ranked in terms of their 
stringency and timing.  The role of the industry in constructing and implementing them 
is highlighted, and the degree to which the industry meets or exceeds regulations in each 
territory is considered.  The insights of the VOC approach are used to explain variations 
in this.  It is found that the VOC approach has greater explanatory power in terms of 
how regulations are constructed and met than a purely materialist perspective, and that 
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national institutional variations determine whether the industry merely reacts to 
regulations or is more proactive in establishing and exceeding them. 
In Chapter 5, market forces are the focus, including the impact of social 
attitudes.  This is because social concern for environmental sustainability is said to be 
flowing through to consumer preferences in the industrialised societies where car firms 
have their home bases.  Three aspects of the relationship between social attitudes, 
consumer demand and firm behaviour are the focus.  First, the change in social attitudes 
to the environment in Germany, the US and Japan is considered using data from the 
World Values Survey, a global survey of social attitudes conducted in several waves 
worldwide throughout the 1990s.  Responses to questions on respondents’ attitudes to 
the environment are quantitatively analysed using SPSS software.  Secondly, the extent 
to which such attitudes are reflected in consumer demand via purchasing decisions is 
analysed.  Finally, the insights of the VOC approach are used to show the impact of 
institutional differences on how the relationship between social attitudes and consumer 
demand impacts on firms strategies.  It is shown that the influence of social attitudes 
versus consumer demand varies between states based on the institutional priority 
accorded each of them. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 
 
Focussing on the rationales offered by firms in their environmental reports and in 
interviews with key personnel, Chapters 6 and 7 examine and compare how 
environmental commitments are approached by individual firms.  Two major questions 
are posed.  First, what do car firms say is driving them to make environmentally 
positive changes to how they do business?  In other words, what is their rationale?  This 
includes an assessment of whether they highlight reacting to material factors (i.e. market 
forces and public policy/regulation) or proactively taking steps for more normative 
reasons (i.e. social concerns and internal company strategies).  Secondly, what are the 
implications of this for how change on environmental concerns occurs within the 
industry in each territory?  Answering this will involve seeing whether firms’ 
nationality matters and whether firms of different nationality are key drivers of change 
and why. 
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In Chapter 6, a snapshot is taken of the following firms’ 2003/04 environmental 
reports, the latest available at the time of writing: 
• Germany: Volkswagen Group, BMW Group, and DaimlerChrysler. 
• US: General Motors, Ford Motor Company. 
• Japan: Toyota, Honda, and Nissan. 
Not only are these firms the production and sales leaders in their home territories, they 
account for over 60 percent of total world passenger car production.  Toyota, 
Volkswagen, General Motors, DaimlerChrysler and Ford are also the top five passenger 
car producers in the world.138
These firms’ environmental reports are analysed using QSR NVivo 2.0 
qualitative analysis software.  The sections of the reports that are qualitatively analysed 
are the executive messages contained at the front of them, the ‘vision’ the companies 
have of environmental matters, and the environmental principles under which they 
operationalise their visions.  The intention is to compare and contrast what it is that 
firms say is driving them to invest in environmentally-friendly product development.  
Therefore, Chapter 5 examines firms’ stated rationales to see what they say is driving 
their concern for, and investment in, environmental technologies.  It is shown that the 
rationales they offer in the reporting is supportive of the VOC approach and also 
highlights some significant differences in endogenous factors between individual firms. 
In Chapter 7, the results of interviews with key personnel in four firms are 
presented.  They are Volkswagen, BMW, Ford and Toyota.  The interviews cover state 
regulations, market forces in terms of consumer demand versus social attitudes, and the 
endogenous internal strategies/drivers of the firms themselves.  Analysing these 
interviews serves two purposes.  First, the views expressed by personnel provide first-
hand accounts to compare with the empirical evidence analysed previously in respect of 
the exogenous factors of state regulations and market forces.  Secondly, they build on 
the qualitative analysis of firms’ environmental reports and the rationales stated within 
them for environmental initiatives.  Again, the insights of the VOC approach for 
national differences, coupled with endogenous factors, are shown to have greater 
explanatory power than a purely materialist approach that focuses simply on state 
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regulations and market forces to explain why firms have taken their environmental 
initiatives. 
 
Chapter 8 
 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the research.  It draws together the analysis of 
state regulations; market forces in terms of social attitudes and consumer demand; and 
firms’ perspectives on their environmental initiatives as presented in their 
environmental reports and revealed in interviews.  The manner in which material versus 
institutional factors are relevant for the industry in each territory is summarised, along 
with the reasons why the VOC pertaining to firms’ home states is the key to 
understanding why they have taken the environmental initiatives they have taken, and 
whether or not endogenous factors have been important in tempering the effects of 
national institutional differences. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The insights of the VOC approach and how they will be methodologically brought to 
bear in operationalising the research have been outlined in this chapter.  The 
contribution to be made to the VOC literature in the process is that its insights will be 
applied in a novel way to the environmental motivations of firms.  As stated in the 
introduction to this Chapter, the application is novel in the sense that rather than 
examining the competitive advantages of states’ industrial bases, or the operation of 
their product and financial markets etc., what is shown is that a state’s variety of 
capitalism has implications for traditionally less ‘core’ considerations such as the 
environment.  As environmental questions increase in importance for business, the point 
is that institutional differences in capitalist relations between states have implications 
for whether, and how, firms from different states address the environmental impact of 
their operations.   
The case has been made for why climate change is a highly relevant 
environmental issue for the car industry, in terms of moving towards greater 
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environmental sustainability.  It is relevant for its growing profile among policy makers, 
business and civil society worldwide as a result of international developments such as 
UNCED and the Kyoto Protocol.  In many ways, it was the global environmental issue 
of the 1990s, and continues to be so in the twenty first century.  It is of particular 
relevance to the car industry, because of the industry’s contribution to CO2 emissions, 
the major greenhouse gas responsible for climate change.  CO2 emissions are in turn 
related to fuel economy, arguably the most visible environmental aspect of passenger 
cars in use.  This leads to an analysis of environmental product developments because it 
is the industry’s products in-use that are responsible for 75 percent of CO2 emissions in 
the life cycle of a typical vehicle.  The time period for consideration largely mirrors that 
of the emergence of climate change as an issue itself: 1990 to 2004. 
However, the main focus of this chapter was to describe in some detail the 
relevant insights of the VOC approach.  The major point to stress is that what is to be 
explained in the chapters to follow is national variation in motivations for responding to 
environmental challenges, on the basis of national institutional differences, rather than 
some global convergence on environmental priorities per se.  The insights outlined will 
not be re-summarised here, but before moving on to the empirical analysis in the 
following chapters, some conclusions may be drawn in the form of suggestions on what 
may be expected to be found based on employing the VOC approach. 
We should expect to see an incremental approach to environmental concerns 
from German firms that is based on consensual cooperation with regulators and mindful 
of the concerns of society and a variety of stakeholders.  The aim of firms will be to 
balance competing views and interests via gradual/incremental measures aimed at 
ensuring ongoing consensus and cooperative coordination, while at the same time 
maintaining profits.  Furthermore, we should see firms exhibit a belief that the 
maintenance of constructive stakeholder relationships contributes to their material 
business goals – i.e. the maintenance of a well-oiled machine. 
We should expect to see similar drivers for Japanese firms, but with a more 
radical technologically-driven approach to environmental concerns, in concert with the 
state and guided by techno-nationalist imperatives.  There should be less of a role for 
organised civil society, but more for society and the nation as an ‘organic’ whole of 
which the firm is a part.  A longer term internally-driven strategic view based on future 
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benefits and market leadership should be the main drivers behind environmental 
initiatives. 
For the US, we should expect concern for the environment to be expressed more 
in material terms of market forces, profits and competition (i.e. winning rather than 
consensus).  If firms are taking environmental action, we should expect to see the 
rationale for this expressed in terms of what consumer demand dictates and state 
regulations require.  These must be addressed in the shorter-term in order to maintain 
their market position, profits and shareholder value. 
Therefore, the key perspective taken by this thesis is that car firms’ 
environmental initiatives are, to a significant degree, a consequence of different 
capitalisms in their home states.  Rather than a convergence on a single way of 
addressing environmental concerns, their divergent approaches reflect different 
institutional frameworks for capitalist relations in the states where they are 
headquartered, and in which they are economically, politically, socially, culturally and 
historically embedded.  
                                                 
1 S. Strange (1997), ‘The Future of Global Capitalism; or Will Divergence Persist Forever?’, in C. Crouch 
and W. Streeck eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, 
London: Sage Publications, p. 184.  She also declares that the problem with authors who take a 
comparative approach to the political economy of modern capitalism is that they do not “see the wood for 
the trees [and] overlook the common problems while concentrating on the individual differences”.  See 
also S. Strange, (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   It should be noted that Ohmae is probably one of the most 
extreme adherents to this view and somewhat ‘caricatures’ this side of the debate.  See K. Ohmae (1990), 
The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, London: Collins. 
2 L. Weiss (1998), The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press; L. Weiss and J. Hobson (1995), States and Economic Development, a 
Comparative Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Polity Press; and S. Vogel (1996), Freer Markets, More 
Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
3 Weiss, op. cit., p.188. 
4 For a discussion of the role of MNCs see P. Dicken (1998), Global Shift: Transforming the World 
Economy, 3rd edition, London: Paul Chapman Publishing; D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. 
Perraton (1999), Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press; and J. 
Dunning (1993), Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Wokingham: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company. 
5 The author recognises that environmental externalities are, of course, not strictly non-economic 
considerations.  They represent market failure in economic terms, and therefore are usually held to require 
action to internalise their value in market transactions.  However, the point here is more that the 
environmental implications of institutional differences in capitalist relations between states is not usually 
addressed in the VOC literature, yet that literature has clear implications for whether, and how, the 
environmental impact of economic activity is addressed. 
6 P. Hall and D. Soskice (2001), ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in P. Hall and D. Soskice 
eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford 
 87
                                                                                                                                               
University Press, p.9.  As noted in Chapter 1, this definition is similar, yet more specific than the widely 
accepted “rules of the game” one offered in D. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.14. 
7 Hall and Soskice (2001), op. cit., pp.10-11. 
8 It does so in the sense that it covers the role of the state and markets, their impact on firms’ operations, 
the nature of technical advances in product development firms are likely to take, and how all these factors 
are evolving over time.  Of course, the VOC literature has a lot to say about other aspects of the 
LME/CME divide such as differences in the education, training and vocational skills of workers, and 
there is some extensive literature on the nature of union power and bargaining.  However, these are only 
relevant to the research here in as much as they describe the organising principles of firms, and so have 
been grouped under this umbrella rather than treated separately. 
9 These include the contributions in D. Coates ed. (2005), Varieties of Capitalism , Varieties of 
Approaches, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; P. Hall and D. Soskice eds. (2001), Varieties of 
Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University; and S. 
Berger and R. Dore eds. (1996), National Diversity and Global Capitalism, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.  See also R. Dore (2000a), Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany 
versus the Anglo Saxons, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press; R. Dore W. Lazonick and M. 
O’Sullivan (1999), ‘Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century’, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol.15, No.4, pp.102-120. 
10 These include P. Doremus, W. Keller, L. Pauly, and S. Reich (1999), The Myth of the Global 
Corporation, Princeton: Princeton University Press; L. Pauly and S. Reich (1997), ‘National Structures 
and Multinational Corporate Behaviour: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalisation’, International 
Organization, Vol.51, No.1, pp.1-30; P. Hall (1997), ‘The Role of Interests, Ideas and Institutions in the 
Comparative Political Economy of Industrialised Nations’, in M. Lichbach and A. Zuckerman eds., 
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; J. 
Hollingsworth (1997a), ‘Continuities and Change in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, 
Germany, and the United States’, in J. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The 
Embeddedness of Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; R. Whitley (1999), Divergent 
Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
A. Griffiths and R. Zammuto (2005), ‘Institutional Governance Systems and Variations in National 
Competitive Advantage: an Integrative Framework’, Academy of Management Review, Vol.30, No.4, 
pp.823-842; C. Hampden-Turner and A. Trompenaars (1993), The Seven Cultures of Capitalism: Value 
Systems for Creating Wealth in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, New York: Currency Doubleday; Held et. al., op. cit.; Weiss, op. cit.; and Weiss and 
Hobson, op. cit.  See also the contributions in C. Crouch and W. Streeck eds. (1997), Political Economy 
of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, London: Sage Publications. 
11 Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit., p.266. 
12 After all, the VOC approach only coalesced as a distinct strand of comparative political economy in the 
1990s, and is one of several institutional approaches that often share common perspectives and insights.  
See, for example, the discussion in the introduction of P. Hall (1999), ‘The Political Economy of Europe 
in an Era of Interdependence’, in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. Stephens eds., Continuity and 
Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
13 Hall and Soskice (2001), op. cit., p.57. 
14 S. Berger (1996), ‘Introduction’, in S. Berger and R. Dore eds., National Diversity and Global 
Capitalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
15 Dicken, op. cit., pp.119-121.  Weiss and Hobson, op. cit., note that “the state was not the principal 
driving force in industrialisation” (p.219) and follow this statement with “American political economy 
subsequently developed in an anti-statist direction, leaving economic coordination to the business 
organisation” (p.220).  The result is said to be “a regulatory rather than developmental central state” 
(p.221).  In respect of the environment specifically, see also K. von Moltke and A. Rahman (1996), 
‘External Perspectives on Climate Change: a View from the United States and the Third World’, in T. 
 88
                                                                                                                                               
O’Riordan and J. Jager eds., Politics of Climate Change: A European Perspective, London and New 
York: Routledge. 
16 Vogel quoted in S. Wilks (1990), ‘The Embodiment of Industrial Culture in Bureaucracy and 
Management’, in S. Clegg and S. Redding eds., Capitalism in Contrasting Cultures, Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, p.143.  On the adversarial, competitive nature of reaching ‘consensus’ see L. Scruggs (2003), 
Sustaining Abundance: Environmental Performance in Industrial Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp.227-228; and OECD (1996), Environmental Performance Reviews: United States, 
Paris: OECD.  See also M. Kraft (2002), ‘Environmental Policy and Politics in the United States: Toward 
Environmental Sustainability?’ in U. Desai ed., Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized 
Countries, Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
17 Wilks, op. cit., p.143 
18 Ibid., p.131. 
19 Ibid., p.150. 
20 Ibid., p.138. 
21 W. Streeck (1997), ‘German Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?’, in C. Crouch and W. Streeck 
eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, London: Sage 
Publications, p.38. 
22 J. Broadbent (2002), ‘Japan’s Environmental Regime: The Political Dynamics of Change’ in U. Desai 
ed., Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries, Cambridge: The MIT Press; and 
Wilks, op. cit., p.143. 
23 Dicken, op. cit., pp.121-125.  See also Dore (2000a), op. cit. 
24 Broadbent, op. cit., p.300. 
25 This may be relevant for other East Asian states in their post war development such as South Korea 
though. 
26 S. Redding and R. Whitley (1990), ‘Beyond Bureaucracy: Towards a Comparative Analysis of Forms 
of Economic Resource Coordination and Control’, in S. Clegg and S. Redding eds., Capitalism in 
Contrasting Cultures, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, p.92. 
27 Wilks, op. cit., p.142. 
28 Ibid., p.143. 
29 Associated with this is the view that business must to some extent be altruistic and principled in its 
behaviour, looking beyond its own ‘selfish’ concerns to that of society and the state.  This point is made 
by authors such as  Wilks, op. cit. and expanded on further in the following section on the role of product 
markets. 
30 Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit., p.271. 
31 Being interventionist means the state playing a more coordinating role in the case of Germany, and 
having a more organic, symbiotic relationship with business in the case of Japan. 
32 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., p.49. 
33 Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit., pp.271-277. 
34 Or, more accurately, action that does not clearly return financial rewards in the short term. 
35 A point implicitly made in no author (2006), ‘The Business of Giving: A Survey of Wealth and 
Philanthropy’, The Economist, 25 February. 
36 Wilks, op. cit., p.138. 
37 L. Pye and M. Pye (1985), Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority, Belknap: 
Harvard University Press, quoted in Wilks, op. cit., p.141. 
 89
                                                                                                                                               
38 Japan has recently introduced such laws and the European Commission has responsibility for such 
matters in Europe now, but this statement remains true for much of Germany and Japan’s post-World War 
Two economic development. 
39 R. Boyer (1996), ‘The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalisation but Still the Century of 
Nations?’, in S. Berger and R. Dore eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, p.45.  See also J. Hollingsworth (1997b), ‘The Institutional Embeddedness of American 
Capitalism’, in C. Crouch and W. Streeck eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping 
Convergence and Diversity, London: Sage Publications. 
40 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., p.31. 
41 D. Soskice (1999), ‘Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market 
Economies in the 1980s and 1990s’, in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. Stephens eds., Continuity 
and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.110-113. 
42 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., pp.26-27. 
43 Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, op. cit., p.25. 
44 Ibid., p.25.  See also R. Dore (1997), ‘The Distinctiveness of Japan’, in C. Crouch and W. Streeck eds., 
Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, London: Sage 
Publications.  On p.23 he notes that “a list of the sixty-odd members of Toyota’s first-line suppliers’ club 
in 1990 has only two or three names not present in 1970, and only two or three of the names which 
figured in the earlier list have now disappeared”. 
45 R. Dore (2000a), op. cit. 
46 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., p.18.  This is despite per capita GDP being comparable between LMEs and 
CMEs on average, data for which is provided on p.19 – i.e. the magnitude of stock market capitalisation 
in the US versus CMEs such as Germany and Japan is not a function of the different magnitudes of their 
economies. 
47 Ibid., pp.18-19. 
48 Ibid., p.29.  See also ibid., p.22.   
49 S. Vitols (2001), ‘Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK’, in P. Hall and 
D. Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.337-339. 
50 A point made repeatedly in the VOC literature.  See for example Dore et. al., op. cit.; Wilks, op. cit., 
especially p.138; and Pauly and Reich, op. cit. 
51 Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit., p.279. 
52 R. Dore (2000b), ‘Will Global Capitalism be Anglo-Saxon Capitalism?’, New Left Review, Vol.6, 
p.108.  See also Pauly and Reich, op. cit., where they point out on page 10 that cross-shareholdings in 
Japanese firms have barely changed in past decade. 
53 Redding and Whitley, op. cit., p.89.  See also Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit., especially pp.280-285. 
54 Hall and Soskice (2001), op. cit., p.23. 
55 Vitols, op. cit., p.337-339.  See also Dore (2000a), op. cit. 
56 Dore (2000a), op. cit., with the quotations on pp.10-11 and p.18.  See also Streeck, op. cit. 
57 Hollingsworth, (1997a), op. cit., p.293. 
58 Ibid., p.280 and 285. 
59 Dore also comments on the nature of pension funds, and how these are applied to portfolio investment 
in multiple firms in LMEs, versus held within the firm as investment capital in CMEs.  This is not 
included here as it does not bear on the arguments in this thesis beyond the fact of greater short term 
portfolio investment in LMEs generally, versus longer term investment in CMEs, reflecting the different 
natures and importance of their stock markets. 
 90
                                                                                                                                               
60 Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, op. cit., p.75. 
61 Ibid., p.135. 
62 Dore (2000b), op. cit., p.103. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, op. cit..  This is a theme of theirs.  For example, they note that 
managers of US firms believe that “if they are profitable, then everything else must be all right” (p.44).  
However, “for Germans, value must be deeply imbedded in products of solidity and worth [because] they 
do not like it when money and its enjoyment becomes separated from worthwhile artifacts” (p.213).  
Indeed, “for German managers, money is a means, not an end; a lubricant of industrialisation, not a potion 
in itself; of value in furthering work, but dangerous in itself” (p.218).  
65 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., p.30 and 33. 
66 Ibid., p.24. 
67 Ibid., p.24. 
68 O. Fioretos (2001), ‘The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Preferences: Varieties of Capitalism in the 
European Community’, in P. Hall and D. Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.220-221. 
69 Pauly and Reich, op. cit., p.12. 
70 Dore (2000b), op. cit., p.222. 
71 A point particularly stressed in Streeck, op. cit. 
72 Dore (2000b), op. cit., p.107. 
73 By way of illustration, Dore notes that in a meeting of shareholders a US company chairman is likely to 
address the audience by talking about “your firm”, whereas a Japanese company chairman will talk about 
“our firm”.  See Dore (1997), op. cit., p.20. 
74 Pauly and Reich, op. cit., p.11.  See also Dore (2000a), op. cit., pp.24-26. 
75 Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993), op. cit., p.32. 
76 Ibid., p.60. 
77 Ibid., p.158. 
78 Ibid., pp.97-99, with emphasis added. 
79 More specifically, the “values that Germans bring to their processes of wealth creation is(sic) 
manifested in a highly codified economic system”.  See ibid., p.198.  
80 In fact, the Japanese themselves appear to believe that “the company resembles an organism that grows 
and develops, even more, it is a family with deep and affectionate bonds”.  See ibid., p.132.   
81 A US firm may be thought of as a “perfectly tuned machine” as well, but it is one in the sense of being 
designed for “responding to a market mechanism”.  See ibid., p.73.  Therefore, the emphasis is most 
appropriately on the latter rather than the former – i.e. it is a mechanism for responding to material market 
signals. 
82 Dore (2000a), op. cit., p.193 
83 Ibid., p.207. 
84 Soskice, op. cit., pp.106-110.  The divide between industry and group coordination between these 
states, as well as between them and LMEs, is also discussed in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. 
Stephens (1999), ‘Convergence and Divergence in Advanced Capitalist Democracies’, in H. Kitschelt, P. 
Lange, G. Marks and J. Stephens eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
85 Dore (2000b), op. cit., p.106. 
 91
                                                                                                                                               
86 A point made in Hall and Soskice, op. cit., pp.35-40; Soskice, op. cit., pp.117-118; and Hollingsworth 
(1997a), op. cit., p.296.  Whether or not this is an advantage of the US variety of capitalism is hotly 
debated, because while an ability to act rapidly and embrace radical technological change would seem to 
confer competitive advantages, some commentators say that the US’ lack of ability to embrace 
incremental technological change is resulting in its firms losing the competitive edge they once possessed.  
They are increasingly is in a position of always having to play catch-up with technological advances 
made by firms in Japan and other East Asian states, and possibly Europe too.  For example, see Weiss, 
op. cit.; and Weiss and Hobson, op. cit. 
87 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., p.41. 
88 Soskice, op. cit., p.114. 
89 Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit., p.289.  A similar point is made in Streeck, op. cit., p.41. 
90 Wilks, op. cit., p.142. 
91 Pauly and Reich, op. cit..  See also Doremus et. al., op. cit. 
92 Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit., p.291. 
93 Vitols, op. cit., p.339.  He makes this distinction by comparing the competitive strategies of UK LME-
based firms versus German CME-based firms. 
94 For example, because Ford is more dependent on the production of light trucks than Toyota, this might 
explain why Toyota introduced a medium-sized petrol-electric hybrid passenger car in the form of the 
Prius, while Ford chose to introduce a hybrid version of its SUV Escape.  But this does not answer the 
question of why each firm decided to introduce a hybrid at all, especially in the case of Ford as it is the 
first US company to do so.  For firms’ different production profiles, see the relevant sections on each firm 
in Part 2 of Deutsche Bank (2004), The Drivers: How to Navigate the Auto Industry, Frankfurt am Main: 
Deutsche Bank AG.  The timing and nature of the firms’ introduction of petrol-electric hybrids is 
discussed in their environmental reports.  For example, see Toyota Motor Corporation (2004), 
Environmental and Social Report 2004, Tokyo: Toyota Motor Corporation; and Ford Motor Company 
(2004), 2003/4 Corporate Citizenship Report: Our Principles, Progress and Performance: Connecting 
with Society, Dearborn: Ford Motor Company. 
95 Dicken, op. cit., p.197. 
96 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., p.15. 
97 Whitley, op. cit., p.13. 
98 These are widely-held views that are well summarised in Dore et. al. (1999), op. cit.  See also 
Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit.  They are also at the core of the arguments made in Doremus et. al., op. 
cit., and Pauly and Reich et. al., op. cit.  The latter note on page 3 that “the institutional legacies of 
distinctive national histories continue significantly to shape the core operations of multinational forms 
based in Germany, Japan and the United States”. 
99 Dore et. al. (1999), op. cit., p.102. 
100 Berger, op. cit., p.22; and Boyer, op. cit., p.56.  The point about the path dependence of institutions in 
specific societies is widely made.  For further examples, see Hall (1999), op. cit., p.150; and generally in 
Hollingsworth (1997a), op. cit. 
101 This point is made particularly explicitly in Dore et. al. (1999), op. cit. 
102 Whitley, op. cit., p.13.  He makes a similar point in Redding and Whitley, op. cit. 
103 This is exactly the point made in Dore et. al. (1999), although Dore later confesses to “an underlying 
evaluative bias” against LMEs because of a belief that “the processes of marketisation and 
financialisation are a bad thing”.  See Dore (2000a), op. cit., p.219. 
104 D. Suzuki and H. Dressel (2002), Good News for a Change: Hope for a Troubled Planet, Toronto: 
Allen and Unwin, p.16. 
105 OECD (2000), Frameworks to Measure Sustainable Development, Paris: OECD, p.8. 
 92
                                                                                                                                               
106  ‘Greenwashing’ is a term used by environmentalists to describe well publicised commitments to 
environmental concerns that do not translate into action.  They therefore amount to cynical public 
relations exercises.  See for example no author (2002a), ‘Greenwashing the Car’, Scientific American, 
Vol.287, No.4, p.8. 
107 The issue is described as a “crucial event” for the car industry in D. Levy, and S. Rothenberg (2002), 
‘Heterogeneity and Change in Environmental Strategy: Technological and Political Responses to Climate 
Change in the Global Automobile Industry’, in A. Hoffman and M. Ventresc eds., Organizations, Policy, 
and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.  See also M. Paterson (1996), ‘Neorealism, Neoinstitutionalism and the Climate Change 
Convention’, in M. Imber and J. Vogler eds., The Environment and International Relations: Theories and 
Processes, London and New York: Routledge; U. Luterbacher and D. Sprinz (2001), ‘Problems of Global 
Environmental Cooperation’, in U. Luterbacher and D. Sprinz eds., International Relations and Global 
Climate Change, Cambridge: The MIT Press; M. Schreurs (2002), Environmental Politics in Japan, 
Germany and the United States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially chapters 6 and 7; G. 
Porter and J. Brown (1996), Global Environmental Politics, Boulder: Westview Press; and S. Barrett 
(2003), Environment and Statecraft: the Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
108 Deutsche Bank (2004), op. cit., p.58.  For a list of which states have ratified the Kyoto protocol and 
the implications, see UNFCCC (no date a), Kyoto Protocol, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/2613.php, accessed 12 February 2005; 
UNFCCC (no date b);  Status of Ratification, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php, accessed 12 
February 2005; and UNFCCC (no date c), Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kpstats.pdf, accessed 12 
February 2006. 
109 For example, it is responsible for 94 percent of Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions.  See OECD 
(2002a), Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan, Paris: OECD, p.218. 
110 Estimates vary, but this is based on OECD (2003), CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 1971-2002, 
Paris: OECD; OECD (2002b), Strategies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transport, Paris: 
OECD; D. Austin, N. Rosinki, A. Sauer and C. le Duc (2003), Changing Drivers: the Impact of Climate 
Change on Competitiveness and Value Creation in the Automotive Industry, Sustainable Asset 
Management and World Resources Institute, http://pdf.wri.org/changing_drivers_full_report.pdf, 
accessed 10 January 2004, p.5; JAMA (2003), 2003: The Motor Industry of Japan, 
http://www.jama.or.jp/eng/pdf/MIJ2003.pdf, accessed 18 January 2004, p.24; ECMT (2001), Vehicle 
Emission Reductions, Paris: OECD, p.35; ECMT (1997), CO2 Emissions from Transport, Paris: OECD, 
p.52; W. Harrington and V. McConnell (2003), Motor Vehicles and the Environment, Washington: 
Resources for the Future, http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-RPT-carsenviron.pdf, accessed 2 January 
2004, p.8; and OECD (2002a), op. cit., p.67 and pp.232-233 
111 IEA (1997), Transport, Energy and Climate Change, Paris: OECD, p.9.  
112 The science behind this is explained in K. Bradsher (2002), High and Mighty – SUVs: The World’s 
Most Dangerous Vehicles and How they Got That Way, New York: Public Affairs, p.246 and 451.  See 
also OECD (2002b), op. cit., p.17; and Austin et. al., op. cit., p.20.  A conversion chart of fuel economy to 
CO2 emissions in grams per kilometre is provided in Austin et. al., op. cit., p.74. 
113 Deutsche Bank (2004), op. cit., p.58; and OECD (2004), Can Cars Come Clean?  Strategies for Low-
Emission Vehicles, Paris: OECD, p.7.   
114 IEA (1997), op. cit., pp.19-20.  As an indicator of the contribution of passenger cars to these figures, 
approximately 80 percent of emissions from transport in Europe are accounted for by road transport, and 
of this two thirds is accounted for by passenger cars.   See ECMT (1997), op. cit., p.10. 
115 OECD (2004), op. cit., p.18.
116 Indeed, Deutsche Bank believes that that “fuel economy and CO2 emissions standards offer the best 
prospect for reducing vehicles’ contribution to climate change”.  See Deutsche Bank (2004), op. cit., p.58.  
 93
                                                                                                                                               
The IEA also sees improving fuel economy, such as via switching to alternative fuels, as the way for the 
industry to reduce the CO2 emissions of cars.  See IEA (1993), Cars and Climate Change, Paris: OECD. 
117 It could be argued that another is noxious emissions for the smog they cause at a primarily local rather 
than global level.  However, there is no doubt that climate change and CO2 emissions are the global 
environmental issue of the last decade, and one of primary concern to the car industry. 
118 This is the colloquial name for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held 
in Rio de Janeiro on 3-14 June 1992.  See UN (no date a), Earth Summit: UN Conference on Environment 
and Development, http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html, accessed 8 February 2006. 
119 Australia, Kazakhstan, Croatia, Monaco and the US are the only non-ratifiers.  See UNFCCC (no date 
a), op. cit.; UNFCCC (no date b), op. cit.; and UNFCCC (no date c), op. cit. 
120 R. O’Brien, A. Goetz, J. Scholte and M. Williams (2000), Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral 
Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.231. 
121 GRI (2002), Sustainability Reporting Guidelines: 2002, 
http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/2002/GRI_guidelines_print.pdf, accessed 10 December 2004; 
and UN (no date b), The Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/, accessed 25 August 
2003. 
122 A. Florini (2003a), ‘Business and Global Governance: the Growing Role of Corporate Codes of 
Conduct’, Brookings Review, Spring, pp.4-8; and A. Florini (2003b), The Coming Democracy: New Rules 
for Running a New World, Washington: Island Press. 
123 Florini (2003a), op. cit.; Florini (2003b), op. cit.; OECD (2001a), Corporate Responsibility: Private 
Initiatives and Public Goals, Paris: OECD; OECD (2001b), OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, Global Instruments for Corporate Responsibility, Annual Report 2001, Paris: OECD; C. 
Holliday Jr, S. Schmidheiny and P. Watts (2002), Walking the Talk, Sheffield: Greenleaf. 
124 For example, see WBCSD (2000), Annual Review 2000: Ten Years of Achievement, Geneva: WBCSD, 
http://www.wbcsd.org/DocRoot/fQ4x089Xp5OEnrs0Gp2i/ar2000.pdf, accessed 17 August 2003. 
125 J. Karliner (1997), The Corporate Planet, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, p.30.  He points out that 
over this timeframe the environment began to be taken seriously by business.  Corporate environmental 
departments and policies emerged, and senior executives came to be in charge of environmental issues. 
126 P. Hawken, A. Lovins and H. Lovins (1999), Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial 
Revolution, New York: Little Brown and Co, p.24. 
127 D. Suzuki (1993), Time to Change, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, p.135. 
128 Ibid., pp.137-139. 
129 Suzuki and Dressel (2002), op. cit., pp.289-290. 
130 Ibid., pp.290-291. 
131 A similar viewpoint on the car industry is evident in Hawken et. al., op. cit. 
132 This is based on a review of the environmental reports available from the major firms’ websites, and/or 
discussion of them there.  In addition, pdf files on firms’ environmental initiatives downloaded from the 
website of the UNEP’s Division of Technology, Industry and Economics were also used to confirm firms’ 
first year of publication of environmental reports.  These pdf files are summaries of information from 
“publicly available sources, such as environmental reports, press statements and the internet, and in many 
cases comments kindly provided by auto manufacturers”.  They include sections on environmental 
reporting and when it commenced.  See UNEP (no date), Environmental Action Already Undertaken by 
Auto Manufacturers, http://www.uneptie.org/energy/act/tp/amf/action.htm, accessed 7 January 2005. 
133 US Energy Information Administration (no date), ‘Crude Oil Prices: World Prices’, Historical 
Petroleum Price Data, http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/historic/hpetroleum2.htm , accessed 9 January 2006, 
Washington DC: EIA. 
 94
                                                                                                                                               
134 P. Pierson and T. Skocpol (2002), ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science’, in I. 
Katznelson and H. Milner eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, p.698. 
135 G. King, R. Keohane and S. Verba (1994), Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Social 
Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.52. 
136 H. Eckstein (1975), ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’, in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby eds., 
Strategies of Enquiry, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, p.81. 
137 R. Adcock and D. Collier (2001), ‘Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and 
Quantitative Research’, American Political Science Review, Vol.95, No.3, p.529. 
138 Global production data is given in OICA (2005), Motor Vehicle Production by Manufacturer: World 
Ranking 2004, http://www.oica.net/htdocs/Main.htm, accessed 13 January 2006; and OICA (2004b), 
World Motor Vehicle Production by Manufacturer: World Ranking 2003, 
http://www.oica.net/htdocs/Main.htm, accessed 29 November 2004.  Production and sales data on a 
territorial basis is given in G. Maxton and J. Wormald (2004), Time for a Model Change: Re-engineering 
the Global Automotive Industry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.115-123; CCFA (2003), 
Analysis and Statistics, Paris: CCFA, http://www.ccfa.fr/pdf/2003eng.pdf, accessed 10 January 2004; and 
VDA (2003), Annual Report 2003, Frankfurt: VDA, 
http://www.vda.de/en/service/jahresbericht/files/VDA_2003_EN.pdf, accessed 17 March 2004, p.45.  The 
exception to the home territory production and sales rule is BMW in Germany which has slightly smaller 
market share than General Motors Opel.  However, it is the other major purely German-owned firm after 
Volkswagen.   Of the top passenger car producers in the world, Nissan and Honda were ranked seventh 
and eighth respectively and BMW was ranked fifteenth. 
 95
Chapter 3: Firms’ CO2 Emission Environmental Product 
Development Initiatives 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, the case was made for why the focus for empirical analysis in this thesis 
will be climate change, and firms’ product development initiatives that address their 
contribution to this environmental problem.  The crucial relevance of climate change to 
the car industry was outlined, along with its links to fuel economy, and why the focus 
should be on passenger cars in use rather than other aspects of firms operations.  With 
these points in mind, this Chapter serves as a brief interlude to summarise firms’ 
product development initiatives aimed at reducing the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
of passenger cars in use, and which initiatives firms of different nationalities highlight.  
The reason for doing so is to provide some background on the types of technologies and 
product developments that are relevant to the question of addressing the environmental 
problem of climate change.  Having done this, by focussing on the relative emphasis 
placed on different environmental product development initiatives by different firms, it 
is shown that there are clear national differences.  Furthermore, prior to detailed 
empirical analysis being undertaken in the following chapters, the insights of the 
varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach are shown to already highlight potential reasons 
for why this should be the case. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  The car industry’s main environmental 
product development initiatives affecting the contribution of passenger cars in use to 
climate change are summarised, based on a selection of authoritative literature that does 
this in more detail.  These are identified as incremental technologies; petrol and diesel-
electric hybrid drivetrains; hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and alternative fuels.  The 
summary of these product development initiatives is followed by a comparative analysis 
of the ones individual firms themselves choose to highlight in their latest environmental 
reports.  It is shown that far from a universal approach to the issue of climate change, 
there are distinct national differences.  This supports the view expressed in Chapters 1 
and 2 that firms’ home states matter, that a study on the basis of national institutional 
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differences is pertinent, and therefore that the VOC approach is pertinent for explaining 
national differences in firms’ product development strategies. 
The insights of the VOC approach are shown to be pertinent in the following 
ways.  First, Japanese firms are taking the most technologically radical approach, 
whereas the approach of German and United States (US) firms is more incremental.  
This highlights the technonationalist nature of Japanese capitalism versus the others.  
Secondly, US firms very clearly place a high priority on market forces and market 
potential for new products in their development process.  By contrast, Japanese firms 
seem to be more internally driven for the initiatives they are undertaking, and German 
firms are developing a range of technological solutions based on their technological 
competencies.  This highlights the role of market forces for LME-based US firms, 
versus other non-material drivers for product development in CME-based German and 
Japanese firms.  Thirdly, the timing differences between firms for the development and 
introduction of environmental product attributes further illustrates the LME/CME divide 
in terms of the importance of markets, and the technonationalist drivers of Japanese 
firms versus the others.  Japanese firms aim to be first on the market with the latest 
technologies, whereas German firms aim to have environmental technological solutions 
ready when the moment is right, although not necessarily for market reasons.  US firms 
are investigating a range of product development alternatives but are driven by markets 
for their introduction and the aim of selling the most vehicles, rather than being first on 
the market with them. 
 
Environmental Product Development Initiatives 
 
Given the relevance of the issue of climate change, and the direct relationship between 
CO2 emissions and fuel economy, the major areas in which the industry is taking 
initiatives aimed at reducing the CO2 emissions of its passenger cars in use are: 
incremental technologies; petrol and diesel-electric hybrid drivetrains; hydrogen fuel 
cell vehicles (FCVs); and alternative fuels.  The literature on these product development 
areas is extensive.  The following summary is drawn from reliable sources that 
summarise the trends: the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(OECD), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Deutsche Bank and a 
report of Sustainable Asset Management and the World Resources Institute.1
 
Incremental Technologies 
 
Incremental technologies refer to advances in the design of the conventional product of 
the car industry.2  They involve advances in vehicle design, such as the use of lighter 
materials, reduction of a car’s rolling resistance and improved aerodynamics (all of 
which mean less fuel needs to be used to propel the vehicle).  Transmission advances, 
such as the introduction of six speed manuals, advanced intelligent automatics, and 
continuously variable transmissions have also improved the performance that can be 
accessed from conventional drivetrains.  In addition, cars with larger engines that can 
deactivate some of the engine’s cylinders when not required are now available in order 
to reduce their fuel consumption.  But most significant are advances in the design of 
conventional petrol and diesel internal combustion engines.  It is estimated that since 
1996, improvements to conventional petrol engines have resulted in CO2 emission 
reductions of around 35 percent.3  These have been achieved through the development 
and commercial introduction of engine technologies such as electronic fuel injection 
systems, multi-valve engines and variable cam timing that have led to efficiency 
improvements in engine operation as well as increased power. 
For diesel engines, remarkable technological advances have been made by 
European firms through the introduction of advanced high pressure direct injection 
engines.  Diesel is denser than petrol and so burning a litre of diesel produces about 
2,636g of CO2 (by comparison to 2,337g of CO2 for petrol).  But diesel engines are 
inherently more fuel efficient than petrol engines because a diesel vehicle tends to be 20 
to 40 percent more fuel efficient than a comparable petrol vehicle, and therefore emits 
10 to 30 percent fewer CO2 emissions per kilometre travelled.4  Therefore, not only are 
these advanced diesel engines more efficient than the conventional ones they replace, 
they are more efficient than equivalent advanced petrol engines.  By running a lot 
cleaner than older diesel engines they also produce fewer noxious emissions,5 often less 
than equivalent petrol engines.  The technology is now well developed with European 
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suppliers on the verge of introducing third generation advanced diesel drivetrains in 
2006.6
 
Petrol and Diesel-Electric Hybrid Drivetrains 
 
Petrol-electric and diesel-electric hybrid drivetrains use two sources of power instead of 
one.  They consist of a normal internal combustion engine mated to an electric engine.  
Mild hybrids deactivate the internal combustion engine when the car is idling, while full 
hybrids can operate on either power source or a combination of both.  Japanese firms 
(Toyota and Honda) were the first to introduce full petrol-electric hybrids in the 1990s 
with models such as the Toyota Prius and Honda Insight.  Toyota sold 300,000 hybrid 
cars globally in 2005, with Japan and the US being the biggest markets for such 
vehicles. They are now expanding the range of models offered in hybrid form. 7  Ford is 
the first non-Japanese firm to release a full petrol-electric hybrid vehicle with a hybrid 
version of its Ford Escape sports utility vehicle (SUV).  Other US firms have plans to 
release mild hybrids.  No diesel-electric hybrid vehicles have been commercially 
released yet. 
 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles 
 
Hydrogen FCVs are the long term goal of the car industry.  Fuel cells are 
“electrochemical devices that convert a fuel’s energy directly into electrical energy”.8  
FCVs fuelled by hydrogen only emit water vapour as their exhaust gas.  They produce 
no CO2 emissions at all.  Hydrogen internal combustion engines are also being 
considered by many firms that would similarly emit only water vapour, but use a more 
conventional drivetrain.  The main problem with the technology is that it is currently 
more expensive than petrol and diesel internal combustion engines to produce, and little 
refuelling infrastructure for hydrogen exists.  To date, research into hydrogen 
technologies has only resulted in prototypes rather than vehicles for commercial sale. 
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Alternative Fuels 
 
Vehicles that run on alternative fuels, or dual fuel vehicles that have the capability of 
running on conventional petrol/diesel as well as alternative fuels, have been 
commercially available for some time.  They include liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), 
compressed natural gas (CNG), ethanol and methanol.  These have CO2 emission 
advantages over petrol engines, but not necessarily over diesel engines.  Methanol is not 
widely used any more because of its corrosiveness and toxicity.  In addition to these, 
new biofuels are now being trialled that are sourced from biomass stocks that can be 
used in conventional diesel engines, as well as advanced synthetic fuels.  These have the 
potential to deliver CO2 emission benefits in the order of 30-60 percent less than petrol 
or diesel cars, while also reducing noxious emissions and reliance on non-renewable 
fossil fuels.9
 
What About Fully Electric Cars? 
 
Fully electric vehicles were once seen as the way to minimise the environmental impact 
of cars, because they produce no emissions in use at all.  Car firms have all had electric 
vehicle research and development programs, and some still mention them in their 
environmental reports.10  However, the commercial impact of such vehicles has been 
minimal.  They have not been widely offered by firms, nor embraced by consumers, in 
the way that advanced diesels or petrol-electric hybrids have been.  In terms of 
impacting on the overall CO2 emissions of the industry and future developments in this 
regard their impact has been, and is likely to continue to be, minimal.  It is now hard to 
find a current reference in which fully electric vehicles are cited as a major strategy for 
addressing the challenge of climate change by the industry or commentators on it.11
 
Convergent or Divergent Strategies? 
 
The environmental product development initiatives that impact on climate change that 
firms choose to highlight in their environmental reports are summarised in Table 3.1.  
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The critical reader will be concerned that, while this table is quite extensive, much has 
been left out in such a dramatic distillation.  Such a concern would be well-founded, 
because firms’ activities are more complex than this summary, and their environmental 
reports are dense documents with a great deal more information.  However, the purpose 
is not to describe firms’ investment activities in detail, but to distil the essence of their 
activities for the purpose of comparative analysis, to show the broad brushstrokes in 
terms of the most evident initiatives that firms report they are taking that impact on CO2 
emissions/fuel economy.  Also, the author is aware that not all firms’ investment in 
product development that has positive environmental outcomes is necessarily 
undertaken out of concern for the environment.12  The purpose here is not to judge the 
extent to which such developments were initially undertaken for environmental reasons, 
but to highlight the key product development initiatives that firms themselves choose to 
give priority to in their environmental reports as having such benefits, and then to draw 
some obvious associations between the national differences and the insights of the VOC 
approach. 
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Table 3.1: Investment in Climate Change Related Environmental Product Development Initiatives Reported in Firms’ Environmental Reports 
 Main Product Development Focus to address Environmental Concerns 
GERMANY  
Volkswagen Incremental technologies
The focus is on development of advanced small diesels that have been commercially brought to the market – e.g. 3 l/100km ‘Lupo’ diesel model in production.  Plans to release 
lower fuel consumption models by 2006 are outlined - e.g. a 1l/100km diesel car prototype was produced in 2002. 
 
Hybrids 
Prototypes produced since 1986 and still being improved and tested, but not yet made commercially available. 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
Seen as at least 20 years away and therefore a long term proposition.  Prototypes are in testing. 
 
Alternative fuels 
Research on synthetic fuels (‘synfuel’) and fuel from biomasss (‘sunfuel’).  This involves working with oil companies and government to encourage implementation of 
strategies to produce these and make them available to consumers. 
 
BMW Incremental technologies
Modifications to diesel engines to prevent particle emissions before they need filtering at the tailpipe.  Research and implementation of advanced diesel technologies is stressed 
as a key feature, as are other incremental technologies for conventional engines such as variable valve intake technology; weight reductions in components and wheels; 
improved aerodynamics; six speed transmissions etc. 
 
Hybrids 
No activity reported.  There is not even a reference to such vehicles. 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
Seen as the long term objective of the firm.  It appears that the firm very much sees hydrogen FCVs as the next step, rather than any interim technology such as hybrids.  
Prototypes have been developed, and further development of the ‘7 series’ range of vehicles with fuel cells is under way.   The focus is on “the development of hydrogen 
technology ready for series production” (p.47). 
 
Alternative fuels 
Other than hydrogen as the long term solution to environmental problems, no other reference is made to alternative fuels.  In fact, hydrogen is seen as the most promising 
alternative fuel. 
 
DaimlerChrysler Incremental technologies
Low weight, small advanced models that get 3 l/100km are referred to, such as the Smart range of models.  In general, the firm’s goal is to “optimise the exhaust emissions and 
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 Main Product Development Focus to address Environmental Concerns 
fuel consumption of current gasoline and diesel engines” (CD ROM).  Other advances are also highlighted, particularly those associated with advanced diesels such as: 
common-rail injection; turbochargers with variable turbine geometry; electronic exhaust gas recirculation; and boost pressure and fuel injection. 
 
Hybrids 
The focus is on diesel-electric hybrids.  There are plans to launch these on the US market for the company’s biggest SUVs such as the Dodge Ram and Jeep Liberty.  The power 
advantages, as well as the environmental advantages, of such an approach are stressed.  Production of such vehicles for the North American market is given as late 2004.  Such 
vehicles are seen as an interim stage prior to hydrogen FCVs. 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
Prototypes have been produced and are in operation.  In 2003, 60 A-class Mercedes FCVs were produced and in 2004 these were given to customers in Japan, Germany, 
Singapore and the US for testing over the next two years.  The goal is to commercially sell hydrogen FCVs by 2010.  They are seen as the most promising technology for the 
mid to long term, but the belief is also stated that “it will probably be about 20 years, however, before fuel cell cars are part of the everyday street scene” (CD ROM). 
 
Alternative fuels 
Dual fuel vehicles able to run on natural gas are highlighted, such as the Mercedes E200 limousine (i.e. a large, powerful model).  Also, great potential is seen in fuel derived 
from biomass such as ‘SunDiesel’, a renewable synthetic diesel fuel launched in 2003 that Volkswagen is also a partner in developing.   This can be used in current diesel 
engines without requiring modification. 
 
JAPAN  
Toyota Incremental technologies
The focus is on increasing the fuel efficiency of all its vehicles, across the board, through technological innovation in place. 
 
Hybrids 
The world leader, along with Honda.  Toyota has the successful Prius model in the market in its second generation.  As at march 2004 it had sold 210,000 hybrid vehicles, and is 
now licensing the technology to other firms such as Ford. 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
Prototypes have been produced with the aim of commercially introducing them as early as possible.  Sixteen hydrogen FCVs have been leased and a fuel cell bus began 
operations in Tokyo in 2003. 
 
Alternative fuels 
There is some mention of CNG and other alternative fuels, but this is not highlighted as strongly as the potential for technological improvements in conventional engines, hybrid 
technologies and hydrogen FCVs.  
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Honda Incremental technologies
Various technical improvements for petrol engines are highlighted with the aim of developing “the ultimate gasoline engines” (Ecology, p.13) including: variable cylinder 
management system (a six cylinder engine that uses only three cylinders when heavy acceleration is not required); variable cams for different engine power requirements 
mounted on a single camshaft; downsizing engines by 10 percent in terms of weight; advanced transmissions such as continuously variable transmissions; improved 
aerodynamics; all engines installed “sideways” for maximum efficiency; and lean burn combustion.  No mention is made of diesels in the Environmental Report at all, but they 
are mentioned in passing in “Ecology” in the sense that there is a goal of improving diesel efficiency too (Ecology, p.13). 
 
Hybrids 
Developed in 1999 and in the market (the Insight and hybrid Civic), and their performance and sales are mentioned along with other low emission petrol and natural gas 
vehicles. 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
The first prototype was developed in 1999.  Leasing of hydrogen FCVs to customers commenced in 2002.  By March 2004, five FCVs were leased to customers in Japan and 
seven to customers in the US.  Their FCVs were certified for commercial use by the Japanese Ministry for Land, Infrastructure and Transport in 2003, and in July 2002 they had 
the first hydrogen FCV in the world to be approved for commercial sale in the US.  The car will be released for sale in 2005. 
 
Alternative fuels 
Natural gas vehicles are mentioned, specifically the natural gas version of the Civic (a small four cylinder car), released in 1997.  However, only 79 were sold in 2003.  Also 
mentioned are electric vehicles, developed in the 1980s and released in 1996. 
 
Nissan Incremental technologies
Rather than just focussing on future technologies, Nissan “believe that it is also extremely important to make improvements to each individual vehicle” (p.20).  Advances are 
highlighted aimed at improving involve reducing fuel consumption with the aim of reducing CO2 emissions.  These include: continuously variable transmissions; reducing the 
weight and rolling resistance; direct injection engine developed in 1997 and lean burn engine in 1994; and electronically controlled variable valve timing introduced in 2001.  
Examining reforestation as a way to offset the effects of vehicle use is also mentioned.  There is no mention of diesel, other than in the executive message and in terms of 
meeting regulations. 
 
Hybrids 
Identified as a priority.  A hybrid system was developed and released via the Tino hybrid in 2000.  Nissan has signed a “technology cooperation agreement” with Toyota and 
have built a hybrid prototype of the Altima to go on sale in 2006 (p.30). 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
“Full-scale development” (p.19) commenced in commenced in 2001, although the firm describes itself as “a late starter” compared with other car manufacturers (p.10).  Since 
then, prototypes were produced in 2001, 2002 and 2003, but the technology is seen as a long term prospect as energy sources “shift” over the next 20-30 years (p.10).  Hydrogen 
FCVs are highlighted as the technology of the future, but it is also stated that 2005 is the projected year for technical development to a level for practical use (p.61). 
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Alternative fuels 
Not mentioned other than in the executive message.  No details of product development. 
 
US   
General Motors The ultimate goal of zero exhaust emissions is stated, along with higher fuel economy. 
 
Incremental technologies
Seen as the major current objective.  Advances highlighted are: alternative fuelled vehicles (ethanol, LPG and CNG) with over 1 million ethanol-capable vehicles on the road in 
the US; diesels in Europe; and ‘displacement on demand’ that allows cars with larger engines to operate on fewer cylinders when more power is not required focussing on 
vehicles with 6 and 8 cylinders, such as large SUVs. 
 
Hybrids 
Seen as a medium term goal from now into the next decade.  Mild hybrids (based on stop-start technology), to be commercially introduced in 2004-2006 on SUVs and pickup 
trucks.  The focus is on “the largest vehicles with the highest fuel consumption” (p.4-5). 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
Seen as a long term goal.  Research is in progress and prototypes have been produced.  The aim is to make these commercially viable by 2010 and to be the first manufacturer to 
sell one million of them.  To date, the company has spent over US$1 billion on fuel cell research. 
 
Alternative fuels 
A major current focus with dual-fuel and specialised vehicles that can run on them already in the market (CNG, LPG and ethanol).  The focus is, again, on the larger pickup 
trucks and SUVs. 
 
Ford  Incremental technologies
Advances mentioned include: continuously variable transmissions; six speed automatic and automatically shifted manual transmissions that improve fuel economy; and common 
rail advanced diesel engines developed in partnership with PSA Peugeot Citroen.  Some very technical information is provided on “the anatomy of a partial zero emissions 
vehicle” (p.24).  The potential of diesel is highlighted for Europe, but it is noted that market perceptions are strongly against them in the US.  The focus is very clearly on 
Europe for diesels and elsewhere for hybrids.  For the US, the importance of SUVs to the company is acknowledged, along with the strategy that 2004 was the “year of the car” 
for the company in North America in an attempt to broaden the company’s product base.  In a special focus on the company’s (and America’s) top selling vehicle, the F150 
pickup truck, Ford notes that despite improvements in its emissions of noxious gases, the 2004 model actually has no improvement in fuel economy over the 2003 vehicle it 
replaces, with the non-4wd version actually having slightly worse fuel economy. 
 
Hybrids 
Ford states its commitment to hybrid vehicles, focussed on large SUVs, with the launch of the Escape SUV hybrid in 2004.  There are plans to introduce another SUV hybrid 
(the Mercury Mariner) in 2007 as well as a midsize sedan.  The Escape hybrid is the first full hybrid to be offered in the US.  Although it is being built on Toyota’s system 
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 Main Product Development Focus to address Environmental Concerns 
(licensed from Toyota according to Toyota’s report), no mention is made of this in Ford’s report.  What is stressed is Ford’ research and development commitment to hybrids 
and bringing further models to the market.  Ford foresees the potential for diesel-electric hybrids, but says both hybrids and diesel will require “consumer education”. 
 
Hydrogen FCVs 
Seen as the ultimate long term goal of technology development, but highly contingent on a range of factors, such as consume demand, government regulations, fuel 
infrastructure etc.  Ford has produced prototypes and has 20 of these on the road at present in testing, with plans to double this number in the next two years.  They are being 
trialled in Canada, the US and Germany.  No clear timeframe is given for their commercial introduction, because the market is seen as too uncertain at present and so the 
company is waiting to see “if the societal will and resources emerge to support a major shift to hydrogen fuel cells” (p.64).  The need for the development of a retail hydrogen 
infrastructure is stressed as necessary before commercial sales of FCVs.  No timeframe is given for the introduction of FCVs, other than that of the US Department of Energy 
which states that by 2015 a determination will need to be made on whether there has been sufficient technical progress, whether manufacturers are ready, whether there is 
sufficient demand and whether the infrastructure exists as a result of the demand.  The company has a partnership with BP which is looking at developing hydrogen fuelling 
infrastructure. 
 
Alternative fuels 
There is a belief that CNG and LPG have a role to play, particularly in fleet vehicles.  The potential of dual fuel vehicles able to run on petrol/LPG and petrol/natural gas is 
stressed for Europe, but Ford says that limited demand has led to the discontinuation of such models in the US.  Dual fuel vehicles that can run on ethanol continue to be 
manufactured for sale in both the US and Europe.  No other new fuels are mentioned in any detail, although biomass fuels are mentioned once in passing along with a range of 
other possibilities. 
 
Sources: Volkswagen AG (2003), Environmental Report 2003/2004: Partners in Sustainability, Wolfsburg: Volkswagen AG; DaimlerChrysler (2004), 360 Degrees: Environmental Report 2004: 
Alliances for the Environment, Stuttgart: DaimlerChrysler Communications, including accompanying CD ROM; BMW Group (2003), Sustainable Value Report 2003/2004: Innovation. Efficiency.  
Responsibility., Munich: Bayerischen Motoren Werke; Toyota Motor Corporation (2004), Environmental and Social Report 2004, Tokyo: Toyota Motor Corporation; Honda Motor Company 
(2004), Honda Environmental Annual Report 2004, Tokyo: Honda Motor Company; Honda Motor Company (2002), Honda Ecology, Tokyo: Honda Motor Company; Nissan Motor Company 
(2004), Sustainability Report 2004, Tokyo: Nissan Motor Company; Nissan Motor Company (2004), Environmental Report 2004, Tokyo: Nissan Motor Company; Ford Motor Company (2004), 
2003/4 Corporate Citzenship Report: Our Principles, Progress and Performance: Connecting with Society, Dearborn: Ford Motor Company; General Motors Corporation (2004), 2004 Corporate 
Responsibility Report, Detroit: General Motors Corporation. 
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What Major German, US and Japanese Firms Say in Their Environmental 
Reports 
 
All firms stress their concern for fuel economy and CO2 emission reductions, and 
highlight technology-driven solutions with conventional engines.  They all mention the 
product development initiatives already identified to one degree or another.  The main 
point of difference is that German firms stress their advances in diesel technologies 
whereas the others do not stress the diesel option as strongly.  For German firms, the 
promotion of clean, small diesel engines is seen as a key way to reduce fuel 
consumption and meet European Union (EU) CO2 emission commitments.  
DaimlerChrysler, showing the German side of its heritage, notes the following on 
diesel: 
In 1936 came the highly acclaimed debut of the first diesel-engined car: the Mercedes-Benz 
260D – soon the vehicle of choice for every German taxi driver….Today, diesels are top-notch 
high-tech machines, with  only a fraction of the emissions of their ancestors.13
Thus, German firms are developing an existing technology to its furthest point, one that 
they invented and have experience in producing. 
US firms, recognising diesel cars’ potential in the European market, mention 
them in relation to their European operations.  However, outside of Europe they see 
limited opportunities for diesels.  For example, General Motors states: 
Diesel usage in the US will depend on how diesel-equipped vehicles will comply with future 
emissions requirements, customer acceptance, and the price of diesel fuel.  We see advanced 
diesel engines as complementary to gasoline-powered engines. Concerns over emissions 
regulations, market acceptance, taxation based on engine displacement, fuel consumption, and 
the price of fuel largely dictate in which markets diesels are popular today.14
Fundamentally, General Motors sees diesel’s acceptance outside Europe in regulatory 
and market acceptance terms, and limited as a result of these.  Ford takes a similar view 
when it notes that “when it comes to perception of diesel engines, Europe and North 
America seem to be more than an ocean apart”.15   Japanese firms might be expected to 
take a similar view for their European operations, but do not.  Despite increasing their 
market share in Europe, they barely mention diesel technologies at all.  In conventional 
engines, Japanese firms are clearly focussed on advanced petrol engines.   
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Hybrid vehicles occupy a central position in Japanese firms’ environmental 
strategies.  They see hybrids as the next step in the mass production of highly fuel-
efficient small cars, and not necessarily an interim step in advance of hydrogen FCVs.  
Not only do they have research and development programs, but in the case of Honda 
and Toyota have been selling hybrids commercially since the 1990s.  Toyota is 
licensing its hybrid technology to US firms and Nissan (e.g. for the Ford Escape SUV 
hybrid and the Nissan Altima hybrid).  Although Nissan does not yet have a hybrid 
product on the market, it identifies the development of petrol-electric hybrid cars as a 
priority. 
US firms also see hybrids as important enough to warrant the recent/imminent 
release of a range of models.  However, there are qualitative differences.  The first 
hybrid released by a US firm is the Ford Escape, an SUV.  This is mirrored in General 
Motors’ plans to release hybrid SUV models, as well as that of DaimlerChrysler for the 
US side of its operations.  While Japanese firms are producing small, efficient cars 
using hybrid technologies, US firms see hybrids as a way of making their light trucks 
more fuel efficient. 
The German firms are not at all focussed on hybrids to the same extent.  
Volkswagen has been producing prototypes since 1986, which is as early if not earlier 
than Toyota, yet has not commercially released any hybrid models.  It continues to 
undertake research.  BMW sees FCVs and hydrogen powered drivetrains as the next 
step without any reference to hybrids in the interim.16  DaimlerChrysler sees hybrids as 
“an important interim stage” yet dismisses them as inferior to diesels because they use 
more fuel and do not generate less CO2 emissions than a modern diesel engine.17
FCVs are seen as the future by all firms, and all are investing in FCV 
technologies.  However, the ‘future’ is varying distances away depending on firm 
nationality.  US and German firms see the commercial introduction of hydrogen FCVs 
as 10-20 years away whereas Japanese firms see them as a more imminent prospect.  
German firms report that they continue to undertake development work with the aim of 
having excellent prototypes that perform well, so they can be introduced when the time 
is right.  Thus, DaimlerChrysler’s goal is to sell FCVs commercially by 2010, while 
agreeing with Volkswagen that real commercialisation is at least 20 years away.  BMW 
sees them as the most promising long term solution.  Both General Motors and Ford see 
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FCVs as a long term goal, the former aiming to make them commercially viable by 
2010, but the latter having no clear timeframe and suggesting commercial viability is 
highly contingent on a range of factors the results of which will not be clear until 2015.  
By contrast, Japanese firms are keen to sell FCVs as soon as possible.  Toyota wants to 
introduce FCVs “early”18 while Honda plans to release an FCV for commercial sale in 
2005, and is the first company in the world to have an FCV approved for commercial 
sale.  Nissan sees 2005 as the year it develops FCVs to a level where they are suitable 
for practical use.   
The approach to the introduction of FCVs is thus qualitatively different between 
Japanese firms versus US and German firms.  Japanese firms want to be the first with 
products on the market, rather in the vein of hybrids.  Indeed, Toyota sees the 
possibility of hybrid FCVs, so that rather than hybrids being an interim technology, it is 
one that may be incorporated in FCVs.19  This first-on-the-market approach may be 
contrasted with General Motors’ goal of being the first company to sell one million 
FCVs – i.e. rather than being first to sell hydrogen FCVs, General Motors wants to be 
first to sell the most of them.  Ford wants the market to mature enough and the 
refuelling infrastructure to be in place before it makes clear commitments to releasing 
FCVs, and likewise German firms simply see them as a technology solution whose day 
will eventually come.  Therefore, US and German firms are focussed more on market 
conditions, whereas Japanese firms are keen to make the technology commercially 
available and shape the market for them.  While US firms are waiting for the market to 
mature and German firms have the technology ready for when the moment is right, 
Japanese firms are releasing their products in the hope that markets will catch up with 
their advanced, commercially available products. 
Alternative fuels barely rate a mention in Japanese firms’ environmental reports.  
Their focus is much more on radical new technologies involving alternative drivetrains, 
particularly hybrids and FCVs.  It is US and German manufacturers who focus most on 
alternative fuels.  However, once again there are qualitative differences.  The US 
manufacturers stress that they are already producing dual-fuel vehicles and vehicles that 
can run on alternative fuels such as ethanol.  Again, this is primarily for their light 
trucks in the US, and for normal cars in the EU and fleets.20  Of the German 
manufacturers, BMW makes no mention of alternative fuels at all, again focussing on 
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hydrogen as the most effective fuel of the future.  However, Volkswagen and 
DaimlerChrysler stress the potential of, and their investment in, synthetic alternative 
fuels, and fuels derived from biomass that may be used in their current diesel engines.  
They are working together in a cooperative partnership with a range of other companies 
and organisations to develop such fuels which Volkswagen describes as “an ideal 
interim stage between the hydrocarbon and hydrogen economies”.21  Such ‘biofuels’, 
mentioned in passing in the Ford report, are thus a centrepiece of Volkswagen and 
DaimlerChrysler’s environmental strategies. 
In summary, all firms have strategies in respect of all the environmental product 
developments identified, regardless of their nationality.  However, there are distinct 
differences in emphasis, and this appears to be on the basis of firms’ nationalities.  What 
all car firms have in common is that while research and development continues on 
hydrogen FCVs, these are seen as a distant prospect.  Germany, US and Japanese firms 
are also working on incremental technologies and introducing them to vehicles that they 
have on the market.  Beyond this there are three major differences.  First, in Germany 
(and Europe) there have been strong moves towards diesel cars.22  Secondly, hybrid 
vehicles are very much a Japanese initiative, and even though Ford has introduced a 
petrol-electric hybrid model it has done so licensing the technology from Toyota.  
Hybrids are thus the key strategy for Japanese firms while being gradually introduced 
by the US industry and considered by German firms.  Thirdly, for the US no clear 
strategy is evident, except possibly dual fuel vehicles, and vehicles than operate on 
alternative fuels generally.  These have primarily been promoted in the US, and mostly 
for larger vehicles such as SUVs.23  The relative emphasis and qualitative differences in 
the way these technologies are viewed by firms themselves have implications in the 
light of the VOC approach because the differences appear to be related to firms’ 
nationalities. 
 
National Differences and the Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
The clear national differences evident from firms’ treatment of CO2 emissions and fuel 
economy in their environmental reports speak to the institutional differences highlighted 
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by aspects of the VOC approach.  These are considered on a territory by territory basis 
below. 
 
German Firms 
 
German firms are largely focussed on diesels and alternative fuels.  They were the 
pioneers in the former, and the latter is complimentary in that it allows them to advance 
conventional technologies, particularly diesel, without needing to turn to more radical 
drivetrains.  Hydrogen drivetrains, particularly in the form of FCVs, are seen as a long 
term environmental solution, or the environmental solution in the case of BMW, but one 
that is at least 20 years away.  Overall then, German firms demonstrate a somewhat 
conventional technology strategy.  This is not to say that significant investment in new 
technologies is not the case, but that those brought to the market now are primarily 
based on a platform of diesel engines and knowledge of them.  German firms embrace 
of advanced diesel technologies, in smaller cars, as the centrepiece of their product 
environmental strategies is largely responsible for the successes of the German, and 
indeed entire EU car industry, in reducing CO2 emissions.  Not only have they 
developed more technically advanced diesel engines, but the commercialisation of them 
on a large scale and the uptake of them by consumers has had very beneficial results.24
Generalising on German firms is to some extent difficult because of BMW and 
DaimlerChrysler.  Being more a prestige car maker, BMW’s strategic focus is 
somewhat different to the others for whom the prestige market is one segment among 
others in which they compete.  Because BMW’s focus is narrower, the scope of its 
activities is also more limited.  No activity is reported on hybrids and no mention is 
made of alternative fuels other than hydrogen as the long term final solution.  However, 
what it does have in common with the other German firms is a focus on more traditional 
technologies and developing these to advanced levels.  Therefore, BMW fits the 
German model in the nature of its activities, even if the scope of them is more limited. 
DaimlerChrysler’s mixed heritage makes categorising its activities more 
problematic.  Sometimes it looks like a German firm, while at others it looks more like 
a US firm.  For example, it is focussed more on diesel technologies than hybrids as a 
way of reducing CO2 emissions and improving fuel economy, like Volkswagen and 
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BMW.  Like a German company, it stresses its implementation of advanced diesel 
technologies in small efficient cars like the ‘Smart’ range, and in advances in 
conventional engines generally.  However, it sees potential in melding diesel and hybrid 
technologies and putting such engines in its larger SUVs and pickup trucks, in a similar 
manner to Ford and General Motors.  It sees FCVs as a long term alternative, like the 
other German firms, yet wishes to introduce them within the next 20 years subject to 
market conditions in the manner of General Motors’ and Ford’s indicative timeframes.  
It stresses the potential for alternative biofuels in the manner of Volkswagen, and CNG 
for its European models, but does not mention ethanol as an alternative fuel for its US 
models at all.   
Clear conclusions on DaimlerChrysler are therefore hard to come to grips with 
here, but the German side of its operations does square with what is evident on 
Volkswagen and BMW’s reporting.  DaimlerChrysler’s focus on diesels fits with the 
observation that German firms prefer an incremental approach based on refining and 
advancing existing, proven technology.    Particularly with Volkswagen, the impression 
one gets is of a company not taking radical steps, but focussed on what can be done now 
with conventional technologies to be the best and a market leader in diesel technologies, 
clean emissions, recyclability and cleaner/more environmentally friendly fuels.  Where 
investment is being undertaken on more radical technologies, such as FCVs and 
hydrogen power, such advances are being done in the background rather than in the 
market.  In short, German firms are advancing conventional technologies in the market 
and developing radical technologies for when conditions emerge that permit these to be 
implemented.   
These observations fit with Germany’s incremental approach to technological 
improvements and quality-driven nature of its CME style of capitalism.  German firms 
are taking an incremental approach with the aim of balancing competing interests via 
gradual/incremental measures – i.e. technological environmental advances while 
maintaining profits.  They have developed advanced diesel technologies, in which they 
have a history of expertise, are examining alternative fuels, and are introducing new 
products to the market in a considered and measured manner.  CME-style, it is not so 
much a matter of responding to market forces, as having the appropriate vehicles for the 
overall environment as and when this may be appropriate, and developing technologies 
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on the basis of their histories of expertise in particular technologies (i.e. firms’ expertise 
dictates their actions rather than market forces). 
 
Japanese Firms 
 
Japanese firms have a more radical technological focus than their German or US 
counterparts.  Although fuel economy is seen as a priority in all vehicles, along with 
emission reductions, and the goals set by firms involve optimisation of conventional 
technologies, more radical drive technologies are embraced and highlighted.  FCVs are 
not seen so much as a distant possibility as one that is on the way, and soon.  Hybrid 
petrol-electric vehicles are seen as a viable alternative now and being brought to the 
market.  Diesel technologies are not so much dismissed, if they are mentioned at all, as 
in the background.  Alternative fuels for conventional engines are similarly in the 
background by comparison to US firms, Volkswagen and DaimlerChysler.  Thus, 
Japanese firms have, or intend to have, radical technological solutions in the market 
before anyone else, while improving the environmental performance of conventional 
drivetrains. 
The more radical technology-driven, first-to-market approach of Japanese firms 
suggests they are driven more by internal strategies than reacting to market forces.  
They are not waiting until the moment is right, in the vein of German firms, but are 
developing and marketing new technologies regardless of whether a market exists for 
them yet, and without waiting for markets to mature.  This fits with the 
technonationalist version of Japan’s CME-style of capitalism, as well as the point that 
markets are less of a driver for action in CMEs generally - i.e. like German firms, it  fits 
with what they have a history of expertise in, in the sense that the Germans are diesel 
experts, whereas the Japanese are petrol and advanced technology experts.  
 
US Firms 
 
Rather than being focussed on a single clear strategy, one gets the impression that US 
firms are doing everything.  Of course, the German and Japanese firms operate in the 
same way to some extent, but they are more strategically focussed on one type of 
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technological solution.  US firms’ lack of focus does seem to be a conscious strategic 
decision though.  Ford explicitly acknowledges this in noting that “benefits can be 
gained by exploring these technologies simultaneously and in combination, rather than 
trying to select one ‘winner’”.25  This is not to say that German and Japanese firms do 
not recognise this point too, it’s just that their reports do not demonstrate it so clearly. 
It also does not mean that US firms are random in their approach to the 
environmental impact of their products, so much as one that is contingent on the market 
potential for such products, or specifically the potential for them in different markets 
with different conditions.  Thus, hybrids are seen as a solution for light trucks in the US 
market and diesels are seen as the solution for Europe.  Such a market driven approach 
suggests not so much a market leading or market defining role for US firms, as one in 
which market conditions must be recognised and reacted to.  So, as German firms 
define their strategy in terms of where their expertise lies and Japanese firms focus on a 
radical technology approach that may shape what the market evolves to, US firms look 
first to what market conditions exist now and tailor their products accordingly.  Their 
environmental solutions are less radical than those of Japanese firms, and although they 
exhibit a German stance in terms of focusing more on conventional technologies they 
do so more overtly in terms of maintaining their position in markets and competing in 
them. 
Overall, for US firms what is evident is a horses-for-courses approach, with 
different solutions for different markets, and environmental initiatives for large SUVs 
rather than new vehicles in the mould of Toyota’s Prius.  They focus on market success 
expressed in terms of sales targets, rather than on being first in the market per se.  
Overall, this suggests a more materialist perspective in which reaction to, and tailoring 
products to fit, market conditions is more to the fore, LME-style.  Market forces are the 
primary consideration, and maximising sales rather than being first on the market with a 
new product.  When they do market new environmentally friendly products they react to 
different market situations and provide the products that they see as most suitable, 
rather than attempting to lead the market with new innovations. 
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Conclusion 
 
Four key areas in which the car industry is taking initiatives aimed at reducing the CO2 
emissions of its passenger cars in use have been identified: incremental technologies; 
petrol and diesel-electric hybrids; hydrogen FCVs and alternative fuels.  It was shown 
that although all firms are interested in, and have strategies for developing, all these 
technological approaches to addressing CO2 emissions and the fuel economy of their 
passenger cars, the relative emphasis depends on their nationality.  Japanese firms are 
focussed on hybrids, German firms are focussed on diesels.  German and US firms are 
focussed on alternative fuels, but in different ways: for US firms this is a strategy for 
addressing the fuel consumption of their larger light trucks, for German firms it is an 
across the board strategy.  Alternative fuels are not such a high priority for Japanese 
firms.  While FCVs are a relatively distant prospect for all firms, Japanese firms want to 
introduce them as soon as possible, whereas German and US firms want to be ready to 
introduce them when the environment for them is appropriate.  There is clearly a 
stronger emphasis on reacting to market forces and developing products to suit different 
markets for US firms.  Such market motivations are less prevalent for German and 
Japanese firms whose strategies seem more internally-driven - e.g. on the basis of 
technological expertise for German firms, and an embrace of radical new technologies 
by Japanese firms. 
These observations have implications in a VOC context for three reasons.  First, 
the technonationalist version of the Japanese CME appears to be manifested in Japanese 
firms’ more radical embrace of hybrid technologies, and radical leading-edge 
technological advances generally.  The focus is then on being first on the market with 
such technologies.  Secondly, LME-style, US firms appear to be more driven by market 
forces than CME-based Japanese and German firms for whom for whom non-price, 
internally-driven innovation strategies are more the case.  Thirdly, the time frame for 
the introduction of these technologies is commensurate with the divide between LME 
US-based firms on the one hand, and CME German and Japanese based firms on the 
other.  The time frames for the latter are not as determined by market forces as they are 
for the former.  The Japanese firms in particular appear to be driven by a desire to be 
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first on the market with new technologies and new products, regardless of market 
forces. 
However, these are simply observations at this stage, more in the nature of 
suggested implications of the activities that firms are undertaking.  They are not the 
result of rigorous analysis.  This is the task at hand for the next four chapters where 
firms’ product development initiatives are examined in the light of state regulations, 
market forces, and the rationales offered by firms themselves in their environmental 
reports and in interviews with key personnel. 
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Chapter 4: State Regulations in the European Union, US and 
Japan 
 
Introduction 
 
Changing the behaviour of economic actors to internalise environmental externalities is 
seen as unlikely without effective regulation.  As outlined in Chapter 1, the liberal 
economic argument is that economic actors responsible for environmental damage will not 
face the costs of such environmental externalities without effective state regulation that 
forces them to do so.  This is because, traditionally, the degree to which environmental 
regulations are effective is seen in material terms: when regulations are introduced, their 
stringency, effective monitoring of the behaviour of those subject to regulation, penalties 
for non-compliance etc.  However, while accepting that regulation is necessary and can 
alter behaviour, it will be argued in this chapter that an institutional perspective on the way 
such regulations are developed – how rules are made - is necessary to explain the extent of 
compliance with them and their effectiveness.  The proposition is this: that the institutional 
basis for developing regulations explains their effect and the level of compliance by 
economic actors with them more than the material facts of the regulations themselves.  
Specifically, when the institutional basis of state-firm relations is based more on 
cooperation and consensus and a longer-term view less dictated by short term gains, as in 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), the effect of regulations and compliance is greater. 
The analysis proceeds by first outlining how the institutional basis of state-firm 
relationships suggested by the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach outlined in Chapter 2 
is related specifically to environmental regulations in the European Union (EU), United 
States (US) and Japan.  Given the focus on climate change specifically, actual regulations 
to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from passenger cars in use are then outlined in 
each of the territories, following which empirical evidence for the effect of these 
regulations is considered.  The regulations are compared with actual CO2 emissions and 
equivalent fuel economy for vehicles produced by firms by territory and nationality.  The 
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empirical analysis demonstrates that the toughest and longest-standing regulations do not 
necessarily produce the lowest CO2 emissions.  For example, point-of-sale fuel taxes do not 
necessarily raise fuel prices, fuel price rises do not necessarily reduce fuel consumption, 
and tougher CO2 emission standards do not necessarily produce better compliance by the 
car industry nor lower CO2 emissions.   Therefore, while there are differences in the timing 
and stringency of regulations in the EU, US and Japan, and such material factors matter, it 
is shown that such material differences are less important than the institutional nature of the 
relationship between business and government that informs the way in which regulations 
are developed.   
The conclusion reached is therefore that the insights of the VOC approach in 
general apply specifically to the manner in which CO2 emission regulations have been 
developed in each of the three territories.  The greater the extent to which environmental 
regulations have been developed on a co to self-regulatory basis, rather than imposed by 
regulators, the greater the compliance with them, the greater the effect of them, and thus the 
more environmental externalities are internalised.  Therefore, institutional aspects of the 
way regulations are developed are more important than the material facts of them.  
Importantly, it is also shown that this has ramifications beyond the borders of the territories 
considered, as to a large extent car firms ‘export’ the institutional features of their home 
states’ regulations in the products they sell – i.e. the products they offer for sale beyond 
their borders reflect the effectiveness of their home states’ regulations.  Specifically, US 
firms trail EU and Japanese firms when it comes to addressing the CO2 emissions of the 
passenger cars they sell not just in their home territory, but internationally.  The reason for 
this is that the CME nature of EU and Japanese firms’ home states means that regulation is 
based more on co to self-regulation, and therefore EU and Japanese firms are more likely to 
be proactive in suggesting and implementing initiatives to further reduce CO2 emissions 
than their liberal market economy (LME) based US counterparts. 
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Institutional Aspects of Regulation: The Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
and How Environmental Regulations are Developed 
 
Chapter 2 outlined the insights of the VOC approach in respect of state-business relations 
in LMEs versus CMEs.  Briefly, in LMEs a separation of states and markets is preferred, as 
opposed to closer state-business relations in CMEs.  This is reflected in a preference for 
markets as organisers of economic activity in LMEs, versus greater state coordination of 
economic activity, and state involvement in markets in CMEs.  A greater focus on the 
material imperatives of markets, and reacting to them, was found to produce a shorter-term 
perspective for firms in LMEs, whereas a longer-term perspective not dictated as strongly 
by the short term material imperatives of markets is the case for firms in CMEs.  Following 
this line of thought, firms in LMEs are happier with formal contracts and decisions based 
on market signals that define shorter-term profit levels, and they will usually prefer 
deregulation over heavier state guidance and intervention.  Firms in CMEs tend more 
towards consensus decision-making between themselves and between them and states 
based on long-established networks.  In regulatory terms, firms in LMEs will react more 
efficiently to regulations that alter price signals in the market, whereas firms in CMEs will 
react more efficiently to regulations based on rules and standards. 
Germany and Japan are CMEs, while the US is an LME.  Based on the discussion in 
Chapter 2, it was shown that most countries in Europe fall into either the CME category or 
somewhere between the two.  This last point is important because the focus in this chapter 
is on EU rather than German regulations.  This is because, as Hall and Soskice note, “the 
regulations of the European Union have become almost as important as national policies”.1  
Indeed, for all intents and purposes, EU environmental policies are effectively national 
policies given their applicability to all EU member states.  The Treaty on European Unity 
of 1991 (the Maastricht Treaty) represented “the most extensive abdication of national 
sovereignty in modern times”,2 and resulted in a good deal of what were previously 
national policies being transferred to the European Commission (EC).3  Therefore, on 
regulations it is appropriate that those put in place at the regional level of the EU be 
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considered in place of the German regulations.  To focus on the latter would be to deny the 
pan-European realities of regulatory settings for EU member states.  
The following discussion expands on the institutional basis of state-firm relations in 
the EU, US and Japan by introducing some key observations on what this means in terms of 
environmental regulations. 
 
The European Union 
 
EU regulations effectively are the Germany regulations for the purpose of analysis, as they 
are the regulations for all other EU member states.  Furthermore, when speaking about the 
German car industry, we are to a large extent speaking about a European industry (given its 
dominance of the EU market).4  Therefore, the author concurs with the following point 
made by Pauly and Reich on the relationship between Germany and the EU in their 
comparative analysis of German, US and Japanese industrial bases: 
Although some of our evidence draws on the larger industrial base of the European Union, we view 
the German base as distinctive enough and regionally dominant enough to be the central analog to 
the American and Japanese cases.  Of Europe’s top one hundred firms, twenty seven are German. 
They account for the largest share of European industrial production and sales, and, across key 
technology-intensive sectors, German firms hold a much larger - and rising - share of world 
production than firms based in any other European country.5
As such, clearly drawing the boundaries between what is a German versus a European firm, 
or industry, is a somewhat futile exercise because the boundaries are not clearly defined.  
Crossing them is somewhat inevitable, certainly in regulatory terms. 
The key question arising is can it be said that the EU has a VOC?  There are at least 
three problems in doing this.  First, there are methodological problems in doing so as the 
VOC approach is fundamentally one about states, not regions.6  Secondly, there are 
practical reasons, to the extent that within the time period considered here the EU expanded 
from 15 to 25 member states.  Therefore, the EU itself has undergone a compositional 
change.  Thirdly, there are problems even generalising among its key, founding members.  
As Schmidt so clearly demonstrates using the cases of Germany, France and the UK, it is 
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hard to say these member states possess a European VOC between them.  Instead, she finds 
that national variations mean they have three distinct varieties of capitalism.7  What is true 
in general for EU member states is also shown to be the case in respect of environmental 
policy and regulations in particular by authors such as Scruggs and Leveque.8
It would seem anathema to the VOC approach to ascribe one type of capitalism to 
an entire region.  Even so, there are reasons why the EU overall may be said to be CME-
like in setting environmental regulations.  First, Leveque argues that the EU has 
increasingly performed a centralising role for environmental policy-making that includes 
industry and peak bodies in what may be best thought of as a coordinated regulatory 
‘game’.9  Since the Maastricht Accord followed by the Act of Political Union in 1992, 
environmental protection has been established as an explicit action of the EU with 
decisions made on the basis of qualified majority voting.  This has created “a harmonised 
environmental policy and regulatory system among the member states”10 that has increased 
the impetus for coordination between member states and harmonisation of their rules.   
Secondly, the fact of a regional market provides impetus for firms to coordinate 
their actions through peak bodies in order to influence the outcome of regulatory processes, 
and indeed to be proactive in so doing.  This allows them to avoid the complexities and 
additional costs that come from the existence of different regulations in individual member 
states.  Firms lobby and influence EU-wide environmental policy-making via inter-firm 
coalitions, meaning that “the regulator is confronted with a dominant source of information 
instead of obtaining contrasted data from competing industry interest groups”.11  Industry 
peak bodies suggest environmental targets and regulations to be adopted in order to provide 
greater regulatory clarity and certainty, and thus voluntary agreements with industry are 
being increasingly employed.  Directives are the main legal instrument of EU 
environmental policy, proposed by the EC and approved by the Council of Ministers, and 
because the EU has increasingly gone down the path of voluntary industry agreements 
Directives often confirm as legally binding regulations initiatives that were initially 
proposed by industry.  Once in effect Directives are binding on all member states.  
Therefore, the EU is CME-like in the sense that Directives on environmental regulations 
are often proposed voluntarily by industry peak bodies, negotiated with the EC and, 
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subsequent to their acceptance, generalised to the whole of the EU.  Firms, who were 
instrumental in their proposal, have a stake in their implementation in concert with relevant 
state authorities.12   
Thirdly, there is a wealth of literature on the EU, often quite critical, that points to 
the way in which the EU moves in slow, bureaucratic, incremental steps in the development 
and implementation of policy.13  This is characterised by an iterative process of rounds of 
negotiations, compromise, and consensus-building.  Understanding the process, let alone 
the outcome, of these processes is so problematic that to view them as merely the state 
imposing regulations (LME-style), rather than the result of close business-regulatory 
relations and a complex negotiation process, would be to completely miss the point. 
 
The US 
 
State-business ties in the US have historically been institutionally weak.  The adversarial 
relationship between state and business highlighted in Chapter 2 means that rather than 
being based on voluntary commitment and consensus, US environmental regulations have 
primarily taken the form of command-and-control regulations.  Environmental regulations 
have been imposed by government with stiff penalties for non-compliance.14  Coupled with 
this, or because of it, high levels of litigation are employed to challenge environmental 
measures.  In fact, litigation is generally built into environmental regulations to ensure their 
acceptance by both non-government organisations (NGOs) and firms, and litigation is 
frequently used both before and after regulations are introduced.15   
Litigation exists in tandem with a pluralistic multi-tiered federal system of 
government and bureaucracy that sees many levels of environmental regulation possible 
and existing simultaneously in a context of “shared authority” that the OECD characterises 
as follows: 
The complexity of federal-state-tribal-local government relationships, and of procedures regulating 
pollutant emissions, has meant that the process of implementation of regulatory policies has involved 
high transaction costs to regulatory agencies at all levels of government and to the regulated 
industries. 16   
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The many layers of lobbying that go on all the time through many and varied highly-
organised NGOs and industry groups, the fracturing of the implementation of national rules 
through the federal system and high litigation levels mean that the legal enforcement 
capacity of the state is actually quite weak.  All this concurs with the idea of firms in LMEs 
preferring clearly stipulated contracts, competing for supremacy in the market and 
preferring competition and conflict over relational cooperation. 
 
Japan 
 
Along with Japan being characterised by a strong partnership between government and 
industry, it is generally true that environmental regulations have not been as tough as in the 
EU or US.17  Although stiff penalties may exist for breaking environmental regulations, in 
reality litigation is very much a last resort because environmental policy is based on a 
consensus approach between industry and government.  Implementation is more a case of 
moving forward slowly so that consensus is more likely.  Negotiated (legally non-binding) 
agreements between industry and government are common for achieving environmental 
targets.  Often, targets are suggested by the government in the form of vague guidelines 
initially, industry has time to digest them and incorporate them in business plans, and 
government-industry consultation is ongoing throughout.  The result is that when legally 
binding targets are set they are widely agreed on and attainable by firms and their rationale 
is accepted.18  Given the blurred line between government and business interests in Japan, 
Scruggs notes that the two cooperate closely on environmental issues to consciously 
attempt to shift the economy out of high environmental impact modes to ones with lower 
environmental impacts.19
This suggests the more organic nature of state-business relations in Japan postulated 
in Chapter 2, in the sense that rather than regulations being the result of collectively 
negotiated agreements, and a drawn out process of negotiated consensus-building a la the 
EU, Japanese environmental regulations are more the result of a common position reached 
behind closed doors between industry and government.  This is typical of the Japanese 
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blurred line between government and business interests, as opposed to the drawn-out 
bureaucratic process of reaching a common position that characterises the EU. 
 
Comparing the EU, US and Japan 
 
Clear points of difference emerge from the preceding discussion that lead commentators 
such as Schreurs to observe that different levels of support for the Kyoto Protocol between 
the three territories is directly related to the nature of their capitalisms: 
The differences voiced in the climate change negotiations speak to larger differences that have 
developed among these countries in terms of the roles they feel that government and markets should 
play in environmental protection and where responsibility for taking action lies.  They further reflect 
differences in the relationships that have emerged among governments, business, and environmental 
NGOs in the policy-making process.20
The US sees the problem in terms of the LME preoccupation with market efficiency and 
competition with a minimal role for government.  A more arms-length and at times litigious 
relationship between NGOs, business and government based on pluralism and a lack of 
consensus has helped to foster such a view.  By comparison, a more 
coordinating/partnership approach is taken in the EU and Japan where firms and regulators 
are likely to cooperate on setting regulatory strategies.  In the EU and Japan it is seen as a 
more natural state of affairs for the state/regulator to be involved to promote good policy 
and guide business in the attainment of environmental goals on the basis of consensus and 
cooperation.  This does not mean that industry in the EU and Japan is keen to be regulated 
and industry in the US is not.  While firms in both are keen to avoid regulation, in the EU 
and Japan they are more likely to work closely with regulators to find regulatory solutions 
in a spirit of consultative decision-making rather than confrontation.21
What are the implications of this?  Firms in the EU and Japan are more likely to 
cooperate with government in setting regulations on a more voluntaristic basis than in the 
US.  They will be more willing to accept command-and-control style regulations, on which 
they have had considerable input, rather than the idea of competition in the market.  They 
will be more inclined to consensus driven regulation rather than regulations that have been 
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imposed as a result of a multi-stakeholder fight the outcome of which may have been 
decided through acrimonious litigation.  The result is that they are more likely to feel 
comfortable with, and committed to, the aims of regulation and comply with its 
requirements more willingly. 
We now turn to actual regulations on CO2 emissions in each of the three territories 
before seeing how the empirical evidence bears out the points made by the institutional 
perspective outlined so far. 
 
CO2 Emission Regulations in the EU, US and Japan 
 
The close and fixed relationship between fuel economy and CO2 emissions means there are 
only three ways to reduce CO2 emissions for cars powered by the combustion of fossil fuels: 
reduce car use; improve fuel economy; or switch to alternative fuels/propulsion systems.22  
While the first is less applicable to car manufacturers (because it is hard to imagine they 
would desire reduced car use) it nevertheless has been the focus of governments, 
particularly through the market mechanism of point-of-sale fuel taxes.  These should make 
vehicles with higher CO2 emissions more expensive to run, and indirectly alter firms’ 
behaviour as they will switch to the production of vehicles with lower CO2 emissions that 
are cheaper to run and thus regarded more favourably by consumers. The latter two sit very 
much with car manufacturers and command-and-control regulations put in place by 
regulators, more simply referred to as standards.  Standards that focus on CO2 emissions 
and fuel economy are considered here. 
 
Market Mechanisms 
 
Point-of-sale fuel taxes have been imposed in the EU, US and Japan for a considerable 
period of time.  There have been a variety of rationales for them other than reducing CO2 
emissions or improving fuel economy (e.g. funding road construction).  They have also 
been implemented in a rather uncoordinated way with national, regional and local taxes 
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levied by a variety of authorities.23  But regardless of their rationale they should indirectly 
affect manufacturers’ strategic decisions due to changed price signals faced by consumers 
who should initially attempt to reduce their car use and then demand cars with greater fuel 
efficiency.  Table 4.1 presents fuel prices and the total of all taxes as a percentage of fuel 
prices in the EU, US and Japan in 1980, 1990 and 2000.  Table 4.2 summarises the findings. 
Clearly, the EU and Japan have substantial fuel taxes.  With the exception of diesel 
in 2000 when Japan had higher taxes, the EU has always had the highest taxes followed by 
Japan with the US a distant third.  In terms of tax increases as a share of price, these were 
much greater over 1980-1990 than 1990-2000.  In fact, increases in the 1990s were modest 
with the exception of Japan where the tax share of diesel prices increased by 54 percent and 
that of petrol by 17 percent.  The US actually reduced taxes on petrol in the 1990s and the 
EU had small increases.  For the EU and Japan the magnitude of state-imposed taxes 
clearly encourages consumers to use less fuel or buy cars that are more fuel efficient.  In the 
case of Japan the impetus for doing so has been strengthened through substantial tax rises 
over the entire 1980-2000 period, but unlike the EU where the tax on diesel is lower than 
that for petrol, there is now virtually no difference in Japan between taxes on diesel and 
petrol.  While the EU’s taxes therefore encourage the greater uptake of diesel over petrol 
cars to encourage lower fuel consumption, Japanese taxes signal a desire for greater fuel 
efficiency across the board.    Low US taxes, and falls or only modest increases in them in 
the 1990s encourage higher fuel consumption by comparison. 
While the tax share in price gives an indication of government policy, fuel prices 
actually impact on consumers and their purchasing decisions.  And there are obviously 
more factors that affect price than taxes.  Prices in all territories fell over 1980-1990 as 
world oil prices stabilised after the shocks of the 1970s.  This much is unsurprising.  What 
is interesting though are price movements after 1990.  Given tax levels in the EU it is 
unsurprising to find that it has both the highest petrol and diesel prices, but that diesel is 
cheaper thereby encouraging its use over petrol.  The EU’s petrol and diesel prices both 
rose over 1990-2000.  The US, with the lowest taxes (falling in the 1990s in the case of 
petrol) also has the lowest fuel prices,24 but unlike the EU fuel prices in the US went down 
and stayed down in the 1990s.  For Japan, despite a large rise in petrol taxes and a huge rise 
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in diesel taxes in the 1990s, petrol and diesel prices actually fell by 13 and 11 percent 
respectively.  In other words, fuel prices came down and went down further to the extent 
that by 2000 petrol in Japan was cheaper than diesel in the EU, and diesel was cheaper than 
petrol in the US.  Only the EU has clear price signals to encourage the use of less fuel, 
thereby encouraging the production of more efficient vehicles.  While fuel prices in Japan 
have been on the whole higher than in the US, continuing falls in price have reduced 
incentives for fuel efficiency, although price incentives exist for favouring diesel over 
petrol in Japan.  In the US there have been and remain no strong price incentives for fuel 
efficiency.  
Apart from summarising the tax and price movements in the three territories, one 
major overall observation emerges from the above discussion: tax rises do not necessarily 
lead to concomitant price increases.  But even focussing on prices it will be shown below 
that higher prices do not necessarily reduce fuel consumption and car use.  Before turning 
to the empirical evidence for this, standards in each territory are outlined in the following 
section. 
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Table 4.1: Fuel Prices and Taxes in 1980, 1990 and 2000 in Real Terms at 1995 Prices Adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity 
Country Unleaded Petrol Diesel 
 
1980 
($US/litre) 
1990 
($US/litre)
2000 
($US/litre)
1980 tax 
(%price)
1990 tax 
(%price)
2000 tax 
(% price)
1980 
($US/litre) 
1990 
($US/litre)
2000 
($US/litre)
1980 tax
(%price)
1990 tax 
(%price)
2000 tax 
(% price)
USA 0.61 0.4 0.41 .. 27 23 0.46 0.35 0.36 15 28 30 
Japan 1.11 0.75 0.65 37 47 55 0.77 0.44 0.39 24 36 55 
EU15 average 1.21 0.91 1.01 49 62 63 0.68 0.58 0.70 25 45 48 
Source: OECD (2002c), ‘Transport’, OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002, Paris: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2958321.pdf, 
accessed 12 January 2004, p.23.  Prices and taxes are for unleaded petrol except that 1980 prices and taxes for European countries are for leaded petrol, 
and 1990 prices and taxes for Spain and Sweden included in the average for EU15 are for leaded petrol.  Data is not available on US unleaded petrol taxes 
for 1980. 
 
Table 4.2: Ranking Fuel Prices and Taxes in the EU, US and Japan 
 1980 
(1=highest 3=lowest) 
1990 
(1=highest 3=lowest) 
2000 
(1=highest3=lowest) 
Average 
Rank 
Change 1980-1990 Change 1990-2000 
TAXES       
USA       
Petrol .. 3 3       3 .. Decrease (15%) 
Diesel 3 3 3       3 Big increase (89%) Small increase (7%) 
Japan       
Petrol 2 2 2       2 Increase (28%) Increase (17%) 
Diesel 2 2 1       1.7 Big increase (52%) Big increase (54%) 
EU       
Petrol 1 1 1       1 Increase (25%) Almost no change (3%) 
Diesel 1 1 2       1.3 Big increase (81%) Small increase (8%) 
PRICES       
USA       
Petrol 3 3 3       3 Decrease (-34%) Almost no change (3%) 
Diesel 3 3 2       2.7 Decrease (-24%) Almost no change (3%) 
Japan       
Petrol 2 2 2       2 Decrease (-32%) Decrease (-13%) 
Diesel 1 2 3       2 Decrease (-43%) Decrease (-11%) 
EU       
Petrol 1 1 1       1 Decrease (-25%) Increase (11%) 
Diesel 2 1 1       1.3    Decrease (-15%) Increase (21%) 
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Standards 
 
Although market mechanisms may have played an indirect role in changing car industry 
strategies, regulations in the EU, US and Japan have also been based on standards that 
target firms directly.  These have been introduced at different times and in different ways, 
but regardless of this they should directly impact on firms’ strategies based on their timing 
and stringency. 
Although the EU has had an environment policy since 1973, the Act of Political 
Union has seen greater harmonisation of environmental regulations in the 1990s generally 
and in vehicle emission standards specifically.25  With respect to car CO2 emissions, the 
EU car industry’s peak body, the Association des Constructeurs Europeens d’Automobiles 
(ACEA), came forward in the 1990s to make voluntary commitments to reduce new car 
CO2 emissions for cars produced in the EU.  This commitment was submitted to the EC in 
July 1998, although it was first foreshadowed in 1995 through a Joint Declaration with the 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) under which the ACEA agreed to 
find ways to reduce the fuel consumption of all new cars sold in ECMT countries.  This 
industry-led voluntary commitment was subsequently made a Directive of the EC, and 
through it more than 15 percent of total CO2 emission savings being sought under the EU’s 
Kyoto Protocol targets will be met.26  The targets are shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: EU Industry Commitments on CO2 Reductions 
Category Date Effective g/km 
Some new cars 2000 120 
All new cars 2003 165-170 fleet average 
All new cars 2008 140 fleet average 
All new cars 2012 120 fleet average 
Sources: Official Journal of the European Communities (1999), Commission Recommendation of 5 February 
1999 on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions from Passenger Cars, 1999/125/EC, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/co2/99125/en.pdf, accessed 19 July 2004. 
 
For the EU, individual car models were to be made available with CO2 emissions of 
120g/km or less by 2000 and the fleet average for all new cars will be 140g/km by 2008 
and 120g/km by 2012.  An interim 2003 target of 165-170g/km was also set.  The target of 
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140g/km equates to average fuel economy of 5.8l/100km for petrol cars and 5.25l/100km 
for diesels, representing a 25 percent reduction on 1995 levels.  These voluntary 
commitments are described by the ECMT as “ambitious, both technically and 
economically”.27
The US introduced fuel economy standards in the 1970s via its Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) program.  CAFE was launched through the 1975 Energy Policy 
Conservation Act with standards coming into force in 1978.  It applies to all cars 
manufactured for sale in the US, whether produced domestically or imported, and is a sales 
weighted average fuel economy of a manufacturer’s passenger car fleet in any given model 
year.  Unlike the EU’s voluntary industry commitments, CAFE standards have always been 
state-mandated with long-standing stiff penalties in the form of fines for firms failing to 
meet the standards for new car fleets.28  In fact, for most of the 1990s, the US was the only 
industrialised state with mandatory fuel economy standards.29  Table 4.4 presents the 
CAFE standards for passenger cars and light trucks since the program commenced.  Light 
truck standards are included because a separate category exists for them and because light 
trucks, mostly in the form of four wheel drive sports utility vehicles (SUVs) as passenger 
vehicles, now account for approximately 50 percent of the new car market in the US.  In 
recognition of this 50:50 split a derived average standard combining the individual 
standards for passenger cars and light trucks is also presented.30
Despite the consistent strengthening of US standards up to the mid-1980s there has 
been no change in the CAFE standard for passenger cars since 1990, nor for light trucks 
since 1996.  Before this the standard actually regulated for worsening fuel economy in the 
late 1980s for passenger cars before being strengthened again in 1989, so the current fuel 
economy standard for passenger cars is really the same as it was in 1985.  For light trucks, 
there is a similar story with the standard little changed from 1987 levels.  It is also at 
significantly weaker levels than for normal passenger cars.  Given the 50:50 sales split 
between passenger cars and light trucks, the effective standard is really best thought of as 
the average for the two categories at around 10 l/100km since the mid 1980s.31  
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Table 4.4: US CAFE Standards 
Model 
Year 
Passenger Cars 
(l/100km) 
Combined Average for 2wd and 
4wd Light Trucks (l/100km)a
Derived Average Standard - Passenger 
Cars plus Light Trucks (l/100km) 
1978 13.07   
1979 12.38 14.28 13.65 
1980 11.76 15.75 14.42 
1981 10.69 14.88 13.49 
1982 9.80 13.44 11.62 
1983 9.05 12.38 10.71 
1984 8.71 11.76 10.24 
1985 8.55 12.06 10.31 
1986 9.05 11.76 10.40 
1987 9.05 11.47 10.26 
1988 9.05 11.47 10.26 
1989 8.88 11.47 10.17 
1990 8.55 11.76 10.16 
1991 8.55 11.64 10.10 
1992 8.55 11.64 10.10 
1993 8.55 11.53 10.04 
1994 8.55 11.47 10.01 
1995 8.55 11.42 9.99 
1996-2004 8.55 11.36 9.96 
Sources: ECMT (2001), Vehicle Emission Reductions, Paris: OECD, p.79; and NHTSA (2003), Automotive 
Fuel Economy Program Annual Update Calender Year 2002, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/CAFE/FuelEconUpdates/2002/2002AnnualUpdate.pdf, accessed 15 
January 2004, p.4. 
a From 1982 manufacturers could comply with separate standards for two-wheel drive and four-wheel drive 
light trucks, or a combined standard.  After 1991 there has only been the combined standard.  Only the 
combined standard is shown here and before 1982 it is derived as the average of the two-wheel drive and four 
wheel drive standards. 
 
In Japan, fuel economy targets were introduced in the 1970s under the Energy 
Conservation Act.  They were first set in 1979 for 1985 targets under the Law Concerning 
the Rational Use of Energy, and most recently revised in 1998 by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Transport to accommodate 
Japan’s Kyoto Protocol commitments.  Petrol passenger cars must achieve average fuel 
economy improvements of 22.8 percent on 1995 levels by 2010, and diesel passenger cars 
must achieve increases of 14.9 percent by 2005.  Car manufacturers who do not meet these 
standards are to be penalised, but penalties are less likely to be imposed than in the US 
because since 1998 targets have been set on the basis of the ‘top runner method’.  Rather 
than setting ambitious targets for firms to achieve, this method sets standards based on the 
most efficient model in a given weight class and then all manufacturers are given time to 
match it.32
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Table 4.5: Japanese Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Cars 
Weight (kg) 
1985 
Petrol 
Target 
(l/100km) 
1985 
Average 
Petrol 
Target 
(l/100km) 
2000 
Petrol 
Target 
(l/100km)
2000 
Average 
Petrol 
Target 
(l/100km)
2010 
Petrol 
Target 
(l/100km)
2010 
Average 
Petrol 
Target 
(l/100km)
2005 
Diesel 
Target 
(l/100km) 
2005 
Average 
Diesel 
Target 
(l/100km)
2010 
Average 
Target 
based on 
1995 
Weight 
Class Sales
(l/100km) 
<703 5.56  5.21 4.72  
703-827 5.85  5.49 5.32  
828-1015 6.58  6.13 5.59  
1016-1265 9.01  8.26 6.25 6.17 
1266-1515 9.01  8.26 7.69 7.58 6.62 
1516-1765 12.05  10.99 9.52 8.40 
1766-2015 12.05 8.59 10.99 7.9 11.24 7.19 9.26 7.85
2016-2265 19.23  17.24 12.82 10.20 
>2265 19.23 19.23 17.24 17.24 15.63 14.23 11.49 10.85
Sources: OECD (2002a), Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan, Paris: OECD, p.79, except diesel 
targets which are from ECMT (2001), Vehicle Emission Reductions, Paris: OECD, p.82.  The 2010 target is 
based on 1995 weight class sales is from JAMA (2004a), 2004: The Motor Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, 
p.41. 
 
Table 4.5 presents Japan’s passenger car fuel economy targets for 1985, 2000 and 
2010.  As can be seen, targets are set for nine weight classes and have been progressively 
tightened since they were first set for 1985.  For the sake of comparison with the EU and 
US average fuel economy standards for cars under and over 2,015kg have been calculated, 
on the basis that most passenger cars weigh under 2,015kg and light trucks tend to be 
heavier than this.33  An average value for the 2010 target calculated on the basis of the fuel 
economy of cars in their respective weight classes sold in 1995 is also shown.  For petrol 
cars, average fuel economy targets for cars under 2,015kg of 7.9 l/100 km were set for 2000, 
and 7.19 l/100km for 2010.  Cars over 2,015kg have significantly weaker standards, in fact 
much weaker than for US light trucks.  The targets for diesel cars are less stringent than for 
petrol vehicles but must be met five years earlier.  Whatever the mix of heavy and lighter 
vehicles sold, on the basis of 1995 weight class sales this equates to an overall target of 
6.62 l/100km for 2010. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of Passenger Car CO2 Emission/Fuel Economy Standards 
Territory Year 
Proposed 
(rank) 
Year 
Effective 
(rank) 
Passenger Petrol 
Car Target, 1990-
present (rank) 
Passenger Diesel 
Car Target, 1990-
present (rank) 
EU 1995 (3) 2000-2012 (3) 5.8 (1) 5.25 (1) 
US 
Passenger Cars 
Average Passenger Cars Plus Light Trucks 
1975 (1)          1978 (1) 
                      8.55 
10.16-9.96 (3)
 
                  8.55 
10.16-9.96 (3) 
Japan 1979 (2)          1985 (2) 7.9-7.19a or 6.62b(2) 7.85 a or 6.62b(2) 
a The average for car categories below 2,015kg. 
b 2010 average target based on 1995 weight class sales. 
 
Table 4.6 summarises when CO2 emission/fuel economy standards were introduced 
in each territory and their stringency.  Japan had fuel economy regulations for passenger 
cars well before the EU, and the US was the first of the three with targets set for 1978.  It 
must be conceded that the EU’s Act of Political Union is largely responsible for the timing 
of its standards and that significant steps taken by individual member states prior to the 
1990s are omitted here.  Even so, for Europe as a whole the timing is accurate in the sense 
that on a regional basis regulations have been in place for a shorter period of time than the 
US or Japan.  In addition, there is evidence that the voluntary approach to regulation 
exhibited in the setting of these standards is a phenomenon that has only come to the fore in 
the 1990s throughout the EU.  This is because while it is true that variations between EU 
member states make it difficult to reach sweeping conclusions about policies and their 
implications before the 1990s, even for states such as the Netherlands and Germany where 
two thirds of voluntary environmental agreements originated prior to 1990, the majority of 
these were concluded after 1990.34
The US has clearly had the weakest standards for passenger cars since 1990, and the 
use of light trucks as passenger cars further reduces its effective fuel economy targets.  
Japan has significantly tougher standards for passenger cars less than 2,015kg than the US, 
but it is worth noting that fuel economy targets for vehicles over 2,015kg are far more lax 
than those in the US for light trucks.  The Japanese standard for diesel cars over 2,015kg, 
while not as lax as that for petrol, is also reasonably close to the US equivalent.  However, 
the average 2010 target on the basis of actual weight class sales is perhaps the most 
accurate reflection of the effective Japanese target and it is clearly tougher than the US 
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standard.  While the EU is the latest starter it has easily the most stringent standards of the 
three. 
 
Comparing Regulations with Actual CO2 Emissions/Fuel Economy 
 
The question of whether tougher regulations result in lower CO2 emissions may now be 
considered.  Table 4.7 presents average CO2 emissions and equivalent fuel economy for 
vehicles produced by firms by territory and nationality based on 2002 sales.  What is 
clearly demonstrated is that in each of the territories, US firms sell the least fuel efficient 
vehicles that produce the most CO2.  EU and Japanese firms sell more fuel efficient 
vehicles that produce less CO2.  This correlates with higher fuel prices and tougher 
standards in the EU and Japan, so what is interesting about this result is that firms appear to 
be exporting the regulatory requirements of their home territories to others in which their 
products are sold.  Tougher regulations at home result in better environmental performance 
not just within the borders where regulations apply but also abroad.  As a counter argument 
to this it must be conceded that Japanese and EU firms’ products in the US are less fuel 
efficient than those they sell at home, so local conditions have an effect, but even so their 
products are still significantly more fuel efficient than the local US product.  Similarly, 
while US cars sold in either Japan or the EU are far more fuel efficient than the ones they 
sell at home, they remain less fuel efficient than EU or Japanese cars.   
The end result is very much an us (EU and Japan) versus them (US) market profile 
for car firms.  However, although stronger regulations in the EU and Japan via higher fuel 
taxes and prices combined with more stringent standards correlate with the production and 
sale of more fuel efficient cars that produce fewer CO2 emissions, regardless of the 
territory in which they are sold, a more detailed examination of each territory sheds more 
light on this finding that raises questions for drawing simple conclusions on these material 
factors alone.  In fact, as we shall see, such an examination casts doubt on the material facts 
of regulations significantly changing industry behaviour at all in some cases. 
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Table 4.7: Average CO2 Emissions and Fuel Economy by Nationality and Territory based on 2002 Sales 
 Territory where Cars are Sold 
Manufacturer Nationality US  EU  Japan  
 g/km l/100km g/km l/100km g/km l/100km 
Average of EU manufacturers 237.67 10.13 177.00 7.55 185.00 7.89 
Average of US manufacturers 290.00 12.36 203.67 8.66 195.00 8.31 
Average of Japanese manufacturers 233.67 9.96 171.00 7.27 186.33 7.95 
Average per territory 253.78 10.82 183.89 7.83 188.78 8.05 
Source: D. Austin, N. Rosinki, A. Sauer and C. le Duc (2003), Changing Drivers: the Impact of Climate 
Change on Competitiveness and Value Creation in the Automotive Industry, Sustainable Asset Management 
and World Resources Institute, http://pdf.wri.org/changing_drivers_full_report.pdf, accessed 10 January 2004, 
p.31 
 
Turning to market mechanisms first, if these are to indirectly affect firms’ decisions 
they must first directly affect consumers’ behaviour in a way that leads them to demand 
cars with better fuel economy.  Two observable changes in behaviour should be possible: 
using less fuel and driving shorter distances.  Figure 4.1 shows total distance travelled by 
passenger vehicles and Figure 4.2 shows total consumption of road fuels.  In order to adjust 
for the number of cars in use average distance travelled per passenger vehicle is shown in 
Figure 4.3 and average fuel consumption per vehicle is shown in Figure 4.4.35
 
Figure 4.1: Total Distance Travelled by Passenger Vehicles 
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Source: OECD (2002c), ‘Transport’, OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002, Paris: OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2958321.pdf, accessed 12 January 2004, p.15. 
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Figure 4.2: Total Consumption of Road Fuels 
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Source: OECD (2002c), ‘Transport’, OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002, Paris: OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2958321.pdf, accessed 12 January 2004, p.22. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Average Distance Travelled per Passenger Vehicle  
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Source: OECD (2002c), ‘Transport’, OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002, Paris: OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2958321.pdf, accessed 12 January 2004, p.11 and 15. 
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Figure 4.4: Average Fuel Consumption per Vehicle 
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Source: OECD (2002c), ‘Transport’, OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002, Paris: OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2958321.pdf, accessed 12 January 2004, p.10 and 22.  The calculation 
for 2000 for the EU and US uses 1999 vehicle stock data as OECD tables do not provide data for 2000. 
 
What is striking about Figures 4.1-4.4 is that comparing distance travelled and fuel 
consumption with movements in taxes and prices36 reveals no obvious relationship.  Higher 
taxes and prices are not necessarily associated with less car usage.  The fact that fuel has 
been taxed in all three territories over the entire period (i.e. this policy is not new) does not 
seem to matter either. 
For distance travelled, unambiguously higher prices and taxes in the EU are 
associated with increases in total distance travelled over the entire period, rather than 
decreases as one might expect.  The best that can be said is that distance travelled per 
vehicle plateaued somewhat in the 1990s.  For the US, falling prices in the 1980s are 
associated with increases in total distance travelled and in distance travelled per vehicle.  
However, after this continued low prices are associated not with increased car usage as one 
might expect, but instead with a fall in total distance travelled in the early 1990s, and in the 
case of distance travelled per vehicle a sustained fall from a peak of 13,315km in 1989 to a 
distance of around 12,000km per annum for most of the 1990s.  Even more incongruously, 
 138
falls in fuel prices in Japan are not reflected in any more dramatic increases in total distance 
travelled per annum than are seen in either the EU or US.  In fact, the average distance 
travelled per passenger vehicle actually fell in the 1990s despite fuel continuing to become 
cheaper. 
For fuel consumption, the EU’s tax policies and the price differential between diesel 
and petrol have produced a clear increase in diesel use.  Dramatic increases in total EU 
diesel use are mirrored in increases in diesel use on a per vehicle basis, while the opposite 
is true for petrol.  But whatever the relative shifts in EU diesel and petrol consumption, 
high and increasing taxes and prices have not led to a fall in fuel consumption overall.  This 
has still increased.  For the US, petrol and diesel consumption has indeed increased as one 
would expect from its low taxes and falling fuel prices, but this cannot explain why petrol 
consumption per vehicle has fallen by around 8 percent.  Although falling fuel prices in 
Japan are also associated with increased fuel usage, petrol consumed per vehicle has fallen 
by even more than in the US and diesel use per vehicle has remained static despite a similar 
price differential to the EU. 
How can these equivocal and often anti-intuitive observations be explained?  The 
answer is quite simple: fuel taxes and prices alone are not a determining factor in car use.  
Why should this be so?  First, practical reasons associated with implementation mean that 
market mechanisms are less predictable due to the large number of individuals owning and 
driving cars which are the source of emissions.  They have different preferences and face 
different situations that may not be easily generalisable.  Secondly, while making fuel more 
expensive may initially make consumers use their cars less or desire more efficient cars, 
once these cars are made available they can drive further for the same price and the amount 
of CO2 produced as a result of these longer trips will counteract the initial effects.  Thirdly, 
the effect of higher prices depends on the price elasticity of demand for fuel.  There is 
evidence that fuel purchase decisions are price inelastic in both the short and long term, and 
that other factors such as income levels in general are more important – e.g. estimates for 
the UK suggest that prices would have to rise more than incomes to affect fuel purchasing 
decisions, and that even if one holds income constant a substantial 10 percent rise in the 
price of fuel produces only a 3 percent fall in fuel consumption.  Fourthly, the availability 
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of alternative travel modes is a factor.  In the US where 90 percent of travel is by motor 
vehicle it may be argued that higher fuel prices only serve to increase costs faced by people 
on lower incomes who have little choice but to rely on car travel anyway.37  In short, 
market mechanisms are unpredictable in the effects to which they give rise.  There is 
simply too much going on besides them to isolate their effect.  What is clear is that only 
mandating better fuel economy/reduced CO2 emissions from new cars directly impacts on 
the problem and on the industry itself. 
Turning to standards and starting with the EU, Figure 4.5 shows average actual CO2 
emissions of ACEA new cars from 1995 to 2001.  What is shown is an unbroken 
downwards trend in CO2 emissions with the 2003 target of 165-170g/km reached in 2000, 
three years ahead of schedule.  On the basis of this performance the ECMT believes it 
highly likely that the 2008 target of 140g/km will be reached on schedule if not earlier.  In 
fact, in 2001 2.8 million cars with CO2 emissions of 140g/km or less were sold, 
representing 23 percent of all sales and an increase of 970 percent on 1995 figures!  These 
impressive efforts were largely achieved by advances in conventional engine performance, 
particularly through the development and sale of technologically advanced diesel cars (the 
EU now accounts for 90 percent of global diesel sales).38   
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Figure 4.5: Average Actual Emissions of ACEA New Cars Weighted by Registrations 
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Source: ECMT (2003), Monitoring of CO2 Emissions from New Cars, CEMT/CM(2003)10, provided by the 
ECMT on request, p.6. 
 
For the US, the increasing popularity of light trucks as passenger cars goes a long 
way to explaining the worsening fuel economy of all cars shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7.  
But even leaving light trucks aside and focussing on passenger cars, Figure 4.6 shows that 
there is only limited evidence for the standard improving fuel efficiency.  Despite the 
CAFE standard being the same as in 1985, and unchanged at 8.55 l/100km from 1990 
onwards, US manufacturers did not manage to meet it until 1993.  While they did meet it 
after this, the downward trend in fuel consumption was not unbroken, with worsening fuel 
economy in 1992, 1994, 1997 and 1999.  Furthermore, until 2000 imported vehicles were 
consistently more fuel efficient, although even for these fuel economy has been worsening 
since 1997.  The reason for this, as we shall see below, lies with the structure of the CAFE 
standards themselves, but overall it is clear from this data that state-imposed standards in 
the US have had a far less dramatic role in bringing about fuel economy improvements for 
domestically produced vehicles.  Not only are the regulations weaker, but US firms do not 
meet them as well as their European counterparts meet EU standards nor with an unbroken 
downward trend in fuel consumption. 
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Figure 4.6: US New Passenger Car Actual Average Fuel Economy as Measured Under CAFE 
Regulations 
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Source: NHTSA (2003), Automotive Fuel Economy Program Annual Update Calender Year 2002, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/CAFE/FuelEconUpdates/2002/2002AnnualUpdate.pdf, accessed 15 
January 2004, p.21. 
 
For light trucks the situation is worse.  Although long-standing weaker standards for 
light trucks may have encouraged US manufacturers to build SUVs as passenger vehicles, 
Figure 4.7 shows they have increasingly had trouble meeting the standard.  In fact, they 
have been unable to meet it since 1994.  Imported light trucks have consistently out-
performed them, and their fuel economy has been improving since 1995.  Despite the fact 
that light trucks are most popular in the US, it would appear that a culture of making more 
fuel efficient vehicles in this class exists to a far greater degree outside the US.  Indeed, one 
might surmise that the only reason why the actual average fuel economy for all light trucks 
has remained around 11.1 l/100km after 1998 is because of improvements in the fuel 
economy of imported vehicles.  This is hard to prove though because the US National 
Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA), which is responsible for 
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administering the CAFE standards, decided to cease classifying light trucks based on 
whether they were domestically produced or imported after 1998.39  
 
Figure 4.7: US New Light Truck Actual Average Fuel Economy as Measured Under CAFE Regulations 
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Source: NHTSA (2003), Automotive Fuel Economy Program Annual Update Calender Year 2002, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/CAFE/FuelEconUpdates/2002/2002AnnualUpdate.pdf, accessed 15 
January 2004, p.21. 
 
While the observation has been made that the US has preferred to impose what, by 
comparison to the EU and Japan, are weaker and somewhat static fuel economy standards, 
and that the US industry has not met these standards or had trouble meeting them in the 
1990s, it is also true that there are ways for firms to distort fuel economy results.  One way 
is by carrying forward the amount they exceed the CAFE standard in one model year into 
future model years to offset failures to meet the CAFE standard in the latter.40  In the case 
of passenger cars this has put US manufacturers at a disadvantage on their home territory 
due to keen competition from more fuel efficient Japanese brands which have increased 
their market share.  As Crandall notes: 
Japanese companies have large carry-forward credits, while GM and Ford have deficits to make up 
from future surpluses.  This situation has encouraged the Japanese companies to compete in the US 
market for large cars, because US manufacturers have to compromise on their large car designs in 
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order to meet and even exceed CAFE, while the Japanese do not even have to meet the standard for 
three years because of their accumulated credits.41
Similarly, the NHTSA notes that for passenger cars “the disparity between the average 
CAFEs of the import and domestic manufacturers has declined in recent years as domestic 
manufacturers have maintained relatively stable CAFE values and vehicle offerings, while 
the import manufacturers have introduced new vehicle offerings that feature larger 
passenger cars and light trucks to the market”.42  The decline in imported passenger cars’ 
fuel economy supports these observations.  It means that Japanese firms in particular 
recognise that in the US it is feasible to sell small import runs of big, heavy, powerful 
vehicles with poor fuel economy with little concern about overshooting CAFE standards 
due to the greater efficiency overall of their passenger car fleets in previous years. 
Another way that CAFE fuel economy figures are distorted is through concessions 
from the sale of alternative fuel vehicles.  For example, a dual fuel vehicle that can run on 
petrol or ethanol has its fuel economy calculated as the average of the fuel economy on 
each fuel.43  But the reality is that in 2002 alternative fuel accounted for less than 0.2 
percent of all transport fuels used in the US.44  Dual fuel vehicles almost never run on 
alternative fuels because even if their owners know this is possible it is very hard to buy 
and more expensive.45  At the same time as manufacturers receive concessions for selling 
such vehicles, they may still sell gas guzzlers as long as these sales are offset by enough 
vehicles of higher efficiency to meet the average fuel economy for fleets under CAFE.  The 
situation is even worse because the most fuel inefficient vehicles such as Ford’s Excursion 
or General Motors’ Hummer which weigh over 3,855kg are not counted because they are 
so big and heavy that they do not fit the definition of any vehicle under CAFE 
regulations.46
It does indeed seem likely that CAFE standards have been largely responsible for 
fuel economy improvements in the US, such as they are, because despite the stability of the 
standards over the last decade the industry is still having trouble meeting them.  One 
wonders what US firms’ fuel economy would be like without them, because even with 
them the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) finds that in reality the fuel economy 
of cars and light trucks in 2002 was at its worst for two decades, at 9.64 l/100km and 13.60 
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l/100km respectively.  The EPA finds that the best year for fuel economy for all passenger 
vehicles was actually 1988.47
Japan presents a dramatic case of easily exceeding standards.  Figure 4.8 shows that 
the average fuel economy Japanese firms have achieved is almost as good as that of EU 
firms in 2001 and identical by 2002.  This is despite Japanese targets being weaker and fuel 
prices lower than in the EU.  Fuel economy improvements have also not been met via a 
shift to diesel cars as in the EU, because nearly 100 percent of Japanese cars sold are petrol-
powered.48  On any comparison Japanese firms not just met targets early, they have always 
been well ahead of them.  If one compares average fuel economy with the derived under 
2,015kg average targets, they met the 2000 target three years ahead of schedule and the 
2010 target 10 years ahead of schedule.  Therefore, the 2010 target had already virtually 
been reached in 2000, the target date that preceded it.  If one compares average fuel 
economy with the 2010 average target based on 1995 weight class sales, the target was 
almost met in 2002 eight years ahead of schedule.  The industry appears to continuously 
improve the fuel economy of its cars even in the absence of increasingly strict government 
regulation.  In a sense, it has barely been regulated by standards because fuel economy is 
generally better than the standard.
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Figure 4.8: Average Actual Fuel Economy for Japanese Petrol Cars  
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Sources: JAMA (2003), The Motor Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, 
http://www.jama.or.jp/eng/pdf/MIJ2003.pdf, accessed 18 January 2004; and JAMA (2004a), 2004: The Motor 
Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, p.43. 
 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that more stringent regulations 
explain differences in the industry’s CO2 emissions/fuel economy performance to some 
extent.  EU and Japanese firms, which face stronger market mechanisms in the form of 
higher fuel taxes and prices plus stronger standards, perform better than US firms.  
Furthermore, they do so in each of the three territories, suggesting that regulations have 
ramifications beyond the borders within which they apply.  Thus, the empirical evidence 
supports a view that the regulatory environment of firms’ home countries is at least as 
important as local market conditions.  Even if less fuel efficient cars are sold in the US and 
more fuel efficient cars are sold in the EU and Japan, the relative efficiencies of EU vs US 
vs Japanese brands tends to remain the same.  Thus, firms’ adherence to their home 
territories’ regulations are to a large extent ‘exported’ to others in which their products are 
sold, further supporting the point made in the introduction that car firms are strongly 
affected by their home countries’ environments. 
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However, the evidence on the effect of market mechanisms is inconclusive.  These 
do not appear to be a determining factor in car use.  They therefore cannot be said to be a 
determining factor in changing firm strategies.  Furthermore the Japanese industry, with 
weaker standards than the industry in the EU and falling fuel prices, has performed as well 
if not better.  In fact, the Japanese industry is up to a decade ahead of the standards it faces, 
as opposed to the industry in the EU which is meeting its standards more modestly ahead of 
schedule.  Based on the evidence presented here, the length of time regulations have been 
in place seems largely irrelevant, strikingly so in the case of the US where firms are having 
increasing trouble meeting the longest-standing standards of the three. 
The institutional implications of these observations are discussed further in the 
following section. 
 
Institutional Explanations for the Empirical Evidence 
 
The US has primarily employed a command-and-control approach via CAFE standards 
rather than market mechanisms.  The results are less effective by comparison to the EU and 
Japan.  Tougher standards have proved politically intractable because “the US Congress has 
repeatedly rejected bills proposing higher fuel economy standards and has shown no 
willingness to take action on climate change”.49  This is to be expected because, as an LME, 
market forces and competition are the main drivers in the US and so this should favour 
regulation based on market mechanisms.  And, LME-style, regulators have caved in to 
industry lobbying and relaxed the standard at times.50  However, we have seen that market 
mechanisms in the form of fuel taxes are generally less successful as a means of reducing 
car CO2 emissions due to a range of factors that make them a blunter instrument.  This puts 
the US at a real disadvantage because, being an LME and more favourably disposed to 
market mechanisms, in this case even if they could be used more their effect would be less 
predictable and efficient than standards.  
The result is that there has been far less internalisation of environmental 
externalities through regulation in the US than in the EU or Japan.  Rather than being 
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involved in a more structural way in the setting of regulations, the car industry in the US 
has instead played more of a lobbying-type role and, in the face of regulations it has not 
liked, resorted to bitter challenge through litigation.  US government signals have not been 
consistent either as in addition to not toughening CAFE standards for over a decade, Ford 
and General Motors successfully lobbied for a relaxation of the standards in the 1980s.  The 
industry does not comply easily with CAFE standards, exceeds them in many instances and 
has used the loopholes available to avoid complying with the spirit of them in favour of the 
letter.51
A large part of the problem may lie with the original rationale for CAFE standards.  
Although in place since 1978, their aim was not originally environmental.  Instead, their 
aim was the protection of the US economy against vulnerability to rising fuel prices after 
the OPEC oil shocks of the 1970s. Unlike EU and Japanese standards, no norm of 
environmental protection, let alone CO2 emission reductions, was intended by them, and as 
the US has failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol one cannot even say that such standards are 
now a mechanism for meeting targets under it, as is the case for EU and Japanese 
standards.52  As the price of oil has never accelerated to the same degree as occurred in the 
1970s and early 1980s (although this may yet occur) the US industry now views these 
standards as an unfair burden.  It contends, LME-style, that consumer demand should be 
the key determinant of fuel economy rather than such regulations.53
Although primarily comprised of CMEs, the EU has relied on market mechanisms 
via fuel taxes more heavily than either Japan or the US.  And the EU has used the price 
differential between diesel and petrol to encourage the use of diesel cars as a way of 
reducing CO2 emissions due to their greater efficiency.  This is certainly working.  Even so, 
the lack of correlation between high fuel prices and car usage, plus the steady level of taxes 
in the EU as a proportion of fuel prices in the 1990s, cannot explain why firms committed 
to 25 percent reductions in CO2 emissions on 1995 levels.  These were proposed by the 
industry itself, not imposed by the EC.  Instead, in keeping with the CME nature of EU 
institutions for environmental regulation, a better explanation is that EU states and firms 
prefer a cooperative approach to car CO2 emission standards, based on voluntary 
agreements between industry and regulators.  Indeed, this is increasingly the case in other 
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aspects of environmental regulation for which there are now over 300 voluntary 
agreements.54
Voluntary agreements are not uncontroversial due to the lack of coercion via the 
threat of sanctions.55  While this concern is valid, it is still the case that the conditions 
underpinning the EU industry’s commitments are very much those one would expect of a 
CME, namely a strong industry association that represents a large share of the market, 
higher levels of trust between government and industry and a concern that regulations not 
impact adversely on economic competitiveness.56  The industry has coordinated its actions 
to head-off competitive bargaining by presenting a united front to cooperate with public 
regulatory bodies in a manner that has not occurred in the US.  In addition, commitment to 
the imperative of reducing CO2 emissions is stronger because only the EU specifically 
targets CO2 reductions in g/km rather than focussing on fuel economy.  In other words, 
while fuel economy and CO2 emissions are linked and regulations for either largely serve 
the same purpose, the focus for the EU is specifically on climate change.  
It has been shown that Japanese firms are acting well in advance of imposed 
standards, and that these to a large degree follow rather than lead changes in firm behaviour.  
Fuel taxes provide less of an imperative than in the EU, but in any case falling fuel prices 
are associated with highly fuel efficient cars.  Therefore, it is in the institutional framework 
for standard setting that answers are to be found.  In this regard, the top runner method of 
setting fuel efficiency/ CO2 emission standards effectively enshrines competition on the 
basis of fuel efficiency in the Japanese industry.  This is because the top runner method sets 
standards based on manufacturers who are producers of the most efficient cars.  Less 
efficient firms must catch up with them so those who are in the lead effectively set the 
regulatory pace.  Therefore, rather than setting an ambitious target to achieve the Japanese 
system is based more on a minimum floor as the standard is based on what is already 
attainable by the most efficient producers.  In so doing, competitive pressures have been 
built into the industry that see firms producing vehicles with ever higher fuel efficiency 
well in advance and excess of government standards.  The industry has internalised fuel 
efficiency as a norm because of the institutional structure of government-business relations 
and the reflection of this in the manner in which standards are set. 
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The observation that the institutional framework of Japanese standard setting means 
that firms are asked to do no more than meet what is already industry best practice is 
consistent with the general observation of the CME-nature of Japanese regulation: the 
government rarely imposes unattainable targets and rarely resorts to coercion.  In turn, 
business rarely resorts to litigation or other forms of direct confrontation to avoid 
regulations.  Instead, the approach taken is one characterised by the state suggesting the 
strategic direction to which industry responds as a challenge.  The following observation by 
Arima is worth noting: 
If a certain manufacturer or importer cannot comply with the target by the target year, the MITI 
Minister will issue (sic) recommendation to it, and if it fails to abide by the recommendation, its 
name will be made public or (sic) administrative order will be issued.  This provides a very strong 
incentive for manufacturers and importers to comply with the Top Runner targets.57
In other words, rather than stressing legal or financial penalties for non-compliance, the 
Japanese system focuses on damage to reputation and relationships.  As one would expect 
of a CME, these are highly important and damage to them is a major concern of the 
industry. 
 
The Institutional Basis for Internalising Environmental Externalities 
 
If one was to summarise the effect of state-business relations in causal terms, it would thus 
look something like Figure 4.9.  Three levels are proposed: self-regulation (US), co-
regulation (EU) and co-regulation where firms have to some extent taken the lead 
(Japan).58   These speak to the relationship between government and industry in terms of 
dependent and independent variables, in the sense of where environmental improvements 
are likely to be initiated.  The implications are that firms in the EU and Japan are more 
likely to not just comply with regulations, but go beyond compliance to internalise 
environmental externalities to a greater degree than their counterparts in the US. 
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Figure 4.9: Regulation in Terms of Dependent and Independent Variables 
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The EU and Japan both take an approach based on co-regulation.  The industry 
proposes solutions that are then backed with regulatory standards.  In the EU a strong 
coalition of car manufacturers represented by the ACEA made commitments that were 
subsequently adopted as a Directive.  These commitments were made in advance of any 
mandated by the EC.  Although the negotiations on the commitment were tough and have 
been subject to criticism, the end result is a cooperative agreement on standards described 
by the ACEA as reflecting a “partnership based on mutual trust”.59  In other words, there is 
a shared norm between the industry and the EC for reducing CO2 emissions based on 
consensus and cooperation.  What exists is not so much a case of self-regulation by the 
industry, but co-regulation between its peak body and the EC: “a hybrid form between self 
and public regulation for, like self-regulation, the set of measures to achieve the 
environmental target is set by the industry whereas, like public regulation, the 
environmental objectives continue to be set by public authorities”.60  The result is that 
firms’ collective action is more likely plus the chance of free riding is reduced because of 
regulatory involvement by authorities as well as the industry itself.61  The ACEA and the 
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EC are working together in a relationship that is structural, rather than just a matter of good 
communications or lobbying by industry to government.   
Japan tends to articulate targets or put policies ‘out there’: to signal to industry what 
is expected on the basis of current best practice with the industry responding before strong 
targets are set.  In the case of CO2 emissions, this amounts to fuel economy targets with 
long lead times.62  This regulatory culture, enhanced by the top runner method of setting 
standards, has entrenched a norm of continuous improvement in fuel economy as part of 
doing business.  In this vein, the point was made earlier that sustained fuel economy 
improvements commenced the year before the introduction of the top runner method of 
setting standards in 1998.  This suggests that the foreshadowing of the introduction of the 
2010 target on this basis, as well as its actual introduction, impacted on industry strategies.  
JAMA loudly proclaims the Japanese industry’s successes and leadership in producing the 
cleanest and most efficient vehicles in the world.  The organisation says that the Japanese 
car industry sees its challenge as producing the world’s cleanest vehicles.63  On CO2 
emissions specifically, JAMA says that “Japan’s automobile manufacturers consider 
increased fuel economy a top-priority issue and are therefore committed to, and actively 
engaged in, research and development aimed at the achievement of this goal”.64  JAMA 
proudly reports that regardless of fuel economy targets set by government, “greater cuts in 
CO2 emissions are on the way for the transport sector overall and the automobile industry is 
responding by voluntarily making a number of bold moves”.65  Clearly, there is an attitude 
present that the environmentally-friendly nature of the industry’s product with respect to 
CO2 emissions is a competitive strength to be loudly proclaimed, not a millstone around its 
neck.  As such, Japanese firms seek to meet standards ahead of the target year as a way of 
improving their corporate image.66
For the US, there is no discernable norm of increasing fuel economy/reducing CO2 
emissions.  Government neither taxes fuel sufficiently nor is proactive enough in 
demanding effective fuel economy improvements.  The industry does not recommend 
improvements in its product’s efficiency, but instead the relationship between state and 
industry is adversarial and the industry continues to oppose CAFE regulations.  The 
industry’s peak body, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM), is not supportive 
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in its position statements on CAFE and sees market forces as a more natural determinant of 
what cars should be offered.  It asserts that US consumers demand less efficient cars, so the 
industry cannot be held responsible for worsening fuel economy: 
The only way to control carbon dioxide emissions is to reduce fuel combustion, which requires 
making the vehicle smaller, lighted and less powerful….We make more than 30 different models that 
get 30 miles per gallon or better.  Very few consumers buy them.67
Rather than seeing fuel economy as its responsibility, the industry believes the US 
government should provide subsidies to consumers for the purchase of “advanced 
technology vehicles”.68  What is left in the absence of cooperation is instead a battle 
between regulators and the industry.  If the industry seeks to do anything other than what is 
required by government, it is a matter of avoiding or weakening what already amount to 
comparatively weaker regulations.  For the US the result is that CO2 emission reductions 
are not taken as seriously or proactively in business strategies as in the EU or Japan. 
At the end of the day, EU and Japanese firms are now in the position of having 
more environmentally-friendly products and facing lower adjustment costs in meeting any 
future regulations than US firms.  The car industry’s behaviour is becoming the 
independent variable that affects the dependent variable of government policy in the EU 
and Japan so that the need for strong government leadership on regulations is less necessary 
than in the US.  Regulators in the EU and Japan are now following the industry in 
legislating for emission reductions rather than the other way around.  This suggests greater 
internalisation of environmental externalities by the industry, and therefore a normative 
change in attitude about how business is to be conducted rather than just a change in 
behaviour in reaction to regulations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is easy to assume that the strictest and most enduring regulations must explain firm 
behaviour when considering environmental problems.  Therefore, one is always tempted to 
ask who has the toughest standards, the highest prices, the strongest enforcement measures, 
and the toughest penalties for non-compliance.  However, the evidence presented in this 
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chapter has demonstrated that only asking such material questions cannot answer questions 
such as the degree to which industry complies with regulations, its support for them, and 
whether it is leading or following such regulations.  These are questions that ultimately 
relate to attitudes and interests, rather than just behaviour, because they do not only ask 
whether firms comply with regulations, but go beyond this to seek answers to qualitative 
questions of how well they comply, whether they are likely to continue doing so, and 
whether they are likely to lead change in future or only respond to what is demanded of 
them. 
The evidence presented has shown that the institutional nature of state-firm relations 
is the determining factor for the car industry’s CO2 emission reductions, rather than the 
material factors of the longest-standing or most stringent regulations.  It has been shown 
that although the timing of regulatory standards is less important than their stringency, even 
the latter is not necessarily a determining factor for firm behaviour (e.g. Japan’s weaker 
regulations produce at least as strong results as the EU’s).  The argument that market 
mechanisms in the form of point-of-sale fuel taxes and higher fuel prices change consumer, 
and ultimately firm, behaviour has also been shown to be false.  The different institutional 
factors underpinning regulation in the EU, US and Japan better explain the car industry’s 
approach to, and thence outcome of, regulations. 
Even in an age of globalisation, different institutional arrangements have 
ramifications beyond the borders of states.  While investment and production are 
increasingly international and trade freer, the importance of the regulatory environment in 
car firm’s home states has been shown to override any notions of the ‘stateless’ corporation.  
Institutional features in firms’ home territories remain important in explaining industry 
performance.  To a large extent car firms ‘export’ the institutional features of their home 
states’ regulations in the products they sell.  In all the territories in which they operate 
Japanese and European firms are more likely to sell cars that are more fuel efficient and 
produce less CO2 emissions than US firms.  The institutional features of firms’ home 
territories in terms of whether they have attributes more closely associated with LMEs (the 
US) or CMEs (the EU and Japan), which result in a less or greater co-regulatory approach 
to setting regulations, mean that US firms are behind EU and Japanese firms when it comes 
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to addressing CO2 emissions not just in their home territory but internationally.  
Institutional differences mean that EU and Japanese firms are more likely to be proactive in 
suggesting and implementing initiatives to further reduce CO2 emissions because the CME-
nature of their home territories means that regulation is based more on co-regulation. 
The implications of these results may go beyond environmental concerns alone.  It 
may also be true that US firms are at a disadvantage in a competitive sense if consumer 
demand is increasingly informed by environmental performance, or if one accepts the view 
that there is a positive relationship between environmental protection and economic 
prosperity.69  Neither regulations nor the LME institutional framework in which they have 
been developed in the US have helped to change its industry’s behaviour, nor created an 
environment in which more efficient vehicles are regarded more favourably. 
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Chapter 5: Market Forces: Social Attitudes versus Consumer 
Demand 
 
Introduction 
 
Exogenous sources of change can broadly come from two directions: ‘top-down’ (the state) 
or ‘bottom-up’ (society).  In Chapter 4 the former was considered in the form of state 
regulations.  The conclusion reached was that the institutional basis for developing 
regulations, specifically whether state-business relations are more those one would find in a 
liberal market economy (LME) versus a coordinated market economy (CME), is more 
relevant than material factors such as the stringency and timing of regulations.  Institutional 
factors were found to be the main determinant of the degree to which firms embrace change 
in respect of the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions/fuel economy of their products.  The more 
CME institutional framework of the European Union (EU) and Japan results in a co-
regulatory to self-regulatory relationship between business and regulators.  The result is 
greater internalisation of environmental externalities via CO2 emission/fuel economy 
improvements because firms’ commitments are increasingly the independent variable, 
rather than being dependent on regulatory intervention.  By contrast, state regulations 
remain very much the independent variable for the LME-based United States (US) industry.  
This has led to significantly less acceptance of the need to reduce CO2 emissions/increase 
fuel economy. 
Another pertinent finding of Chapter 4 was the relative ineffectiveness of market 
mechanisms in the form of taxes and prices as a determinant of consumer behaviour.  While 
market mechanisms are a favoured solution by those who see environmental problems as 
the result of externalities, so that prices need to be altered to reflect costs to the 
environment arising from economic activity, the evidence presented in Chapter 4 showed 
that market mechanisms do not have the effects postulated: they are neither associated with 
reduced fuel consumption nor distance travelled and therefore cannot be said to (indirectly) 
affect firm strategies.  Focussing on markets, apart from market mechanisms, the other 
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material explanation for firms’ improved environmental-friendliness that is often promoted 
is that increased social concern for the environment finds expression in markets via 
consumers’ revealed preferences.  This represents a ‘bottom-up’ source of change because 
it is said that environmental externalities are being internalised as a result of the expression 
of consumers’ increased environmental concerns.  This is the focus of this chapter. 
Commentators on corporations and ecological sustainability who believe increased 
concern for the environment within society is being materially manifested in markets 
include Korten, Hawken et al, and Karliner.1  They identify an emerging shift towards 
more ecologically sustainable practices in international capitalism as a result.  Therefore, 
capitalist relations are shifting away from a concern for simple profit maximisation to more 
holistic motivations for maximising sustainability in the use of the world’s resources.  
Industry groups such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) also see increased environmental concern as offering commercial opportunities, 
as well as demanding more environmentally-responsible behaviour on the part of business 
for long term economic sustainability.2  Similarly, commentators such as Porter and van 
der Linde see environmentally responsible behaviour as a way of business being more 
efficient and profitable.  Others such as Florini and Prakash see this as part of the reason 
why ‘private authority’ is increasingly taking responsibility for the environmental effects of 
profit-motivated action.3
Such viewpoints reflect the perspective that there is a growing movement towards 
post-materialist values in industrialised societies.  Post-materialism is used to describe an 
increased awareness and concern for issues of collective social concern, rather than 
individual economic wellbeing.  This includes increased concern for the environment.  
Authors such as Inglehart and Desai see such a shift as meaning that politics is now less 
defined in terms of left versus right, and more in terms of materialism versus post-
materialism. Thus, politics is increasingly defined in industrialised societies as a matter of 
material values such as the economy, standards of living and wealth creation versus 
concern for post-materialist values such as gender relations, racial harmony, human rights 
and the environment, with a shift in focus in progress towards the latter.4
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A shift towards post-materialist values should lead to institutional change because, 
as O’Riordan and Jordan note in respect of the question of climate change, social attitudes 
need “neither structure nor regulation, but they are most certainly institutional 
arrangements”.5  Thus, commentators on the role of civil society such as Wapner perceive a 
“shift in the ‘balance of legitimacy’ in environmental issues” that started in the late 1980s 
and early  1990s which means that “environmental concern now enjoys a broad base of 
support” that represents a change in “values, attitudes and practices”.6  Indeed, Wapner 
sees the shift as so profound that he characterizes it as follows: 
When corporations, households, communities, and farmers take these [environmental] measures it is 
not because governments are breathing down their necks.  They are pursuing environmentally sound 
practices because they are aware of the severity of environmental problems and want to contribute to 
alleviating such dangers.  They are being ‘stung’, as it were, by an ecological sensibility.  This sting 
is a type of governance.  It represents a mechanism of authority that is able to shape human 
behaviour.7
In essence, a shift in social attitudes is said to have ‘mainstreamed’ the environment and led 
to a shift in behaviour by all social, political and economic groups. 
This chapter examines such broad claims to see if they are true in practice for the 
car industry.  The central question is whether growing social concern for the environment 
in the industry’s three major hubs - Germany, the US and Japan - may be said to be a cause 
of change, making firms more conscious of the need to address the environmental impact of 
their products.  In order to answer this question, answers will be sought to the following 
two questions.  First, are social attitudes associated with consumer demand?  This will 
involve a comparison of trends in social attitudes in Germany, the US and Japan versus 
trends in consumer demand for cars.  Secondly, (depending on the answer to the first 
question) is it reasonable to say that social concern for the environment is likely to change 
corporate strategies and the products offered by the car industry?  The answer, putting it 
simply, is found to be that social concern for the environment is not clearly related to 
consumer demand.  Therefore, any changes in the environmental performance of car firms’ 
products cannot be clearly said to be explained by changing social sentiments mediated 
through markets. 
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Data from the World Values Survey (WVS), a global survey of social attitudes, is 
used to comparatively analyse social concern for the environment in each territory.  The 
social attitudes considered are respondents’ stated concern for the environment, willingness 
to take direct action in markets and willingness to take non-market action in respect of their 
environmental concerns.  Apart from a shared strong concern for the environment by 
respondents from Germany, the US and Japan, it is shown that there are significant 
variations in willingness to take action on the basis of this concern – e.g. German and US 
respondents are more willing to take direct market action than Japanese respondents.  
Detailed data on the CO2 emissions of new passenger cars sold in Germany, the US and 
Japan is then examined.  Fuel economy is considered, because of its direct relationship to 
CO2 emissions of passenger cars in use, along with attributes of cars purchased that impact 
on it: sales of light trucks as passenger vehicles; engine size; car class; diesel-powered 
vehicles; and alternatively powered vehicles.  It is found that there is no clear-cut 
relationship between social attitudes and actual market outcomes – e.g. good environmental 
outcomes through car sales in Japan are not clearly traceable back to social concern for the 
environment. 
Looking at the results through an institutional lens, focussing on the role of market 
versus non-market forces, the effects of government regulations, the role of technology and 
the path dependence of established competitive advantages, leads to the following 
conclusions.  Social concern for the environment is not a universal cause of change, 
because the effect of it is not necessarily related to its magnitude.  Only in the case of 
Germany may it be said that the post-materialist values thesis is supported by the evidence, 
with social concern reflected in consumers’ purchasing decisions and firms’ product 
offerings.  Although even in this case it will be shown that it is not clear that concern for 
the environment is what is driving actual consumer behaviour.  In Japan, government 
regulations and industry strategic decisions seem to be leading rather than following such 
attitudes.  In the US, despite strong social concern for the environment, a materialist 
analysis appears to remain most pertinent.  This is because the industry is much more 
reactive to market forces which do not support a move to more environmentally-friendly 
vehicles.  These conclusions are shown to support the predictions of the varieties of 
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capitalism (VOC) thesis, especially in the sense that LME-based firms are more 
predisposed to a materialist perspective than CME-based firms.  In addition, path 
dependence plays a role as the US industry has a competitive advantage in the production 
of much less environmentally-friendly vehicles than those produced by German and 
Japanese firms, and government regulations are much less supportive of change.  
 
Data Sources and Methodology 
 
Two sources of data are employed to facilitate comparative analysis.  The first is the WVS.  
The WVS has been conducted since 1981.  Originally a survey of European values,8 it now 
encompasses surveys of national samples of the populations of 80 countries.  At least 1,000 
people are surveyed in each country in each wave of the survey, with the intention of 
understanding the basic values and beliefs of people in each society and how these are 
changing over time.  The WVS is coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the 
University of Michigan under the direction of Ronald Inglehart, with surveys in individual 
countries carried out by an international network of social scientists.9  Four waves of the 
WVS since the early 1980s have been conducted, and in this chapter questions asked on 
concern for the environment and willingness to take environmental action are analysed to 
compare social attitudes from the early 1990s to 2001 in Germany, the US and Japan. 
The results of analysing responses to questions asked in the WVS are compared 
with the second source of data: actual information on the fuel economy and attributes of 
new cars purchased in Germany, the US and Japan.  Average fuel economy data already 
presented in Chapter 4 is re-visited.  In addition, data on vehicle attributes is analysed that 
demonstrates consumers’ revealed preferences: proportion of sales accounted for by light 
trucks/four wheel drives, engine size, the class of vehicle purchased, the uptake of more 
efficient diesel technologies and the degree to which new technologies are being embraced.  
The results of the analysis of social attitudes revealed through the WVS, and consumers’ 
revealed preferences as evidenced by the attributes of cars they purchase, is then interpreted 
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through an institutional lens that goes to the motivations of firms explained by the VOC 
approach. 
 
Social Attitudes 
 
Turning first to a comparative analysis of social attitudes in the three territories, responses 
by those surveyed through the WVS are considered.  Questions asked in the last three 
waves of the WVS from 1990 to 2001 (wave two: 1990-1993; wave three: 1995-1997; and 
wave four: 1999-2001) that relate to environmental concerns were aggregated and put in 
three categories to facilitate analysis: 
1. Concern for the environment.  These are questions about the priority respondents 
accord environmental versus economic imperatives, and whether they believe we 
should master or coexist with nature. 
2. Willingness to take direct action in markets.  These are questions about action that 
potentially has a direct material impact on firms because they relate to respondents’ 
willingness to act in markets via paying more for, or choosing, products that are 
better for the environment. 
3. Willingness to take non-market action.  These are questions relating to action with 
less material impact on firms, but which nevertheless may encourage a change in 
their behaviour.  This includes civil action through environmental movements, non-
market financial sacrifices, and non-market other action that is environmentally-
friendly.  The market implications of such action are less obvious than those in 
category 2., yet they indicate respondents’ willingness to change the ‘rules of the 
game’ by tipping attitudes more in favour of environmentally-friendly behaviour.  
This may lead to changes in firms’ behaviour if responding to such action is 
perceived as a more appropriate way to conduct business.10 
It should be noted that, as with many global surveys, different questions were asked in 
different waves, and not all countries were included in the WVS in each wave.  Therefore 
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data gaps exist and inconsistencies arise, details of which are provided in Appendix A.  
These are acknowledged and adjustments to take account of them made as much as possible.  
Response frequencies were analysed for questions asked in each of these categories, as well 
as cross tabulations between concern for the environment and environmental action. 
 
Concern for the Environment 
 
Two questions asked in waves three and four of the WVS target respondents’ concern for 
the environment. They are: 
• Whether priority should be given to protecting the environment or economic growth 
and creating jobs. 
• Whether human beings should master or coexist with nature. 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the responses to these questions.  Responses indicate that 
concern for the environment is significant in all territories.  The majority of US and 
Japanese respondents gave priority to protecting the environment over economic growth 
and creating jobs (60 and 57 percent respectively).  A sizeable minority of German 
respondents (45 percent) gave priority to protecting the environment.  In addition, an 
overwhelming preference was expressed in all three territories for coexisting with nature 
rather than mastering it, particularly for Japan and Germany where almost all respondents 
said they believed in coexisting with nature (96 and 98 percent respectively).  Although 
fewer respondents in the US believed in coexisting with nature, the preference for so doing 
was still very high at 86 percent of respondents. 
The response frequencies show that the two questions were answered in different 
ways.  It appears that respondents would like both environmental protection and economic 
growth.  When forced to choose their responses flow close to half each way.  This is not an 
insignificant result because it suggests that on balance the environment and economic 
growth are viewed as being of at least equal importance.  Responses to mastering or 
coexisting with nature reflect more complex perceptions of humanity’s relationship with 
nature.  This question may pick up cultural traits favouring harmony and balance (e.g. 
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Japanese notions of ‘wa’ – harmony – and German preferences for negotiated consensus) 
versus individualistic achievement (e.g. US and other Anglo-Saxon cultures’ belief in the 
virtues of competition).11  Hence the differences in the responses for Germany and Japan 
on the one hand and the US on the other.  But overall, concern for the environment in all 
three territories is high: highest in the US and Japan on the question of the environment 
versus the economy, and highest in Germany and Japan on the question of coexisting with 
nature rather than mastering it. 
 
Willingness to Take Direct Action in Markets 
 
Willingness to act on concern for the environment in a way that directly impacts on firms’ 
bottom lines is indicated by responses to two questions asked in wave three.  Respondents 
were asked: 
• Whether they would strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree to buying 
things at 20 percent higher than usual prices if it would help protect the environment. 
• Whether in the previous 12 months they had chosen household products that are 
better for the environment. 
Table 5.2 presents a summary of the responses to these questions.  On willingness to pay 
higher prices, there is a clear divide between US and Japanese respondents versus German 
respondents.  Only around 35 percent of US and Japanese respondents agreed with paying 
higher prices, whereas German respondents were nearly twice as strong in their support for 
this (60 percent).  Although not presented in Table 5.2, the WVS data also shows that 
German respondents who agreed with paying higher prices were twice as likely to strongly 
agree with so doing by comparison to US and Japanese respondents.12  German and US 
respondents were most likely to choose household products that are better for the 
environment (88 and 73 percent respectively), but even though Japanese respondents were 
less likely to have done so a clear majority of them had as well (60 percent).   
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Willingness to take direction action in markets is therefore strongest in Germany, by 
paying both higher prices and choosing household products if this helps the environment.  
US respondents are willing to exercise a preference for household products that are better 
for the environment, but are not so willing to pay higher prices.  Japanese respondents are 
the least willing to pay higher prices or choose household products that are better for the 
environment.  Therefore, direct market signals as a result of social attitudes are likely to be 
strongest in Germany, followed by the US and then Japan. 
 
Willingness to Take Non-Market Action 
 
Respondents were asked questions on non-market action that they would be prepared to 
take/have taken that reflects their concern for the environment.  The questions are put in 
three sub-categories here: civil action through environmental movements, non-market 
financial sacrifices, and non-market other action.  The results are summarised in Table 5.3, 
and discussed below. 
On civil action respondents were asked: 
• How much confidence they have in the green/ecology/environmental movement 
(asked in waves three and four).  
• Whether they are members of an environmental organisation (asked in all waves). 
• Whether they are active members of the organisation (in waves two and three) or 
did unpaid work for it (in wave four). 
• Whether in the last 12 months they had contributed to an environmental 
organisation (asked in wave three).  
• Whether in the last 12 months they had attended a meeting or signed a letter or 
petition aimed at protecting the environment (asked in wave three). 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Concern for the Environment 
Respondents’ Nationality Priority to protecting the 
environment (%) 
Humans should coexist with nature (%) 
Germany 45 96 
US 60 86 
Japan 57 98 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of Willingness to Take Direct Action in Markets 
Respondents’ Nationality Agree to buying things at 20% 
higher than usual prices (%) 
Have chosen household products that are 
better for the environment (%) 
Germany 60 88 
US 36 73 
Japan 34 60 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of Willingness to Take Non-Market Action 
Respondents’ 
Nationality 
CIVIL ACTION NON-MARKET FINANCIAL 
SACRIFICES 
NON-MARKET NON-
FINANCIAL ACTION 
 Great deal of 
confidence or 
quite confident 
in the 
green/ecology/ 
environmental 
protection 
movement (%) 
Membership of 
environmental 
organisation 
(%) 
Have 
contributed to 
an 
environmental 
organisation 
(%) 
Active 
member/ 
Have 
attended a 
meeting or 
signed a 
letter or 
petition 
(%) 
Agree to 
an 
increase 
in Taxes 
(%) 
Agree to 
giving part 
of income 
(%) 
Agree that  the 
government 
should reduce 
environmental 
pollution but it 
should not cost 
me any money 
(%) 
Have 
decided 
to reuse 
or 
recycle 
(%) 
Have tried to 
reduce water 
consumption 
(%) 
unpaid work 
for an 
environmental 
organisation 
(%) 
68 5 15 2 30 50 30 70 85 71 Germany 
57 16 26 7 18 60 69 57 86 56 US 
60 3 8 1 13 60 70 56 69 47 Japan 
Source: World Values Survey. 
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Sixty eight percent of German respondents said they were confident in the green/ecology/ 
environmental movement, a higher percentage than of US and Japanese respondents (57 
and 60 percent respectively).  However, far more US respondents were actually members of 
environmental organisations (16 percent) compared to Germany and Japan (5 and 3 percent 
respectively).  Indeed, actual membership of environmental organisations in Germany and 
Japan is so low as to be virtually insignificant.  It is also worth noting, though not presented 
in Table 5.3,  that of those who had confidence in the environmental movement, a higher 
proportion of US respondents had a great deal of confidence in it compared to Germany or 
Japan.13  Therefore, although fewer US respondents were confident in the environmental 
movement than in Germany or Japan, if they were they were more likely to be highly 
confident and to be members of such organisations.  US respondents were also most likely 
to contribute to environmental organisations (26 percent versus 15 percent for German and 
8 percent for Japanese respondents) and be active members/do unpaid work for them (7 
percent versus just 1 to 2 percent for German and Japanese respondents). 
Civil action thus seems most likely in the US followed by Germany, and least likely 
in Japan.  This appears to be at odds with the phenomenon of the Green Party in German 
politics, a former coalition partner in the German government, and the fact that 
environmental issues have entered mainstream politics there to an extent they probably 
have not in the US and Japan.  The reason for this apparent paradox is suggested by 
German responses to the question of attending a meeting or signing a letter or petition 
aimed at protecting the environment.  German respondents were around twice as likely to 
do so compared to US or Japanese respondents (30 percent as opposed to 18 and 13 percent 
for US and Japanese respondents respectively).   This suggests that Germans are potentially 
as willing to take civil action as their US counterparts, just in a less formal manner.  They 
are very supportive of the environmental movement, and will take action in respect of its 
goals, but they are simply less likely to belong to environmental organisations.   
Overall, the conclusion is that civil action on environmental concerns is more likely 
in the US and Germany, and much less likely in Japan.  In Germany there may be less 
willingness to do so via environmental organisations than in the US, but nevertheless civil 
action may occur on a less formalised basis via attending meetings and signing petitions. 
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On non-market financial sacrifices respondents were asked:  
• Whether they would strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree to an 
increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental damage 
(asked in all waves). 
• Whether they would strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree to giving 
part of their income if they were certain the money would be used to prevent 
environmental pollution (asked in wave four). 
• Whether they would strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree that the 
government should reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost them any 
money (asked in wave four). 
Responses to these questions demonstrate a clear divide between US and Japanese 
respondents on the one hand and German respondents on the other.  For the US and Japan, 
around 60 percent of respondents would support an increase in taxes, and commensurate 
with this around 70 percent were in favour of giving part of their income to prevent 
environmental pollution.  German respondents were clearly less supportive of tax increases 
(50 percent) and giving part of their income (30 percent) than US and Japanese respondents.  
On the government reducing environmental pollution at no cost, the divide is reversed.  70 
percent of German respondents said that they believed this should be the case, whereas only 
around 56 and 57 percent of Japanese and US respondents respectively thought that the 
government should take action without it costing them any money.  Once again, more 
detailed data on the strength of feeling on this, although not presented in Table 5.3, is 
informative: of German respondents who agreed that the government should act in this 
manner at no cost to them, a much larger proportion strongly agreed that this should be the 
case than their US and Japanese counterparts.14  Therefore, responses to these questions 
show that US and Japanese respondents are clearly more willing to make non-market 
financial sacrifices than Germans. 
On non-market other action respondents were asked in wave three: 
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• Whether in the last 12 months they had decided for environmental reasons to reuse 
or recycle something rather than throw it away. 
• Whether in the last 12 months they had tried to reduce water consumption for 
environmental reasons. 
Responses to these questions show that Germans respondents were, on balance, most 
willing to reuse or recycle and reduce water consumption.  Although US respondents were 
marginally more willing to reuse or recycle than Germans (86 versus 85 percent), Germans 
were much more likely to save water (71 versus 56 percent).  Japanese respondents were 
less likely to either reuse or recycle (69 percent), or save water (47 percent), than German 
or US respondents.  Therefore, German respondents are most willing to take non-market 
other action, followed by US and then Japanese respondents. 
 
Cross Tabulations: Environmental Concern versus Environmental Action 
 
Cross tabulations allow a determination to be made on the extent to which an association 
exists/does not exist between questions on concern for the environment and environmental 
action (either direct market or non-market action).  The results demonstrate the extent to 
which attitudes to the environment are associated with willingness to take action that is 
environmentally-friendly.  A chi square based coefficient that measures association, phi, 
was calculated for the cross tabulations on the basis that all variables are nominal and 
arranged in two by two tables.  The test for statistical significance is applied at p<0.01.  The 
cross tabulations and a discussion of them is provided at Appendix B with a summary of 
the findings presented in Table 5.4. 
Although it is association rather than causality that is investigated here, the two 
questions on environmental concern were assumed to be independent variables and by 
convention are shown in the columns of tables in Appendix B and Table 5.4.  They are:  
• Whether priority should be given to protecting the environment or economic growth 
and creating jobs. 
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• Whether human beings should master or coexist with nature. 
Responses to questions on environmental action that indicated a willingness to take direct 
action in markets or non-market action were assumed to be dependent on these two 
questions on the basis that concern for the environment over economic growth, or co-
existing with nature rather than mastering it, should predict a greater willingness to take 
action that results in the protection of the environment.  By convention, these are shown in 
the rows of tables in Appendix B and Table 5.4. 
Overall, four major observations emerge: 
• A ‘no’ response does not indicate that there is no association, but that it is not strong 
enough/the data is not sufficient to support a finding that the association is 
statistically significant.  But even when a statistically significant association is 
indicated, concern for the environment is mostly only weakly associated with 
environmental action.  The exceptions are protecting the environment and paying 
higher prices for the US and Japan; protecting the environment and increase in taxes 
for the US and Japan; and protecting the environment and giving part of income for 
Japan.  In these three cases the association is weak to moderate. 
• Therefore, only in the cases of Japan and the US are the associations ever stronger 
than ‘weak’. 
• Associations are more likely to be statistically significant when the independent 
variable is priority to protecting the environment rather than coexisting with nature.  
This reflects the small sample sizes for respondents who said they had priority for 
mastering nature, particularly in the cases of Germany and Japan where less than 10 
percent of respondents indicated such a priority.  It probably also reflects the 
complexities inherent in the mastering/coexisting with nature question flagged 
earlier. 
• In the case of Japan it is striking to note that in seven cases statistically insignificant 
associations suggest a counter-intuitive relationship between the variables, as well 
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as in two cases where a statistically significant association exists.  The statistically 
significant associations indicate that Japanese respondents’ belief in mastering 
nature rather than coexisting with it is associated with greater willingness to act in 
environmentally-friendly ways through contributing to environmental organisations 
and trying to reduce water consumption! 
Therefore, the association between concern for the environment and environmental 
action is mostly a weak one, particularly in the case of Germany.  This suggests that for 
German respondents, willingness to act in environmentally-friendly ways is less associated 
with their concern for the environment than is the case for US and Japanese respondents.  
Environmental action is thus to some extent decoupled from concern for the environment in 
the German case.  It may occur for other reasons that can only be speculated on here, such 
as concern to reduce financial outlays by buying more efficient products, security concerns 
to do with natural resource constraints, or perhaps just fashion. 
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Table 5.4: Cross Tabulations Concern for the Environment with Environmental Action 
CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT  
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION Is a Preference for Coexisting with Nature Associated with 
Taking Action (statistically significant at p<0.01)? 
Is a Priority for Protecting the Environment Associated with 
Taking Action (statistically significant at p<0.01)? 
 Germany US Japan Germany US Japan 
WILLINGNESS TO TAKE DIRECT 
ACTION IN MARKETS 
      
No No No Buy things at 20% higher than usual prices 
if it would help the environment 
Yes (weak) Yes (weak-moderate) Yes (weak-moderate)  
  
No (counter-intuitive) Have chosen household products that are 
better for the environment 
Yes (very weak) Yes (very weak) Yes (very weak) Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
    
WILLINGNESS TO TAKE NON-
MARKET ACTION 
      
Civil Action       
No (counter-intuitive 
for wave 4) 
Confidence in the 
green/ecology/environmental movement 
Yes (very weak) Yes (very weak 
to weak) 
Yes (weak) Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
    
No No No (counter-intuitive 
for wave 4) 
No (counter-intuitive 
for wave 3) 
Member of an environmental organisation Yes (very weak) Yes (very weak to 
weak) 
No No No No Active member/unpaid work for an 
environmental organisation 
Yes (very weak) Yes (very weak) 
  
No Have contributed to an environmental 
organisation 
Yes (very weak) Yes (very weak) Yes (very weak and 
counter-intuitive) 
Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
    
No No No No Have attended a meeting or signed a letter 
or petition aimed at protecting the 
environment 
Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
  
Financial Sacrifice       
No No (counter-intuitive 
for wave 4) 
Increase in taxes if the extra money were 
used to prevent environmental damage 
Yes (weak) Yes (weak) Yes (weak-moderate) Yes (weak to weak-
moderate)   
No (counter-intuitive) Give part of your income if you were 
certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution 
Not available Yes (very weak) Not available Yes (weak) Yes (weak-moderate) 
  
No (counter-intuitive) The government should reduce 
environmental pollution but it should not 
cost me any money 
Not available Yes (very weak) Not available Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
  
Non-financial Action       
No  No No Have decided to reuse or recycle Yes (weak) Yes (very weak) Yes (weak) 
No No No Have tried to reduce water consumption Yes (very weak  Yes (very weak and 
counter-intuitive) 
Yes (weak) 
 
Source: Source: World Values Survey, waves two to four.  Details are provided at Appendix B.  The classification of the strength of the association is as follows: 
Phi<0.125=very weak; 0.125<phi<0.25=weak; 0.25<phi<0.375=weak-moderate; 0.375<phi<0.5=moderate; 0.5<phi<0.625=moderate-strong; 0.625<phi<0.75=strong; 
0.75<phi<1=very strong. 
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 Summary of the Findings from Analysing Social Attitudes 
 
The only point of clear commonality between Germany, the US and Japan is a strong 
concern for the environment.  Beyond this, there are considerable variations: 
• German respondents exhibit the strongest willingness to take direct market action, 
followed by US respondents.  Japanese respondents are least willing to do so.   
• Japanese and US respondents are quite willing to make non-market financial 
sacrifices through paying higher taxes and giving part of their income with 
environmental concerns in mind.  They expect government action on the 
environment to cost them money.  German respondents are less willing to make 
such non-market financial sacrifices. 
• The relevance of formal civil action can virtually be ruled out for Germany and 
Japan.  Only in the US is the minority of respondents willing to engage in such 
action large enough to be considered significant.  However, when it comes to 
informal civil action via attending a meeting or signing a letter or petition, German 
respondents are the most willing to do so.  The significance of civil action, whether 
formal or informal, is much lower for Japanese respondents.  The only observation 
that can be made is that Japanese respondents are reasonably confident in the 
environmental movement, such as it is. 
• Other non-market action is most likely for German respondents, followed by US 
respondents.  It is considerably less likely for Japanese respondents. 
• For Germans, environmental action (both direct market and non-market) is more 
weakly associated with concern for the environment than is the case for US and 
Japanese respondents.  These results suggest that Germans’ willingness to take 
action is, to some extent, decoupled from their concern for the environment.  
Although environmental action is more likely than in the US and Japanese cases, it 
is taken less out of underlying environmental concerns than for other reasons. 
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 • For the US and Japan, there are stronger associations between concern for the 
environment and environmental action.  This suggests that environmentally-friendly 
action is more contingent on, or related to, concern for the environment. 
• However, two of the statistically significant associations (and seven of the 
statistically insignificant ones) for Japanese respondents are counter-intuitive. 
If one was to ask ‘what’s the bottom line’, the answer would be that beyond 
significant concern for the environment in all territories, willingness to take environmental 
action is mostly stronger in Germany and the US than Japan.  This is particularly so for 
Germany with respect to direct market action.  For the US and Japan, there is greater 
willingness to make non-market financial sacrifices, but overall Japanese respondents’ 
willingness to act in environmentally-friendly ways is the weakest of the three.  Concern 
for the environment is more strongly associated with environmental action in the US and 
Japan than Germany.  However, before being able to answer whether or not these 
differences in social attitudes are associated with differences in consumer behaviour, the 
trends in consumer demand for new cars must be considered.  This is done in the following 
section. 
 
Consumer Demand 
 
The conclusion from Chapter 4 was that regulations and different institutional arrangements 
have ramifications beyond the borders of states.  It was shown that in each of the territories, 
US firms sell the least fuel efficient vehicles that produce the most CO2/have the worst fuel 
economy, and that EU and Japanese firms sell more fuel efficient vehicles that produce less 
CO2/have better fuel economy.  It was shown that although this correlates with higher fuel 
prices and tougher standards in the EU and Japan by comparison to the US, there were also 
institutional explanations for this in terms of state-business relations.  The aim here is again 
to ‘dig’ further behind the overall fuel economy figures for each territory to examine in 
more detail the attributes of vehicles purchased by consumers, determine whether this 
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 squares with social attitudes and therefore whether it is likely to provide the impetus for 
firms to focus their attentions on providing more fuel efficient products in future.  The fuel 
economy of cars purchased in each territory is considered first, followed by an analysis of 
attributes of new cars purchased that impact on this: the proportion of light trucks in total 
sales, engine size, car class, the proportion of diesel powered vehicles in total sales and the 
take-up of alternative powered vehicles.  The reason for the choice of these attributes as 
being indicative of consumer preferences is as follows: 
• Light trucks in the form of sports utility vehicles (SUVs)/four wheel drives are 
bigger, heavier, less fuel efficient and more environmentally damaging than normal 
passenger cars.  If consumers display a preference for such vehicles environmental 
concerns are unambiguously of less concern to them in practice. 
• A preference for vehicles with larger engines over time cannot possibly indicate a 
growing concern for the environment in practice.  Even if engines overall are 
becoming more efficient, bigger engines must use more fuel and are indicative of a 
desire for more power, acceleration and performance over lower fuel usage, lower 
CO  emissions and less impact on the environment.   2
• Definitions of car class vary between the three territories so directly comparable 
data is not available.  Nevertheless, regardless of definitional differences smaller 
cars should have less environmental impact than bigger cars, so a preference for 
them indicates greater concern for environmental impacts.  The definitions of car 
classes in each territory are explained in Appendix C. 
• Diesel powered vehicles must always produce less CO2 emissions and be more fuel 
efficient due to the higher density of diesel as opposed to petrol.  As noted in 
Chapter 3, diesel provides 20 to 40 percent better fuel economy and produces 10 to 
30 percent fewer CO2 emissions.  Consumers who know this and show a preference 
for diesel are therefore also showing a preference for reducing environmental 
damage, at least in terms of fuel efficiency and CO 15 emissions.  2
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 • The take up of alternatively powered vehicles that have lower environmental 
impacts should indicate whether consumers are keen early-adopters of new 
environmentally-friendly technologies. 
It should be noted that two other attributes were considered but rejected for analysis: 
vehicle weight and power.  Although the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) finds that preferences for cars that are heavier and more powerful 
has detrimental effects on their environmental performance in terms of CO2 emissions, both 
these indicators were rejected due to a lack of specificity in what they might indicate.  In 
the case of vehicle weight this arises because increases or decreases in the average weight 
of vehicles purchased do not conclusively indicate anything other than a “trend towards 
installing more equipment for safety, comfort and utility”.16  It does not indicate anything, 
on its own, about consumer preferences with respect to the environment.  For example, it 
does not indicate whether increased weight is due to the purchase of larger cars and SUVs, 
or a rise in the proportion of mid-sized cars that might be greater than the fall in large cars.  
Similarly, advances in engine technologies mean that regardless of the size of an engine, all 
engines have become more powerful.17  Therefore, smaller engines are now able to power 
heavier vehicles and vehicles in smaller classes are now more powerful than they were 
without having larger engines.  In fact, it is possible that a more powerful engine of the 
same size in a small car gets better fuel economy because it does not have to work as hard 
to deliver the same performance.  Therefore, increases in engine power on their own cannot 
indicate preferences for performance over the environment so much as advances which 
have simply made all engines more powerful ceteris paribus. 
 
Fuel Economy 
 
Figure 5.1 presents the average fuel economy of new cars sold in each territory from 1991 
to 2001.  Clearly, much less fuel efficient cars are sold in the US than in Germany and 
Japan.  But more important than this are the changes over time.  German and Japanese car 
sales exhibit dramatic fuel economy improvements (from around 8 to 7 l/100km), whereas 
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 the fuel economy for US cars sold is virtually unchanged (around 8 l/100km).  If light 
trucks are included in US figures, on the basis that these are increasingly sold in the US as 
passenger vehicles in the form four wheel drive SUVs and pickup trucks (discussed in the 
following section), the fuel economy of all passenger vehicles in the US has actually 
worsened from 9.2 to 9.6 l/100km.  Therefore, market signals for the sale of more fuel 
efficient cars only exist in Germany and Japan. 
 
Figure 5.1: Average Fuel Economy of New Cars 
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Sources: VDA (no date), Fuel Consumption, 
http://www.vda.de/en/aktuell/kraftstoffverbrauch/marktgewichtet.html, accessed 29 July 2005; NHTSA 
(2003), Automotive Fuel Economy Program Annual Update Calender Year 2002, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/CAFE/FuelEconUpdates/2002/2002AnnualUpdate.pdf, accessed 15 
January 2004, p.21; JAMA (2003), 2003: The Motor Industry of Japan, 
http://www.jama.or.jp/eng/pdf/MIJ2003.pdf, accessed 18 January 2004, p.24; and JAMA (2004a), 2004: The 
Motor Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, p.43. 
 
 
 
 
 180
 Light Trucks 
 
Light trucks are increasingly being purchased as passenger vehicles in the US, and such a 
trend clearly represents environmentally-unfriendly behaviour.  Figure 5.2, which presents 
the share of light trucks in total passenger car registrations from 1990 to 2003, shows that 
only in the US has the percentage of light trucks in total passenger car registrations 
increased markedly throughout the period with little sign of abating, to the point where over 
half of passenger vehicle sales in the US are now light trucks.  Purchasing light trucks as 
passenger vehicles occurs in Germany and Japan as well.  However, although the growth in 
the share of light trucks in passenger car registrations has been greatest in Germany, 
especially after 1997, the change exaggerates the significance.  This is because for 
Germany the share of four wheel drives (4wds) in total registrations remains very small by 
comparison to the US and Japan.  In fact, despite increases in most EU markets they remain 
very much niche vehicles, and in Germany where their popularity has increased more than 
in most EU markets, they have increased their market share from 3 to only 7 percent.  For 
Japan, the share of light trucks peaked in 1996 at nearly 40 percent.  Since then it has 
declined to 26 percent.  Thus, only in the US has growth in the sale of light trucks occurred 
to such an extent that they now account for the majority of new passenger vehicle sales. 
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 Figure 5.2: Percentage Share of Light Trucks in Total Passenger Car Registrations 
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Sources: ACEA (no date d), New Passenger Car Registrations in W.Europe, Breakdown by Specifications: 
Share of 4x4, http://www.acea.be/ACEA/4x4-PC-90-02.pdf, accessed 9 June 2004, except 2003 figure which 
is from ACEA (2004b), EU15 Economic Report, http://www.acea.be/ACEA/ER-0204-Internet.pdf, accessed 
9 June 2004; K. Hellman and R. Heavenrich (2004), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy 
Trends: 1975 Through 2004, United States Environment Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/420r04001.pdf, accessed 13 May 2004, pp.7-9 and 14-16; and 
JAMA (2004a), 2004: The Motor Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, p.9.  Data presented for Japan and 
Germany is for 4wds.  For Japan, there is a ‘Recreational Vehicles’ class but this is not used as it includes 
station wagons, van-type SUVs, off-road 4wds and minivans (i.e. not all of these are light trucks).  Data for 
the US is for light trucks, which include SUVs, pickup trucks and minivans used as passenger vehicles.   
 
Engine Size 
 
Engine size is a key measure of environmental concern.  Smaller engines tend to use less 
fuel, and technological advances mean that engines of the same size increasingly produce 
more power.  Therefore, if an engine the same size can now deliver more power in a car 
that is the same size, or be placed in a car that is larger/heavier with similar performance 
compared to that delivered by a larger engine previously, then a preference for larger 
engines must clearly indicate that environmental concerns are secondary.  A preference for 
smaller engines indicates the converse.18  Figure 5.3 shows average engine size of new cars 
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 from 1990 to 2003.  US consumers buy cars with the biggest engines.  For cars alone (i.e. 
excluding light trucks), in 2003 US car engines were around 50 percent larger than German 
cars and twice the size of Japanese cars.  In addition, engine sizes in the US have risen 
significantly, for all passenger vehicles by 13 percent and for cars alone by 5 percent.  
German car engines have also increased in size by 5 percent.  Only in Japan’s case have 
engines become smaller, by 7 percent. 
 
Figure 5.3: Average Engine Size of New Cars 
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Sources: ACEA (no date b), New Passenger Car Registrations in W.Europe, Breakdown by Specifications: 
Average Cubic Capacity, http://www.acea.be/ACEA/Average_CC-PC-90-02.pdf, accessed 9 June 2004; 
ACEA (2004b), EU15 Economic Report, http://www.acea.be/ACEA/ER-0204-Internet.pdf, accessed 9 June 
2004; K. Hellman and R. Heavenrich (2004), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends: 
1975 Through 2004, United States Environment Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/420r04001.pdf, accessed 13 May 2004, pp14-16; and JAMA 
(2004c), Motor Vehicle Statistics of Japan 2004, Tokyo: JAMA, p.12. 
 
Car class 
 
Data on car class is available for each market.  Although the class definitions are slightly 
different in each,19 what is of interest for comparative purposes is whether, over time, 
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 consumers are buying smaller, lighter, more compact cars, which would tend to indicate 
they are making more environmentally conscious purchasing decisions, or larger, heavier 
cars which would suggest the converse.  Given the magnitude of the market share of light 
trucks in the US and Japan, the class of these is also considered here. 
Figure 5.4 presents German passenger car sales by class from 1999 to 2003.  It 
shows that the share of small cars has grown from 16 to 20 percent.  This trend is 
accompanied by a contraction in the share of lower-medium cars and steady share of 
medium cars.   The share of other classes was relatively constant, with the exception of 
vans which increased their market share from 6 to 10 percent, and are largely responsible 
for the rise in the ‘others’ class.  Again, the increase in share of 4wds is relatively 
marginal.20
Figure 5.5 presents US passenger car sales by class from 1990 to 2004.  It shows 
that for passenger cars, the small car class has suffered sustained falls in market share from 
around 60 percent to under 50 percent, while gains have been made in the mid-size and 
large classes.  The largest gains have been made in the large car class where the share has 
grown from 13 to 18 percent.  Figure 5.6 presents a breakdown of US light trucks sales by 
class from 1990 to 2003.  It shows similar trends to those for cars in that in addition to the 
observation that light trucks now make up just over 50 percent of all new passenger vehicle 
sales in the US, there has been a huge rise in the share of large light trucks in total US light 
truck sales over the period, from 30 to 49 percent.  In fact, by 2004 more large light trucks 
were sold than either medium or small light trucks, and almost as many as small and 
medium light trucks combined.  Therefore, not only has there been a shift to the purchase of 
light trucks on the part of consumers, but they are increasingly buying bigger light trucks 
and bigger cars. 
Figure 5.7 presents Japanese passenger car sales by class from 1990 to 2004.  It 
shows that the small car class has been squeezed with more sales flowing to larger standard 
and smaller mini cars.  However, standard cars’ market share peaked in 1995 at 20 percent 
and has receded to around 17 percent since then, whereas sales of mini cars increased 
steadily up to 2000.  Since then they have held a steady 29 to 30 percent share of the market.  
Over the entire period around 80 percent of car sales in Japan have been either small or 
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 mini cars, but the share of mini cars has almost doubled over the period.  Figure 5.8 
presents a breakdown of Japanese 4wd sales by class from 1994 to 2003.  It shows similar 
trends to those for cars.  Larger 4wds have declined as a proportion of total 4wd sales from 
a peak of 28 percent in 1996 to 15 percent in 2003, while the share of mini 4wd drives has 
remained around 11 percent.  Thus, in addition to 4wds declining as a market segment in 
Japan, those that are sold are getting smaller and therefore less environmentally damaging, 
as are cars. 
A lot of data has been presented in this section.  The trends may be summarised as 
follows.  For Germany, cars are getting smaller with the share of sales in the small class 
growing at the expense of the larger lower-medium and medium classes.  While 4wds have 
increased their share of sales, they remain niche vehicles.  For Japan, the overall trend is 
also for smaller cars.  Mini cars have increased their share of sales.  So have larger standard 
cars.  However, overall the market is dominated by mini and small cars.  4wds, while 
popular in Japan, exhibit sales trends very different from their US equivalent, with sales 
increasingly in the mini 4wd class.  The US is moving in the opposite direction to Germany 
and Japan with cars and light trucks both getting bigger.  Mid-size and large cars have 
increased their share of sales at the expense of small cars, and burgeoning sales of light 
trucks as passenger cars have been led by sales of large vehicles.   
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Figure 5.4: German Passenger Car Sales by Class 
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Source: VDA, provided on request 6 January 2005.  ‘Others’ includes cabriolets, vans, utilities and other 
vehicles.  Aggregated data by class is unavailable prior to 1999. 
 
Figure 5.5: US Passenger Car Sales by Class 
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Source: K. Hellman and R. Heavenrich (2004), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends: 
1975 Through 2004, Appendix F, United States Environment Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/420r04001-f.pdf, accessed 13 May 2004; Hellman, K.H., and 
Heavenrich, R.M. (2004), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2004, 
United States Environment Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/420r04001.pdf, 
accessed 13 May 2004, p.9 and p.16. 
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Figure 5.6: US Light Truck Sales Broken Down by Class 
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Source: Hellman, K.H., and Heavenrich, R.M. (2004), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy 
Trends: 1975 Through 2004, Appendix F, United States Environment Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/420r04001-f.pdf, accessed 13 May 2004.  
 
Figure 5.7: Japanese Passenger Car Sales by Class 
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Source: JAMA (2004b), World Motor Vehicle Statistics Vol.3 2004, Tokyo: JAMA, p.168. 
 Figure 5.8: Japanese 4wd Sales Broken Down by Class 
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Source: JAMA (2004a), 2004: The Motor Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, p.9. 
 
Diesel Powered Vehicles 
 
If consumers know the fuel efficiency and CO2 emission benefits of diesel powered 
vehicles, then purchasing them suggests motivations based on environmental concerns for 
using less fuel and producing lower CO2 emissions.  However, diesel cars are insignificant 
anywhere but the EU.  In the US and Japan, diesel cars account for less than 1 percent of 
all new car registrations.21  A large part of the explanation is that the industry in Germany, 
and the EU more broadly, has promoted small diesel cars as a clean and technologically 
advanced solution to the environmental effects of car use.  Thus, perceptions of diesel are 
different there.  This is supported by the literature of the European and German peak 
industry bodies, as well as firms’ environmental reports.22  
Figure 5.9 presents diesel sales as a percentage of total car sales in the EU and 
Germany from 1990 to 2003.  It shows that diesel’s share of EU car sales increased from 14 
to 44 percent, and similarly for German car sales from 10 to 40 percent.  These trends put 
 188
 the 5 percent increase in engine size for German cars shown in Figure 5.3 in perspective: 
consumers have purchased smaller vehicles with marginally larger diesel engines and 
reduced their cars’ environmental impacts. 
 
Figure 5.9: Diesel Sales as a Percentage of Total Car Sales in the EU and Germany 
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Source: ACEA (no date c), New Passenger Car Registrations in W.Europe, Breakdown by Specifications: 
Share of Diesel Cars, http://www.acea.be/ACEA/DIESEL-PC-90-02.pdf, accessed 9 June 2004; and ACEA 
(2004b), EU15 Economic Report, http://www.acea.be/ACEA/ER-0204-Internet.pdf, accessed 9 June 2004. 
 
Alternatively Powered Vehicles 
 
It seems that almost everywhere one looks there are exciting stories about alternatively 
powered vehicles, especially petrol-electric hybrid vehicles and the long term potential for 
fuel cell technologies which will allow cars to run on hydrogen.23  Japanese firms are the 
world leaders in the commercial production of such cars, particularly Toyota and Honda 
which commercially released petrol-electric hybrids in the late 1990s.  Demand for the 
second generation petrol-electric hybrid Toyota Prius is growing so much that Toyota had 
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 to increase production to 130,000 cars for 2004 in order to meet international demand, with 
an eight month waiting list for the model in the US.24   
Table 5.5 presents sales data on alternatively powered vehicles from 1995 to 2002.  
Although at first glance sales of such vehicles appear significant, the share of alternatively 
powered vehicles in total passenger vehicles provides a more realistic perspective.  The 
OECD estimates the total stock of passenger cars in 1999 at 174 million in the EU, 207 
million in the US and 51 million in Japan.25  Combining these figures with those for 
alternatively-powered vehicles in use in 2002, the proportion of alternatively powered 
vehicles in the total stock of passenger cars is greatest in Japan (0.26 percent), followed by 
the US (0.24 percent) and lastly the EU (0.04 percent).26  For Germany, 0.1 percent of new 
car registrations in 2002 were alternatively powered vehicles.27  These percentages hardly 
represent a consumer-led stampede to alternatively powered vehicles of the same 
proportions as, say, diesel in the EU and Germany or light trucks in the US. 
 
Table 5.5: Sales of Alternatively Powered Vehicles 
Vehicle Type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
EU Sales of Passenger 
Vehicles 
481 1,265 5,271 20,559 13,013 17,823 18,080 18,641 
TOTAL 
1995-2002: 76,492  
US Vehicles in Use 246,855  265,006 280,205 295,037 322,355 406,615  445,300 505,787 
Japan Vehicles in Use 11,018 12,208 17,481 38,769 56,429 74,770 106,409 130,329 
Source: JAMA (2004a), 2004: The Motor Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, p.52; US Department of Energy 
(no date a), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/datatables/afvtable1_03.xls, accessed 6 October 2004 
for alternatively-powered vehicles in use; US Department of Energy (no date b), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/datatables/atf14-20_02.html, accessed 6 October 2004 for petrol-
electric hybrids made available by manufacturers for sale; ACEA (2003), Monitoring of ACEA’s Commitment 
to CO2 Emission Reductions from Passenger Cars 2002, Final Report, 
http://www.acea.be/ACEA/20040317PublicationEmissions.pdf, accessed 14 May 2004, p.7 
 
Although sales of alternatively-powered vehicles have been minimal to date, the 
trends are of interest.  Sales of them are increasing in all territories except the EU.  In 
contrast to the US and Japan, sales of alternatively powered vehicles in the EU peaked in 
1998, and have levelled out since then at under 20,000 units a year.  The lack of penetration 
by alternatively powered vehicles in the EU is underscored by the European Commission 
noting that the influence on fleet average CO2 emissions of alternatively powered vehicles 
remains negligible, so that until 2002 member states were not required to include them in 
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 28reports on CO  emission reductions.2    A word of caution is warranted on the US data too, 
as many vehicles counted in the data are light trucks that are able to run on alternative fuels 
such as ethanol.  However, they probably never do.  This is because it is more expensive 
and often hard to purchase, apart from the fact that many owners of such vehicles do not 
realise that it is possible for them to run on alternative fuels.29  The data given here includes 
estimates by the US Department of Energy of the number of dual-fuel capable vehicles in 
the US that actually do run on alternative fuels, but even so this is just an estimate.  And if 
one looks at the figures for alternatively powered vehicles in the US in private hands (as 
opposed to public authorities) that are not heavy trucks or buses, the figures for 2001 and 
2002 are reduced to around 200,000 vehicles (i.e. less than half the figure shown in Table 
5.5).30
Overall, there remains far more hype and hope around the potential for alternatively 
powered vehicles than actual market penetration.  At this early stage, the data available 
does not suggest consumer demand is instrumental in encouraging the provision of such 
vehicles.  The trend, such as it is, is strongest in Japan, but even there preferences remain 
very much with more conventionally-powered vehicles.  Until the trends become clearer all 
that can be said is that the emerging potential for sales growth of alternative powered 
vehicles looks most promising in Japan, and to a lesser extent the US, but consumer 
demand for them is hardly in the driver’s seat. 
 
Social Attitudes and Consumer Demand: Institutional Explanations for a 
Puzzle 
 
The evidence suggests anything but a clear-cut relationship.  In fact, it appears that social 
concern for the environment is not clearly related to consumer demand.  The relationship is 
contingent on the territory considered.  Therefore, any changes in the environmental 
performance of car firms’ products cannot be clearly said to be universally explained by 
changing social sentiments mediated through markets.  As such, an answer is possible to 
the question of whether social attitudes are associated with consumer behaviour.   
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 For Germany, the answer is a qualified yes.  Concern for the environment in 
Germany is supported by a strong willingness to pay higher prices and choose household 
products that are better for the environment.  There is also a willingness to take non-market 
action, apart from making financial sacrifices.  Consumer behaviour demonstrates a 
growing preference for more environmentally-friendly vehicles through the dramatic 
uptake of diesel cars and a preference for smaller cars, albeit with larger (diesel) engines.  
The result is that fuel economy is improving.  Germany does generally have all the signs 
pointing in the ‘right’ direction in that one can say social concern for the environment and 
willingness to act in environmentally-friendly ways is reflected in consumer demand for 
more environmentally-friendly vehicles.  The only qualification is that the link between 
concern for the environment and environmental action is weaker than in the US and Japan, 
suggesting that the willingness to act and the action itself via revealed preferences may not 
necessarily reflect environmental concern.  In other words, it may not reflect post-
materialist values. 
For the US, the answer is no.  There is strong concern for the environment, as in 
Germany.  There is a strong willingness to purchase environmentally-friendly household 
products (potentially offsetting less willingness to pay higher prices) plus reasonably strong 
non-market signals exist for environmental change based on social attitudes, especially via 
civil action.  There is also a strong association between concern for the environment and 
environmental action.  However, the reality is that US consumers are purchasing ever more 
environmentally damaging vehicles.  Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is that their 
uptake of light trucks as passenger cars is similar to the uptake of diesels in Germany. 
For Japan, a clear answer is not possible.  Concern for the environment, while as 
high as in Germany and the US, is somewhat counterpoised by the weakest willingness to 
take environmentally-friendly action of the three territories.  The only exception is in 
willingness to make non-market financial sacrifices.  In addition, despite a stronger 
association between concern for the environment and environmental action than for 
Germany, the association is also puzzlingly counter-intuitive at times.  Yet Japanese 
consumers appear to exhibit a strong preference for smaller, more environmentally- 
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 friendly vehicles, and the industry is a pioneer in the development and commercial 
marketing of petrol-electric hybrids.   
What is to be made of these results?  For example, why do strong social concerns 
and a reasonably strong willingness to act in the US have no discernable impact on actual 
car sales?  Why are good environmental outcomes through car sales in Japan not clearly 
traceable back to social attitudes and a willingness to act on them?  Exploration of the 
institutional implications of these results is required, and explanations are suggested in 
terms of market versus non-market forces, the effects of government regulations and the 
role of technology, and the path dependence of established competitive advantages. 
 
Market versus Non-Market Forces 
 
Firms in LMEs coordinate their activities via hierarchies and competition in markets, 
whereas firms in CMEs are characterised by more non-market cooperative relationships, so 
that it is not primarily the market and its price signals that determines firms’ behaviour, but 
relationships based on cooperative networks between them, the state and society.  Therefore, 
institutional support for responses to social attitudes should be most acute in CMEs, in this 
case Germany and Japan.  This is because firms in these CMEs are likely to give higher 
priority to non-market forms of coordination.  In LMEs, the archetypal version of which is 
the US, material market forces (i.e. consumer demand) are the main drivers.  The market is 
given primacy and short term profits are more the aim.31
For Germany, social attitudes favour the environment and people are willing to take 
market and non-market environmental action.  However, it cannot be said that there is a 
strong association between the two, so the environmental action that Germans are willing to 
take may be for other reasons.  Whatever the association though, the result is that in terms 
of both market and non-market action there are strong incentives for the car industry to sell 
more environmentally-friendly products, and it has.  Indeed, with social and market signals 
pointing in the ‘right’ direction, one is tempted to say that good environmental results 
would have been achieved regardless of whether Germany was a CME or LME.  
 193
 Nevertheless, it may be said that firms’ product offerings reflect social environmental 
concerns and willingness to take environmental action (even if not necessarily for 
environmental reasons), and therefore that positive environmental market outcomes have 
resulted. 
A shift to more environmentally-friendly products is more problematic for US car 
producers.  As LME firms, they give priority to market signals and opportunities for 
shorter-term profitability suggested by such signals.  As long as they can sell big, gas 
guzzling light trucks social attitudes are unlikely to flow through to changes in the products 
offered by US firms.  Therefore, the outcome is a feedback loop of incentives and outcomes 
that militate against them producing more environmentally-friendly products.  On the one 
hand consumers are concerned about the environment and their concern is associated with 
their willingness to act on it.  However, it is possible that they are not demonstrating strong 
enough demand in markets on the basis of this concern.  They might be willing to do so if 
only firms would offer products that reflected their concern, but this is unlikely to happen 
because firms are unwilling to offer vehicles for sale that will attract purchasers on the 
basis of their environmental concerns because the market signals for so doing are not strong 
enough.  Car firms are therefore more reactive to material market pressures, and without a 
more apparent direct relationship between social attitudes and material market outcomes, 
and thence short term profitability, firms are unlikely to drive environmental change.  Even 
if US social concerns for the environment are reasonably high, firms are happy for 
consumers to feel guilty while they sell them more light trucks!32
Despite reasonably strong social concern for the environment in Japan, willingness 
to act is weaker than for Germany or the US.  This is true of market and non-market action, 
with the exception of a willingness to make financial sacrifices.  Even though a stronger 
association exists between environmental concern and action than for Germany, it is 
sometimes counter-intuitive.  Therefore, the Japanese impetus for change through social 
attitudes might be thought to be the weakest of the three territories due to less willingness 
to act and confused associations between concern and action.  However, there is the 
puzzling fact that more environmentally-friendly vehicles are being sold.  It is possible to 
draw the conclusion that the relationship between social attitudes and actual market 
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 outcomes is tenuous in Japan’s case, unless the fact of their existence has more impact due 
to the greater importance accorded to social attitudes by firms in a CME like Japan.  This 
idea is supported by Katzenstein who notes that “visibility characterizes Japan’s social 
order” and that this reinforces the importance of public and published opinion which can 
give rise to “social sanctions”.33  Thus, the fact of the existence of a social concern for the 
environment may mean that being seen to be environmentally-friendly is very important to 
firms.  This results in firms offering more environmentally-friendly products for sale on the 
basis of the existence of social concern and leading the market even though willingness to 
take environmental action is lower than in the US or Germany. 
 
The Effects of Government Regulations 
 
There are fuel economy regulations in place in Germany, the US and Japan, but it was 
shown in Chapter 4 that these differ considerably in how they are constructed.   
The EU car industry’s peak body, the Association des Constructeurs Europeens 
d’Automobiles (ACEA), came forward in the 1990s to make voluntary commitments to 
reduce new car CO2 emissions/fuel consumption for cars produced in the EU.  This 
commitment was submitted to the European Commission (EC) in July 1998, and was 
subsequently made a Directive of the EC.  As a result of it more than 15 percent of total 
CO2 emission savings being sought under the EU’s Kyoto Protocol targets will be met.  It is 
thus, de facto, also the German regulation in respect of fuel economy.34   
The US introduced fuel economy standards in the 1970s via its Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) program.  CAFE was launched through the 1975 Energy Policy 
Conservation Act with standards coming into force in 1978.  It applies to all cars 
manufactured for sale in the US, whether produced domestically or imported, and is a sales 
weighted average fuel economy of a manufacturer’s passenger car fleet in any given model 
year.  Unlike the EU’s voluntary industry commitments, CAFE standards have always been 
state-mandated with long-standing stiff penalties in the form of fines for firms failing to 
meet the standards for new car fleets.35  There has been no change in the CAFE standard 
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 for passenger cars since 1990, nor for light trucks since 1996.  Before this the standard 
actually regulated for worsening fuel economy in the late 1980s for passenger cars before 
being strengthened again in 1989.  For light trucks, there is a similar story with the standard 
little changed from 1987 levels.  It is also at significantly weaker levels than for passenger 
cars.36
In Japan, fuel economy targets were introduced in the 1970s under the Energy 
Conservation Act.  Since 1998 targets have been set on the basis of the ‘Top Runner 
Method’.  Rather than setting ambitious targets for firms to achieve, this method sets 
standards based on the most efficient model in a given weight class and then all 
manufacturers are given time to match it.37
The main observation, explored in detail in Chapter 4, is that there are strong 
voluntaristic components in the EU/German and Japanese regulations.  For the US, weaker 
and externally-imposed standards are the case.  Thus, CME-style, the institutional form of 
regulations in the EU/Germany and Japan is more favourable to the industry taking the lead 
on environmental advances for their products than in the LME US case.  German and 
Japanese firms are therefore less likely to await market signals and react to them.  They are 
more likely to be proactive in driving environmental change on the basis of social attitudes 
in advance of such market signals or externally imposed regulations that alter market 
conditions. 
 
The Role of Technology 
 
Many commentators note that the CME features of Germany and Japan are expressed in 
different ways.  An important difference that has relevance here is the idea that state 
involvement in the Japanese economy has ‘techno-nationalist’ aims – i.e. technological 
leadership is the goal.  As noted in Chapter 2, while Japanese corporations aim for 
technological leadership, German firms are more likely to incorporate technological 
advances more incrementally and conservatively to improve the quality of existing products.  
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 US firms exhibit an LME-propensity for radical technological change, but only in response 
to market forces, and then more in emerging industries rather than established ones. 
The shift to diesel cars in Germany (and the EU) represents a shift to a technology 
that is more environmentally-friendly, in a technologically incremental manner.  Petrol and 
diesel are existing well-defined technologies, and what German firms have done is to 
switch their focus to diesel and improve the efficiency and performance of engines so that 
they exceed the environmental performance of existing petrol engines.38  In contrast, the 
techno-nationalist nature of Japanese CME institutional arrangements means there is an 
emerging shift on a more radical technological front to, in particular, petrol-electric hybrid 
vehicles.  Although such new technologies are very much at a nascent stage, Japanese 
companies are the pioneers in commercially releasing them on the market.  The Japanese 
Energy Conservation Centre sees the development of such technologically advanced 
alternatively powered vehicles, combined with Japan’s Top Runner Method of setting fuel 
economy standards, as a way for firms to “strengthen their international competitiveness, 
because manufacturers who possess advanced energy-saving technologies can develop new 
business opportunities that respond to consumer needs by applying their basic technology 
[because] consumers’ preference for equipment with higher energy efficiency is expected 
to increase”.39
A word of caution is warranted though, in the sense that perhaps the point should 
not be too overstated.  There is no doubt that most of the improvement in the fuel 
economy/CO2 emissions of new Japanese cars is related to other factors (e.g. buying 
smaller cars).  Even so, it is possible that techno-nationalist features of Japan’s CME mean 
that petrol-electric hybrid technologies are an emerging strategy for revitalising a mature 
industry and seeking new markets.  This, combined with the possibility that social attitudes 
on the environment are taken more ‘seriously’ by firms than in an LME like the US, 
provides greater incentives for commercializing investment in such radical new 
technologies.  Following from this line of argument is the suggestion, again, that Japanese 
firms are leading the market.  Rather than following it, as one would expect in the case of 
LME firms, Japanese firms are investing in the development of the latest technologically-
advanced products that they believe consumers should buy. 
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 The point has already been made that in the US a shift to more environmentally-
friendly products is unlikely without clear market signals.  US car firms continue to 
produce and sell ever bigger light trucks as passenger vehicles.  It is hardly surprising then, 
that when US firms think of technological advances they think in terms of equipping their 
largest and most fuel-thirsty SUVs with the capacity to run on alternative fuels like ethanol, 
or purchase the technology from Japanese firms to equip them with petrol-electric hybrid 
drivetrains.40  Neither represents the technological shift evident in German and Japanese 
firms’ product line-ups. 
 
The Path Dependence of Established Competitive Advantages 
 
Figure 5.10 (derived from Table 4.7 in Chapter 4) shows that US firms sell the least fuel 
efficient vehicles while EU and Japanese firms sell more fuel efficient vehicles, regardless 
of the market profile in each territory.  Although it is also the case that Japanese and EU 
firms’ products in the US are less fuel efficient than those they sell at home, their products 
are still significantly more fuel efficient than the local US product.  Similarly, while US 
cars sold in either Japan or the EU are far more fuel efficient than the ones they sell at 
home, they remain less fuel efficient than EU or Japanese cars.  This would seem to reflect 
firms’ production profiles that indicate that US firms are skewed towards the production of 
larger vehicles, particularly light trucks.  Indeed, production data for 1998 to 2004 indicates 
that 30 to 50 percent of the output of the two major US producers, Ford and General 
Motors, is accounted for by ‘light commercial vehicles’ by comparison to 3 to 6 percent for 
Volkswagen and 6 to 21 percent for Toyota, the largest German and Japanese firms.  These 
production results have implications for firms’ profit sources.  Ford and General Motors 
rely on light trucks for over 70 percent of their profits and they therefore face a much more 
significant re-design of their product portfolios than German and Japanese firms in order to 
be more environmentally-friendly.41   
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Figure 5.10: Average Fuel Economy for the EU, US and Japan by Firm Nationality, based on 2002 
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Source: D. Austin, N. Rosinki, A. Sauer C. le Duc (2003), Changing Drivers: the Impact of Climate Change 
on Competitiveness and Value Creation in the Automotive Industry, Sustainable Asset Management and 
World Resources Institute, http://pdf.wri.org/changing_drivers_full_report.pdf, accessed 10 January 2004, 
p.31.42
 
While not directly related to the institutional insights of the VOC approach, there 
are clear institutional implications nonetheless that speak to the power these firms have to 
influence the shape of markets.  As noted in Chapter 1, not only is the car industry 
concentrated in a small number of industrialised states, it is then concentrated in a handful 
of firms from each of these.  The implications are that the path dependent effects of 
entrenched competitive advantages, in terms of production and profits from producing 
larger vehicles, outweigh the signals provided by social attitudes.  This could certainly be 
the case in the US, but it may equally be true that a competitive advantage in the production 
of smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles on the part of German, Japanese (and European) 
manufacturers has the opposite effect.  Thus, consumers are not so much ‘in charge’ of 
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 products offered for sale as firms, because they must accept the products firms produce 
regardless of their attitudes or demand preferences. 
Conclusion 
 
Three conclusions have been reached.  First, concern for the environment is not necessarily 
reflected in willingness to act take environmental action.  German WVS respondents are 
more likely than US or Japanese respondents to be willing to take environmental action, 
despite concern for the environment being higher in the US and Japan.  Secondly, 
environmental concern is not necessarily associated with environmental action.  It is at best 
weakly to moderately associated.  In the case of Japan it is sometimes counter-intuitively 
associated.  In the case of Germany it is weakly associated despite willingness to take 
environmental action being stronger than in the case of the US and Japan.  This suggests 
that other non-environmental factors may be driving German respondents to desire to take 
environmental action, so that they are willing to act in environmentally-friendly ways for 
non-environmental reasons.  Thirdly, concern for the environment and willingness to take 
environmental action do not necessarily find expression in market outcomes.  This is only 
clearly the case for Germany, albeit possibly for non-environmental reasons.  Overall, these 
conclusions indicate that social concern for the environment is not clearly related to 
consumer demand.  Therefore, any changes in the environmental performance of car firms’ 
products cannot be clearly said to be universally explained by changing social sentiments 
mediated through markets. 
The evidence disproves the idea that post-materialist values (concerning the 
environment and the car industry at least) are a universal source of behavioural change.  
The hypothesis that social attitudes are reflected in willingness to take action that is 
subsequently manifested in markets via consumer preferences, and that this then alters firm 
strategies, must be rejected.  Although such a clear causal path is intuitively appealing and 
logically reasonable, the evidence does not support it as a universal phenomenon.  
Therefore, the traditional (simplistic) rendering of firms acting in more environmentally-
friendly ways as a consequence of them being instrumental profit-maximising entities is 
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 43insufficient.   However, explanations for the findings are suggested utilising the insights of 
the VOC approach, on the basis that the different institutional settings faced by firms in 
their home states have implications for their corporate strategies. 
For German firms, embedded in a CME with an institutional willingness to look 
beyond market forces to other motivating factors for action, there are clear incentives from 
social concern for the environment and willingness to take environmental action for firms 
to pursue more environmentally-friendly product strategies.  Even if the two are only 
weakly linked, and environmental action may be for non-environmental reasons, the 
incentives are present.  Overall, there are clear incentives for German firms to act either to 
lead the market or respond to its signals, and they have done so via the development of 
smaller diesel vehicles that have been enthusiastically embraced by consumers.  Given their 
LME institutional setting, a lack of market signals for US firms that favour environmental 
improvements in vehicles offered would appear to override significant social concern for 
the environment.  Therefore, for the US a materialist analysis, even in the face of increasing 
post-materialist values, remains appropriate.  Japanese firms may be in the lead, ahead of 
market signals, offering products on the basis of social environmental concerns that 
consumers then purchase.  Even if social concerns are weaker and their association with 
environmental action unclear at times, Japan’s techno-nationalist CME version of 
capitalism supports its firms behaving in this manner, and to offer more radical 
technological solutions than is the case for German firms which have acted more 
incrementally to improve the environmental performance of more traditional products.  The 
manner in which fuel economy regulations are constructed also places the onus on Japanese 
and German firms to lead the market more than is the case in the US. 
Ultimately, what we have is a case of ‘chickens and eggs’.  It is hard to clearly 
determine whether German firms are reacting to social concerns and leading the market, or 
reacting to consumer preferences expressed in the market.  For institutional reasons, they 
and Japanese firms are more likely than US firms to lead the market (on the basis of social 
concerns) than react to its signals.  This is true for German firms even if they are likely to 
be acting less for post-materialist reasons than firms in the other territories.  But regardless 
of their home state, in an industry where production is concentrated in a handful of 
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 enormous corporations and less than two or three of these dominate their home territories, 
to some extent consumer choice will always be defined by these firms.  Their established 
competitive advantages produce a path dependence in their product offerings that may 
override shifts in social attitudes, at least in the short term.  Thus, if consumers are buying 
more environmentally-friendly vehicles in Japan and Germany maybe this is because this is 
where their production expertise lies.  Similarly in the US, despite an expressed willingness 
to act on environmental concerns, it may be that the industry offers less environmentally-
friendly vehicles than German or Japanese firms because their production structures mean 
that these products are instrumental to their ongoing profitability. 
One final observation is that the institutional factors considered in this chapter are 
largely exogenous ones.  What is required is an examination of firms’ endogenous 
institutional factors (i.e. their internal cultures), as it is the interplay of both exogenous and 
endogenous factors that completes what remains a more complex picture than that 
presented here (and indeed a more complex than that presented by more optimistic 
commentators).  This is the focus of Chapters 6 and 7 which examine firms’ rationales for 
environmental product development expressed in their environmental reports and in 
interviews with key personnel. 
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Environment, Stuttgart: DaimlerChrysler Communications, including accompanying CD ROM.  The last of 
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these in particular, on pages 32-35, stresses its history of expertise in diesel dating back to 1936, and its 
developments of the technology as a process dating from its first pioneering efforts.  
39 Energy Conservation Centre (no date), Effects of the Top Runner Program, 
http://www.eccj.or.jp/top_runner/chapter4-2.html, accessed 28 April 2004. 
40 This is clear from the strategies that firms such as General Motors and Ford outline in their environmental 
reports, as discussed in Chapter 3.  For example, see Ford (2004), 2003/4 Corporate Citizenship Report: Our 
Principles, Progress and Performance: Connecting with Society, Dearborn: Ford Motor Company; and 
General Motors (2004), 2004 Corporate Responsibility Report, General Motors. 
41 Production data is from OICA (no date), Production Statistics, http://www.oica.net/htdocs/Main, accessed 
25 July 2005.  Data on firms’ profit and the ‘carbon intensity’ of the products from which they derive it is 
from Austin et. al., op. cit., p.32 and pp.63-64 
42 The careful reader will note that the fuel economy figures quoted here are slightly higher than those 
indicated in Figure 5.1.  I am unable to account for this other than to say that the data comes from different 
sources, but comfort may be taken in the fact that the relative differences between territories appear consistent. 
43 This was the hypothesis raised in Chapter 1 where it was noted that constructing firms in this manner is 
overly simplistic because it suffers from what Katzenstein terms “vulgar rationalism” as it “infers the motives 
of actors from behaviourally revealed preferences”.  In this case, vulgar rationalism would hold that if firms 
are taking a course of action that sees them as more concerned for the environment, this must be because 
consumer demand indicates that it is profitable for them to do so.  See Katzenstein, op. cit., p.27. 
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Chapter 6: Firms’ Rationales for Environmental Product 
Development Initiatives: Environmental Reporting  
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, state regulations and market forces were considered as the key 
material factors impacting on the car industry.  In Chapter 4, it was shown that 
institutional factors determine the environmental performance of the industry in the 
European Union (EU), United States (US) and Japan more than actual regulations.  
Specifically, market mechanisms do not necessarily encourage consumers to use their 
cars less, nor purchase less fuel.  Therefore, it cannot be said that they are clearly a 
mechanism for encouraging firms to change their product strategies.  In addition, neither 
the timing nor stringency of standards is as important as the institutional manner in 
which state-business relations inform their development.  In Chapter 5 it was shown that 
although social concern for the environment exists in Germany, the US and Japan, 
willingness to act on such concerns is by no means universal, and social attitudes are not 
necessarily reflected in consumer demand.  While in the case of Germany there is a 
clear link between social concern for the environment, willingness to act on this concern, 
and actual consumer demand, the relationship between these variables is far more 
tenuous in the US and Japan.  In the US, there is a reasonably strong willingness to act 
on environmental concerns, but little demonstration of this in markets.  For Japan the 
opposite situation to the US is the case: concern for the environment and willingness to 
act on this concern are the weakest of the three, yet ever more environmentally-friendly 
vehicles is the market outcome.   
The results so far go against the grain of the ‘accepted’ wisdom of liberal 
economic perspectives: that rational firms with instrumental material goals aim to 
maximise profits in markets, while being bound by state regulations.   Instead, 
institutional factors provide more compelling explanations for the empirical evidence.  
Specifically, the extent to which a car firm’s home state variety of capitalism (VOC) is 
characterised more by a liberal or coordinated market economy (LME versus CME) 
better explains variations in the outcomes.  Only in the case of US firms is the 
materialist liberal economic view somewhat sufficient to explain their behaviour.  
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However, this is to be expected because the LME of the US institutionally mirrors the 
value system of that very approach.1  For example, US firms appear to be adopting a 
reactive, and barely sufficient, approach to fuel economy standards, and are responding 
more to consumer demand than social attitudes.  The environmental action they take (or 
do not take) is primarily the result of market forces and state regulation.  By contrast, 
CME-based German and Japanese firms focus less on material factors and more on 
normative ones.  German firms, as part of the European car industry, take a more 
cooperative approach to setting regulations and appear to be acting on the basis of social 
attitudes as much as actual consumer demand.  In addressing their carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emission commitments they are promoting diesel vehicles, commensurate with a CME 
preference for incremental technological advances in established industries.  Japanese 
firms are taking a more radical technology-driven approach befitting their 
technonationalist version of a CME.  Proactively acting in concert with, and possibly 
ahead of, the state and certainly ahead of consumer demand, they appear to be more 
internally driven in their environmental initiatives, and possibly more concerned with 
social attitudes than actual consumer demand. 
These insights from the empirical evidence presented so far at a national level 
are examined in more detail in this chapter, and Chapter 7, which evaluate individual 
German, US and Japanese firms’ rationales for their environmental product 
developments.  Two major questions are posed.  First, what do car firms say is driving 
them to make environmentally positive changes to how they do business?  This includes 
an assessment of whether they highlight reacting to material factors (e.g. market forces 
and public policy/regulation) or proactively taking steps for more normative reasons 
(e.g. social concerns and internal company strategies).  Secondly, what are the 
implications of this for how action on environmental concerns occurs within the 
industry in each territory?  Answering this will involve seeing whether firms’ 
nationality matters and whether firms of different nationality are key drivers of change 
and why. 
There is a problem in seeking to identify rationales.  The problem is that 
implicitly one is examining attitudes and beliefs, but these cannot be directly observed.  
They must be inferred on the basis of other indicators.2  While recognising this, the 
objective of Chapters 6 and 7 is to attempt to get inside the ‘heads’ of firms to ‘observe’ 
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such attitudes and beliefs via first-hand perspectives derived from what individual firms 
say in their environmental reports, and the views offered by key personnel in interviews.  
The nature of the perspectives expressed, whether in writing or verbally, are informative 
because, in the words of Finnemore and Sikkink, “norms prompt justification for action 
and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study”,3 
particularly in the light of hard evidence and data.  The two go together: conclusions 
based solely on hard evidence and data without knowledge of norms that express 
justification for action may produce misleading conclusions based on a priori 
assumptions.  
In this chapter, a ‘snapshot’ is taken of firms’ latest environmental reports.4   
These are qualitatively analysed via applying codes for references to material versus 
normative factors, and then for codes in sub-categories below these – e.g. material 
factors include sub-categories such as market forces in the former of consumer demand, 
as well as state regulation; normative factors include social attitudes and internal 
company strategies.  Coding on these and deciding what makes them up was a complex 
endeavour.  It is explained in the first section on methodology.  This is followed by a 
quantitative summary of coding on material versus normative factors, before a largely 
qualitative discussion of the codes on sub-categories within them.  In addition, coding 
for the over-arching concern of ‘sustainability’ as a concept referred to in firms’ 
environmental reports is considered, before conclusions are reached on the different 
rationales for action offered and the strategies these suggest. 
What is found is that material factors, especially market forces, are stressed by 
US firms.  Normative factors are stressed more by German and Japanese firms, 
especially social attitudes for German firms and internal company strategies for 
Japanese firms.  Therefore, it becomes clear that the institutional basis of capitalist 
relations in their home states, outlined via the VOC approach, illuminates how firms 
themselves perceive and communicate their environmental product development 
initiatives.  The findings therefore also support the insights of the VOC approach in that 
institutional explanations are found to be important for understanding the rationales 
firms themselves see as most important to highlight when presenting their 
environmental product development initiatives. 
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Methodology: Analysing Firms’ Environmental Reports 
 
There are two important reasons for examining environmental reports.  First, what is of 
interest is what firms from different states, and indeed the same state, perceive as 
constituting ‘the best possible light’ in which their environmental initiatives may be cast.  
What do they see as most convincing and brand-enhancing for their readerships?  What 
do they think will inspire confidence?  What do they think will convince readers that 
they are a firm committed to environmental concerns and acting on them?  Therefore, 
these reports present firms’ understanding of how their environmental strategies should 
be ‘best’ presented.  Secondly, because considerable effort goes into publishing a 
written report, it presents what each company believes to be its key messages.  While all 
the firms examined have websites that contain environmental information, these are 
updated regularly and evolve over time.  However, a written report endures and presents, 
in one comprehensive document, the activities a firm believes are most important to 
communicate for the period it covers.5
The sections of the environmental reports analysed, the codes applied to 
statements in these sections and the manner in which these are to be analysed are 
described before presenting the findings of the analysis. 
 
Sections of Firms’ Environmental Reports Analysed 
 
Three sections of car firms’ environmental reports were analysed.  First, executive 
statements presenting the view of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and other board 
members that appear at the front of reports were examined.  These ‘set the scene’ of the 
report by presenting the view of its contents by the highest office holder/s.  Secondly, 
environmental ‘vision’ statements were examined.  These relate to the section/s 
presenting the firm’s vision with respect to environmental performance.  The executive 
and vision statements articulate why the firm is taking environmental action, as opposed 
to simply reporting on actions already taken.  Thirdly, the firms’ environmental policy 
guidelines were examined.  These guidelines operationalise the company’s vision by 
setting concise, clear rules for all employees for action on environmental issues.  
Although these three sections account for a small proportion of the reports in total, 
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focussing on them permits a comparative analysis on an as-near-as-equal basis between 
what are otherwise often stylistically dissimilar reports.  They are also where one would 
most expect to find rationales for action rather than descriptions of action undertaken.   
The text to which codes were applied for each firm is provided in Appendix D.  
All quotations from the text of firms’ reports that follow are referenced to the relevant 
sections in Appendix D, rather than the page number in the original report, so that the 
reader may easily find them in their context. 
 
Codes Applied 
 
The executive statements, environmental vision statements and environmental policy 
guidelines were coded for material versus normative factors.  Coding was done using 
QSR NVivo 2.0 qualitative analysis software.  The definitions of the factors to which 
codes were applied, and their sub-categories, are defined below. 
Material factors are split between the sub-categories of market forces and state 
regulation.  These are largely the material factors already examined in Chapters 4 and 5.  
For the sake of coding, market forces are defined in material terms as statements that 
identify forces that affect the firm's financial bottom line and its economic performance 
as a result of the products it sells.  Therefore, codes applied within this sub-category 
related to the following concepts: 
• Competition, in terms of: 
o Consumer demand: The need to take account of consumer preferences or 
demand – e.g. tying efforts on the environment to demand for these, or 
saying that market forces temper what can be done. 
o Competitive pressure from other firms: Competitive pressures from other 
firms in markets or within the industry as a whole. 
• Safeguarding financial returns, in terms of: 
o Profits and sales: References to profits and sales, whether associated with 
environmental concerns or otherwise. 
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o Shareholder value: Providing value to shareholders, or stock performance 
generally. 
o Risk management: Identification of environmental factors as a significant 
business risk factor that needs to be addressed. 
• Proactive action, in terms of: 
o Market share/leadership: Being first to market with products, or leading in 
them, as a business strategy that drives environmental product development 
initiatives. 
o Business opportunity: The idea that being environmentally responsible and 
producing products that reflect this represents a business opportunity. 
State regulation is defined as references to regulations, including complying 
with them, exceeding them, acting on the future likelihood of them etc.  Codes applied 
within this sub-category related to the following concepts: 
• International regulation: Internationally agreed conventions, protocols etc. on 
environmental issues, including: 
o International meetings: Meetings convened by international organisations 
such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) etc., or 
participation in international forums where environmental performance is 
addressed including meetings held by industry groups such as the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 
o International protocols: Ratified international agreements that states have 
decided to adopt (e.g. the Montreal Protocol and Kyoto Protocol). 
o International voluntary agreements: Adherence to, or participation in, 
international non-binding international agreements, such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), Coalition of Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (CERES) Principles etc. 
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• National regulation: National regulations, policies, agreements etc. on 
environmental issues, in terms of: 
o National legislation: Meeting or exceeding the requirements of national 
legislation. 
 Exceeding legislative targets: Exceeding the requirements of state 
legislation. 
 Achieving legislative targets: Meeting the requirements of state 
legislation. 
o National voluntary agreements: National voluntary agreements agreed and 
supported jointly between the industry and regulatory authorities. 
o Input to policy/regulations: Input to/the provision of advice on national 
regulations and regulatory settings. 
• Legislation-general: Meeting or exceeding regulatory requirements generally. 
o Exceeding regulations: Exceeding the requirements of regulations generally, 
o Complying with regulations: Complying with the requirements of 
regulations generally. 
Normative factors are split between the sub-categories of social attitudes and 
internal company strategies.  Social attitudes were considered in Chapter 5.  However, 
internal company strategies, which are endogenous to individual firms, have not been 
considered so far because the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 has been at a national, rather 
than individual firm, level.  Social attitudes are defined as non-market forces to do with 
social perceptions of environmental concerns, and the way this indirectly affects 
perceptions of the firm's business or the firm's reaction to them for other reasons.  Codes 
applied within this sub-category related to the following concepts: 
• General social concern/raised awareness of environmental issues: A recognition 
of increased social concern for the environment and a response to this. 
• Firm image, in terms of: 
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o Brand value: The value of the name of the company and what it represents, 
especially in terms of loyalty and price premiums that it can extract for its 
products. 
o Building trust: References to trust, respect and generally high standing in a 
more general sense than brand value. 
• Responsibility to society on various levels, including: 
o Responsibility to society – unspecified: The firm has a responsibility to 
society generally. 
o Responsibility to society – global: The firm has a responsibility to society 
globally. 
o Responsibility to society – nation: The firm has a responsibility to society 
nationally. 
o Responsibility to stakeholders: The firm has a responsibility to those directly 
affected by the company's operations, specifically customers, suppliers, 
employees and government. 
Internal company strategies are defined simply as endogenous factors that lead 
firms to take the environment seriously.  Codes applied within this sub-category related 
to the following concepts: 
• Corporate Policy: A statement that indicates not just that environmental impact 
is something for which the firm must take responsibility, and take action in 
respect of it, but that it is a: 
o Corporate Belief: Environmentally responsible behaviour is a clear strategic 
commitment, or corporate goal.  In a sense, everything done by a company is 
because it believes it is a ‘good thing’ to do/is in its interest, but this code 
relates to statements that represent a clear belief company-wide that the 
environmental impact of its products is important.  It is a statement along the 
lines that ‘we do this because we believe it is a good/right thing to do’. 
o Guiding principle: Not just a statement of belief, but reference to actual 
internal guiding principles, or guidelines for operation, or policies that codify 
 214
or implement the environmental performance of the company.  To some 
extent this represents a rationale based on circular reasoning (e.g. along the 
lines that ‘we do it because we have guideline that says we do it’) but it still 
indicates a rationale for action based on internal company strategies that in 
this case are clearly codified. 
• History/path dependence: The firm characterises itself as one that takes the 
environmental impacts of its actions seriously, and thus continues to be one 
where concern for the environment is part of how it does business.  This is not a 
change in direction but a continuation of a commitment and strategy.6 
• Leader’s vision: The leader her/himself identifies, or is identified as having, a 
commitment to the environment and action that is aimed at reducing the 
environmental impacts of the company’s products. 
No preconceived notions of what codes might be applied within the sub-
categories were established a priori.  The idea was that the reports ‘speak for 
themselves’.  Therefore, codes under the sub-categories emerged in the course of 
reading and re-reading the reports over a period of six months in 2005.  In so doing, it 
was also realised that another category of coding was required due to the fact that the 
theme of ‘sustainability’ recurred in the texts.  This occurred in two ways.  First, the 
over-arching concern of the concept of sustainability was mentioned.  Secondly, the link 
between environmental and economic sustainability was made by several firms and 
given as the reason behind their environmental product development initiatives.  Coding 
was applied in respect of both these concepts, which are defined as follows: 
• Environmental sustainability: Specific reference to the concept in terms of 
environmental sustainability itself, or sustainable development, environmentally 
sustainable economic development, sustainable mobility or similar.  Any use of 
the word 'sustainable' in an environmental context. 
• Environmental and economic sustainability linked: An expressed belief that 
environmental sustainability is connected with economic sustainability.  This 
may be the idea that there is a double dividend in looking after the environment: 
not only does the environment benefit, but the business benefits through being 
 215
more economically sustainable as a result.  Or it may be that the two are linked 
and need to be balanced. 
The following analysis of the codes applied is both quantitative and qualitative.  
The relative percentages of codes on material and normative rationales are examined 
first.  A qualitative analysis is then applied to investigate the underlying reasons for 
variations in the distribution of material and normative rationales for action.  Therefore, 
the analysis aims to highlight the actual proportional differences in codes between firms 
(i.e. relative emphasis), as well as the qualitative nature of the statements codes 
represent (i.e. how motivations are ascribed).  The coding rules applied and detailed 
results of coding are provided in Appendix E. 
 
Material versus Normative Factors 
 
The VOC approach predicts that material factors should be of greater importance for 
LME-based US firms than CME-based German and Japanese firms.  The latter should 
focus more on normative rationales for action (i.e. a logic of appropriateness rather than 
consequentialism).  This prediction is borne out by the rationales presented by firms 
themselves in their environmental reports.  Table 6.1 summarises the results of coding 
the environmental reports for material and normative factors, and their sub-categories, 
on a national average basis.  Figures 6.1 to 6.4 show the relative coding proportions on a 
firm by firm basis for each of the sub-categories within material and normative factors. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary Totals of Material versus Normative Factors 
  Market 
Forces 
(%) 
State 
Regulation 
(%) 
TOTAL 
MATERIAL 
(%) 
Social 
Attitudes
(%) 
Internal 
Company 
Strategies 
(%) 
 TOTAL 
NORMATIVE 
(%) 
ALL 
CODES
(%) 
 
ALL 
CODES 
(No.) 
GERMAN AVERAGE 18 23 41 37 22 59 100 227 
JAPAN AVERAGE 16 16 32 32 36 68 100 177 
US AVERAGE 40 10 51 28 21 49 100 124 
Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
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Figure 6.1: Proportion of all Codes on Market Forces by Firm 
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Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
 
Figure 6.2: Proportion of all Codes on State Regulation by Firm 
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Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
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Figure 6.3: Proportion of all Codes on Social Attitudes by Firm 
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Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
 
Figure 6.4: Proportion of all Codes on Internal Company Strategies by Firm 
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Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
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There is almost a 50:50 split on average7 in material versus normative factors 
for US firms.  Both are offered as rationales for action.  However, for German and 
Japanese firms there is a clear bias towards normative factors: on average 59 percent of 
German and 68 percent of Japanese firms’ codes are on these.  This confirms the VOC 
prediction that US firms should be more motivated on the basis of exogenous material 
factors than German and Japanese firms. 
Examining the sub-categories of material and normative factors, reveals that the 
material component in US firms’ rationales that loomed largest was their coding on 
market forces.  They do so more than twice as much as German or Japanese firms (40 
percent on average by comparison to 18 and 16 percent for German and Japanese firms 
respectively).  Ford outstrips all other firms by having 45 percent of its codes on market 
forces, around three times the proportion for most German and Japanese firms.  German 
firms code more for state regulation on average than US and Japanese firms, although 
there is a large spread of coding percentages between firms of the same nationality. 
The reason for normative factors’ importance for Japanese firms is their focus on 
internal company strategies.  On average, 36 percent of codes applied to Japanese firms’ 
reports relate to these, versus just over 20 percent of codes on average for German and 
US firms.  The reason for normative factors’ importance for German firms is that they 
are more inclined than Japanese or US firms to code for social attitudes.  On average, 
they have 37 percent of their codes on these, while US and Japanese firms have around 
30 percent.  The exception to the rule is Toyota which codes more than any other firm 
for social attitudes (42 percent).  However, like its Japanese counterparts Toyota still 
skews more to internal company strategies than US or German firms.  Therefore, it is 
still true to say that rather than having an internal rationale for action like Japanese 
firms, German firms are more likely to code for social attitudes. 
BMW deserves special mention.  While other individual firms may be somewhat 
at odds with their national counterparts on sub-categories within material versus 
normative factors, BMW skews towards material factors to the extent that it has a 
profile more like a US firm than a German one.  Indeed, it codes for market forces 
similarly to General Motors.  BMW also has the lowest coding of any firm on internal 
company strategies (12 percent).  However, while BMW is somewhat at odds with the 
other German firms in these regards, on social attitudes its coding is comparable to that 
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of other German firms (40 percent by comparison to 37 percent of Volkswagen and 
DaimlerChrysler).  Therefore, while sharing a German focus on social attitudes, BMW 
also shares US firms’ interest in market forces. 
Overall, although normative factors are not insignificant for US car firms, it is 
clear that, as LME-based firms, they are most concerned with material factors, 
especially market forces.  This relates to LME firms’ preference for market coordination 
of economic activity.  If one excludes BMW from the German average, the difference is 
even greater with Volkswagen and DaimlerChrysler having only 12-13 percent of their 
codes on market forces.  Therefore, excepting BMW, the CME-based German and 
Japanese firms cite normative factors more than their US counterparts.  As per their 
CME differences, Japanese firms code strongest for internal company strategies, while 
German firms code strongest for social attitudes, reflecting the different stakeholder 
focus in each of their home states. 
 
Material Factors in Detail 
 
The material factors of market forces and state regulation are considered in detail in this 
section.  The way in which codes within these sub-categories influence firms’ rationales 
for environmental action is investigated to more clearly contextualise the observations 
made above.  For example, market forces are more important for US firms than German 
and Japanese firms, but just how are they important?  Are they more important from the 
point of view of responding to competitive pressures such as consumer demand, or 
taking proactive action to increase market share?   
Within the sub-category of market forces, codes were applied for competition in 
the form of consumer demand or competitive pressure from other firms; safeguarding 
financial returns in the form of profits and sales, promoting shareholder value or 
minimising risks; and proactive action aimed at increasing market share/leadership or 
exploiting business opportunities.  Within the sub-category of state regulation, codes 
were applied for national and international voluntary agreements; national and 
international legislation; and input to the policy process.  Given that sub-categories of 
sub-categories are considered,8 the frequency of responses is often quite low.  Therefore, 
in the following analysis qualitative differences in the actual statements made are often 
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brought to the fore.  Subsequent to discussing these, the key observations are related to 
the VOC approach in relation to each of the sub-categories. 
 
Market Forces 
 
Only US firms and BMW have a large proportion of their codes in the sub-category of 
market forces (i.e. 33-45 percent of all material and normative factor codes by 
comparison to 12-17 percent for Japanese and other German firms – see Figure 6.1).  
With this in mind, Table 6.2 shows the composition of firms’ codes on market forces.  
The three codes within the sub-category of market forces - consumer demand and 
competitive pressure from other firms; safeguarding financial returns; and proactive 
action - are considered in turn.   
 
Competition: Consumer Demand and Competitive Pressure from Other Firms 
 
Competition in the form of consumer demand or competitive pressures from other firms 
accounts for over 40 percent of US firms’ market forces codes.  In addition, around a 
third of their market forces codes come from a drive to respond to consumer demand.  
Clearly, competition in markets is a key driver for US firms, as one would expect of 
their LME heritage.  The statements they make are also qualitatively strong.  For 
example, on consumer demand Ford says: 
It’s not that our customers want these environmental benefits at any expense. Quite the opposite. 
They’re saying they want it all at little additional cost. They don’t want tradeoffs between 
environmental performance and the power, comfort and safety they’ve grown to expect. Our 
products must reflect this “no compromises” attitude.9
Indeed, the “no compromises” approach to consumer demand is reflected in the primacy 
accorded it in Ford’s executive statement where its Chairman declares that “the fastest 
way to bring about the [environmental] transition we are seeking is through the market 
and competition”.10   
General Motors’ statements about competition, particularly responding to 
consumer demand, are similarly strong.  The firm outlines its commitment to giving 
customers “gotta have” products11 and states from the outset that “a report on our 
behaviour must start with delivery on our promise to design, build and offer great cars 
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and trucks that meet the full range of consumer needs and preferences in the markets 
where we compete”.12  Thus, consumer demand, and responding to market forces 
generally, are the firm’s number one priority.  Its bottom line is that it must “offer 
vehicles that people want to buy” because “if no one buys the product, the new 
technology has no real impact.13  Like Ford, competition in the market via consumer 
demand is General Motors’ primary strategic driver. 
Although BMW exhibits US firms’ focus on market forces, this is not in terms 
of competition in markets.  It, like two of the Japanese firms (Honda and Nissan), does 
not code for responding to competitive pressure from other firms at all, and has only 5 
percent of its material factors codes on consumer demand.  Therefore, despite sharing 
US firms’ concern for market forces, BMW does not share their concern for responding 
to competitive pressures.  While it would be a stretch to say this indicates a CME 
preference for cooperation/coordination between firms, it certainly does not indicate an 
LME-like preference for market competition. 
Of the other German firms, not only do they code less in proportional terms on 
market forces, the statements they make are qualitatively different.  Volkswagen says 
that “companies are obliged to act in line with economic considerations” and that “their 
primary function is to create value and satisfy the needs of their customers”14, and 
echoes General Motors in saying that “eco cars which fail to find buyers are of no use to 
us or the environment”.15  However, Volkswagen additionally notes that: 
The negative associations - in the automotive industry and elsewhere - which in the past have 
linked environmental protection with self-sacrifice or scaremongering have already put off far 
too many customers.16  
Unlike US firms, this is a statement embracing environmental factors as a way of 
encouraging customers, rather than simply responding to consumer demand.  Of the 
other German firms, which have a very small proportion of their market forces codes on 
either consumer demand or competitive pressure from other firms, statements are made 
along the lines that they must manage to “satisfy”17 their customers and develop 
products and technologies that “take account of and drive the market trends of the 
future”18 in order to be competitive.  Not only are these quite restrained statements, but 
the latter statement of DaimlerChrysler’s actually indicates the firm sees its role as a 
mixture of responding to and leading the market, rather than primarily reacting to the 
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demands of consumers.  Like Volkswagen, consumer demand is seen as more of a ‘two-
way street’, in the sense that it may be influenced as well as responded to. 
Japanese firms’ statements on competition in markets are quite weak.  Honda 
simply says that it wishes “to meet the expectations of customers”19 and “provide 
customers with products that totally satisfy them”.20  Toyota talks of providing 
“products and services that fulfil the needs of customers worldwide”21, dealing mainly 
with the need to be mindful of market forces, then strike a balance between them and 
environmental goals.  Nissan makes similar statements, but also declares that 
“customers want environmentally friendly cars, but they expect a sound value 
proposition, so we have to find solutions”.22  Therefore, environmental product 
development initiatives are not as contingent on consumer demand, as for US firms.  
Instead, consumer demand is more a consideration given the firm’s prior commitment 
to the development of environmentally-friendly products.  Concomitant with Japanese 
CME firms’ internal drivers for strategic decisions, the decision to undertake 
environmental initiatives comes first, or is at least balanced with, consumer demand. 
 
Safeguarding Financial Returns: Profits and Sales, Shareholder Value and Risk 
Management 
 
There is one clear observation on firms’ coding for safeguarding financial returns.  It is 
the strength with which BMW codes on it, with 75 percent of its market forces codes 
are in this sub-category.  Therefore, although BMW stresses material factors, especially 
market forces, to a similar degree to US firms, the reason is not so much a 
preoccupation with being competitive in markets as safeguarding its financial returns.  
The reason would seem to be that it knows it has a good product and a significant share 
of the prestige car market, and it wants to make sure it keeps it.  It makes statements 
along the lines that “by consistently serving the premium segments of the car market, 
the BMW Group creates the right conditions for profitable, long term growth”.23  BMW 
is playing a different game as a prestige car maker.  It is not so much competing in 
markets as maintaining its position as a niche prestige car maker. 
For the other firms, there is the observation that in addition to coding less on 
market forces generally, Japanese firms and DaimlerChrysler do not mention 
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shareholder value at all.  This reflects the less stockmarket-focussed nature of financial 
markets in CMEs.  Beyond quantitative coding variations, firms’ statements about 
safeguarding financial returns are qualitatively rather similar.  The clearest differences 
are that Toyota, when mentioning sales, refers specifically to sales of its petrol-electric 
hybrid Prius rather than sales in general – i.e. the spotlight is clearly on its 
environmental initiatives.  However, when US firms mention profits and sales, they 
refer to “razor thin profit margins”24 and action in the face of “difficult economic 
conditions”.25  This can be contrasted with the German firms which note their 
“excellent sales, revenues and profits”26 and the need to remain profitable generally 
over the long term.  The difference in emphasis for US and German firms no doubt 
reflects differences in their underlying profitability. 
 
Proactive Action: Gaining Market Share and Exploiting Business Opportunities 
 
As a proportion of their codes on market forces, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda and 
General Motors code more than the other firms on proactive action, particularly in 
respect of acting to increase market share/leadership.  But given the small number of 
codes involved for firms other than BMW and US firms, and their smaller proportion of 
codes on market forces generally, it would be dangerous to draw conclusions on the 
basis of these coding proportions alone (e.g. DaimlerChrysler has 75 percent of its 
market forces codes on proactive action, but this only relates to eight codes).  However, 
examining the qualitative differences in statements made does reveal some key 
differences, in that it is more a matter of material concerns for German and US firms 
versus more ‘poetic’ visions by Japanese firms. 
US firms are clearly materialist in their approach, with statements about seizing 
opportunities to ensure they remain competitive, often couched in terms of market 
leadership.  A typical statement by General Motors is: “we are committed to leading not 
only with our products and business results, but economically, socially and 
environmentally, as well”.27  For General Motors, it is a matter of “product leadership”, 
being an “industry leader” and indeed “being the world leader in transportation products 
and related services”.28  Ford similarly sees environmental action in terms of a 
“leadership choice” based on “sound business drivers” on which the company “must 
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Table 6.2: Material Factors – Market Forces in Detail 
  Competition Safeguarding Financial Returns Proactive Action TOTAL 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(No.) 
  Consumer 
Demand 
(%) 
Competitive 
Pressure 
from Other 
Firms (%) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
(%) 
Profits 
and Sales
(%) 
Shareholder 
Value (%) 
Risk 
Management 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
(%) 
Market 
Share/ 
Leadership 
(%) 
Business 
Opportunity
(%) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
(%) 
  
GERMANY Volkswagen 54 8 62 8 8 0 15 15 8 23 100 13 
 BMW 5 0 5 19 33 24 75 14 5 20 100 20 
 DaimlerChrysler 0 13 13 13 0 0 13 50 25 75 100 8 
JAPAN Toyota 10 10 20 20 0 10 30 50 0 50 100 10 
 Honda 33 0 29 17 0 0 14 50 0 57 100 7 
 Nissan 58 0 58 8 0 17 25 0 17 17 100 12 
US General Motors 35 6 41 6 6 0 12 47 0 47 100 17 
 Ford 31 9 42 14 9 3 24 17 17 33 100 33 
TOTAL  28 6 35 13 10 7 29 26 10 36 100 120 
Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
 
 
Table 6.3: Material Factors – State Regulation in Detail 
  National and 
International 
Voluntary 
Agreements (%) 
National and 
International 
Legislation (%) 
Input to the Policy 
Process (%) 
TOTAL (%) TOTAL (No.)
GERMANY Volkswagen 44 15 41 100 27 
 BMW  63 25 13 100 8 
 DaimlerChrysler  41 29 29 100 17 
JAPAN Toyota  0 100 0 100 5 
 Honda 14 57 29 100 7 
 Nissan 13 63 25 100 16 
US General Motors 56 22 22 100 9 
 Ford 50 25 25 100 3 
TOTAL  37 35 28 100 92 
Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
 225 
deliver”.29  Environmental sustainability is described in materialist terms as “a 
tremendous business opportunity”.30
German firms’ take a similarly materialist approach.  DaimlerChrysler says its 
“aim is to safeguard future mobility and secure a competitive edge by developing 
innovations and future-oriented technologies that benefit the environment, safety, and 
comfort”.31  Thus, being proactive on environmental matters is a matter of being 
competitive in markets and creating opportunities from a position of leadership.  The 
other German manufacturers echo DaimlerChrysler’s position.  BMW talks about 
ensuring it remains “the most successful premium manufacturer…with a comprehensive 
product range in all the relevant segments of the automobile market”32 and taking action 
to “expand on new markets”.33  Volkswagen also sees its environmental commitments 
as opening up “additional scope for the company to break new ground on its own 
initiative and at its own responsibility”34  because “together, commercial success, far-
sighted environmental protection and social competence enhance the global 
competitiveness of the Volkswagen Group”.35
The language of Japanese firms, in contrast to their German and US counterparts, 
is less materialistic.  They have visions of their roles that can only be described as a 
matter of the heart.  Honda wants to act to increase its market share, and talks about its 
efforts in being a market leader, but sums its efforts up as acting “to share our dreams 
and joys with more customers”.36  When the firm talks of being a leader it mentions its 
successes in fuel economy and the like, but also says “we continuously strive to be a 
leader in bringing forth new values and creating joy”.37  Although Toyota reports on its 
product leadership aspirations in material terms, it goes further to note the need to 
“strive to become a leader and driving force in global regeneration by implementing the 
most advanced environmental technologies”.38  As part of its policy guidelines, Toyota 
states that it desires to “be at the vanguard of the times through endless creativity, 
inquisitiveness and pursuit of improvement”.39  Nissan makes a similarly strong 
statement that: 
As we face global environmental issues, we will act with a sense of volition. We will turn every 
issue we face into a motivating force for improvement as we aspire for a society with a 
symbiosis of people, vehicles, and nature.40
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Such statements suggest more normative rationales to do with how Japanese firms 
conceive their raison d’etres are to the fore.  They also suggest that, in Japanese CME 
fashion, they are more internally driven for their strategic decisions. 
 
Market Forces and the Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
The analysis of the coding on market forces produces the following three observations 
in respect of the VOC approach. 
First, the US firms not only stress market forces more than the other firms, but 
only they stress responding to consumer demand as a leading consideration in 
environmental product development initiatives.  For the rest, consumer demand, and 
competition more broadly, is more an underlying concern to be balanced against 
environmental initiatives, rather than one that drives or constrains them.  This is 
consistent with the importance of market forces in the US LME variety of capitalism, as 
opposed to one factor among many, and more an underlying than primary concern, in 
CMEs. 
Secondly, on safeguarding financial returns, the main observation is that this is a 
major strategic driver for BMW, though not by virtue of its home state’s VOC as much 
as it being a prestige car producer.  This explains why BMW appears more like a US 
firm in its coding for market forces overall.  In addition, there were no references to 
shareholder value for Japanese firms and DaimlerChrysler.  This reflects the lower 
priority accorded stockmarkets in CMEs.  Qualitatively, the main observation is that 
Toyota stresses sales of its petrol-electric hybrid Prius, whereas the other firms are not 
so environmentally-focussed in their statements about profits and sales, and US firms 
face financial pressures that German firms do not. 
Thirdly, when it comes to taking proactive action in markets, qualitative 
differences come to the fore.  US firms see market leadership and business opportunities 
in LME material terms.  German firms’ statements are similar.  However, Japanese 
firms express their leadership aspirations and identification of business opportunities in 
language that implies something more than market success and winning a competitive 
battle is the driving force.  In CME-style, broader strategic goals are the aim, and in the 
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Japanese CME tradition these are based more on an internal vision, rather than external 
motivations. 
 
State Regulation 
 
German firms are generally more likely to cite state regulation as a rationale for 
environmental action than US and Japanese firms, but the variation between firms of the 
same nationality is considerable (see Figure 6.2).  Therefore, no strong quantitative 
statements have been made so far on coding for state regulation overall.  Table 6.3 
shows the composition of firms’ codes on state regulation.  The three codes within the 
sub-category of state regulation - national and international voluntary agreements; 
national and international legislation; and input to the policy process (in terms of 
attending international meetings and input to national policy/regulations) - are 
considered in turn. 
 
National and International Voluntary Agreements 
 
The major observation on voluntary agreements is that US and German firms are far 
more likely to cite them as a rationale for environmental action (41-63 percent of state 
regulation codes) than Japanese firms (0-14 percent of state regulation codes).  It is also 
notable that Japanese firms, in addition to a low proportion of their codes on voluntary 
agreements generally, have no codes at all applied for national voluntary agreements.41  
Beyond these quantitative differences, there is a qualitative similarity about the 
statements made by all firms.  When mentioned, voluntary agreements are noted as 
existing along with the firm’s support for/adherence to them.  Firms cite international 
agreements/guidelines such as Agenda 21, the Global Compact, Coalition of 
Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) guidelines, the Global reporting 
Initiative (GRI), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ‘s 
(OECD) ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) ‘Charta of Sustainable Development’ internationally.  German firms 
also cite national voluntary agreements, particularly the initiatives of the Forum for 
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Sustainable Development of German Business, known as ‘Econsense’, founded in 2001 
by 19 major German corporations.  Ford mentions that voluntary carbon trading 
schemes are emerging that mean it will need to develop appropriate strategies.  
Therefore, the major observation is the lack of Japanese firms’ coding on voluntary 
agreements, particularly national voluntary agreements. 
 
National and International Legislation 
 
In contrast to voluntary agreements, the overriding observation on national and 
international legislation is the degree to which Japanese firms code for them by 
comparison to German and US firms.  At least 57 percent of Japanese firms’ codes for 
state regulation are accounted for by codes on legislation specifically (100 percent in the 
case of Toyota), versus 15-29 percent of US and German firms’ codes.  Therefore, 
although US and German firms are more likely to cite voluntary agreements, and 
German firms are most likely to cite national voluntary agreements, Japanese firms are 
most likely to cite adherence to national and international legislation.   
When Japanese firms mention adherence to such legislation, they are also more 
likely to refer to national, rather than international, legislation.42  By contrast, US firms 
make no mention of complying with national legislation at all, and Volkswagen is the 
only German firm that does, mentioning “Euro 4 exhaust emissions” and “bringing to 
market alternative products with the highest energy efficiency without waiting for the 
state to introduce new legislation”.43  This is not to say that performance against 
specific national regulations is not contained elsewhere in all firms’ environmental 
reports, but it is only Japanese firms who mention them specifically in executive, vision 
and policy statements, citing examples of how they meet or exceed national regulatory 
requirements.  The following statement by Nissan is typical of how Japanese firms do 
this: 
Approximately 90% of new Nissan vehicles sold in Japan and, increasingly, in other parts of the 
world, are certified as ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEV), and we are pushing our lead further 
with super ultra-low emission vehicles (SU-LEV). Our Bluebird Sylphy was the first car ever to 
be certified as a SU-LEV.44
Thus, they mention specific Japanese regulatory targets and how they meet or exceed 
them. 45
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Input to the Policy Process 
 
Excepting Toyota and BMW, all firms are quite likely to note the policy process and 
sometimes allude to their role in it.  Volkswagen does so the most, with 41 percent of its 
state regulation codes on input to the policy process.  The other firms have around 20-30 
percent of their codes on this.  There are no striking national patterns in their coding 
proportions.  However, there is a clear qualitative split between US and Japanese firms 
on the one hand, and German firms on the other.  The former talk in terms of being 
aware of and attending meetings, providing input to discussions etc., but German firms 
demonstrate a more proactive stance. 
Of the US firms, Ford notes that “pension fund managers and administrators 
globally, including a number of US state and local treasurers convened by CERES, have 
joined together to discuss the financial risks they may face because of investments in 
companies whose products and services have an adverse effect on climate change”.46  
Ford is a participant among many in such discussions.  General Motors also talks about 
participating in discussions, the overarching rationale for which, expressed in its policy 
statement, is that it “will continue to work with all governmental entities for the 
development of technically sound and financially responsible environmental laws and 
regulations”.47  The key point is that for both firms the purpose of being ‘at the table’ is 
not so much to promote the cause of environmentalism, as to ensure that financial 
outcomes are protected and the technical challenges more manageable.  Japanese firms 
are simply happy participants in the policy process – e.g. Nissan which notes that it is a 
“participant in the WBCSD Sustainable Mobility Project”.48
However, German firms go a step further to describe how they intend to shape 
the policy process, rather than just participating in it.  BMW declares that “by jointly 
planning and cooperating with all areas of politics, society and government 
administration, the BMW Group is able to offer perspectives for the future where 
mobility and responsibility for the environment no longer represent a contradiction in 
terms”.49  DaimlerChrysler says it “contributes its expertise to non-corporate scientific, 
technical and governmental activities designed to improve the environment”.50  To 
stress the proactive role it plays in making this contribution it further declares that 
“companies need to play a proactive part [and] to this end, DaimlerChrysler is 
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committed to a process of dialogue with politicians, trade associations and social 
interest groups”.51  Volkswagen makes a number of similar proactive statements, one of 
which is that “Volkswagen works hand-in-hand with society and policy-makers to shape 
a development process that will bring sustainable social and ecological benefits”.52  In 
short, German firms do not simply indicate that they are aware of and participating in 
policy discussions.  They want to help drive the process for better environmental 
outcomes.  
 
State Regulation and the Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
The analysis of coding on state regulation produces the following three observations in 
respect of the VOC approach. 
First, in addition to coding proportionally slightly more for state regulation by 
comparison to US and Japanese firms, the German firms share a preference with US 
firms for a more voluntaristic approach to state regulation.  In addition to preferring a 
voluntaristic approach, German firms also stress providing input to government on 
regulations and driving the policy development process.  These observations fit with the 
CME-style of regulation setting and implementation in Germany and Europe: a 
voluntaristic approach based on extensive state-firm discussion and consensus building, 
in the context of a belief that private firms have public responsibilities to fulfill.   
Secondly, the LME-based US firms would rather avoid regulations.  If US firms 
are involved in discussions on policy development it is not so much to proactively shape 
them as to ensure their material interests are not infringed. 
Thirdly, Japanese firms stress compliance with, or exceeding legislation, more 
than their US and German counterparts.  And they refer more to national legislation 
rather than legislation in general, suggesting they are more focussed on their home 
country regulatory settings than US or German firms.  Not only does this support the 
notion of national regulatory structures and ‘home country’ conditions mattering, but it 
supports the CME-nature of Japanese state-firm relations: Japanese firms are focussed 
on regulations they have agreed (often informally) with regulators, particularly at the 
national level, and then set about achieving and exceeding compliance with such 
regulations. 
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Normative Factors in Detail 
 
The normative factors of social attitudes and internal company strategies are considered 
in detail in this section.  The way in which codes within these sub-categories influence 
firms’ rationales for environmental action is investigated in a similar manner to those 
for the sub-category of material factors.  While it has been shown that social attitudes 
are more important for German firms and internal company strategies for Japanese firms, 
in their environmental reports firms refer to these normative factors in different ways.  
Within the sub-category of social attitudes, they mention general social concern and 
raised awareness of environmental issues, the importance of environmental 
considerations from the perspective of the firm’s image, a responsibility to society 
(generally) and a responsibility to stakeholders (those directly affected by the firm’s 
activities) in different degrees.  Within the sub-category of internal company strategies, 
firms cite environmental action on the basis of corporate policy, the importance of the 
firm’s history and therefore path dependence in its actions, and leaders’ vision to 
varying degrees.  Not only are these mentioned by all firms in different degrees, they 
are also addressed in qualitatively different ways.  As with material factors, both 
quantitative and qualitative differences in coding are analysed, subsequent to which the 
key observations are related to the VOC approach for both sub-categories. 
 
Social Attitudes 
 
German firms, and Toyota, stress social attitudes more than US and other Japanese 
firms (see Figure 6.3).  With this in mind, Table 6.4 shows the composition of firms’ 
codes on social attitudes.  The four codes within the sub-category of social attitudes - 
responding to general social concern/raised awareness of environmental issues; firm 
image (as perceived by society in terms of trust, or in terms of brand loyalty stemming 
from its actions and products); a belief in responsibility to society; and a belief in 
responsibility to stakeholders - are considered in turn. 
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General Social Concern/Raised Awareness of Environmental Issues 
 
There is one key quantitative observation on responding to general social concern/raised 
awareness of environmental issues.  It is that while Honda and Nissan code less than 
other firms on social attitudes overall, only they have more than 20 percent of their 
codes for social attitudes on responding to general social concern/raised awareness of 
environmental issues.  These are not identified as a driving force for action on the 
environment by the other firms. 
Honda and Nissan are also the only firms to make qualitatively strong statements 
in this regard.  Honda talks of environmental problems being “recognised as common 
problems for everyone in the 1990s”,53 and that they developed their environmental 
guidelines “amid the increasing momentum toward environmental conservation and the 
acceleration of environmental measures all over the world.”54  Nissan similarly cites 
“strong interest in the world today about how to balance economic development with 
environmental protection”55 and “demands from society regarding exhaust 
emissions”.56  Indeed, Nissan sees “society demanding a shift from conventional 
environmental management to consolidated environmental management, to include our 
consolidated subsidiaries”.57  Even though the other Japanese firm, Toyota, does not 
quantitatively code as strongly, its earlier quoted statement that only firms that respond 
to environmental problems “will be acceptable to society” connotes that social concern 
on the environment require a response if the firm is to endure in future.58  Therefore, for 
the Japanese firms, particularly Honda and Nissan, social concerns are highly 
significant motivators for environmental action.  This is a key finding because it 
resolves (or at least illuminates) the conundrum of Chapter 5 that Japanese firms’ 
market profiles are at odds with Japanese social concern for the environment by 
comparison to Germany and the US, and it supports the hypothesis suggested in Chapter 
5 that the fact of such concern, as much as its degree, is taken more seriously by 
Japanese corporations. 
Volkswagen makes similarly strong statements to the Japanese firms, such as the 
following: 
Social interest groups including consumer and environmental associations, and thus the political 
sphere, set the bar high for companies, be it at national or international level. As a result, large 
international companies with prominent global brands are today caught more firmly in the 
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spotlight of public attention than ever before. It is a challenge which, like other major 
international players, we at Volkswagen have taken up from the outset not least by making a 
voluntary commitment to enter into target agreements and reduce the fuel consumption of our 
cars.59
Like Japanese firms, Volkswagen sees the “challenge” posed by social interest groups 
as one that must be met.  However, this is not the case for the other German firms.  
BMW does not mention general social concern at all, and DaimlerChrysler merely notes 
that “corporate governance issues have rightly attracted considerable attention and are 
now the subject of wide-ranging public debate”,60 so that environmental concerns are 
subsumed within the wider question of corporate governance generally, and then only 
referred to in the context that a lot of debate is going on.   
US firms refer to general social concern in similarly oblique terms.  General 
Motors merely notes the increased “visibility as the public, government, and 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have looked to corporations and the private 
sector to play a leading role in addressing the impact of globalisation on living standards, 
economic development and environmental improvement ”.61  Ford too notes that “times 
are changing”, “questions about fuel economy” are being asked, and that fuel economy 
is recognised by people as a “quality issue”.62  On climate change, Ford notes that 
“customers are demanding accountability”.63  However, these statements of recognition 
of changing social attitudes do not quite amount to the ‘call to arms’ that Nissan, Honda 
and Volkswagen imply. 
 
Firm Image 
 
Firm image relates to statements about how firms wish to be perceived for their 
environmental credentials and why.  Quantitatively, Toyota and Honda code strongly 
for acting to boost firm image, as do US firms, but only BMW does so of the German 
firms.  However, as one would expect of a concept such as ‘image’, the qualitative 
rather than proportional differences in the coded passages reveal clearer national trends.  
What is noticeable is that image is about material success in markets for LME-based US 
firms, rather than a more holistic vision in the case of the CME-based German and 
Japanese firms. 
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US firms take the attitude that building trust and brand image is part of doing 
business.  Ford’s Chairman says “transparency and open dialogue can be uncomfortable 
at times, but I believe these are prerequisites for building the trust required to move 
forward”.64  But along with statements about the importance of behaving with integrity, 
Ford says that the reason for so doing is building trust and respect with “investors, 
customers, dealers, employees, unions, business partners and society”.65  Underlying 
such statements are material goals: “focusing on customer satisfaction and loyalty and 
keeping our promises”66 and “seeking enhanced stakeholder loyalty as a route to 
competitive advantage and long term growth”.67  General Motors’ statements are 
similar.  Although it talks of doing business the “right way” and being “measured” by 
its conduct,68 the reason for behaving responsibly towards the environment (and in 
general) is to “earn our customers’ enthusiasm through continuous improvement driven 
by the integrity, teamwork and innovation of GM people”.69  Clearly, a desire for 
ongoing material success is a significant part of why firm image is important to the US 
firms. 
At the other extreme, Japanese firms (excepting Nissan) want to be seen 
virtually as social leaders, commanding respect and standing in the community for what 
they do.  Rather like their statements on being market leaders, one finds highly emotive 
and ‘organic’ statements in their reports.  Thus, Honda is “striving to become a 
company that people will want to exist”70 and that “all people can look up to”.71  It 
wants to “share its joys”72 with its customers and people generally.  In its policy 
statement, Honda declares it “will consider the influence that [its] corporate activities 
have on the regional environment and society, and endeavour to improve the social 
standing of the company”.73
For Toyota, image is similarly a matter of social standing and respect “by all 
peoples around the world”.74  The firm talks of “good faith”: 
Toyota places great importance on the idea of “good faith.” Good faith means acting with 
sincerity and without betraying the confidence and expectations of others, keeping one’s 
promises, and fulfilling one’s duties, and this is embodied in the following way in the Guiding 
Principles at Toyota Motor Corporation: “undertake open and fair corporate activities to be a 
good corporate citizen around the world.”75
Therefore, image is not just a matter of selling more cars at higher prices,76 but also of 
sincerity, confidence, keeping promises and fulfilling duties.  Toyota virtually wants to 
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be a member of the family, being “kind and generous”, and with a desire to “strive to 
create a warm, homelike atmosphere”.77  For Honda and Toyota, firm image is not just 
a matter of material benefits, but their social standing in society in terms of trust and 
respect. 
Where Japanese firms are emotive, German firms make the most logically 
holistic statements in relation to image.  For example, DaimlerChrysler says: 
We believe that only a policy of openly providing information on environmental protection 
measures and reporting on achievements and problems in the implementation of these measures 
will motivate employees and create credibility in the general public.78
Thus, “credibility in the general public” goes beyond economic success alone, although 
the firm links the two in saying “in order to safeguard the future of the company and 
increase its acceptance in society at large, we have committed ourselves to the principle 
of sustainable development”, and that impressing people with products is also a matter 
of convincing them with your “philosophy”.79  Volkswagen too takes a similarly 
holistic view in which “reputation among clients and the general public” is tied up with 
the broad goal of “access to - and the long term safeguarding of - resources at all 
levels”.80  The over-arching aim is that “the name Volkswagen is inseparably linked 
with [sustainability] principles”,81 and there is a recognition at a policy level too that, as 
one would expect of Germany’s CME state-business relations, “cooperation with 
policy-makers and the authorities is based on a fundamentally proactive approach 
founded on mutual trust”.82
BMW, which codes proportionally more than any firm on the factor of firm 
image, exemplifies the German holistic perspective on this from the viewpoint of a 
premium producer.  It makes many statements, but perhaps the best illustration of this 
perspective is found in the following: 
The BMW Group’s commitment to social, economic and ecological responsibility as an 
international company is in keeping with its performance as a corporate citizen. Thus, reputation 
management serves to develop the company as a responsible partner in the global community. A 
company that is firmly anchored in society as a reliable partner creates acceptance for its 
products. This acceptance is particularly important for a premium supplier, such as the BMW 
Group.83
For BMW, firm image is about selling cars and material success, but also about a 
broader aim of being a good corporate citizen more broadly and “a partner in the global 
community”. 
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Responsibility to Society 
 
There is considerable variation in coding proportions on responsibility to society in all 
territories, although on average Japanese and German firms code more on this than US 
firms.  But the low percentage of codes for Honda and BMW, and the particularly 
noticeable range in coding between General Motors and Ford, make it difficult to reach 
clear conclusions about national differences on a quantitative basis.  The qualitative 
nature of firms’ statements is more illuminating.  These show that while all firms refer 
to their responsibility to society, some German and Japanese firms see themselves as 
part of society and enmeshed in it, as opposed to US firms which see themselves as 
outside society with responsibility to it.   
Of the German firms, BMW, despite coding significantly less than its German 
counterparts, nevertheless sees itself as “anchored in society as a reliable partner”, the 
result being that it “creates acceptance for its products”.84  This anchoring in society is 
mirrored in DaimlerChrysler’s language.  It sees itself as “bound up in an intricate web 
of relationships” that mean “over and above our commercial status as an automaker, we 
are very much a part of the society in which we operate”.85  Volkswagen stops short of 
saying it is part of society but comes close when it says it is a “partner to society”, and 
“hand-in-hand with society”.86  If Volkswagen and society are not of the same entity, it 
is at least ‘married’ to, or a good ‘friend’ of society. 
Of the Japanese firms, Nissan does not quite make the link, stopping short in the 
manner of Volkswagen.  It is close to being part of society but still primarily sees itself 
as “contributing” and “collaborating” rather than a society member.  Honda does make 
the link in saying it is “a responsible member of society”.87  But Toyota waxes most 
lyrical in declaring that “as a member of society [it will] actively participate in social 
actions”.88  In its policy statements it says it will “be contributive to the development 
and welfare of the country by working together, regardless of position, in faithfully 
fulfilling your duties”,89 and “pursue growth in harmony with the global community 
through innovative management”.90
There should be no mistake that US firms’ statements on their responsibility to 
society are strong.  Their actions have an acknowledged effect on it, and this is where 
their rationale for action lies.  As such, Ford identifies the need for “a public 
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commitment to strengthen our connection with society” and wishes to bring about a 
transition to a more environmentally sustainable society in this context.91  Ford seeks to 
“contribute to the communities around the world in which we work”.92  General Motors 
too seeks to be a “constructive influence”93 and wants to “meet the needs of both our 
customers and society as a whole”.94  There is nothing weak about these sentiments, but 
they clearly make the firms ‘us’ and society ‘them’.  German and Japanese firms make 
as strong, if not stronger links, but in some cases also bridge the gap between the two. 
 
Responsibility to Stakeholders 
 
The main difference in codes between responsibility to society and responsibility to 
stakeholders is that the former refers more to social responsibility generally (e.g. local 
communities, national and global society etc.) while the latter refers to those directly 
impacted by the firm’s business (i.e. customers, suppliers, employees and government).  
US firms clearly have a higher proportion of social attitudes codes on responsibility to 
stakeholders.  General Motors and Ford have 38 and 36 percent of their codes 
respectively on responsibility to stakeholders, whereas German firms have around 30 
percent, and Japanese firms code in a range from 15-33 percent.  Given that Ford and 
General Motors are LME-based firms, it is perhaps not surprising that they code more 
on responsibility to those directly affected by their business, rather than society more 
generally.  Indeed, this is commensurate with the point made in the previous section that 
their statements separate them somewhat more from ‘society’ than is the case for 
German and Japanese firms.  Yet, concern for stakeholder relations in addition to short 
term market outcomes should also hold weight for CME-based firms.   
Qualitative differences shed light on this puzzle.  The key difference between 
German and Japanese firms on the one hand and US firms on the other is the degree to 
which material versus normative motivations are stressed.  Somewhat unsurprisingly, 
US firms see responsibility more in instrumental materialist terms.  For example, Ford 
talks of “seeking enhanced stakeholder loyalty as a route to competitive advantage and 
long term growth”,95 and “actively pursuing the benefits derived from a diverse 
workforce, as well as those from the diversity of perspectives provided by our 
stakeholders”.96  Similarly, General Motors notes that it has “long recognised the 
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importance of government policies, international relations, environmental performance 
and labour and community responsibilities to our business.97  Responsibility to 
stakeholders is not always stressed for environmental reasons as much as it is beneficial 
to firms’ material interests.   Therefore, although responsibility to stakeholders is 
highlighted for its importance by US firms (a motivation not predicted by the VOC 
approach), it is for material reasons (a motivation very much supported by the VOC 
approach). 
By contrast, German and Japanese firms see acting responsibility to stakeholders 
as valuable in and of itself.  Although DaimlerChrysler notes that “we consider our 
commitment to the interests of our employees and of society at large not an obligation 
but an investment in the future of DaimlerChrysler”,98 and Toyota mentions “work with 
business partners in research and creation to achieve stable, long term growth and 
mutual benefits”,99  Japanese and German firms tend to go beyond seeing responsibility 
to stakeholders in purely material terms.  The following statement by Toyota illustrates 
the point:  
Toyota hopes that the 21st century will be truly prosperous for society, and aims to grow as a 
company together with its stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, business partners, 
and employees, through making things and making automobiles, while seeking harmony with 
people, society, the global environment and the world economy.100
Therefore, responsibility to stakeholders is coupled with concern for a prosperous 
society and the interests of all people generally.  These concerns go well beyond 
material market outcomes.  In fact, Volkswagen and BMW reverse causality by saying 
that acting responsibly is actually in the material interests of their stakeholders.  The 
other Japanese firms make no mention material interests in the context of responsibility 
to stakeholders at all.  They talk in terms of acting environmentally responsibly with 
respect to them without mentioning material benefits from so doing. 
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Table 6.4: Normative Factors – Social Attitudes 
  General Social 
Concern/Raised 
Awareness (%) 
Firm 
Image 
(%) 
Responsibility to 
Society (%) 
Responsibility to 
Stakeholders (%) 
TOTAL 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(No.) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 13 13 41 33 100 39 
 BMW  0 52 17 30 100 23 
 DaimlerChrysler  4 13 52 30 100 23 
JAPAN Toyota  4 35 38 23 100 26 
 Honda 23 46 15 15 100 13 
 Nissan 28 6 33 33 100 18 
US General Motors 8 23 31 38 100 13 
 Ford 14 41 9 36 100 22 
TOTAL  11 27 32 31 100 177 
Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
 
Table 6.5: Normative Factors – Internal Company Strategies 
  Corporate 
Policy (%) 
History/Path 
Dependence 
(%) 
Leader’s 
Vision 
(%) 
TOTAL (%) TOTAL 
(No.) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 78 22 0 100 27 
 BMW  86 14 0 100 7 
 DaimlerChrysler  93 7 0 100 15 
JAPAN Toyota  81 14 5 100 21 
 Honda 65 35 0 100 17 
 Nissan 64 32 4 100 25 
US General Motors 75 25 0 100 12 
 Ford 50 7 43 100 14 
TOTAL  73 21 6 100 138 
Source: Company Environmental Reports. 
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 Social Attitudes and the Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
The analysis of coding on social attitudes produces the following clear observations in 
respect of the VOC approach that relate to the difference in emphasis accorded material 
factors in LMEs versus CMEs. 
Honda, Nissan and Volkswagen (and Toyota to some extent qualitatively) are 
most likely to see changing social concerns generally as a cause for action of the highest 
order, or a demand that must be met for their firm’s survival.  Apart from the 
implications this has in terms of the post-materialism thesis analysed in Chapter 5 (i.e. 
that social attitudes are taken most seriously in Japan) it indicates that in most cases 
these firms are rather more proactive on social attitudes than reactive – i.e. they are 
anticipating rather than responding to them in terms of building their image and acting 
in a manner that they see as responsible to society or their stakeholders.  It also indicates 
that CME-based firms can substantially alter their environmental actions on the basis of 
social concerns, not just on the basis of material market forces.   Japanese (with the 
exception of Nissan) and German firms also see their image regarding the environment 
as very important.  While the former code proportionally more than the latter, both 
make strong statements on image.  And while there is considerable spread in 
proportional terms on responsibility to society, in qualitative terms Japanese and 
German firms make stronger statements on this too than their US counterparts.  Only on 
responsibility to stakeholders do US firms quantitatively lead Japanese and German 
firms in coding proportions.  However, in qualitative terms they remain more materially 
focussed.  
The implications are clear and go to the CME/LME divide between firms.  Not 
only do German firms and Toyota code most for social attitudes overall, the CME 
German and Japanese firms take a qualitatively more holistic approach, in some cases 
placing themselves within society and taking account of social responsibilities, their 
image and social concerns in a more holistic fashion than US firms.  When US firms 
report their rationales in respect of social concerns they are clearly thinking more about 
their financial bottom line and material factors.  Their focus is also somewhat more on 
the impact their business has on those most closely related to it, rather than on society 
generally. 
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 Internal Company Strategies 
 
The Japanese firms stress internal company strategies most (i.e. 34-39 percent of all 
material and normative factor codes by comparison to 12-25 percent for German and 
Japanese firms – see Figure 6.4).  With this in mind, Table 6.5 shows the composition 
of firms’ codes on internal company strategies. The three codes within the sub-category 
of internal company strategies - corporate policy; history/path dependence; and leader’s 
vision - are considered in turn. 
 
Corporate Policy 
 
German firms and Japanese firms code more on corporate policy than their US 
counterparts (64-93 percent as opposed to 50-75 percent).  This suggests they are more 
inner-directed on environmental matters, because they cite firm-wide guidelines or 
corporate beliefs and strategies in place, rather a belief of individuals in top 
management or an accident of history as internal rationales for environmental action.  
This is especially the case for Japanese firms, given that they code most for internal 
company strategies overall.  It further suggests they have a stronger commitment to 
environmental considerations because they have internalised them as part of how they 
do business more than US firms.  This is borne out in the analysis of the qualitative 
nature of the statements made as well. 
Of the US firms, Ford’s strongest statement of corporate policy (expressed as a 
“goal”) is as follows: 
Our ultimate goal is to build great products, a strong business and a better world. As with the 
vehicles we create, this goal is evolving over time from initial concept to final product. We know 
that true leadership will require strong vision and values, as well as perseverance and patience. It 
also will require dedicated leaders and active partners.101
This is an aspirational statement focussed on the ends to be achieved (i.e. “great 
products, a strong business and a better world”), but one does not get a sense of why the 
company wants to do this other than it is a good thing to do.  General Motors’ strongest 
statement is similar: 
Integrity is one of our core values; we live it every day, with each decision we make and each 
action we take. Integrity transcends borders, language and culture; it’s all about creating an 
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 environment that supports, and demands, proper business conduct.  Doing the right thing is not 
always convenient, but it’s essential to sustaining our culture of integrity and our leadership 
position in corporate responsibility. It means honest and accurate reporting of our performance, 
both internally and externally. It means competing - and succeeding - by the rules, whether they 
are laws, regulations, or simply GM policy. It means making our actions match our words.102
General Motors wants to “do the right thing” with “integrity” and be “honest” and 
declares its commitment to corporate responsibility.  But like Ford exactly why this is 
left implicit, other than that it is a ‘good thing’ in and of itself. 
 
DaimlerChrysler makes similar statements to the US firms, but the other German 
firms elaborate more.  BMW and Volkswagen say that elevating the corporate priority 
of environmental concerns is good for business.  For example, BMW says: 
Corporate governance is an all-embracing issue that affects all areas of the company. Taking 
responsibility for our actions, transparency and trust in others have long been the principles of 
our corporate culture. This corporate culture is essential for the success of the BMW Group both 
today and in the future.103
BMW further says that its “product and market offensive” incorporates environmental 
responsibility in order to “safeguard the future of the BMW Group on a sustainable 
basis”.104  Volkswagen makes similar statements, but in so doing notes that it has 
cultural reasons for adopting corporate environmental policies: 
Volkswagen is a company with German roots, European values and global responsibility.  The 
rights, personal development, social security and economic participation of its employees are 
core elements of corporate policy.105
Thus, for Volkswagen there is something German and European about having a sense of 
responsibility, expressed as corporate policy, for the environment. 
Where Volkswagen and BMW start, Japanese firms take off, waxing lyrical 
once again.  Honda has its environmental policies because it “wishes to preserve the 
environment for future generations”,106 and to “pass on the beautiful natural 
environment”107 to them.  This is all part of the firm’s desire “to pass on our joys to the 
next generation”.108  This view of the firm’s role in ensuring inter-generational equity is 
said to flow through to its employees who adhere to company policies because they are 
“both a member of the company and of society”.109  Nissan, like Honda, has a corporate 
vision on the environment that is about more than the firm’s material position.  As 
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 Honda want to create joy, Nissan says it has a “corporate vision of enriching people’s 
lives”,110 and therefore is on a “social mission”.111  The reason is as follows: 
It is our view that the basis of environmental protection lies in the human capacity to show 
kindness and concern. Along with striving to understand the environment better, all of us at 
Nissan bring a shared concern for people, society, nature and the Earth to bear on our 
activities.112
Nissan’s aim is to bring about “symbiosis of people, vehicles and nature”.113  Like 
Honda, Nissan’s environmental policies are based on notions of inter-generational 
equity: “we will not accept short term gains if it means compromising our future needs 
or the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.114  Toyota makes similar 
statements, going so far as to cite the precepts of its founding father, Sakichi Toyoda, as 
the reason why it has such policies.  He enjoined Toyota as a company to “be at the 
vanguard of the times through endless creativity, inquisitiveness and pursuit of 
improvement” to be “practical and avoid frivolity”, and as a result everyone at Toyota is 
required to “dedicate ourselves to providing clean and safe products and to enhancing 
the quality of life everywhere through all our activities”.115  
Qualitatively, it appears that statements on corporate policy fall into three 
categories: we do it because it’s a good thing to do (i.e. no explicit reasons offered); we 
do it because it’s good for us (i.e. instrumental material reasons); and we do it because 
of a higher vision (i.e. a strong statement of belief that goes above and beyond material 
concerns).  US firms’ statements are very much in the first category, German firms to 
some extent make it to the second category.  But the third category goes to statements of 
belief based on firm culture and a higher principle than making money that Volkswagen 
hints at in its cultural references, but Japanese firms make explicit.  Their statements of 
corporate policy demonstrate visions of inter-generational equity, and a concern for the 
wellbeing of society and the natural environment that goes beyond material motivations. 
 
History/Path Dependence 
 
Japanese firms code most on citing their histories, and thus the path dependence of 
previous action/concern/decisions in taking their current environmental initiatives.  17-
35 percent of Japanese internal strategy codes relate to their history/path dependence, 
versus 7-25 percent for US and German firms.  This suggests that in coding strongly for 
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 internal company strategies, Japanese firms do so from the perspective of an enduring 
firm culture.  It also suggests that they have a head start on their US and German 
counterparts by being more ‘locked in’ to embracing environmental initiatives. 
A qualitative analysis of the statements made reveals further that only the 
Japanese firms, and Volkswagen, identify a history of environmental product 
development initiatives specifically.  Thus, Volkswagen says its environmental policies 
date back to the 1970s when its Environmental Department was established, and cites its 
experience in environmental technologies.  Of the Japanese firms, Toyota traces its 
environmental concern to the Toyoda Precepts handed down by its founder, Sakichi 
Toyoda, and the codifying of its environmental principles in 1992.  Nissan presents a 
summary of its environmental efforts and achievements dating back to the 1960s as a 
way of demonstrating its commitment, noting that its current environmental initiatives 
are the result of “the accumulation of technology over the years” from historical 
environmental commitments.116  Similarly, Honda discusses its environmental 
initiatives since the 1960s to highlight that it “has long been engaged in environmental 
conservation”.117  None of the other German and US firms specifically refer to a history 
of environmental commitments in the same manner.  For example DaimlerChrysler says 
it has a “115 year tradition of technological leadership and innovation”,118 echoed by 
General Motors which notes its history of innovation as well, while BMW and General 
Motors say they have a long history of strong principles in terms of taking responsibility 
for their actions more generally – e.g. General Motors talks of a legacy of “doing 
business the right way”.119  Ford rather obtusely refers to “building on our heritage”.120   
Therefore, although path dependence is important for all firms, quantitatively it 
is most important for Japanese firms, and qualitatively only they and Volkswagen refer 
to path dependence in environmental product development initiatives specifically. 
 
Leader’s Vision 
 
There is only one observation to make on this rationale for action, and that is its 
importance in the case of Ford.  Although Nissan and Toyota’s executives make 
statements of support for their firms’ environmental initiatives, for the Chairman and 
CEO of Ford, Bill Ford, such support is more personal.  For example, he declares: 
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 “when I became Chairman of Ford Motor Company five years ago, I pledged that we 
would distinguish ourselves as a great company through our efforts to make the world a 
better place” and “one thing that has not changed is my belief that improved 
sustainability performance is not just a requirement, but a tremendous business 
opportunity”.121  He relates his beliefs to his place in the lineage of the firm’s founding 
family: 
My family connects me to the automotive business in a unique way. I feel a special 
responsibility and pride in the contributions Ford makes to the quality of life of our employees, 
customers, business partners and neighbours worldwide. I am dedicated to ensuring that we are 
the best automotive company in the world, by any measure.122
These and other statements of Bill Ford reveal that environmental initiatives are not so 
much a case of corporate policy, or even path dependence in the sense of previous 
strategies, as personal beliefs and vision held by its Chairman who is ancestrally related 
to its founding father.  In fact, the importance Ford leaders’ visions is a feature of Ford’s 
environmental report.  There is no distinct ‘vision’ section, but rather Bill Ford says at 
the outset that he has: 
“asked a group of our senior leaders to develop a sensible approach to the issues of climate 
change, energy security and fuel economy. Some of their viewpoints are shared in this report. 
Their work will drive our product development.123
Their thoughts and views on the matter, sprinkled throughout the report as it provides 
evidence of the company’s performance, thus largely constitute the firm’s vision, and 
they are what was coded as the vision statement of the company in this analysis. 
 
Internal Company Strategies and the Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
There are three clear observations on internal company strategies that relate to the VOC 
approach. 
First, the internally-driven nature of firm strategies under Japanese CME 
capitalism is evident.  Quantitatively and qualitatively this is where their strategic drive 
for environmental initiatives lies.  And having taken the internal decision early to focus 
on the environment as a strategic priority there is a path dependence about their ongoing 
environmental initiatives. 
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 Secondly, for German and US firms, the internal drivers are not just 
quantitatively weaker, they are qualitatively less clear.  German firms are a mixed bag, 
with only Volkswagen approaching the Japanese firms in the importance of internal 
company strategies.  For the others, the more outwardly-driven stakeholder model of 
German CME capitalist relations would seem to explain their divergence from the 
Japanese firms.  Even so, their statements indicate them to be more internally driven 
than US firms, which is to be expected as LME-based firms stress the endogenous 
forces of market forces and state regulations.  This is possibly why when US firms 
highlight the corporate policy aspects of their environmental commitments, even though 
the language of their commitments is strong the rationale for the commitments is not.   
This brings us to the third observation: the importance of the leader’s vision in 
US-based LME firms.  The greater unilateral power of top management in LMEs means 
that if environmental commitments are a management priority, they tend to be the firm’s 
priority.  Hence the importance of the views of a firm’s leaders in whether 
environmental strategies are embraced.  In the case of Ford, top management 
commitment is evident.  In the case of General Motors it is not.  
 
The Over-Arching Concern of the Concept of Sustainability 
 
Although not specifically related to the VOC approach, the frequency with which the 
concept of ‘sustainability’ appears in the reports prompted coding for it as a separate 
category.  Table 6.6 summarises the results of coding for the over-arching concern of 
sustainability: the degree to which environmental sustainability is stressed, and the 
degree to which it is seen as intertwined with the economic fortunes of the firm.  It 
shows that firms are three to four times more likely to cite environmental sustainability 
as a rationale for action, than explicitly linking this with economic sustainability.  When 
they do, Japanese firms are the most likely to make the connection, although Ford and 
BMW come close.  But clearly, the concept of environmental sustainability occurs most 
in German firms’ reports: Volkswagen mentions it 66 times, BMW 45 times and 
DaimlerChrysler 21 times.  The frequency of codes also explains why the percentage 
proportion of codes linking environmental sustainability and economic sustainability 
appears slightly lower for German firms than Japanese firms.  German firms code so 
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 much more for the concept of environmental sustainability generally, that although they 
draw the link between it and economic sustainability, the sheer magnitude of coding on 
the former makes the percentage of coding on the latter seem proportionally smaller.  
There is no doubt that, based on the sheer number of times the concept of sustainability 
is mentioned, the German firms (especially Volkswagen) have comprehensively 
adopted the concept of sustainability as something to be cited and taken seriously in 
their environmental reporting. 
 
Table 6.6: Summary Totals of Over-Arching Concern for Sustainability 
    Environmental 
Sustainability (%)
Environmental and Economic 
Sustainability Linked (%) 
ALL 
CODES 
(%) 
ALL 
CODES 
(No.) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 88 12 100 66 
  BMW  67 33 100 45 
  DaimlerChrysler  81 19 100 21 
 GERMAN AVERAGE(%) 80 20 100 132 
JAPAN Toyota  60 40 100 5 
  Honda 57 43 100 7 
 Nissan 67 33 100 18 
  JAPAN AVERAGE(%) 63 37 100 30 
US General Motors 100 0 100 3 
  Ford 69 31 100 16 
 US AVERAGE(%) 74 26 100 19 
TOTAL   76 24 100 181 
Source: Company Environmental Reports 
 
There are also qualitative differences that relate to the way in which the two 
concepts are linked.  At one end of the spectrum are firms that see their future economic 
and environmental sustainability as inextricably intertwined.  They make statements that 
elevate environmental concerns and sustainability not just to sit alongside, but to be part 
of economic sustainability.  These firms include the Japanese firms of Toyota and 
Honda, the German firms of Volkswagen and DaimlerChrysler, and Ford.  For example, 
Toyota says: 
If the automobile is to remain a beneficial tool in the twenty first century, environmental 
responses are essential.  Without environmental responses, the automobile industry has no future, 
and Toyota is convinced that only automakers that succeed in this area will be acceptable to 
society.124
Honda similarly says that only through “preservation of the global environment…will 
we be able to count on a successful future not only for our company, but for the entire 
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 world”.125  Of the German companies, Volkswagen makes statements such as “we can 
only achieve lasting economic success if our business activities are guided not only by 
social considerations but by ecological aspects as well”,126 and DaimlerChrysler 
expresses similar sentiments.  Ford recognises that the task of “integrating” economic, 
social and environmental responsibilities is difficult, and that they can sometimes 
appear to be “at odds”,127 but that sustainable development must be elevated “to sit 
alongside other business imperatives”.128  It looks like more a question of balance for 
Ford, were it not for the firm’s Chairman and CEO saying that environmental concerns 
are “a key element in building our company for the next 100 years” and that it is only 
through addressing environmental concerns that automobiles can “secure their role in 
providing mobility to a growing and changing world”.129  
Nissan and BMW conceive the link between economic and environmental 
sustainability more in terms of balance where both are, to some degree, competing aims.  
Nissan makes several statements to this end, such as the following: 
There is strong interest in the world today about how to balance economic development with 
environmental protection.  Economic growth does not necessarily threaten the environment.  To 
the contrary, investments in technology can greatly benefit our understanding of the world we 
live in and how to preserve it.  Collaboration among corporations, civic organisations, 
governments, and society in general will help move the world towards an effective balance 
between a healthy environment and healthy growth.130
This statement clearly reflects a concern for balance between competing, or at least 
alternative, interests.  It is reflected in others made by the company, along the lines that 
“continued innovation is crucial to achieve a balance between economic development 
and the protection of the natural environment”.131  However, there is also a sense in the 
Nissan reports that economic growth is dependent on environmental sustainability.  The 
company says that “protecting the environment is the single most important aspect of 
sustainability”, and it does so in the context of believing precautions on environmental 
issues are “needed to allow economic development to continue”.132  Perhaps the 
nuances are subtle, but while Nissan’s statements on sustainability suggest that a 
balance needs to be struck, in the case of Toyota, for example, economic development 
and the very future of the automobile depend on environmental action. 
The distinction is clearest in the case of BMW.  Although the belief is expressed 
that “the company’s economic success and the efficient use of resources in the entire 
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 value added chain depend upon one another”, this is coupled with the idea that 
“economic efficiency and sustainability can be compatible with one another”.133  It is 
not that they are/must be, but that it is possible that they can be, and then in rather a 
material sense of using resources efficiently.  If the distinction is too subtle, then the 
firm’s vision statements make it plainer: 
Economic success and responsibility.  For the BMW Group, long term economic success 
provides the basis for its activities.  It is only on this basis that the company can assume 
responsibility permanently and sustainably. 
And: 
For the BMW Group, economic success is both the prime objective and stable basis for 
assuming responsibility for…the environment”.134
Therefore, environmental sustainability is contingent on economic success.  In BMW’s 
environmental policy the focus then is on how to “reconcile the interests of people and 
nature, technology and progress with the right of future generations to an intact 
environment”.135   
All of this is not a matter of ‘black and white’, but more ‘grey’, as BMW, like 
Nissan, recognises the need to reconcile competing interests, whereas Toyota, Honda, 
DaimlerChrysler, Volkswagen and Ford see their economic future as depending on both.  
But one thing is clear: General Motors does not draw the link at all.  The closest the 
company comes is in acknowledging that its operations have environmental impacts and 
recognising this it works to “continuously reduce the environmental impacts of our 
business in line with a commitment to contribute to sustainable development”.136  The 
idea that environmental and economic sustainability are linked, or that one is dependent 
on the other, is an association never explicitly made.  It is also the case that General 
Motors’ codes least on environmental sustainability, with its codes relating to a mere 
three statements. 
In summary, with the exception of General Motors, all firms explicitly associate 
their economic fortunes with environmental sustainability.  As a proportion of their 
codes on environmental sustainability, Japanese firms are most likely to do so and, with 
the possible exception of Nissan, to see the two as inextricably intertwined.  German 
firms are less likely to code for the linkage than Japanese firms.  BMW’s statements, 
like Nissan’s, are somewhat weaker as they refer more to balancing competing aims 
than ones that are mutually reinforcing.  However, the German firms are most likely to 
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 mention the concept of environmental sustainability in the first place.  The only firm 
that does not make an explicit link between environmental and economic sustainability 
is General Motors.  It also refers to the concept of environmental sustainability the least.  
The suspicion this raises is that without the strength of commitment of its Chairman and 
CEO to environmental strategies, Ford too, LME-style, would also downplay the 
importance of environmental concerns as a strategic business issue in favour of more 
material priorities. 
 
Different Rationales for Action, Different Strategies 
 
As an Australian author, predisposed to employing an LME ‘lens’, US firms’ behaviour 
seems most ‘rational’ and ‘believable’.  This is because their environmental concerns 
are couched more in material terms of market forces.  In taking action that is 
environmentally positive, the rationale they present is expressed in terms of what the 
market dictates: what consumers demand, what the competition imposes, what 
safeguards their financial returns.  This reflects a preference for market modes of 
economic coordination in LMEs.  In adhering to regulations, voluntary rather than 
imposed regulation is preferred, and the purpose of being involved in the policy process 
is to ensure their material interests are not overly compromised.  This reflects a 
preference for arms-length government involvement in markets in LMEs.  Although 
social concerns are important, these are seen more in terms of how they affect business 
interests, and the interests of stakeholders predominate (i.e. those with an interest in, 
and who are directly affected by, the firm’s material interests).  Again, the LME market 
model, based as it is on shareholder value and a resulting preoccupation with profits in 
the shorter term, supports such a perspective.  In LME fashion, internal drivers for 
change are not as important as external (mainly market) imperatives unless, as in the 
case of Ford, individual leaders’ perspectives result in them coming to the fore.  This is 
because of management’s more unilateral control over firm strategies in LMEs.  
Commensurate with this, sustainability as a concept is recognised, but not necessarily 
mutually supportive of economic interests, unless such top management commitment is 
present.  
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 German and Japanese firms’ look ‘non-rational’ when viewed through an LME 
lens.  Indeed, their statements raise questions about whether they may be regarded as 
genuine at all - e.g. is Honda pulling our collective legs when it says it is motivated not 
by profits but “joy”?  However when their statements are viewed through a CME lens, 
the analysis in this chapter comes more into focus. 
German firms are more focussed on normative than material factors, particularly 
social concerns.  This is commensurate with the German CME model which sees firms 
as bearing public responsibility for their actions and looking to social attitudes in 
upholding such responsibilities.  Their image and standing matters to them from an 
economic perspective, but also in terms of their role in society.  Market forces are more 
an underlying concern than one given primacy for action.  Even if BMW is as 
concerned as US firms about safeguarding its financial interests, it remains otherwise 
less focussed on market forces in terms of consumer demand and competitive pressures 
than on social attitudes.  While German firms share a US preference for voluntary 
agreements, they couple this with a desire to be proactive in the policy process in 
achieving consensus-based agreements that serve environmental as well as 
material/business focussed goals.  Close and cooperative, consensus-based state-
business relations, predicted by the VOC approach, are therefore central to their 
perspective on state regulation.  They are thus likely to develop internal corporate 
policies to further their environmental goals in the light of social concerns and their 
close relations with the state, and the result is a commitment to environmental 
sustainability not just as a concept, but for its links to their future economic interests. 
Japanese firms share similar drivers for action with German firms, including in 
respect of social attitudes.  But while German firms exhibit traits of the German 
‘machine’, in which a more integrated approach to the environment involving more than 
material factors pertains, the Japanese firms do so in a more ‘organic’ way that reflects 
the enterprise community aspects of Japanese CME capitalist relations.  They have a 
tendency to be ‘poetic’ and wax lyrical.  They are particularly driven by their internal 
cultures, as predicted by the importance ascribed to communitarian company group, 
consensus-based strategy development and implementation within CME-based Japanese 
firms.  They thus are driven by internal corporate policies and a strong sense of 
history/firm culture that gives impetus to action.  They too are focussed on social 
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 concerns, but in terms of leading society, being respected and doing their social duty.  
They are most likely to see environmental and economic sustainability as linked, 
especially from the point of view of social acceptability.  They are not so much focussed 
on voluntary regulations as German and US firms, but on achieving and exceeding the 
legislative requirements they have agreed with national regulators.  As their CME 
variety of capitalism would suggest, a longer term view based on future benefits and 
market leadership, rather than shareholder value, is the result.  Their aim is not just to 
get products on the market, but to lead the market in new and uncharted directions with 
more radical products.  They want to lead not just in material competitive terms, but in 
meeting broader strategic (in this case environmental) goals. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the above analysis, two caveats are worth bearing in mind.  First, to some extent a 
caricature has been drawn.  National similarities and points of difference have been 
emphasised rather than variations within them.  However, this is necessary in any 
comparative analysis.  One wishes to tease out the similarities and differences within 
and between groups/categories, whether in terms of absolutes or degree, and the 
resulting implications.137  The second caveat is that the qualitative analysis of reports 
has focussed on distinct sections of them.  All the rationales for action within these 
sections may be found to varying degrees throughout the reports.  However, the 
intention was to compare similar report sections, and particularly those sections where 
rationales for environmental action would be most likely to be laid out. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, clear differences in the rationales presented by 
firms themselves for their environmental product development initiatives have been 
revealed.  Furthermore, these are national differences.  However, despite the differences 
an important point emerges from this.  It is that German, US and Japanese firm may all 
be on a journey that leads to the same destination: more environmentally responsible 
behaviour.  It is just that they are taking a different path to it, largely based on the VOC 
of their home states.  Where US firms are focussed on material factors, such as 
consumer demand and market forces generally, and see normative concerns in more 
materialist instrumental terms, German and Japanese firms are more focussed on social 
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 attitudes and internal company strategies so that a more normative approach to their 
business interests is shifting them to more environmentally friendly behaviour.  In the 
end both may arrive at the same point, but US firms will have got there with an eye on 
their bottom lines, whereas German and Japanese firms will have taken a course of 
action that they believe to be normatively ‘right’ and which at the end of the day has 
delivered material benefits.  Thus, it is not so much a matter of ‘greenwashing’ versus 
real commitment, but considering different paths to that commitment, and the different 
drivers that facilitate it in different (institutional) contexts. 
These conclusions have been derived via an analysis of firms’ executive 
statements, vision statements and environmental policy guidelines in their 
environmental reports.  They support the findings so far in Chapters 4 and 5, vis a vis 
state regulations and market forces, and add the perspectives of individual firms internal 
strategies.  However, to build on the insights these environmental reports shed on 
individual firms’ rationales for action, the views expressed by key personnel who were 
willing to be interviewed within them are the subject of analysis in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7: Firms’ Commitment to Environmental Product 
Development Initiatives: Interviews 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the main environmental product development initiatives being 
undertaken by firms, prior to Chapters 4-6 which concentrated on the key material factors 
of state regulations and market forces, as well as normative factors relating to social 
attitudes/concerns and internal company strategies.1  It was shown in these chapters that 
national institutional variations explain differences in the degree and nature of car firms’ 
environmental initiatives.  As per the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach, the liberal 
economic model has been shown to only apply in the case of United States (US) firms 
based in the archetypal liberal market economy (LME).  However, German and Japanese 
firms are based in coordinated market economies (CMEs) where the institutional basis of 
capitalist relations leads them to focus on more normative, rather than material, factors.  
For example, they are inclined to take a more holistic view in which their role in society 
occupies a more central strategic position, and internal corporate strategies proactively 
drive environmental product initiatives, rather than reacting to the material imperatives of 
state-imposed regulations and consumer demand in markets. 
Therefore, firms’ rationales for their environmental commitments reflect the 
institutional context of their home states where they are economically, politically, socially, 
culturally and historically embedded, as well as physically headquartered.  The detailed 
qualitative analysis of the major German, US and Japanese firms environmental reports in 
Chapter 6 highlighted a further point.  In addition to national institutional differences 
affecting the behaviour of firms, it also produces different perceptions of what they believe 
is important in addressing the environmental impact of their operations.  The analysis also 
highlighted some key differences predicted by the VOC approach and related institutional 
perspectives at sub-national levels.  For example, German firms are particularly mindful of 
consensual cooperation with regulators while taking account of social concerns, while 
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Japanese firms place more emphasis on leading society and being internally driven by their 
company policies. 
To build on these findings, this chapter seeks to marry firms’ stated rationales for 
environmental commitments examined in Chapter 6, with the results of interviews with key 
personnel drawn from Volkswagen, BMW, Ford and Toyota.  The focus is again on 
individual firms, but first-hand perspectives are brought to bear in addition to the literature 
they produce.  As well as inviting interviewees to speak generally on their firms’ 
environmental product developments and motivations behind them, the interviews had a 
significantly semi-guided component through which interviewees were directed to 
comment specifically on state regulations, market forces (in terms of consumer demand 
versus social attitudes), and internal company strategies.2
The chapter proceeds by first describing the interview methodology.  Mirroring the 
analysis in Chapters 4-6, interviewees’ perceptions of state regulations, the role of market 
forces, including consumer demand versus social attitudes, and internal company strategies 
are considered in turn.  For state regulations, interviewees’ responses fell broadly into two 
categories: the role they see government playing, and the nature of state-business relations 
in the light of this.  The key differences noted are that German and European Union (EU) 
regulations were identified as leading environmental strategies there, and even worldwide, 
to an extent not highlighted for Japan and the US.  This was associated with a different 
causal relationship between business and government that interviewees identified.  The 
state was seen as leading environmental strategies, or a partner in them with firms, in the 
case of German firms, Toyota personnel said that they were leading government, whereas 
Ford personnel said their company acts in a more reactive manner to state regulations.  This 
supports the model proposed in Chapter 4.3
For market forces, the role ascribed to consumer demand versus social attitudes is 
highlighted, and the key point is made that, as suggested by the analysis in Chapter 5, social 
attitudes on the environment have not flowed though to consumer demand as clearly as 
some commentators might suggest.  However, the role played by social attitudes in 
influencing company strategies is different.  They are discounted in favour of material 
factors (i.e. consumer demand) in the case of Ford, but the German and Japanese 
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interviewees stressed the role of social attitudes more in shaping their environmental 
strategies. 
For internal company strategies, interviewees made comments that went to 
identifying the main drivers for environmental attributes in the cars they produce, the way 
in which this is associated with their firms’ desires to be ‘leaders’, the role played by senior 
management, and the role of path dependence.  Analysing their comments in respect of 
these aspects demonstrates that, as suggested by the analysis in Chapter 6, Japanese firms 
such as Toyota are most internally-driven, while US firms are least internally-driven on 
environmental strategies.  Indeed, when it came to ‘leadership’, the Japanese and German 
firm interviewees were prepared to identify their firms’ environmental strategies as a key to 
their leadership positions, particularly in the case of Toyota interviewees, while Ford 
interviewees focussed more on market leadership and material factors associated with this – 
i.e. for them environmental leadership was contingent on other material factors.  The 
exception for Ford was the key role played by senior management, in that the firm’s 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Bill Ford, was identified as a key driver of 
Ford’s environmental strategies.  This goes to the more unilateral control exerted by 
management in LME-based firms.  Finally, the point is made that with all the various 
drivers for environmental strategies, interviewees identified what amounted to path 
dependence as a key factor, as indeed it is for the VOC approach more generally.4
Therefore, the aspects of their firms’ rationales for environmental commitments 
highlighted by interviewees are related to the points made in previous chapters, and build 
on them.  They support the insights of the VOC approach and conclusions reached in 
respect of it in the preceding chapters on the basis of the empirical evidence.  In addition, 
the interviews also produced some key observations on the different timeframes under 
which firms operate that are related to the different VOCs of their home states (longer for 
CMEs and shorter for LMEs), the extent to which their perspectives represent a shift from 
materialist to post-materialist values (the shift being more in evidence for CMEs than 
LMEs), and finally some interesting observations in the light of the analysis on how they 
perceive future environmental challenges.  It is shown that the future for Ford interviewees 
is still one based on the LME preoccupations of material factors and remaining competitive 
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in markets, whereas the German and Japanese firm interviewees, in CME-fashion, express 
longer-term perspectives and look beyond such material factors to how their firms will 
shape the environmental future of the industry 
As in Chapter 6, a lot of ground is covered in the views expressed by interviewees 
that are analysed in this chapter.  However, two clear conclusions are reached.  First, 
interviewees’ responses indicate that the rationales offered by firms in their environmental 
reports reflect attitudes that filter down to lower management levels worldwide.  Therefore, 
the institutional context of a firm’s home state VOC permeates its operations 
internationally.  Secondly, and most importantly, the relative importance ascribed by 
interviewees to market forces versus social attitudes, state regulations and internal company 
strategies support the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters based on the empirical 
evidence at a national level, and individual firm rationales expressed in writing in their 
printed reports. 
 
Interview Methodology 
 
All firms whose environmental reports were analysed in Chapter 6 were invited to 
participate in interviews.  They were sent Participant Information Statements describing the 
research and questions to be asked, subsequent to which phone calls were made seeking 
meetings.  A copy of the Participant Information Statement and questions asked are 
provided at Appendix F.  Volkswagen, BMW, Ford and Toyota accepted the invitation.  
General Motors, DaimlerChrysler and Honda declined.  An interview with a Nissan 
employee was conducted, but at interview he repeatedly declared that he knew little about 
environmental matters.  This was a curious response given the information he received and 
phone discussion prior to the interview.  His responses have been omitted from the 
following analysis because analysing non-responses would be unproductive.  In total, 
interviews with three personnel from Toyota, five from Ford, and one each from 
Volkswagen and BMW are the subject of analysis. 
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The firms involved are a reasonable sample of the industry in their home states.    
Volkswagen and Toyota dominate their home markets.  Volkswagen also dominates the 
European market.  Ford co-dominates its home market with General Motors.  BMW 
dominates the prestige car segment of the market in Germany and internationally.  A brief 
summary of these firms’ operations, by way of additional background, is provided at 
Appendix G, but the key point is that in being granted interviews with personnel from these 
firms, access was given to first-hand perspectives from leading firms within the German, 
US and Japanese car industries.  
All interviews were with senior Australian personnel, except for Volkswagen.  
There are three reasons for this.  First, all the firms have Australian branch offices, so 
approaching these offices for interviews was the easiest course of action.5  Secondly, their 
presence in Australia is not always purely of an import and distribution nature.  Ford and 
Toyota have the full array of operations from research and product development, to 
manufacturing, distribution and sales.  Therefore, strategic product development decisions 
for these firms go beyond simply ‘shifting product’.  Thirdly, interviewing Australian 
nationals working for these firms tested whether Australian as opposed to German, US or 
Japanese perspectives prevail.  This revealed the relative importance of host versus home 
market conditions, and therefore the strength of the VOC thesis.  Volkswagen is the 
exception to the rule because an interview was conducted with a senior office holder in its 
German head office.  Volkswagen Group Australia recommended this course of action.   
The interviews were recorded and transcribed in order to facilitate analysis.  
However, the full transcribed text of the interviews is not made available in this thesis.  
This was a condition of the University of Sydney Ethics Committee.  Therefore, in the 
following analysis the interviewees’ quotations and views are not referenced to these 
transcripts, which have been kept confidential as required.  Instead, it is made clear to 
which firm’s interviewee(s) the views expressed pertain.  In addition, this is done 
anonymously.  This was a decision taken by the author, despite the fact that all interviewees 
except two were happy for quotations to be attributed to them.  However, I am mindful of 
the surprise expressed by John de Lorean, the late charismatic former General Motors 
executive, who noted in his reflections on the culture of the firm after his resignation that 
 264
however ‘pure’ the motivations of an employee commenting on his/her company’s 
strategies, there are always those within it who may draw their own conclusions based on 
personal prejudices and seek to attack that individual.  Indeed, he says that during his time 
with General Motors the very act of airing any view in the public domain was often viewed 
negatively.6
One final point is worth noting before proceeding.  When commenting on the 
environmental product development initiatives of their firms, all interviewees focused 
primarily on fuel economy and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.  This mirrors to a large 
extent the focus on these aspects in environmental reports.  It also supports the focus on 
fuel economy, CO2 emissions and the issue of climate change throughout the thesis. 
 
State Regulations 
 
All interviewees believed governments need to provide an agenda-setting role, informing 
and educating their citizens on environmental matters and acting in the interests of society.  
In practical terms, they all agreed with government support for research and development 
and for business generally (i.e. subsidies).  Tax breaks to encourage consumers to purchase 
more environmentally friendly vehicles were also seen as constructive strategies.   Beyond 
this, there were clear differences of opinion on the role of government regulations, the 
nature of state-business relations and, as a result of these relations, differences in the causal 
relationship between regulations and business strategies.  These qualitative differences are 
clearly related to the VOC of firms’ home states.  Ford interviewees, working for an LME-
based firm, primarily conceived the government’s role as setting regulations to which the 
firm must adhere.  Interviewees from the German and Japanese firms, based in CMEs, saw 
state-business relations in more partnership terms, desiring a closer relationship with 
regulators and, in the case of Toyota, greater state support.  As noted in Chapter 4, the 
differing role ascribed to the state, and the resulting differences in state-business relations, 
have causal implications in the sense that US firms respond to regulations, whereas German 
and Japanese firms are instrumental in co-developing regulations or, in the case of Japanese 
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firms, lead governments in their development.  Both the role of government and the 
resulting differing state-business relations are discussed in the following sections. 
 
The Role of Government 
 
Although all firms agreed that governments play a key role, some regulations were viewed 
negatively by Ford interviewees.  LME-style, these were market interventions that penalise 
environmentally damaging behaviour, such as taxes, which were seen as “blunt 
instruments” because their effects cannot be clearly predicted.7  Instead, a preference was 
expressed for research and development grants to “accelerate the commercialisation and 
introduction of new technologies” – i.e. market enhancing initiatives.  However, CME-
style, support for broader-based state intervention was given by Volkswagen and Toyota 
interviewees.  The Volkswagen interviewee expressed strong support for technologically-
neutral regulations based on environmental impact, including standards and excises.  
Toyota interviewees wanted governments to “come on board” more and cooperate with 
their firm, and they were not very proscriptive in how this should happen.  Therefore, a 
greater range of state interventions were accepted, or even welcomed. 
Raised awareness of environmental issues and the influence of the Kyoto Protocol 
were cited as reasons why governments are taking a tougher stand on issues like climate 
change.  But when pressed, interviewees could not identify any dramatic changes in 
regulations that had impacted on their product development strategies.  Instead, existing 
regulations were said to have been incrementally strengthened.8  Therefore, environmental 
product development initiatives were not seen as driven by tougher state regulations.  This 
included the petrol-electric hybrid Toyota Prius and Ford Escape, the latter of which was 
said by one Ford interviewee to be attributable to state regulations only in the broadest 
“directional” sense.  Only the Volkswagen interviewee saw his firm’s product development 
initiatives as being the result of state regulations, but then significant impetus was provided 
by the industry itself.  He said: 
When we developed these hybrid cars and so on, and the diesel engine, that was a bit compelled by 
the agreement between the car industry in Europe and the governments and the European 
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Commission in Europe, because Volkswagen is the largest mass producer here on this continent so 
we had to carry, I would say, most of the obligations we made there. 
Therefore, Volkswagen developed advanced diesels in response to industry co-sponsored 
EU regulatory targets. 
Concomitant with the Volkswagen interviewee’s perspective, most interviewees 
cited the EU as a regulatory leader.  The German firms’ interviewees saw this as reflecting 
long-standing initiatives to address environmental concerns over the last 15 to 20 years in 
both Germany and Europe.  Because of their stringency, Ford interviewees said European 
standards are now de facto global standards, as no firm wants to make a unique car just to 
meet European requirements.  Therefore, there is an international trend to harmonise 
regulations with those of the EU.  However, one Toyota interviewee noted that outside the 
EU, “pragmatism at the end of the day rules” with progress on environmental matters by 
the US government particularly slow (unless one counts Californian regulations),9 and 
Japan “responding” to, and slightly lagging, the EU.  Any regulatory changes impacting on 
the international industry were thus said to be largely the result of “substantial change over 
the last ten years driven largely by Europe”. 
This leads to the key point of difference between German firms and the others: the 
extent to which governments reflect or lead public opinion.  The Volkswagen interviewee 
said the German government is the protagonist on environmental matters: 
Normally in most countries in the world the Greens are not in the government, so they are the public, 
so to speak, and they influence the government.  Whereas here in Germany they are in the 
government and there they shape, in a way, public opinion because, of course, they are the strongest 
exponents for environmental action and the public is less environmentally-friendly than the 
government. 
Therefore, the German government leads public opinion.  The rise of the German Greens to 
coalition government, mirrored in the rise of similar parties as a political force in a handful 
of other European countries was said to mean that “the government quite often starts, or at 
least strengthens, the political debate or public debate on certain matters”.  One Toyota 
interviewee made similar comments on the German Greens’ role.  Even though the BMW 
interviewee noted that governments are generally “more responsive rather than proactive”, 
and tend to react on the basis of “some external, dramatic, radical, unplanned for change” 
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or a change in public sentiment that affects their re-election chances, he still identified “a 
very high level of maturity and thinking about the environment” in Europe reflected in EU 
legislation and regulations. 
Outside Germany and the EU, and agreeing with the BMW interviewee’s view of 
governments generally, one Ford interviewee said that governments are “reflecting what 
society thinks or wants”.  He explained the reason why as follows: 
Governments want to be elected and how do they do that?  Well, partly by being popular but partly 
by reflecting key stakeholder groups.  You know, the average ‘Joe’….might have a view about the 
environment, but he’s not going to vote or un-vote a particular candidate because of environmental 
views.  But government reflects the needs of the broad community, and I have no doubt there are 
huge changes in government’s awareness and action.  Just the whole business and debate about 
carbon trading and carbon emissions in Australia and globally: Kyoto.   
Therefore, governments reflect environmental concerns not because of any grand 
leadership vision, but because growing environmental awareness affects their re-election 
chances.  One Toyota interviewee was particularly dismissive of government policies 
saying “we see a lot of, I suppose, fairly cynical policy statements put out and a lot of 
window dressing” at worst, or at best “the ideas and the willingness are there, but they’re 
just not implemented”. 
Overall, all interviews saw governments playing an important role.  Government 
intervention was expected and desired, although Ford interviewees expressed dislike for 
governments extensively constraining market forces, as one would expect of their LME 
view of the primacy of markets and market forces as organisers of economic activity.  
Although government regulations were not seen having dramatically changed, there was the 
feeling that they have incrementally been made more stringent.  This is especially the case 
for Germany and the EU, to the point where the EU was seen as a regulatory leader because 
the concept of environmental sustainability has been most deeply and strategically 
institutionalised.  The result is that for Germany and the EU, government regulations are 
playing a leading role in driving environmental sustainability, whereas elsewhere they tend 
to reflect broader social concerns.  Such comments on the role of governments suggest 
differences in state-business relations, and the causal relationship between the two.  This is 
the subject of the following section. 
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State-Business Relations 
 
All interviewees’ said their firms worked with government in setting and meeting 
environmental regulations, but the reason for so doing varied.  LME perceptions of the state 
intervening only to correct market failure were reflected in Ford interviewees seeing 
government imposing environmental regulations to which the firm must adhere to remain in 
business.  CME preferences for greater coordination and partnership between the state and 
business were reflected in the Volkswagen interviewee perceiving state regulations as 
complementing firm strategies, while Toyota interviewees desired greater state action to 
support their firm’s environmental initiatives.  The BMW interviewee was relatively silent 
on the firm’s relationship with government other than to stress that BMW always exceeds 
regulations. 
Ford interviewees saw state regulations in the most adversarial terms.  This is not to 
say that the government was somehow the ‘enemy’.  After all, in an Australian context, 
Ford interviewees cited their firm’s voluntary commitments under programs such as the 
“Greenhouse Challenge”.10  Even so, because state regulations temper market forces one 
Ford interviewee noted that they can be “unnecessarily stringent”, because “if the customer 
preference is for high powered thirsty vehicles but the individual company has a particular 
target to meet, that means they may need to produce unprofitable product to balance that 
out which doesn’t really do anyone any good”.  The implication is that regulations are too 
stringent if they work against market forces too excessively.  Another Ford interviewee 
noted that his firm “would comply with the regulations in order that [it is] involved in 
establishing those regulations”.  The implication is that involvement in negotiations about 
regulations is important in order to limit their impact on market outcomes. 
Why sign up to voluntary agreements then?  Ford interviewees said the reason was 
more to demonstrate that the company is a good corporate citizen.  In respect of the 
Greenhouse Challenge, one Ford interviewee said: 
There’s no regulation associated with it but it simply says, well, here’s something the government 
thinks is important to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and big companies have gone and set the 
example.  Here’s an opportunity to do it.  Well, it’s sort of like, they’d be silly not to wouldn’t they?  
You know, it’s not legislation but it’s a strong encouragement to demonstrate that you’re doing some 
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good things to the rest of the community.  So, why are 500 companies already signed up to the 
Greenhouse Challenge? Well, because we all think we’re good corporate citizens and we want to be 
able to demonstrate that. 
Apart from meeting regulations and trying to temper their stringency, a key reason for 
voluntary commitments is thus to be seen to be setting a good example.  Indeed, the same 
interviewee followed up the above statement with the observation that such initiatives are a 
matter of “an indirect carrot and stick that says, well, if you don’t do these things there’ll be 
a penalty further out, not today, but further out”.  The motivation implied is an instrumental 
desire to reduce the interference of government in future product development strategies. 
It is important that this finding on Ford not be taken too negatively, because 
although they might not always like how the state intervenes, Ford interviewees also saw 
the government as having “a critical role to play” in “setting a vision where we need to go”.  
It was all part of “the fine balance between industry going forward and progressing, and the 
government setting a vision and finding that fine balance between the economic reality of it 
and the fact that, yes, we have to progress”.  In addition, one Ford interviewee stressed 
constructive consultation with government as the key to achieving good regulatory 
outcomes.  Interestingly though, and in line with the confrontational tendencies of such 
interactions in the US LME variety of capitalism, the same interviewee conceded he did not 
“see that in the US [where] it seems much more confrontational”.  All Ford interviewees 
also stressed that part of being a responsible corporation and legitimately remaining in 
business involved regulatory compliance.  As one Ford interviewee put it, you have to “hit 
those regulatory targets otherwise you literally can’t sell your vehicles….so the regulatory 
environment has a huge role to play in terms of shaping outcomes”. 
For Ford, meeting environmental regulations is therefore important because these 
constrain how the firm responds to consumer demand.  One interviewee said: “what we’ll 
look at is what does the customer want, and what are the corporate and regulatory 
requirements that are there as well” because “the regulatory environment will mandate that 
we deliver certain things”.  In other words, business is about reacting to consumer demands 
and meeting government regulations.  Indeed “if there weren’t set targets that had to be 
achieved then [environmental] progress would be made but knowing you have to hit certain 
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targets naturally makes them more evident and helps shape outcomes and resource 
allocation”.   The result is that for Ford regulations are seen more as a ‘ceiling’ to be “hit” 
than a ‘floor’ the company is well above.11
Although the Volkswagen interviewee shared the belief that the government plays a 
crucial role, his perception was not so much one of the government intervening to stipulate 
regulatory targets that must be hit, as one where the industry and government move forward 
together in strategic harmony.  As he put it, while the government in Germany and the EU 
is leading society on the environment, industry and government “actually wants to go in the 
same direction”.  Although Volkswagen is obliged to comply with government regulations, 
he said compliance is less important than the “space” in which consensus positions are 
reached: 
There’s not so much that one leads and the other follows.  It’s more the space that grows because 
companies will of course look more to costs and competitiveness, whereas the government sees more 
of the health aspects and environmental aspects purely without looking so much at costs and the 
international competitiveness of their companies. 
In other words, Volkswagen does not so much respond to state regulations as share a 
similar strategic agenda.  The emphasis might be different, but the agenda is shared 
between industry and government.  It is less a mater of action (by government) and reaction 
(by industry) as a “space” in which consensus is reached.   This is very much what one 
would expect of the negotiated consensus attributes of Germany’s CME.   
Although one Toyota interviewee agreed that “regulations and the forecasted 
regulations introduction scenario will definitely shape what we do”, all Toyota interviewees 
stressed that the firm is well ahead of regulations anyway.   Indeed, the point was made that 
Toyota has a corporate policy of certifying all its vehicles in excess of current regulatory 
requirements.  But going beyond this policy, Toyota interviewees actually saw state 
leadership on environmental issues as a thing of the past.  Two Toyota interviewees 
described the visit of a senior environmental director from Toyota’s head office and his 
message to staff to illustrate this point.  One said: 
Somebody asked that question: how do you think government can help Toyota move forward?  He 
basically said we don’t think you can because 20 years ago a lot of the legislation and guidelines 
helped direct us, gave us direction, but now we’re waiting for government to catch up because 
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they’ve already surpassed every form of legislation.  They already meet or exceed the 2010 emission 
and fuel economy guidelines for virtually all their range in Japan.  He basically said the benchmarks 
aren’t high enough. 
His reply, indicating the company does not take its strategic direction on environmental 
matters from government any more, was summed up in the following terms: “he wasn’t 
trying to be smug, but he basically said that 20 years ago we needed you but now we’re 
waiting for you to give us more direction and work with us”.  In fact, the view was 
expressed that companies that just meet government regulations do not occupy a position of 
leadership as Toyota does. 
The BMW interviewee made similar points to Ford in saying the firm was always 
“mindful of where government policies are going to go” and recognised that “most 
legislative criteria are the result of negotiation and compromise”, but like Toyota he also 
stressed that BMW always seeks to exceed government regulations as a matter of corporate 
strategy. However, unlike Toyota, it was not so much a matter of leading government as 
being aware of regulations and designing products to meet forecast future regulations.  The 
reason for this was explained as BMW’s ethos of leadership in everything it does as a 
premium producer.  The BMW interviewee said: 
Our focus [is] on being innovative and not just being responsive to proposed or existing legislation.  
We take that into account in our planning.  I mean, we wouldn’t say that we’re only going to do this 
because it’s required by government.  We’d say no, let’s go a bit further. 
Regulations for BMW thus establish a ‘floor’ to be above, rather than a ceiling to be hit.  
The BMW interviewee summed up this outlook saying “we’d probably be looking well 
beyond (current regulations) to make sure that at our lowest base we were well past it so 
there is no chance of running into any legislative issues down the track, but also to make 
sure that we remain ahead of the pack”. 
State regulations were thus seen very differently by interviewees from each firm.  
Ford interviewees, in true LME fashion, saw them as a constraint on reacting to market 
forces, but necessary because the government’s role is to act in the public interest and drive 
the agenda on environmental matters.  The German and Japanese interviewees did not see 
government regulations as setting their environmental agendas as much, although for 
Volkswagen it can be said that, in CME fashion, working with government is a key reason 
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why environmental initiatives have been undertaken.  Toyota interviewees went a step 
further in desiring more government involvement to assist in its environmental strategies, 
being ahead of regulations and government policies.  Toyota and BMW also shared a 
strategy of always exceeding regulations. 
These findings also suggest clear differences in the causal relationship between state 
regulations and business strategies.  Ford reacts to and meets current regulations.  
Volkswagen travels the same path as government in a cooperative manner.  BMW aims to 
be aware of proposed future regulations in order to ensure the firm’s products always 
exceed rather than respond to regulatory requirements.  For Toyota, governments lag the 
company on environmental initiatives and a desire was expressed for them to catch up.  The 
causal relationship this suggests supports the model hypothesised in Figure 4.9 in Chapter 
4: US firms react to regulations, German/European firms have a more co-regulatory 
relationship with government (or, in the case of BMW, exceed regulations as a matter of 
corporate policy) and Japanese firms go beyond the co-regulatory model of 
Germany/Europe to lead the government on environmental issues rather than the converse. 
 
Market Forces 
 
All interviewees saw market forces as important, in the sense that their firms are driven by 
economic imperatives to maintain/increase their market share and be profitable.  However, 
perceptions of the strategic role played by social attitudes versus consumer demand differed 
markedly.  This led to them impacting in different ways on the environmental attributes of 
the cars firms produce.  Concomitant with the findings of Chapter 5, the analysis of 
environmental reports in Chapter 6 and the insights of the VOC approach, Ford 
interviewees stressed the importance of consumer demand above all other factors, while 
interviewees from the CME-based firms stressed normative factors relating to consumer 
attitudes more.  The result is that different forces are driving firms’ environmental product 
developments based on different perceptions of just what the market is: consumer demand 
as money ‘on the table’ for purchases in the case of LME-based Ford, versus a range of 
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more intangible attitudinal factors for the CME-based firms.  The distinction is important 
because all interviewees identified a clear disconnect between the attitudes of consumers 
versus the cars they actually purchase.  This disconnect is discussed first, before the other 
observations are expanded on below. 
 
Social Attitudes versus Consumer Demand 
 
All interviewees agreed that concern for the environment has increased.  A major reason 
cited was the media exposure given to global environmental issues, especially the issue of 
climate change.  There was general agreement that concern for the environment will 
continue to increase, although the Volkswagen interviewee noted that it has actually waned 
slightly in Germany and Europe in recent years because of “social problems, mostly labour 
problems” in Europe that have shifted public attention away from the environment.  Even 
so, he said that Volkswagen expects concern to rise again in future as there remains a 
strong underlying awareness of environmental issues as a legacy of the emergence and 
growth of the German/European environmental movement over the last 20 years. 
If concern for the environment is present, the key question is the one asked in 
Chapter 5: does it flow through to market outcomes via consumer demand?  All 
interviewees agreed that for the most part it does not.  Environmental features do not 
encourage consumers to purchase a vehicle, nor will they pay a premium for them.  Other 
attributes such as comfort, reliability and performance remain higher priorities.  Even 
though Toyota is the market leader in petrol-electric hybrids, one Toyota interviewee 
admitted that “the attributes customers are looking for remain ‘grunt, comfort and space’”.  
Ford interviewees did note an increase in consumers’ expectations of all car attributes, so 
that “the value people place on everything….has gone up, or their expectation on all 
attributes has gone up, and as a result environmental has gone up, but not necessarily in its 
relative weighting versus the others”.12  Therefore, consumer demand incentives to develop 
more environmentally friendly products were seen as lacking. 
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If good environmental performance does not impact positively on sales, the 
Volkswagen interviewee did note that bad environmental performance can impact 
negatively.  This is because Volkswagen customers expect their cars to meet environmental 
standards and will not buy cars that fail to do so.  Similarly, the BMW interviewee said that 
environmental performance is an attribute BMW customers expect as a matter of course 
because they conceive environmental attributes as intrinsic to a product that is the latest, the 
best, the most efficient and highest performing.  He said: 
The focus is on efficiency rather than merely economy, because we are in the prestige or luxury part 
of the market where from customers’ perspective they’re not totally driven to BMW by the amount 
of petrol they’ll save by driving economically in one of our cars, but they want to know whether it is 
efficient, and they want to know they’re getting the most performance they can out of their engines. 
Therefore, environmental performance appears to be a quality attribute for BMW. 
The only way in which all interviewees agreed consumer demand positively affects 
environmental outcomes is in the area of fuel economy, but then primarily from the 
perspective of operating cost.  Therefore, the Volkswagen interviewee described this as a 
“financial problem” with consumers driven by a desire “to have smaller cars, cheaper cars, 
and cars that do not need so much fuel”.  Ford interviewees strongly echoed this argument, 
and one Toyota interviewee noted that while the environmental aspects of the Prius may 
have brought customers into showrooms, customer surveys indicated that the number one 
reason why they purchased the car was fuel economy.  So, from a consumer demand 
perspective, material concerns remain very much to the fore. 
On such material concerns, it was noted in Chapter 4 that many analyses attribute 
the greater fuel efficiency of European and Japanese cars to higher fuel prices, and the 
success of diesels in Europe to the price differential with higher petrol prices.13  The fuel 
economy point made by interviewees also tends to support such a view.  However, the 
Volkswagen interviewee made three points to refute such arguments that, he said, he had 
mostly heard “in the American discussion”.14  First, he said the higher purchase price of a 
diesel car is more important, because they tend to have larger engines than petrol cars and 
in Germany there is a purchase tax based on engine size.15  This means that despite cheaper 
fuel, diesel car owners do not “break even” with petrol car owners until they have driven 
approximately 100,000km.  Secondly, he noted that the price differential between petrol 
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and diesel has narrowed over time, providing less financial incentive for favouring diesel 
cars.  Thirdly, he suggested that substantial variation in the price differential across EU 
member states means that there is no clear correlation between the price differential and the 
percentage of diesel cars purchased. 
 
Table 7.1: Diesel to Petrol Price Differential 
 
Percentage by which 
Petrol is more Expensive 
than Diesel (2000) 
Share of Diesels in Total 
Car Sales (2000) 
Austria 44 62 
Belgium 61 56 
Denmark 51 13 
Finland 63 17a
France 54 49 
Germany 46 30 
Greece 36 1 
Ireland 30 10 
Italy 44 34 
Luxembourg 38 50 
Netherlands 61 23 
Portugal 43 24 
Spain 37 53 
Sweden 41 6 
UK 15 14 
EU average 43 33 
Source: OECD (2002c), ‘Transport’, OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002, Paris: OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2958321.pdf, accessed 12 January 2004, p.23; ACEA (no date c), New 
Passenger Car Registrations in W.Europe, Breakdown by Specifications : Share of Diesel Cars, 
http://www.acea.be/ACEA/DIESEL-PC-90-02.pdf, accessed 9 June 2004. 
a No data provided for 2000.  The percentage provided is for 2001. 
 
From a liberal economic perspective these are bold claims, so evidence was sought 
for them.  His point on the higher purchase price of diesel cars is corroborated by the fact 
that ownership taxes as a percentage of the price of a new car in Germany are, on average 
32 percent for a diesel versus only 22 percent for a petrol powered car.16  His point about 
the narrowing price differential is supported by Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) data.  Table 4.1 in Chapter 4 demonstrated that across EU 
member states the average per litre price of diesel increased from 56 to 69 percent of the 
petrol price over 1980 to 2000.17  His point about price differential variations across EU 
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member states is supported by the data presented in Table 7.1 which shows that the 
percentage petrol is more expensive than diesel varies from 15 to 61 percent, and that the 
percentage difference is not clearly correlated with the share of diesels in total car sales 
(e.g. petrol is approximately 50 percent more expensive than diesel in Germany, France and 
Denmark, yet the share of diesels in total car sales is 30, 49 and 13 percent respectively). 
The alternative explanation offered by the Volkswagen interviewee was that it is 
more “an image question” and based on “emotional aspects”: 
I think people quite often have an idea of what in the long range is better for them, and it’s quite 
often based on how much fuel they need, and of course questions always of how expensive it will be, 
and whether I will be able to get diesel anyhow, or will I get the fuel anyhow.  Since there are a few 
uncertainties right now, it is better to have diesel where I need five litres per hundred kilometres, 
rather than petrol where I need seven or eight or nine litres per hundred kilometres.   
Therefore, he said that although consumers value lower operating costs, the security 
afforded by greater fuel economy is another material aspect that is favoured because 
conventional fossil fuel sources are running out. 
If social attitudes on the environment have not flowed through to consumer demand, 
except in a quality sense in the case of Germany and the EU, or in an operating cost and 
fuel economy sense more generally (i.e. not environmental reasons) what role do market 
forces play in encouraging environmental attributes in cars?  This is considered in the 
following section. 
 
Market Forces and the Environmental Attributes of Cars 
 
A clear division was evident between Ford interviewees and the others on the extent to 
which consumer demand drives product development versus social attitudes.  In LME 
fashion, Ford bases its product development on actual consumer demand expressed via 
revealed preferences in markets.  In CME fashion, social attitudes were of more concern for 
the German and Japanese firms whose interviewees stressed a broader understanding of 
market forces beyond short term profits.  The extent to which firms respond to consumer 
demand versus leading it was a related point of difference.  Again, the division was 
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between Ford which seeks to respond to consumer demand, and the other firms which seek 
to lead it on the basis of social attitudes.  Therefore, the interviewees from the German and 
Japanese CME-based firms said that their companies are more willing to look beyond short 
term market imperatives in their product development strategies. 
In highlighting the primacy of consumer demand in product development planning, 
one Ford interviewee explained that: 
The majority of our product work, all of our product planning, is driven by what the market needs.  
So, what trends and customer feedback are we seeing in the marketplace?  Because ultimately we 
want to design and develop vehicles and promote and sell them that respond to market demand. 
The view was also expressed that, “what the customer wants absolutely shapes [Ford’s] 
outcomes”.  Consumer demand was highlighted as the most powerful incentive for 
investment in environmental product initiatives because “the easiest way to generate a 
business case for any new concepts and technologies [is] if there are strong consumer 
forces”.18  But the interviewee who made this point went on to note that “in reality, 
consumer forces don’t always work on this subject”.  Weak consumer demand for 
environmental attributes therefore constrains Ford’s environmental product development.  
The result is that environmental initiatives are “largely driven by the regulatory 
environment”.  
Social attitudes were clearly discounted in favour of consumer demand by all Ford 
interviewees.  Although the rationale for introducing the petrol-electric hybrid Escape SUV 
was said by one Ford interviewee to be “either being smart, saying this is where the 
consumer is going to head, or just us doing the right thing and reflecting society’s unstated 
want, or stated maybe only through specialist groups like NGOs”, in comparing consumer 
demand versus attitudes, another said: 
Both are important but developing a car is a very expensive business and it’s a very sophisticated 
product, and there’s always limitations on the amount of funds that you have available to you no 
matter what you’d like to do.  So, when it comes to trade offs we will always be biased towards the 
consumer preference in terms of how it translates to purchase.  So, that is what we are all about.  
We’re about producing cars that our customers will be excited about and want to buy. 
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Thus, for Ford what matters most is what happens “when it comes down to outlaying 
$20,000”.  The clear message was that consumer demand is the primary strategic driver for 
Ford. 
Toyota’s decision to produce its petrol-electric hybrid Prius, and to take 
environmental product development initiatives generally, was said to be based on a belief 
that a car with good environmental credentials will be seen as a superior product for its 
quality and lower operating cost benefits.  Even if not directly demanded by consumers, 
environmental product attributes were said to be “good for the brand”.  One Toyota 
interviewee said it was a matter of acting on “latent consumer desires”, which he described 
as follows: 
I think people understood that provided that there is no compromising the operation of the vehicle 
and it was a benefit to society, then I think there were people looking out for that kind of creative 
solution.  And that’s what Prius has done.  That’s what I mean by there was a latent desire for that 
kind of product and we just tapped into it. 
If this amounts to responding to consumer demand, it is a very nuanced understanding of 
the concept indeed.  It also suggests that consumer attitudes are more important.  Indeed, 
the same interviewee went on to say that “listening to [consumers’] attitudes will give you 
the edge in terms of providing products that will suit them in five to ten years time”. 
Ultimately, in listening to consumer attitudes over demand Toyota seeks to lead the 
market.  If one was to sum up the firm’s thinking on the environment expressed by its 
interviewees, it would be that it has a future-focussed way of conceiving consumer demand.  
The following explanation by one interviewee sums this thinking up best: 
Global warming, I mean, it’s in newspapers all the time.  I think people are concerned about that.  
You watch little campaigns that are being promoted at the moment, say for example recycling.  
Recycling, not taking plastic bags from the supermarket and taking your own canvass bags etc., these 
are all little things but they’re slowly building a level of consciousness about the environment that 
makes us rush to introduce a vehicle like Prius into the market.  It doesn’t take a lot of convincing 
people that a vehicle like this will provide a benefit to them.  At the beginning in 1997 when we first 
introduced the vehicle that ‘latentness’ was quite small and the thing that we had to appeal to people 
with was technology: look at the amazing technology in this car, and by the way it gives you 
environmental benefits.  With this new generation, sure there’s an awareness that’s grown through 
the previous model, but I think just general awareness of the environment has grown as well so that 
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when you introduce this vehicle you could go out there on the front foot and say this is an 
environmentally friendly drivetrain called hybrid, and by the way it’s got this ‘whizzo’ technology.  
You totally swap the story around that gets the hook into people because they understand the 
importance of the environment. 
As such, Toyota develops products for the future, and markets them in a way acceptable to 
present market preferences.  The focus is on convincing, educating and shaping consumer 
preferences, rather than providing a product that accurately reflects them now.  It is the 
possibility of latent consumer desires that make the firm “rush” to develop products rather 
than the existence of actual demand.  Therefore, Toyota seeks to influence and lead 
demand. 
For the German firms, consumer demand appears to be the least important 
consideration in product development.  Instead, the Volkswagen interviewee said a range of 
other factors take greater precedence.  He said: 
Consumer preferences are mostly a bit later than the internal strategic considerations of the company 
or the government and NGO positions.  In that respect, I think the consumer is the slowest. 
When asked specifically about attitudes versus demand, like Toyota there was a clear 
preferencing of attitudes.  According to the Volkswagen interviewee, if “attitudes are kind 
of stable propositions of consumers whereas consumer demand is something of today…in 
any case it’s consumer attitudes”. 
For the BMW interviewee, the market and consumer demand were referred to in 
stronger terms than Volkswagen.  However, the firm’s relationship with the market was 
seen in two-way terms: the firm responds to and influences the market.  He said: 
We want to supply the market with vehicles that they want to buy.  And we want to stimulate the 
market to buy our vehicles, which is two sides of the same thing.   
Like Volkswagen and Toyota, the BMW interviewee said his firm desired to be ahead of 
consumer demand by producing products to stimulate the market.  Although no strong view 
on social attitudes versus demand was expressed, reacting to consumer demand was seen as 
less important than acting on a ‘vision’ of what a car should be, especially for a prestige car 
firm like BMW: 
Consumer demand in terms of long term planning is being met by continually developing exciting 
cars.  We’re not in the ‘whitegoods on wheels’ type of market.  In terms of style or performance or 
features we are very strong on providing stuff that excites and makes people intrigued, to have an air 
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of intrigue about the cars so they do standout and are not the same as everyone else on the road.  And 
that to a certain extent massages the demand.  You create a car that looks sensational and people are 
just going to run to it.  We’re not just sitting there saying, well, we’ll build a car because we think 
people [want it].  We want to actually show them something and make them want it after they’ve 
seen it. 
Like Toyota, BMW seeks to define what the market is. 
Overall, Ford interviewees’ responses indicated a predilection for responding to 
consumer demand.  This is predicted by the VOC approach, as LME-based firms prefer 
market competition over cooperative coordination.  They are materially motivated to make 
profits in the short term.  However, for the CME-based firm, there was greater emphasis on 
the relationship between firms and markets as a two-way street, in which they often sought 
to lead markets.  This point was clearly made for environmental reasons in the case of 
Toyota, whereas for Volkswagen and BMW it was more a general point about corporate 
strategy.  In terms of consumer attitudes versus demand, Toyota rushes to introduce 
products that it believes consumers only latently desire, and then attempts to convince them 
of their product’s desirability.  Volkswagen acts in a similar manner, but one in which a 
broader range of stakeholders is involved in the process.  BMW is a “massager” of the 
market and environmental aspects of its products’ performance are one of many ways it 
seeks to excel as a prestige car maker commanding price premiums for its products.  For 
each, a CME focus on factors beyond what will drive consumers to put their money on the 
table is evident. 
In environmental terms, the implications are that perceived weak consumer demand 
for environmental attributes reduces the material pressure for Ford to produce more 
environmentally friendly products.  This supports the findings of Chapter 5 where it was 
shown that the US market is characterised by increasingly environmentally damaging 
vehicles despite increased social environmental concerns.  By contrast, in Germany and 
Japan environmental concerns are taken more seriously by the industry as a sign of “latent” 
demand.  In fact, echoing the point on voluntary commitments made with governments, the 
main way in which social attitudes affect Ford’s behaviour were said by one interviewee to 
be how the company is perceived, rather than how it acts, because it wants to be seen as a 
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good corporate citizen.  It is not surprising that this same interviewee concluded that for 
Ford “it’s a very difficult path to tread”. 
 
Internal Company Strategies 
 
The observation that German and Japanese firms seek to lead the market more than follow 
it has implications for internal company strategies.  It suggests, as noted in Chapter 2, they 
are potentially driven more by endogenous than exogenous forces.  That is to say, hailing 
from CME states they focus less on exogenous material factors and more on internal 
visions of what their business stands for.  This should be especially the case for Japanese 
firms whose internal stakeholders within the enterprise community are key drivers of their 
business strategies. 
But the line between exogenous and endogenous factors is blurred.  Interviewees 
noted that internal company strategies are affected by state regulations and market forces.  
Conversely, all firms have strategies that aim to affect these exogenous factors.  The 
causality flows both ways, so determining what is exogenous versus endogenous is 
problematic.  Nevertheless, interviewees’ responses demonstrated that the environmental 
impact of firms’ products was perceived in different ways, and the drive for environmental 
attributes came from within them to varying degrees.  In particular, all interviewees 
mentioned the concept of ‘leadership’, but just what this meant differed between firms, and 
it certainly produced differences with respect to the environmental attributes of their 
products.  The role of senior management was stressed more by Ford and Toyota 
interviewees, and the insight of the VOC approach that top management has more 
‘unilateral control’ than in CMEs appears crucial in the case of Ford (a point also 
highlighted in Chapter 6).  All interviewees also made statements concerning the path 
dependence of the products their firms produced, and the capabilities and constraints 
flowing from this.  As before, these points are expanded on below. 
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The Drive for Environmental Attributes 
 
The drive for environmental attributes emanates more from within Toyota, Volkswagen and 
BMW than Ford.  This is to be expected, given that their CME home states encourage them 
to focus less on external material factors than Ford which hails from an LME.  
Commensurate with the greater focus on internal stakeholders for Japanese CME-based 
firms, this was most clearly the case for Toyota.  Its interviewees noted that protecting the 
environment is a matter of corporate “philosophy” which says that “if you don’t look after 
the environment now, whatever business you currently have will not be protected and you 
won’t have a business in the future.”  In other words, business and environmental interests 
are seen as one and the same.  Given this philosophy, the ultimate goal of the company was 
said to be “the search of the ultimate ‘eco car’”.  The petrol-electric hybrid Prius is 
obviously the clearest expression of this philosophy, but more broadly the belief was 
expressed that “it’s important to say we’re going to strive to make the most efficient vehicle 
we can in each segment.”  A key reason for such a philosophy was said to be ‘kaizen’, the 
Japanese term for continuous improvement.  Kaizen and the environment were linked by 
one Toyota interviewee because “where you can make a more fuel efficient car and then 
make it for less, what you’ve actually got is a better environmental outcome: you’ve got 
less waste, less emissions, all those other things”.  Therefore, the kaizen principle coupled 
with Toyota’s corporate environmental philosophy leads to the environmental attributes of 
its vehicles occupying a central strategic position. 
The result of Toyota’s corporate environmental philosophy is that hybrid 
technologies and working on environmentally-friendly vehicles are now “prestigious” areas 
within the company.  One Toyota interviewee said: “I’ve been talking to engineers [and] 
the place to be is in the hybrid and alternative fuel area: that’s the ‘gun’ job”.  In fact, 
hybrid technologies were now said to be seen by Toyota personnel as “sexy” and “cutting 
edge” so that “everybody wants to put hybrid in their next generation car”.   The resulting 
esprit de corps means that Toyota employees “have a real sense that what they’re doing has 
a real impact on the environment and society as a whole”. 
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Similar, albeit more muted, internal company strategies were said to drive BMW 
and Volkswagen’s environmental strategies.  The BMW interviewee said his firm generally 
pays less heed to exogenous factors because “the imperative for development comes from 
inside BMW rather than government or consumers”.  The Volkswagen interviewee made a 
similar point in saying: 
It’s more the company, the people in the company’s strategy and the company saying OK, first we 
have to avoid environmental problems, and second our expectations of the next ten to twenty years 
are such that we have to do it before the consumer really knows it. 
Therefore, in a similar manner to Toyota, the German firms’ interviewees saw 
environmental attributes of their firm’s cars as being more internally driven than 
exogenously imposed.  For example, the BMW interviewee said his firm possessed “a very 
strongly environmentally aware mindset [that] permeates through all the layers of 
engineering, the engine manufacturers, the drivetrain manufacturers, right down to the body 
manufacturers, the people who design bodies and all that sort of stuff”.  As such, BMW’s 
performance, technological innovation and prestige objectives are always tempered by an 
internal commitment to minimising environmental impacts.  He said there is “an 
environmentally conscious brake” even on the development of large-engined performance 
vehicles. 
Where does this leave Ford, given its LME preference for responding to exogenous 
material factors?  Ford interviewees said their firm wishes to take environmental initiatives 
because it is the “right thing to do”, and probably good for business in the longer term.  
However, future developments for Ford were seen more as “product evolution”, and 
“realistic evolution of technology rather than radical steps in technology”.  In this vein, one 
Ford interviewee explained the following: 
We’re very concerned about corporate citizenship, recognising we’re in an industry which some may 
view as not necessarily in the best interest of the planet.  We don’t agree with that.  We’re really 
talking about benefits to society as a whole, and trying to do whatever we can to have vehicles which 
are fun to drive and are still sustainable.  But it doesn’t do anybody any good if we produce a radical 
product that’s unaffordable because people won’t buy it, we go out of business and noone wins. 
Therefore, there are conflicting exogenous forces (especially consumer demand) versus 
endogenous desires at work for Ford.  In this light, the introduction of the Ford Escape 
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petrol-electric hybrid is a phenomenon that interviewees struggled to explain.  It was said to 
probably be due to “an internal company desire to be a good corporate citizen and to be 
seen as such”.  It was also described as a “foray into the market to see how it’s received”.  
After all, “you have to get your feet wet somewhere and the learning from that can build to 
newer technologies down the track”.  Therefore, it represents an attempt to marry the 
imperatives of consumer demand with a desire to be a good corporate citizen and improve 
the brand’s image. 
Overall, Toyota, as a Japanese firm, exhibits the Japanese CME trait of being more 
internally strategically driven, but the German firms are also more internally driven on 
environmental matters than Ford.  Headquartered in the US, and desiring to be a good 
corporate citizen and seen as such, it struggles with its LME predilection for market forces, 
especially consumer demand, and securing material financial returns in the shorter term. 
 
Leadership and the Environment 
 
All interviewees saw their firms as motivated by a desire to ‘lead’.  However, just what 
constituted ‘leadership’ differed considerably.  Notions of leadership were more likely to be 
defined in corporate philosophical terms by the Japanese and German firms, than in the 
case of Ford where leadership was more narrowly defined, LME style, as primarily a matter 
of market leadership. 
Toyota and BMW interviewees stressed leadership and innovation in everything 
they did.  BMW did this from the perspective of a prestige car maker less bound by pricing 
constraints than volume producers, and therefore with more leverage to invest in new 
technologies.  The BMW interviewee stressed that his company perceives itself as “a 
technological leader” that tries “not to be bound by conventional thinking”.  This was said 
to be BMW’s “point of difference” that distinguishes BMW as a brand.  The way BMW’s 
technological leadership branding impacts on environmental outcomes is that 
environmental performance is seen a key factor in this.  BMW’s pre-eminence in hydrogen 
technologies was given by way of a practical example.  The firm plans to introduce a dual 
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fuel petrol-hydrogen V12 internal combustion engine 7-series model in Europe within the 
next three years.  The intention is to “help spread the message that it’s feasible and it’s 
workable and it’s then up to governments and/or the oil and petroleum industry as to how 
they’re going to work out the refuelling systems in the future”.  BMW is not sacrificing 
performance in so doing, and is seeking to lead technologically by being ahead of the 
market, ahead of the oil industry, and ahead of government and infrastructure.  
Fundamentally, the BMW interviewee said “it’s probably up to companies like BMW, and 
other people in this market, to expose the decision makers in society to whom we sell our 
cars to the reality of cleaner energy, which we have for our cars”.  The result is that BMW 
has a holistic vision of leading governments, society and markets via the environmental 
attributes of the cars it sells. 
Toyota interviewees discussed technological leadership in a thematically similar 
way.  However, in keeping with the firm’s environmental philosophy, Toyota interviewees 
said it is now branding itself as the environmental car firm.  Like the latest technology is 
BMW’s “point of difference” (and related to performance and prestige), this is what gives 
Toyota its distinctive image.  For example, the launch of the Prius was said to come from 
“a strategic decision to take a leadership role” in hybrid vehicles, not required by regulation 
and not expecting immediate financial benefits.  It was described as “totally our own 
initiative”, “not driven very strongly by demand” and “regardless of any government 
direction”.  Also, like BMW, Toyota interviewees saw their firm as leading debate on the 
environment and performing an educative role.  One Toyota interview described this role as 
a matter of “putting ourselves forward and trying to lift that level of consciousness”, and 
noted that since launching the Prius the firm is regularly invited to participate in 
environmental conferences/discussions on sustainable development.  Therefore, Toyota 
exercises a leadership role not just in respect of markets or government, but in shaping the 
environmental agenda more broadly in society through its educative role. 
The Volkswagen interviewee talked not so much of leadership, as cooperatively 
reaching consensus positions with a range of stakeholders on environmental issues that 
require addressing.  He said: 
 286
I would normally think that internal strategies are the result of government regulations and consumer 
preferences.  We might add too one aspect.  At least in Central Europe or in Germany, there is the 
system of co-determination here that means that there is a certain influence of the workers on 
company policies too. 
Therefore, internal strategies were said to be the result of consensus between a variety of 
internal and external stakeholders.  This is clearly the ‘negotiated consensus’ model of 
German CME capitalism.  Commensurate with this model, rather than one exogenous 
factor being more important than the other, or internal strategies taking precedence in 
environmental matters, it is the environmental issue in question that was said to be most 
important: 
It depends very much on the individual aspect of environmental improvement or environmental 
performance.  So, for example, the recycling discussion has been mainly a discussion put forward by 
the government, whereas the CO2 climate discussion is mainly put forward by the NGOs, and the 
cost of fuels, and that means the amount of fuel, the fuel efficiency, is mainly put forward by the 
market.  So, it depends very much on the environmental aspect where we see which one is the strong 
force.   
Therefore, addressing environmental concerns is about balancing stakeholder concerns to 
effectively address particular issues. 
For Ford, no strong internal drivers for environmental initiatives were mentioned in 
a leadership sense, unless one counts leadership in markets on the basis of consumer 
demand.  The environment was seen as important by all Ford interviewees (i.e. in the sense 
of doing the “right thing”, being a good corporate citizen, meeting government regulations 
etc.), but in market terms it is one of a range of consumer demands and regulatory 
requirements to which the firm must react.  Environmental concerns were described as part 
of the never-ending challenge to continually make better products in order to remain 
profitable, but one Ford interviewee declared that “there’s not green flowing through our 
veins, we’re a car company after all!”  The implication is that materialist, market-driven 
considerations take precedence. 
Overall, Toyota interviewees saw their firm as a leader of the environmental debate 
in society, and a leader in producing environmentally friendly cars.  Given such an 
environmental ‘philosophy’, launching a vehicle like the Prius was primarily an internally-
driven strategy.  This ‘fits’ with the Japanese CME variety of capitalism which gives 
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strongest priority to internal motivators for firm strategies.  The BMW interviewee also saw 
his firm as a leader, especially technologically, and this encompasses environmental 
attributes.  In BMW’s case, the CME-basis for looking beyond exogenous material factors 
turns to internal motivations due to the premium nature of its products.  However, the 
Volkswagen interviewee, in typical German CME fashion, saw a balance between 
stakeholders internal and external to the company as the aim, with the goal of reaching 
consensus positions that effectively address particular environmental issues.  Ford, in 
typical LME fashion, must be more focussed on its bottom line with strategies guided by 
material factors.  However, the main caveat to such a summary of Ford’s position is the role 
of its Chairman and CEO, Bill Ford, and his position as a member of the founding family of 
the company that retains a significant stake in its fortunes.  His concern for the environment 
and personal belief that his company has a heritage of corporate responsibility in addition to 
being economically profitable, elevates environmental aspects more than they might 
otherwise feature in a company predisposed to focusing on material factors.  This is 
discussed in the following section and contrasted with the more embedded role of senior 
management in Toyota. 
 
The Role of Senior Management: Ford versus Toyota 
 
The role of senior management was stressed by interviewees from two firms: Ford and 
Toyota.  For Ford, it is a matter of a single individual exercising an agenda-setting role, 
whereas for Toyota it is more that senior management reflects and supports company-wide 
strategies.  This agrees with the organising principles of Japanese CME-based firms versus 
US LME-based firms outlined in Chapter 2.  The enterprise community and company-wide 
strategising is more important for the former, whereas more unilateral control is vested in 
top management in the latter. 
All Ford interviewees stressed the role of their Chairman and CEO, Bill Ford. in 
driving the firm’s environmental agenda.  The interviewee who expressed it most 
articulately said: 
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Certainly a lot of it stems from an unstated desire on the part of the company to be sustainable, in 
Bill Ford’s words, harking back to the heritage of his great grandfather, that we’re a company that’s 
here to improve society.  We want to be profitable, but we also want to contribute to society, and we 
want to do it in an environmentally sustainable fashion as well.  I think there’s an unstated theme 
there.  
There was thus a definite sense of the legacy of the Ford family.  It is hard to underestimate 
the importance of this in cultural terms as the “unstated” (unofficial) environmental and 
social responsibility theme that permeates the company’s culture is tightly interwoven with 
its founding family’s heritage.  This agrees with the analysis of Ford’ environmental 
reporting in Chapter 6, where it was noted that Bill Ford’s personal views were 
conspicuous for the manner in which they were highlighted more than for any other firm’s 
CEO. 
Apart from his association with the cultural heritage of the firm, Bill Ford was said 
to have almost single-handedly raised environmental issues to be a key company strategic 
priority.  His role in doing this was expressed as follows: 
Within this company I think one of the most significant drivers has been Bill Ford personally….I 
would say his personal standard of ‘greenness’, if you want to use that term, on the company is quite 
significant.  I don’t think we would be where we are now if he hadn’t pushed that.  So, arguably a lot 
of our unique driver is Bill Ford. 
Bill Ford was thus identified by the same interviewee as a key driver of the firm’s 
environmental initiatives.  He further noted that Bill Ford and Ford’s Chief Operating 
Officer spent half a day of the 2005 annual meeting of senior management at the firm’s 
headquarters discussing sustainability.  The result, in practical terms, is that he can discuss 
environmental matters with other senior Ford personnel because the firm’s Chairman has 
elevated their strategic priority. 
Like Ford, Toyota interviewees recognised the role played by senior management 
who, as one noted, “for many years have had this sustainability agenda and they’re focusing 
on it because they’ve got a long term vision for the company”.  The continuing focus on 
environmental sustainability by the current senior management of Toyota therefore means 
that it is “one of [its] number one management issues”.  The impetus for the commercial 
launch of the Prius was said to come from the President of Toyota who directed his staff 
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two years before the Kyoto Protocol meeting “to have a car that’s massed produced, on 
sale, ready at that meeting”.  While this looks like opportunistic behaviour as well as 
enlightened environmental concern, the point is nevertheless clear.  While other firms saw 
the importance of the Kyoto Protocol in regulatory terms, Toyota management saw it as an 
opportunity for a new product launch given the firm’s branding focus, and investment in 
research and development on hybrid technologies. 
Overall, it is clear that Ford faces a balancing act.  It has an LME market-focus and 
preference for material factors in setting its strategic goals, yet also has an LME preference 
for more unilateral top management control.  In this case the latter results in the elevation 
of environmental factors in the firm’s strategic focus.  For Toyota, management 
commitments are important too, but less a unilateral force and more in harmony with the 
environmental corporate philosophy of the company generally. 
 
Path Dependence 
 
Finally, in terms of internal strategies, all interviews discussed their firms’ environmental 
initiatives as part of a historical process that enables and constrains their current initiatives.  
They used this to explain why German firms had opted for advanced diesels, Japanese 
firms for petrol-electric hybrids, and why Ford faces significant challenges in improving 
the environmental performance of its products.  The points interviewees’ made support the 
observation of Chapter 6 that path dependence in environmental initiatives enable the 
German and Japanese firms rather than US firms such as Ford.  The technonationalist 
versus incremental technological divide between Japanese and German firms was also 
evident.19
German firms’ shift to advanced diesels was explained in terms of their existing 
expertise and technological capabilities.  The Volkswagen interviewee cited a history of 
expertise in diesel technology, plus the view that hybrids are not seen as an “elegant 
technical solution” because they require drivetrains with two engines rather than one.  The 
BMW interviewee echoed the sentiments of Volkswagen, saying that “our view on hybrid 
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is that we can’t see the value in two power sources in the vehicle”.  Commensurate with the 
German CME role of technology, he also said they were keener to incrementally develop 
existing technologies rather than introduce new ones.  He elaborated on this as follows: 
Car companies have invested a hundred years worth of know-how into building and producing 
internal combustion engines.  That’s a reasonably efficient process and to abandon all that 
investment and go off into a completely different type of technology would be very difficult and 
quite a lot of goodwill, heritage and brand reputation is tied up in the engine systems.  Our aim is to 
make our petrol engines as efficient and clean as they can be….. So, we think there’s still more life 
left in the current technology, and maybe by the time hydrogen is more practical we’ll be ready to 
“push the button” on that as well.   
On hydrogen power, the BMW interviewee also noted that it was a better “fit” with BMW’s 
image than hybrids because “one of BMW’s core elements is driving excitement and 
driving pleasure”, and hydrogen is believed to confer such attributes.  In short, a belief in 
the “elegance” of diesels, a history of expertise in them and petrol internal combustion 
engines, and their ability to deliver performance attributes (in the case of BMW) were all 
reasons why German firms have taken the diesel route in Europe. 
Toyota has a history of producing efficient, smaller cars, so to some extent its drive 
to develop more environmentally friendly cars is the natural progression of an establish 
product development path.  One Toyota interviewee explained this as follows: 
Most of the cars Toyota has made over the years have been smaller cars rather than larger cars.  We 
make Land Cruisers of course at the heavier end, but most of the cars have tended to be small four 
and six cylinder cars, so just by the virtue of having good fuel economy you actually have low 
emissions.  But as engine technology advanced I think the company saw an opportunity to give 
themselves a bit of a leadership role. 
Toyota’s drive for further environmental efficiencies are therefore the continuation of a 
path it has been following over many decades in seeking technologically driven efficiencies 
in mostly smaller cars.  The result is petrol-electric hybrids. 
Given that Ford relies on sales of light trucks and luxury cars, largely sold in North 
American markets, this places strong economic sustainability constraints on the company in 
dealing with environmental concerns.  One Ford interviewee therefore said: 
The challenge for us is to be able to continue to produce [large cars with larger engines] in a 
sustainable way that meets customer expectations, what we call the ‘DNA’ of the product, and at the 
 291
same time recognise that we are in an organisation that wants to be responsible for corporate 
citizenship. 
Apart from the path dependence of the firm’s products’ “DNA”, there are the barriers that 
exist due to consumer demand (or lack of it) for environmentally-friendly vehicles.  The 
lunch of hybrid vehicles such as the Escape SUV was seen as a way around the conundrum, 
yet even though such vehicles “show a lot of promise [they] still fundamentally have 
barriers to consumers which relate to the cost of the product”.  Ford’s material limitations 
mean that Bill Ford is probably doing all he can given a strong LME-driven market focus, 
and the inescapable fact that the short to medium term success of his family business is 
dependent on Ford continuing to produce and sell larger vehicles. 
 
Some Key Implications 
 
Interviewees’ opinions on the role of market forces, state regulations and internal company 
strategies have some further key implications relevant to the VOC approach.  These relate 
to timeframes, and the debate about post-materialist values highlighted in Chapter 5.  
Specifically, interviewees’ responses demonstrated that the CME firms have longer-term 
perspectives than LME-based Ford.  Interviewees’ responses also indicated clear 
differences in the extent to which post-materialist values are/are not being embraced. 
 
Timeframes 
 
The VOC approach suggests that CME firms have longer perspectives less dictated by short 
term market outcomes and shareholder-driven profit imperatives.  There are clear 
differences in the timeframes over which interviewees indicated their firms make 
environmental product development decisions that correspond to the VOC of firms’ home 
states. 
As seen already, Volkswagen and BMW interviewees expressed a preference for 
either being ahead of state regulations (the BMW interviewee said his firm did so as a 
matter of policy) or acting in concert with them (Volkswagen interviewee spoke in terms of 
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partnership with government).  They both also expressed a preference for being ahead of, 
rather than responding to, markets.  Therefore, in both cases, there was a timeframe dictated 
by likely future regulatory requirements and future consumer demand (or shaping it), rather 
than responding to market forces and selling product in the short term.  In regulatory and 
competitive terms, both firms aim to be ahead of what is required. 
Even if Volkswagen and BMW interviewees were not specific about their 
timeframes, their focus gives them a longer term perspective than Ford.  This is because for 
Ford, current consumer demand and the product cycle over the next 3-5 years were 
stressed.  Such a timeframe was seen by one interviewee as crucial for product 
development because what is in showrooms in 3-5 years time has to sell.  He said: 
We would look at those sort of trends [in consumer attitudes] across the board and then reflect those.  
Now, whether its actual trends in something you can physically see today or just an intuitive notion 
from market surveys, it all adds up to what we think the consumer will want in 3-5 years, and that’s 
what we’ll provide. 
Of course, this is not to say that the other firms are unconcerned about selling what is in 
their showrooms!  However, it is fair to say that they did not identify such an immediate 
sales imperative in their responses. 
The longest timeframe belongs to Toyota.  In respect of the firm’s senior executives 
it was said “they don’t focus on next year or the next five, they’ve got 20 and 50 year 
visions because the company is part of the society, the fabric of society, in places 
particularly like Japan”.  Therefore, where Ford looks out 3-5 years, and Volkswagen and 
BMW look out somewhat further than this, Toyota has a 20-50 year vision based on a 
desire to lead both markets and government regulations, in the belief that it bears long term 
responsibility for its actions as a member of society.  As one Toyota interviewee put it:  
There is a hint of a trend within the community that forces you to do the research.  And I think that’s 
what probably happened with Toyota.  We could anticipate that, yes, this sense and this concern in 
the community would continue to grow and if we don’t have something to address this issue when it 
becomes a critical mass we’re not going to have a business in the future.  I think that’s how this 
technology was born out of that thinking. 
A “hint of a trend” thus “forces” Toyota to do the research and market the results.  
Therefore, as noted earlier, a product like the Prius is developed for the future and marketed 
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in a way palatable in the present.  As one Toyota interviewee saw it, it was “not just 
philosophy” but a vision “now being translated into hard, fast, actionable activity”.  This is 
what interviewees said led to the sale of the Prius rather than a research and development 
program: a desire to make the future a current reality. 
 
Materialist versus Post-Materialist Values 
 
Materialist versus post-materialist values are not concepts that specifically relate to 
varieties of capitalism.  Yet there is an implicit link between materialist values and LMEs 
with their focus on markets, competition, and shorter term profits driven by shareholder 
imperatives.  As seen in Chapter 5, whatever the post-materialist environmental concerns of 
American society, a materialist analysis is still most pertinent because US firms appear 
willing to discount them for material benefits.  At the other end of the spectrum, in CME 
Japan concern for the environment is given greater weight, with a more environmentally 
enlightened response the result.  There is no doubt that based on interviews all firms are to 
some degree driven by both materialist and post-materialist values, but there are clear 
differences in degree. 
The environment appeared to be a real concern for the German firms’ interviewees 
for two reasons.  First, resource constraints make environmental concerns important.  The 
primary market force cited by the Volkswagen interviewee was not consumer attitude or 
demand, but finite conventional energy sources.  He said: “starting with the energy crisis, 
and then going on with the price rises for energy, I think you see the nature of the force 
coming from the market”.  Similarly, the BMW interviewee said his firm has invested 
heavily in hydrogen-powered vehicles because “eventually at some stage the oil will run 
out, or the emissions that internal combustion engines emit may be deemed to be too 
unfriendly to the atmosphere, and it will be a lot harder for car makers to continue to turn 
out dirty engines”.  This leads to the second factor, namely the greater institutionalisation of 
environmental concerns at all levels of society and government in a way rarely seen outside 
of Europe.  Although a very real concern for the environment is suggested as a result of 
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these two factors, perhaps it is not so much a matter of post-materialist values as a 
recognition that environmental concerns have material effects.  Then again, whatever the 
impetus for changed company strategies, it is clear that post-materialist values are having a 
normative outcome by altering how business is conducted.  A shift to more post-materialist 
perspectives is a matter of material rationality – i.e. post materialist values are affecting 
material perspectives. 
Something similar appears to be the case for Toyota.  In material terms, being 
environmentally friendly was said to be good business because less waste, and less 
environmental pollution, means greater efficiency.  Therefore, Toyota opportunistically 
recognises the double dividend of improved environmental performance.  Yet, interviewees 
made other statements, which suggest a more post-materialist perspective, such as the 
following: 
Car companies have a social responsibility.  You are creating vehicles that are polluting, and apart 
from regulations that come along and stipulate that you need to meet a specific requirement I think 
some companies are embracing their social responsibility.  That’s one market force. Maybe it’s not a 
market force but it’s something that’s maybe one of those things that you’d describe that’s outside of 
the market forces that are changing consumer behaviour.   
Therefore, social responsibility is virtually seen as a “market force”, or there is at least a 
blurred line between social obligations and market forces.  One interviewee noted that 
Toyota potentially places itself at a material disadvantage because “some of these 
[environmental initiatives] add cost and if our competitors aren’t trying to meet the same 
goals as we’ve set ourselves, they could potentially have cheaper products on the market”.  
This again strongly suggests a post-materialist perspective.  At the end of the day, one 
Toyota interviewee saw both materialist and post-materialist values strategically driving 
Toyota: 
I suppose there’s two aspects to that.  One is there is a commercial benefit in, I guess in my mind, 
certainly the market is going to move towards production of vehicles at some stage that are more 
environmentally friendly.  That’s going to change.  It has to change.  Whether that’s in five years, ten 
years, or 25 years, there will be some environmental ‘crunch’.  Probably before then, but it’s going to 
happen.  It might happen when the government starts putting things in place such as a carbon tax or 
something else in place: changing the settings.  And I guess we’re better positioned to respond to that 
change because of what we do.  But as well as that our incoming president is taking on the issue.  His 
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dream is to make vehicles that actually make the air we breathe cleaner.  Cars that you drive on 
smoggy roads and clean air comes out of the exhaust.  It’s a dream, it’s somewhat an aspirational 
statement to say that’s what we’re striving for.   
Therefore, for both materialist and post-materialist reasons, Toyota is branding itself as the 
environmental car firm.  This suggests it is in transition from materialist to post-materialist 
values. 
Ford interviewees clearly had the most materialist account of environmental product 
development efforts.  The company seeks to meet consumer demand, is constrained by 
government regulations, and takes a shorter term view based on selling cars that will be in 
its showrooms in 3-5 year’s time.  This is not to say that environmental advances are not 
seen as beneficial.  It is just that, rather in the vein of Palmer et. al.,20 it was stated that 
environmental initiatives entail a financial burden.  One Ford interviewee very clearly 
expressed this viewpoint in saying the following: 
We’re a cost competitive business as I’m sure you’d appreciate.  We look for 10 cents out of the cost 
of a car, and people say, well, a car costs $30,000, why do you worry about 10 cents?  Because 
there’s a lot of 10 cents’s.  So, internally, we’ll walk over hot coals to take a variable ten cents out of 
a car, as well as capital investment obviously.  So, something that’s going to cost us 10 cents a car 
we’ll look hard at.  Not so much in the environmental field, but the related, say, the safety field is 
probably easier where you get the same sort of analogy: what do regulations say, what do we do and 
why do we do it?  We could be having the same discussion with safety and probably ultimately 
maybe draw the same conclusions. 
The future environmental benefits of environmental technologies are thus heavily 
discounted in the present, and regarded as a cost to be minimised.  Another Ford 
interviewee noted that the firm “would be the first to jump on some technology if it was 
clean and green and didn’t cost us a lot of money, because the customers are going to go for 
that because it saves them money in terms of fuel and so on”.  This contrasts starkly with 
the perspective of Toyota interviewees who said their firm was eager to make the 
investment despite the assurance of reaping a short to medium term financial return. 
However, Ford interviewees stressed the role played by Bill Ford in driving the firm 
to embrace hybrid technologies and move the company down the path to greater 
environmental sustainability.  He was also said to have been able to do so quite rapidly 
after his promotion to CEO in 2001.  Could Toyota have achieved such a rapid change in 
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company focus as the result of one individual taking up the firm’s top position?  Perhaps 
the LME attribute of responding in a rapid and dynamic way to changes in market 
sentiments also pays dividends when a senior individual supports certain values beyond the 
bottom line and injects these into the culture of the firm’s operations.  By being the first US 
firm to offer a hybrid SUV, Ford has certainly also gained a potential market lead on its 
competitors, albeit by licensing Japanese technology.  It has done so in a more rapid way 
than a German firm that relies on more incremental improvements in existing technologies 
in which it has a history of knowledge and expertise (i.e. diesel). 
 
The Future 
 
The interviews concluded with a question about the major challenges facing firms over the 
next 10-20 years.  An invitation to ‘crystal ball-gaze’ it was answered in remarkably 
different ways, because although all firms’ interviewees saw a hydrogen-powered future for 
their vehicles eventually, probably in 20 years time, the path to this and the motivations for 
it were quite different. 
The future for Ford was seen in terms of responding to a range of challenges in 
much the same way as the firm has in the past.  The challenges were seen neither as radical 
as for Toyota, nor as far-sighted in terms of the implication of environmental concerns as 
for Volkswagen and BMW.  Growing concern for the environment was seen as something 
to be factored into product developments in the same way as increased consumer demand 
for other features such as performance and handling.  As one interviewee put it (and they 
all did in one form or another): 
The eternal struggle of the laws of physics.  Customers want more power and performance and 
handling and quietness, but there’s basic issues of physics that our brilliant engineers work to tackle 
and overcome every day.  How do you get more performance but less fuel?  How do you meet ever 
increasing, whether it be regulatory or just socially acceptable, levels of environmental impact in 
terms of fuel economy and emissions?  So, I think that continual striving of getting better, better, 
better on emissions and fuel economy are two big ones.  Noise is another one: the drive by noise and 
setting better targets for those all the time and getting better on that.  So, I just think that overall 
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thing of technological advancement, continually getting better, using less, being quicker: the eternal 
struggle.  Is there one particular stand out?  I don’t think so. 
The future was therefore primarily conceptualised in terms of continuing to meet consumer 
demand and tougher regulatory standards.  Corporate responsibility imperatives for 
improved environmental performance were also cited, but again a gradual, incremental 
process was envisaged.  One interviewee summed up Ford’s perspective as not necessarily 
more environmentally friendly products but generally “more of everything”. 
For the German firms, real challenges in the form of environmental constraints and 
threats were identified that require a response.  The Volkswagen interviewee said that the 
pre-eminence of the issue of climate change in Germany and Europe means that it must be 
addressed.  As such, the future environmental challenges of the company were very much 
seen in terms of the political and social concerns of its home state, and the region where it 
has its major markets.  Volkswagen sees the answer as moving to advanced biofuels and 
hydrogen in the next 20 years.  The BMW interviewee’s responses were similar.  For BMW 
the future entails the eventual move to a hydrogen-based economy, while always having 
such advanced products that it can continue to succeed in business no matter what 
regulatory constraints or market forces may arise.  A shift to alternative drivetrains was 
seen as inevitable because “there has to be an answer to petroleum internal combustion 
engine cars for the long term future”.  The environment is a key problem they must address.  
There is no alternative. 
One Toyota interviewee envisaged a “multi-fuel future” in a similar manner to the 
German firms, with hydrogen the ultimate outcome.  But for Toyota, there was a sense in 
which the future is here now.  Toyota sees its role as creating the future of passenger cars.  
In particular, the challenge for the future is not reacting to, or addressing the challenges, but 
getting governments to catch up with where Toyota is already going: 
If you want a paradigm shift you’re going to have to come on board and work as a team rather than 
separate and, yes, in this case I think industry will need to lead government and government will 
have to understand where we’re at and help. 
Government and business are a team, but with business in the lead because in Toyota’s eyes 
it is the industry that has the long term vision necessary to lead.  Toyota was also the only 
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firm that envisaged competing in markets on the basis of environmental attributes 
specifically with the endpoint being “the ultimate eco car”. 
If one was to summarise their perspectives, it would be that Ford interviewees again 
exhibited an LME preoccupation with material factors and remaining competitive in 
markets.  German and Japanese firms, with longer-term perspectives, are in CME fashion 
looking beyond immediate material factors to shape the future of their industry in response 
to real environmental constraints that must be addressed.  In Toyota’s case, this is occurring 
regardless, and ahead of, regulations. 
 
The International Implications of National Variations in Capitalist 
Relations 
 
It is clear that not only do interviewees’ responses support the insights of the VOC 
approach, but that the impact of national institutional variations filter down to lower 
management levels within companies worldwide.  This is because firms are institutionally 
embedded in the home states where they have their headquarters, and this is where their 
policy and strategic decisions are taken.  These decisions, expressed in respect of the 
environment in their environmental reports, and exhibited in their product development 
strategies, permeate their operations internationally. 
The evidence speaks for itself, but so do the views expressed by interviewees.  For 
example, one Ford interviewee said that despite designing unique cars for Australia and 
manufacturing them here, the firm still did so given the constraints and overall corporate 
policy settings of head office.  On environmental technologies, the role of Ford Australia in 
setting such policies was said to be relatively minimal.  He said : 
Ford Australia is unlikely to initiate some of those things.  We’re too small.  We’re a bit operator.  
This technology is going to be driven globally. 
Therefore, he said that “typically, at the local level we would not initiate new technology”.  
In a similar vein, the Volkswagen interviewee noted that “the culture of a company is quite 
often the culture of the place where their headquarters is”.  One Toyota interviewee noted 
quite colourfully that what might seem “airy fairy” and more peripherally related to core 
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business from an Australian perspective is very much central to the way the firm operates 
from a Japanese perspective.  In relation to Toyota’s reports he said: 
There are a lot of words in there about our commitment to living in harmony with the environment 
and so forth.  That’s not just rhetoric.  It’s a Japanese company so it’s a commitment that’s believed 
in, and our product designs reflect it. 
Therefore, there is something Japanese about the firm’s holistic view of its business and its 
desire for harmony. 
The fact that these points were made by Australian branch office personnel (with 
the exception of Volkswagen) lends even greater weight to the idea that national varieties 
of capitalism have implications beyond their borders.  The evidence itself further supports 
the insights of the VOC approach.  The analysis of the interviews has been quite detailed, 
but if one were to draw broad brushstrokes on the viewpoints offered by interviewees one 
could summarise them as shown in Table 7.2. 
The German firms exhibit German CME traits, albeit from different perspectives 
given that one is a volume producer (Volkswagen) and the other a premium producer 
(BMW).  They both do not react to consumer demand, so much as attempt to be ahead of it, 
and then social attitudes are more important than actual demand.  They do not meet 
government regulations, so much as exceed them (BMW) or move in the same direction as 
government in a spirit of partnership (Volkswagen).  Being based in Germany and the EU, 
the role of government is stronger for them because of the political mainstreaming of 
environmental regulations, leading to the EU’s international regulatory leadership.  BMW, 
as a prestige car firm, is more internally driven than reactive to exogenous factors, whereas 
in true German CME fashion a balance of stakeholder viewpoints internal and external to 
the company is what shapes Volkswagen’s approach to environmental strategies.  Overall, 
this means that for Volkswagen there is no clear strong driver for environmental initiatives, 
but a balance between exogenous and endogenous forces, whereas although BMW shares 
similar viewpoints to its German volume counterpart, its prestige perspective skews its 
focus more to internal company strategies. 
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Table 7.2: Summary of Findings 
 Importance of Market 
Forces 
Importance of State 
Regulations 
Importance of Internal 
Company Strategies 
Timeframes Materialist versus 
Post-Materialist 
Values 
The Future 
Volkswagen Social attitudes: 
Medium, respond and lead  
 
 
Consumer demand:   
Low, respond and lead 
 
Medium: 
German/EU regulatory 
leadership and embedding 
of environmental 
principles, partnership 
approach 
Medium to high: 
A balance of exogenous and 
endogenous factors through 
a stakeholder approach 
Medium term Post materialism 
driven by 
materialist 
rationality. 
Environmental factors are a 
key challenge to be 
addressed. 
BMW Social attitudes:  
Medium, lead 
 
Consumer demand: 
Low, lead 
 
Medium: 
German/EU regulatory 
leadership and embedding 
of environmental 
principles, design for 
future regulations 
High: 
Product development driven 
by an internal vision 
Medium term Post materialism 
driven by 
materialist 
rationality. 
Environmental factors are a 
key challenge to be 
addressed. 
Ford Social attitudes: 
Low to medium, respond 
 
Consumer demand: 
High, respond 
 
High: 
Constraint on responding 
to market forces 
Low, except for the role of 
senior executives: 
Vision of the 
Chairman/CEO 
Short term Materialist More of the same – the 
environment is one of a 
range of product attributes 
to be addressed and 
balanced. 
Toyota Social attitudes: 
Medium, lead and respond 
 
Consumer demand: 
Low, lead 
 
Low: 
Firm leads government 
High: 
Corporate philosophy drives 
environmental initiatives. 
Long term Transition to post-
materialism 
Shaping the future of 
environmental car attributes 
is a key factor.  Competition 
on the basis of 
environmental attributes is 
envisaged. 
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 Similar sentiments are evident for Toyota.  As a Japanese CME firm, it sees itself as 
very much part of the fabric of society with resulting social obligations to lead 
environmental debate and educate society.  It leads markets (on the basis of social attitudes, 
or “nascent consumer demand”).  However, it goes beyond cooperating with government to 
assume a leadership position, and desires greater government cooperation.  As a firm based 
in a techno-nationalist CME with a philosophical commitment to the environment, it is 
technologically driven to produce petrol-electric hybrids such as the Prius.  Toyota’s 
distinguishing feature is one that characterises Japanese CME firms more generally: a high 
importance placed on internal drivers.  The result is it is now branding itself as an 
environmental car firm with environmental leadership a core management objective. 
Ford, with its headquarters in the archetypal LME, is more focussed on reacting to 
weak environmental consumer demand than addressing stronger social attitudes.  Similarly, 
it meets government regulations rather than exceeds them.  Its main objectives are 
profitability and economic success, and therefore the firm is more exogenously materially 
driven.  The ‘wildcard’ in the case of Ford is the role of the company’s Chairman and CEO 
given his environmental awareness, and the family heritage he brings to his firm of a 
concern for corporate citizenship.  This forms the foundation for Ford’s internal drive to 
address environmental concerns, despite market forces exerting contrary material 
incentives.  Given the greater power of top management to make decisions and set strategy 
in LME-based firms, this is primarily where the impetus for Ford’s environmental 
initiatives comes from. 
These findings confirm the analysis of environmental reports which showed, in 
broad terms, that German firms are more driven by social concerns and a more balanced 
approach than simply responding to market forces, and that Japanese firms are more 
internally driven for their strategies.  US firms are more predisposed to approach 
environmental initiatives from a market perspective.  There are further implications of these 
observations that relate to the timeframes and attitudes to post-materialism that come from 
different emphases related to firms’ home state VOC: a tendency to longer timeframes and 
greater weight to post-materialist values for CME firms by comparison to those based in 
LMEs.   Ford has a shorter term timeframe than the other firms, being more focussed on 
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 current market conditions, current regulatory requirements, and profitability within the 
current product cycle.  It remains the most materialist in its perspective on environmental 
product developments.  The German firms have a more medium term perspective based on 
being ahead of markets and regulatory requirements, and being more stakeholder, rather 
than market, driven in how these exogenous factors are addressed.  Toyota has the longest 
timeframe, being so strongly internally driven on environmental matters that this 
significantly overrides exogenous factors.  It is also the case that in the case of Toyota, this 
is associated with a shift to post-materialist values in how it conducts its business, whereas 
for the German firms such a shift is occurring for more materialist reasons – i.e. post-
materialism is good for business.   
 
Conclusion 
 
When you have something positive to say, you are not afraid to say it, and indeed grasp 
opportunities to do so.  All the firms that participated in interviews are committed to 
enhancing the environmental performance of their products.  Volkswagen and BMW are 
doing so with advanced diesels in the short term and alternative fuels in the longer-term.  
Ford is the first non-Japanese company to launch a petrol-electric hybrid vehicle, and the 
first in the world to do so in the form of an SUV.  Toyota is a pioneer in petrol-electric 
hybrids and has committed to applying the technology across its model range.  It is possible 
that these firms self-selected themselves for participation in interviews because of 
commitments they have made such as these.  However, whether this is the case or not, what 
has clearly emerged is that far from a global perspective on the environment being the case, 
or even an Australian perspective in the case of Australian interviewees, interviewees from 
each firm had very distinct ‘lenses’ through which they saw the environmental performance 
of the cars their firms produce.   
It is also important to concede that there are no absolutes, that these are complex 
issues, firms are complex organisations, and the intersection of various factors and the 
forces they exert on firm strategies are not straightforward.  For example, it should not be 
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 assumed that these firms in no way tailor their operations for the different jurisdictions in 
which they operate, such as to suit Australia’s VOC.  Similarly, beyond the national 
distinctions highlighted by the insights of the VOC approach, a firm such as Ford is 
obviously concerned about consumer attitudes and Toyota is obviously concerned about 
making profits.  And characterising German firms’ embrace of advanced diesels as an 
incremental rather than radical step like hybrids was challenged by the Volkswagen 
interviewee who made the point that the research and development that went into advanced 
diesels is not dissimilar to that for hybrids.  A complex mixture of national and specific 
firm traits are bound up in these conclusions.   
Even so, the there are clear points of difference in emphasis between firms.  These 
points of difference have implications for which firms are setting the environmental agenda 
and which are following.  As a result, they also indicate which firms are likely to dominate 
future environmental initiatives, and thence which are likely to redefine the global market 
for passenger cars in a more environmentally sustainable manner.  In a sense the answer is 
obvious: Japanese and German firms.  In the course of undertaking research for this thesis, 
several people (although none from Toyota) expressed the view that Toyota developed its 
Prius opportunistically to take advantage of emerging attitudinal trends, the signing of the 
Kyoto protocol, and likely emerging market forces.  They are still motivated by a desire to 
increase their market share.  This may be true, but the question has to be asked if this is the 
case why were there not a whole range of Priuses introduced in the late 1990s, or cars with 
similar environmental pretensions?  Similarly, it might be expedient to explain the move of 
European producers to advanced diesels in terms of the price differential between petrol 
and diesel.  But there are internal corporate technological advantages for European firms in 
so doing, and specific market factors, particularly in terms of social attitudes, that tend to 
get overlooked in such a simple rationalist explanation for the shift to diesels.  Clearly, the 
result of different national and corporate perspectives is that Toyota is leading the industry 
in the commercialisation of hybrid technologies, and the German firms are doing likewise 
with diesels and alternative fuels.  Ford is attempting to catch up, yet may still have 
considerable success in market terms because it is attempting to marry the more internally-
driven (in the case of Toyota) or consensus driven (in the case Volkswagen) strategies of 
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 the others with market forces and the commitment of its Chairman and CEO to 
environmental initiatives. 
 
                                                 
1 The reader will note that for the sake of analytical tractability, in Chapter 5 social attitudes and consumer 
demand are considered together as ‘market forces’ because they are the focus for cross-state comparative 
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latter chapters. 
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3 See Figure 4.9 
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“microcosm” of the international market.  Productivity Commission (2002), Review of Automotive Assistance, 
Inquiry Report, Report No.25, Melbourne: Productivity Commission. 
6  See Wright, Patrick J. (1979), On a Clear Day you can see General Motors: John Z. de Lorean’s Look 
Inside the Automotive Giant, Grosse Point: Wright Enterprises. 
7 The evidence on fuel taxes presented in Chapter 4 would tend to support such a view. 
8 Example given by interviewees included Euro 3 noxious emissions regulations being superseded by Euro 4 
regulations, and more stringent fuel economy standards. 
9 For the US, this interviewee referred to the historically long-standing strict Californian noxious emissions 
regulations and recent Californian CO2 emission regulations.  However, on Californian regulations it was 
noted in a footnote in Chapter 3 that while the state of California has historically had much stricter regulations 
for non-CO2 emissions than national regulations for the US as a whole, it actually lags national regulations 
when it comes to CO2 emissions.  This is because although California passed a law requiring “maximum 
feasible reductions” in greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light trucks in 2002, no specific standards 
were mandated under this law, and car manufacturers are not required to take any action to reduce emissions 
until 2009.  Therefore this may effectively be ruled out in terms of any comparison being undertaken here on 
the basis of CO2 emissions.  See D. Austin, N. Rosinki, A. Sauer and C. le Duc (2003), Changing Drivers: the 
Impact of Climate Change on Competitiveness and Value Creation in the Automotive Industry, Sustainable 
Asset Management and World Resources Institute, http://pdf.wri.org/changing_drivers_full_report.pdf, 
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accessed 10 January 2004, p.6; and OECD (2004), Can Cars Come Clean?  Strategies for Low-Emission 
Vehicles, Paris: OECD, pp.110-112.
10 This is an Australian federal government program under which firms operating in Australia make voluntary 
commitments to reduce CO2 emissions. 
11 The imagery is along the lines that Ford reaches for the ceiling, much the way that the US industry as a 
whole struggles to comply with CAFE regulations as demonstrated in Chapter 3.  Therefore, regulations 
represent a maximum level of regulatory compliance that must be ‘reached’ for, rather than a minimum level 
of compliance easily exceeded. 
12 This point was weakened by two other Ford interviewees though, who saw the possibility that 
environmental attributes could actually have a negative effects on sales.  One of them said that “market forces 
have worked in the reverse if anything [because] there’s a focus on more features, quieter cars which result in 
more sound deadening material, safer cars which involve stiffer structures, and airbags which of course add 
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Main: Deutsche Bank AG, p.72. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis opened with the observation that changing the behaviour of firms to 
internalise environmental externalities is usually seen as unlikely in the absence of 
changes in market forces or effective state regulation – i.e. material factors that alter the 
material incentives to economic actors.  However, the thesis has sought to ‘open up’ the 
question of addressing environmental externalities by also focussing on normative 
factors that explain institutional differences in the capitalist relations of firms’ home 
states.  To empirically ground the analysis, the thesis has focussed on the car industry, 
the world’s largest manufacturing sector dominated by a handful of large multinational 
corporations (MNCs).  Not only is the car industry the world’s dominant manufacturing 
sector, it is also a major contributor to environmental damage, particularly the pressing 
global issue of climate change. 
By focussing on the industry’s contribution to the problem of climate change 
through the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions of its products (passenger cars) in use, the 
central question asked was: what motivates car firms to actually make environmental 
commitments?  More accurately, from an institutional perspective, what institutional 
factors are likely to motivate firms in the car industry to see environmental issues as 
central to their business interests?  In seeking to answer this question, two related 
specifying questions were asked.  The first of these, contingent on the answer to the first 
question, was: are the motivators for firms embracing environmental improvements 
universal, or specific to firms based on their nationality or, possibly, individual 
cultures?  Depending on the answers to the first two questions, the third question was: 
why should the car industry be concerned about the environment, particularly given its 
global economic significance and resulting political power? 
What has been found is that firm commitments are not happening equally (i.e. in 
terms of magnitude), nor in the same manner (i.e. there are qualitative differences).  
Firms’ strategies are dependent on where they have their home bases, and in this thesis 
firms from three of the car industry’s major hubs were considered: Germany (and 
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Europe to some extent), the United States (US) and Japan.  In explaining the national 
differences, the institutional basis of capitalist relations in firms’ home states revealed 
by the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach has been shown to be crucial for 
explaining variations in car firms’ responses to climate change.  In fact, there is a two 
way relationship such that the insights of the VOC approach support the results of the 
empirical analysis conducted here, and in turn the results support the insights of the 
VOC approach.   
This concluding chapter reprises the key insights of the VOC approach applied 
to the empirical analysis in the thesis, and their relation to firms’ actions in respect of 
environmental product developments.  It first summarises whether casting firms as 
rational economic actors (as per the liberal economic model) or seeing them as 
institutionally embedded in their home states (as per institutional models) is more 
appropriate.  The way in which the insights of the VOC approach apply is summarised, 
in particular the idea that the material perspective of firms as rational economic actors is 
only really applicable to liberal market economy (LME)-based firms, whereas 
coordinated market economy (CME)-based firms are driven by less material 
imperatives.  The main findings of the thesis are then summarised.  What firms are 
actually doing, and the national differences in their environmental product 
developments, is considered first, particularly from the perspective of whether this 
represents radical or incremental change.  The point is made that the national 
differences are a reflection of the LME versus CME divide of the major firms’ home 
states.  The role of state regulations is then considered, particularly the conclusion that 
the extent to which state regulations establish minimum floors (in the case of CMEs) 
versus maximum ceilings (in the case of LMEs) is a matter of firms’ home state variety 
of capitalism.  The role of market forces is then addressed, particular  differences in the 
way market forces are perceived depending on firms’ home state variety of capitalism.  
LME-based firms are most concerned with material factors, and therefore discount 
social attitudes in favour of focussing on the material impacts of factors such as 
consumer demand and short term profit motivations.  However, CME-based firms give 
higher priority to social attitudes because of a greater focus on normative factors.  The 
findings on internal strategic drivers are summarised.  It is shown that the importance of 
these revolves around whether firms may be conceptualised more as rational business 
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calculators (LME-based firms) or motivated more by beliefs (CME-based firms).  In the 
light of the findings, conclusions are also presented on materialist versus post-
materialist values, again suggesting a split along LME/CME lines on the basis of firms’ 
home states, and therefore the extent to which a shift in business attitudes is occurring 
as a result of a shift towards post-materialist attitudes or not (it is in the case of CME-
based firms, it is not in the case of LME-based firms).   
Finally, answers to the questions are stated.  These are that the factors that 
motivate car firms to see environmental issues as central to their business interests are 
contingent on national institutional differences identified by the VOC approach.  
Therefore, car firms’ primary motivators for embracing environmental improvements 
are specific to their nationalities, and to some extent their individual cultures (although 
individual cultures are themselves a reflection of nationalities).  As such, there is the 
crucial finding that it is not sufficient to say that material factors such as state 
regulations or consumer demand are the primary motivators for all firms in the car 
industry, or at least they do not necessarily produce the same material outcomes.  The 
reason why the car industry should be concerned about the environment is therefore best 
answered in terms of the institutionalised norms that lead car firms of different 
nationalities to perceive environmental issues in different ways.  There is no single 
answer, but multiple ones to such a question because the VOC of nations has 
implications not just for the type of products that transnational economic actors 
produce, and the competitive advantages they develop, but also the way they address 
related issues arising as a result of their activities, such as environmental degradation.   
The thesis concludes with suggestions for future research. 
 
Rational Economic Actors or National Institutional Embedding? 
 
To answer the questions posed in this thesis, two contrasting perspectives on addressing 
environmental externalities were considered: the liberal economic model versus 
institutional models.   
The mainstream liberal economic model is based on a rationalist approach that 
sees firms as motivated by material concerns.  They seek profits in markets, and act 
instrumentally to do so.  They are motivated by a logic of consequentialism.1  Based on 
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a priori assumed motivations of them as materially-driven profit seekers, a rationalist 
analysis is applied the result of which is that, ceteris paribus, environmental 
externalities can only be addressed by state intervention.  Alternatively,2 consumer 
preferences must change so that market signals provide incentives for them to alter their 
behaviour on the basis of their instrumental profit-seeking goals.   
Institutional models do not make assumptions about actors’ rationality, but 
instead focus on norms of behaviour and how these become institutionalised over time.3  
They are based not just on a logic of consequentialism defined in terms of a priori 
assumptions regarding actors’ rationality, but on a logic of appropriateness based on 
norms.4  The hypothesis of the thesis is that both logics are relevant, but that the relative 
importance of material, rationalist, instrumental motivations for action need to be 
weighed against normative rationales that become institutionalised over time.  In order 
to do this, the VOC approach was adopted as the framework for analysis because both 
material and normative rationales for action are encompassed within it, and because it 
says that the degree to which firms conform to the liberal economic model, or 
alternatives, is actually a question of institutional embedding in their home states.5
Therefore, the VOC approach makes a series of observations on the institutional 
basis of firms’ home state capitalist relations that should predict their motivations.  
Specifically, firms’ motivations are ascribed on the basis of whether their home states 
lean more towards LMEs, as in the case of the US, versus CMEs, as in the case of 
Germany (and to some extent the Europe more broadly) and Japan.  In Chapter 2 this 
was shown to mean: 
1. Closer state-business relations in CMEs versus a separation of the state and 
markets in LMEs.  For Germany, a coordinating role for the state is the case, 
while for Japan a more organic, symbiotic relationship is suggested based on 
mutual understanding. 
2. A resulting priority for markets as organisers of economic activity in LMEs, in 
both the product and financial spheres, versus markets as one among a variety of 
mechanisms for organising economic activity in CMEs on a more relational, 
cooperative basis.  In the case of Germany, the role of society and a feeling of 
responsibility towards it is particularly important, as well as negotiated 
 310
consensus between a range of stakeholders often prescribed by law.  For Japan, 
the enterprise community, and the relationship between stakeholders within it, 
plays a stronger role. 
3. The firm may be conceived of as a network of contracts with significant power 
invested in management in LMEs, that acts on market signals to make profits in 
the short term and pay dividends to shareholders, versus a collective (Germany) 
or community (Japan) in CMEs that acts to enhance its reputation through close 
relational ties with stakeholders.  US firms are ‘instruments’ (of profit), German 
firms are ‘well-oiled machines’ and Japanese firms are ‘organisms’. 
4. US firms are likely to be more focussed on exogenous material factors, but with 
more power in the hands of management to act unilaterally in devising strategies 
to respond to these.  Because Japanese firms are more internally driven 
strategically, endogenous factors have greater prominence.  German firms are 
somewhere in between, but with prominence given to (exogenous) social 
responsibilities. 
5. A preference for non-price competition via product innovation in established 
industries in CMEs via incremental technological change, versus price 
competition in established industries in LMEs.  Radical technological change is 
favoured in new industries in LMEs, however in the case of Japan a preference 
for technonationalism may produce quite radical technological advances over 
time even in established industries. 
It was found that, taken together, these drivers of firm strategies imply a shorter-
term perspective for LMEs versus a longer-term perspective for CMEs.  This is because 
in the latter there is less focus on markets, profits, paying shareholders dividends, and 
competing in established industries on the basis of price.  This also implies a clear 
preference for materialist perspectives on the part of LME-based firms, versus less 
materialist perspectives for CME-based firms. 
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What Firms are Doing: Radical or Incremental Change? 
 
A range of environmental product development initiatives being undertaken by car 
firms that address the contribution of their products in use to climate change were 
outlined in Chapter 3.  These include incremental technologies, petrol and diesel-
electric hybrid drivetrains, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) and alternative fuels.6  
Developments in these areas all aim to improve fuel economy and reduce passenger 
cars’ contribution to CO2 emissions.7  However, an analysis of car firms’ environmental 
reports and the relative focus of the industry and individual firms showed that divergent, 
rather than convergent, strategies are being employed by firms, and that their strategies 
diverge on the basis of their nationalities.8   
Japanese firms are focussed on petrol-electric hybrids, and on introducing 
alternative vehicles more broadly as soon as possible.  Not waiting for markets to 
mature, they are keen to introduce new, radical technologies now.  By contrast, German 
firms are focussed on incremental technologies in the form of advanced diesels, largely 
to meet the requirements of their co-regulatory CO2 emission reduction agreements with 
the European Commission.  German and US firms are focussed on alternative fuels, but 
in different ways.  For US firms, this is a strategy for addressing the fuel consumption 
of their larger light trucks, which have come to dominate sales for the US market and 
US-based firms.  However, for German firms it is an across the board strategy for all 
vehicles.  While FCVs are a relatively distant prospect for all firms, Japanese firms 
want to introduce them as soon as possible (in the manner of their technologically-
driven environmental initiatives more generally), whereas German and US firms want 
to be ready to introduce them when market, regulatory and infrastructure conditions are 
conducive.  A stronger emphasis on reacting to market forces generally and developing 
products to suit different markets was noticeable for US firms, but more ‘in the 
background’ for German and Japanese firms which have determined clear (and 
differentiated) technological strategies. 
These divergent strategies appear related to firms’ home state variety of 
capitalism in three ways.  First, the technonationalist version of the Japanese CME is 
manifested in Japanese car firms’ more radical embrace of hybrid technologies, and 
radical leading-edge technological advances generally.  The focus is then on being first 
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on the market with such technologies.  Secondly, LME-style, US firms appear to be 
more driven by market forces, hence their diversified strategy with different products 
for different markets, than CME-based Japanese and German firms for whom non-price, 
internally-driven innovation strategies are more the case.  Thirdly, the time frame for 
the introduction of these technologies is commensurate with the divide between LME 
US-based firms on the one hand, and CME German and Japanese based firms on the 
other.  The time frames for the latter are not as determined by market forces as they are 
for the former.  Japanese firms in particular appear to be driven by a desire to be first on 
the market with new technologies and new products, regardless of market forces. 
Such broad observations were supported and developed through a detailed 
analysis of the role of state regulations, the nature of market forces, and the internal 
strategic drivers of firms. 
 
State Regulation: Floors or Ceilings? 
 
The liberal economic model holds that well-targeted regulations, in the form of 
penalties or incentives, are required to internalise environmental externalities. These 
must be enforced by the appropriate authorities to ensure compliance.  In Chapter 4, 
regulations in the form of market mechanisms and command-and-control standards 
were considered.  Surprisingly, market mechanisms were found to be less important in 
determining industry behaviour in all cases than standards.  In the case of the latter, the 
material facts of regulations – their stringency and timing – were found to be 
insufficient for explaining the degree to which industry complies with regulations, its 
support for them, and whether it is leading or following such regulations.  These are 
normative questions, because they do not only ask whether firms comply with 
regulations, but go beyond this to seek answers to qualitative questions of how well they 
comply, whether they are likely to continue doing so and whether they are likely to lead 
change in future or only respond to what is demanded of them.  In a nutshell, they go to 
illuminating the degree to which regulations are ‘floors’ that establish minimum 
requirements (for minimal behavioural change) that are easily exceeded by firms, versus 
‘ceilings’ that establish the maximum effort they are inclined to make in addressing 
environmental externalities. 
 313
The VOC of firms’ home states explains the extent to which regulations 
establish floors or ceilings.  The nature of state-firm relations, and how this informs the 
development of regulations, was seen to be the determining factor in the industry’s 
performance in respect of them.  Closer state-business relations in CMEs were found to 
mean that firms based there are more likely to be proactive in suggesting and 
implementing initiatives to reduce CO2 emissions.  Regulation is based more on co to 
self-regulatory relations with the state, and the result is that the industry exceeds 
regulations which may be thought of as floors that they are well above.  By contrast, 
LME-based US firms, more arm’s length from the state in setting standards and 
therefore having standards imposed on them, act more as lobbyists in respect of the state 
against regulatory strengthening.  They barely meet regulatory requirements.  Therefore, 
regulations are ceilings that the US industry struggles to reach. 
These findings were found to have an international dimension because of their 
ramifications beyond the borders of firms’ home states.  Firms export the institutional 
features of their home state’s regulations in the products they sell.  In all the territories 
in which they operate Japanese and German/European firms sell cars that are more fuel 
efficient and produce less CO2 emissions than US firms.  The institutional importance 
of national regulatory environments, in terms of state-business relations, how this 
informs the setting of regulatory standards, and the resulting floor versus ceiling 
conception of these standards, was shown to override any notions of the ‘stateless’ 
corporation. 
 
Market Forces: Material Returns or Social Attitudes 
 
In the absence of state regulatory intervention, the liberal economic model posits that 
internalisation of environmental externalities occurs when market forces in the form of 
consumer demand mean that such externalities are incorporated in the price mechanism.  
When they are, an ‘invisible hand’ efficiently takes environmental concerns into 
account.  Combined with this view is the post-materialist values thesis that such an 
outcome is increasingly likely because of changing social attitudes.9  However, the 
extent to which market forces drive corporate strategic change on the environment was 
shown to be institutionally dependent on whether markets (in LMEs) or more relational, 
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cooperative relations between economic actors and society (in CMEs) coordinate 
economic activity.  It was found that because material concerns are most important to 
LME-based firms, social concern for the environment is discounted in favour of 
consumer demand and the short term profit motivations to which it gives rise.  By 
contrast, German and Japanese CME-based firms give higher priority to social attitudes 
because of a greater focus on normative factors over material ones.   
Therefore, mirroring the regulatory floors versus ceilings findings on state 
regulations, was the finding of the relative importance of material returns in LMEs 
versus social attitudes in CMEs.  Social concern for the environment in Germany and 
Japan was found, in a manner similar to the way in which regulations are developed in 
these CMEs, to produce a willingness to lead markets that does not exist for US LME-
based firms.  Predisposed to react to the material facts (and returns from) consumer 
demand in markets, US firms discount social concerns.  Echoing the findings of Chapter 
4 on state regulations, states that have a co-regulatory approach, or one where 
regulations have highly voluntaristic components, are more likely to lead markets.  For 
example, in addressing their CO2 emission commitments, the German industry is 
promoting advanced diesel vehicles, which is also commensurate with a CME 
preference for incremental technological advances.  Japanese firms are taking a more 
radical technology-driven approach befitting their technonationalist version of a CME.  
Proactively acting in concert with, and possibly ahead of, the state, and certainly ahead 
of consumer demand, they are more internally driven in their environmental initiatives, 
and more concerned with social attitudes than actual consumer demand. 
 
Internal Strategic Drivers: Rational Business Calculations or Beliefs? 
 
The analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 of individual firms’ rationales for their environmental 
product development strategies expressed in their environmental reports and in 
interviews with key personnel further illuminated the industry-wide conclusions reached 
in respect of state regulations and market forces.  LME-based US firms are focussed on 
material factors – i.e. the actual demands of state regulations and consumer demand in 
markets.  In contrast, CME-based firms are more focussed on social attitudes (German 
firms) and internal strategies (Japanese firms).  They have a more normative perspective 
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on their business interests.  A key exception to the rule, yet possible under the VOC 
approach, is that while endogenous drivers for change are not as important as 
exogenous, material (mainly market) imperatives for LME-based firms, in the case of 
Ford the perspective of the firm’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) results 
in environmental concerns coming to the fore.  This is because of management’s more 
unilateral control over firm strategies in LMEs.  Commensurate with this, sustainability 
as a concept is recognised at Ford, even if not clearly supportive of immediate material 
economic interests, because management commitment is present. 
Unpacking the German and Japanese firms’ differences in approach to 
environmental product developments is further illuminated by the VOC approach.  
German firms are particularly mindful of consensual cooperation with regulators while 
taking account of social concerns, while Japanese firms place more emphasis on leading 
society and being internally driven by their company policies. 
The German CME model sees firms as bearing public responsibility for their 
actions and looking to social attitudes in upholding such responsibilities.  Their image 
and standing matters to them from an economic perspective, but also in terms of their 
role in society.  They couple their concern for social attitudes with a desire to be 
proactive in the policy process to achieve consensus-based agreements that serve 
environmental as well as material/business focussed goals.  Close and cooperative, 
consensus-based state-business relations are therefore central to their perspective on 
state regulation, and they are thus likely to develop internal corporate policies to further 
their environmental goals in the light of social concerns and their close relations with 
the state. 
Japanese firms have similar drivers for action to German firms, but the 
enterprise community aspects of Japanese CME capitalist relations are more to the fore.  
This reflects the more ‘organic’ way in which Japanese firms conceive their relations 
with the state and society as opposed to the negotiated consensus, ‘machine’-like modus 
operandi of German firms.  Thus, Japanese firms are particularly driven by their internal 
cultures, as predicted by the importance ascribed to group, consensus-based strategy 
development and implementation within the Japanese CME model.  They are internally 
driven by a belief in the importance of the environment and a company-specific vision 
of the strategies required to act on this belief.  Less driven by the material imperatives 
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of market forces in the short term, they aim to lead the market in new and uncharted 
directions with more radical products.  They want to lead not just in material 
competitive terms, but in meeting broader strategic (in this case environmental) goals. 
 
Materialist versus Post-Materialist Values: Which Firms Believe 
Environmental Concerns are Important? 
 
Taken together with the observations on state regulation and market forces, the findings 
on internal strategic drivers lead to key conclusions on the extent to which car firms are 
acting in a manner commensurate with materialist versus post-materialist values. 
German firms do not meet government regulations, so much as exceed them or 
move forward with regulators in a spirit of partnership.  They do not react to consumer 
demand, so much as attempt to be ahead of it, and social attitudes are more important 
than actual demand.  They are more likely to seek a balance of stakeholder viewpoints 
external and internal to the company in developing environmental strategies, so that a 
balance between exogenous and endogenous forces is achieved. 
Japanese firms go beyond cooperating with government to assume a leadership 
position.  As firms based in a technonationalist CME with philosophical commitment to 
the environment, they are driven to produce technologically radical environmentally-
friendly vehicles such as Toyota’s Prius.  In so doing, a high importance is placed on 
internal strategic drivers.  The result for firms such as Toyota is that they are 
increasingly branding themselves as environmental firms as part of being technological 
leaders.  In so doing, environmental leadership is becoming a core management 
objective. 
US firms remain, LME-style, more focussed on reacting to weak 
(environmental) consumer demand than addressing stronger social attitudes.  As well as 
reacting to market forces in the form of consumer demand, they are predisposed to 
reacting to and meeting state regulations, rather than exceeding them.  With material 
motivators of profitability and economic success to the fore, they are more exogenously 
driven.  However, in the case of Ford the role of the company’s Chairman and CEO is 
important because of his environmental awareness, and family heritage of corporate 
citizenship values.  This forms the foundation for Ford’s internal drive to address 
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environmental concerns, despite market forces exerting contrary material incentives.  
Given the greater power of top management to make decisions and set strategy in LME-
based firms, this is primarily where the impetus for Ford’s environmental initiatives 
comes from. 
In the end, and as made explicit in Chapter 7, there is no doubt that all firms are 
to some degree driven by both materialist and post-materialist values, but there are clear 
differences in degree and rationale.  A shift to more post-materialist perspectives is a 
matter of material rationality for German firms – i.e. post materialist values are 
affecting materialist perspectives.  Japanese firms are displaying their environmental 
credentials for both materialist and post-materialist reasons.  They are in transition from 
materialist to post-materialist values as drivers of their business strategies.  US firms 
clearly are predisposed, as a result of the LME variety of capitalism of their home state, 
to materialist approaches to the environment.  The exception is the role of senior 
management in the case of Ford. 
 
Answers to Questions 
 
In finding an answer to what motivates car firms to make environmental commitments, 
three questions were asked.  The first, stating this question more accurately, was: what 
institutional factors are likely to motivate firms in the car industry to see environmental 
issues as central to their business interests? 
Japanese car firms are indeed potentially the “saviours of the environment”10 
because they have chosen as a matter of internal company strategy to embrace 
environmental technologies as a way of enhancing corporate performance. Parker sums 
this up neatly as follows: 
Rather than being ‘lucky’ as suggested by some commentators on the fast sale of hybrids when 
they were launched in North America at a time of rising gasoline prices (2000), the success of 
the new hybrid technology can be traced to the foresight and planning of firms that recognised 
mounting environmental pressures and responded. Supportive policies were created by 
government, industry associations and competing firms, with the end result being a race to 
deliver new technologies for cars in the 20th century that are less damaging to the 
environment.11
 318
But Japanese firms’ actions are, at their root, due more to their home state’s CME 
variety of capitalism than an altruistic concern for environmental sustainability.  First, 
the co to self-regulatory manner in which regulations are set means firms tend to lead 
the state and markets with their environmental product development initiatives.  They 
have a longer-term strategic timescale.  Secondly, the technonationalist CME model that 
typifies Japanese capitalist relations leads its car industry to apply the most radical 
technological solutions and commercially release them as soon as possible.  Thirdly, the 
Japanese industry’s leadership role on the environment is the least associated with 
changes in social attitudes and willingness to act on these of the three, but its CME 
variety of capitalism lead the fact of the existence of social concern to be more 
strategically important.  Finally, internal strategic drivers are to the fore for Japanese 
firms.  They are increasingly, as a result of the path dependence of previous actions and 
their core beliefs, internalising a concern for environmental sustainability in their 
business strategies. 
The case is similar for German car firms.  Advanced diesels are their focus, so a 
less technologically-radical approach has been the result.  It is certainly true that diesel 
is cheaper and that diesel has been embraced by the industry and policy makers.  But as 
the analysis in Chapter 4 and the opinions of the Volkswagen interviewee suggest, such 
market factors are not necessarily the driving force behind such developments.  It is 
more a matter of path dependent expertise in such technologies, and a technologically 
incremental approach to addressing climate change that allows them to meet CO2 
emission regulations, voluntarily proposed, in the most cost-effective manner possible 
and to exceed the targets set.  In addition, social concern, willingness to act on this 
concern and actual consumer behaviour also favour such a course of action.  Again, the 
CME basis of capitalist relations is at the core of the strategies being adopted by the 
German industry, as it is acting more on social concern, in partnership with state 
regulators, and on a longer-term cooperative strategy to incrementally move towards 
more environmentally-friendly technologies for its products. 
It therefore appears that it is Japanese and German firms that will capitalise on 
the inaction of US-based car firms.  Waiting for, or reacting to, market conditions in the 
form of material returns as a result of consumer demand, or reacting to (and often 
opposing) state regulations, they are lagging the Japanese and German industry in 
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environmental product development initiatives.  Without competitive pressures from 
Japanese and German firms, the VOC approach and the analysis in this thesis supports 
the finding that for institutional reasons they are unlikely to lead strategic change 
towards more environmentally responsible technologies, at least in terms of their 
introduction in cars commercially available for sale.  If they do, as in the case of Ford 
with vehicles such as the petrol-electric hybrid Escape SUV, it is because of a 
commitment by senior management.  But again, institutional factors that give 
management the power to act more unilaterally in LMEs are at the root of explaining 
why this should be the case. 
Therefore, answering the question of what motivates car firms to make 
environmental commitments, or more specifically what institutional factors are likely to 
motivate firms in the car industry to see environmental issues as central to their business 
interests, hinges on the impact of differing national institutional factors.  It is not so 
much a question of whether car firms are concerned about the environment and whether 
or not they have real environmental product development strategies (they are all 
interested in doing so to one degree or another), as what would drive them, or has 
driven them, to do so.  The question of ‘greenwashing’ versus real commitment to 
reduce the environmental impact of the industry’s products remains relevant, but so do 
nationally appropriate and conducive paths to environmental commitments.  Although 
ensuring firms make credible environmental commitments is an important 
consideration, and that these commitments effectively address environmental problems, 
the question of nationally conducive paths to so doing is no less important.   
The second question, contingent on the answer to the first one, was: are the 
motivators for firms to embrace environmental improvements universal, or are they 
specific to firms based on their nationality or, possibly, individual cultures?  Clearly, the 
answer is that the motivators are both nationally specific, and firm-specific.  It cannot be 
said that the motivators for firms to embrace environmental improvements are 
universal.  Therefore, the crucial finding is that it is not sufficient to say that material 
factors, such as state regulations or consumer demand, are the primary motivators for all 
firms in the car industry.  They cannot be said, by the fact of their existence, to even 
necessarily produce the same material outcomes. 
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These findings in respect of the second question are important because of their 
broader implications.  The mainstream liberal economic perspective on economic 
actor’s motivations is a somewhat cynical (although adherents might prefer ‘realistic’ or 
‘rational’) one that any concern for the environment must be the result of materially-
driven instrumental behaviour based on a logic of consequentialism.  The aim is purely 
self-interested profit seeking on the part of firms.  However, what has been shown is 
that far from a global perspective on the environment being the case, car firms have 
very distinct ‘lenses’ through which they see the environmental performance of the cars 
they produce.  Employing the insights of the VOC approach, this thesis has presented 
empirical evidence for why the liberal economic model only approximates the 
behaviour and motivations of US-based car firms.  This is because they are based in the 
archetypal LME.  However, for CME-based German and Japanese firms, a different 
institutional basis for capitalist relations leads them to focus on more normative factors.  
In turn, such normative factors influence the way they view their material interests, and 
the consequences of their actions.  They are inclined to take a more holistic view in 
which their role in society occupies a more central strategic position, internal corporate 
strategies proactively drive environmental product initiatives, and leadership over, or 
partnership with, regulators is a feature of their strategic planning. 
The third question, contingent on answers to the first two and re-phrasing the 
central question more accurately, was: why should the car industry be concerned about 
the environment, particularly given its global economic significance and resulting 
political power? 
Institutionalised norms have implications for the way in which firms of different 
nationalities approach important issues such as the environment and, specifically in this 
thesis, the issue of climate change.  The VOC approach has been employed to 
demonstrate that it is the institutional basis of different capitalisms that is particularly 
relevant when one considers MNCs such as those in the car industry whose operations 
may be truly global, but whose ‘spirit’ remains rooted in the nation that gave them birth.  
It has been shown that the VOC of nations has implications not just for the type of 
products these transnational economic actors produce, and the competitive advantages 
they develop, but also the way they address related issues arising as a result of their 
activities, such as environmental degradation.  Thus, while their attitude and actions 
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relating to environmental concerns have been the focus, non-environmental institutional 
factors relating to states’ VOC have been shown to be salient for explaining their 
actions.  Therefore, the VOC approach has implications for the way in which non-
economic issues, such as environmental externalities, are addressed by these 
transnational actors. 
Of course, there are no absolutes.  Environmental issues are complex, firms are 
complex organisations, and the intersection of various factors and the forces they exert 
on firm strategies are not straightforward.  To a large extent, this thesis has barely 
scratched the surface.  Therefore, the conclusions reached need to be qualified by 
acknowledging that US firms are obviously normatively concerned about social 
attitudes and have internal strategic drivers for the actions they take (witness the 
commitment of Bill Ford to improving the environmental performance of his firm).  
Similarly, German and Japanese firms are obviously materialistically concerned about 
making profits.  There are also a complex mixture of national and specific firm traits 
bound up in these conclusions.  Even so, there are clear points of national difference in 
emphasis between firms.  US firms have a materialist predilection for reacting to market 
forces in the form of consumer demand, and state regulations.  German and Japanese 
firms take a more normative stakeholder-driven approach focussing on social concerns 
(especially German firms) and internal company strategies (especially Japanese firms).  
They lead, or coordinate their activities with, their governments rather than opposing or 
reacting to them.  Therefore, strategies for addressing the environmental impacts of 
these firms should reflect their institutional preferences: markets and state regulation for 
US firms, close stakeholder consultation and cooperation for German firms in 
partnership with government, and a strategy that challenges Japanese firms to address 
the environmental impact of their actions via internally-driven corporate policies.   
Finally, despite their institutional differences, an important point emerges from 
this that was stressed at the end of Chapter 6.  It is that German, US and Japanese car 
firms may all be on a journey that leads to the same destination: more environmentally 
responsible behaviour.  It is just that they are taking a different path to it, largely based 
on the VOC of their home states.  Where US firms are focussed on material factors, 
such as consumer demand and market forces generally, and see normative concerns in 
more materialist instrumental terms, German and Japanese firms are more focussed on 
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social attitudes and internal strategies so that a more normative approach to their 
business interests is shifting them to more environmentally friendly behaviour.  In the 
end both may arrive at the same point, but US firms will have got there with an eye on 
their bottom lines, whereas German and Japanese firms will have taken a course of 
action that they believe to be normatively ‘right’ and which at the end of the day has 
delivered material benefits. 
 
Future Research 
 
For future research, institutional factors beyond those covered by the VOC approach 
potentially require consideration.  In the light of the demonstrated importance of 
institutional perspectives, including the insights of the VOC approach, future research 
arising from this thesis revolves around two related key themes.  First, the global versus 
national/international debate.  Secondly, the role of private versus public authority.  
Subsequent to some elucidation of the manner in which future research will need to be 
mindful of institutional factors beyond those covered by the VOC approach, my vision 
for a future research agenda with these two themes in mind is elaborated on below. 
This thesis employed an institutional model based on the VOC approach.  The 
VOC approach’s use of the CME/LME divide was useful in undertaking the empirical 
analysis, and yielded significant conclusions.  However, it is important to note there is a 
danger of making a caricature of states based on a simple dualistic categorisation of 
them as LMEs or CMEs.12  This is a problem with the VOC approach in that while it 
has a lot to say about states at the extremes, it has much less salient insights for states 
that possess a mixture of LME and CME attributes.  As a leading exponent of the VOC 
approach, Hall himself concedes that “there is still an implicit emphasis in [the VOC] 
literature on a few ideal-typical countries”, even if “it has generated an important set of 
propositions of wide potential applicability.13  This is basically a problem of concept 
intension and extension.  Concept intension refers to “the set of meanings or attributes 
that define the category and determine membership”, in this case what it takes to be 
classified as an LME or CME.  The extension of a category “refers to the set of entities 
in the world to which it refers”, in this case which countries are categorised as either 
CMEs or LMEs.14  But if a country possesses attributes of both CMEs and LMEs, in 
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other words we are not at the extremes of the continuum, the VOC approach is not so 
useful and there is the danger of concept stretching (i.e. over-extension) in order to 
encompass states that do not fit the categories.  Accepting these points, certain states are 
not handled well by the VOC approach, and treating regions like the EU as a 
homogenous unit has been acknowledged to be problematic.  In future research, it will 
therefore be important to extend the insights of the VOC beyond the extreme cases of 
LMEs versus CMEs. 
Turning to the first of the two themes for future research, at the outset this thesis 
noted that while being focussed on the environmental initiatives of a particular industry, 
and the importance of institutions that give rise to different capitalist relations in its 
firms’ home states, the issues considered speak to a larger debate about the extent to 
which a shift in power has occurred from states to markets and the forces of 
transnational capital, versus the enduring relevance of states in international capitalist 
relations.  The former may be thought of as a global perspective, the latter a more statist 
perspective that holds that international economic relations are more international (i.e. 
between states) than global (i.e. a borderless world).15  This thesis sits within this broad 
debate.  What has been shown is that the statist/international perspective remains 
relevant even in manufacturing sectors such as the car industry that are characterised by 
MNCs with globally integrated production networks and global sales.  Therefore, at its 
broadest level, the thesis takes issue with arguments that the world is becoming 
homogenised because of the greater permeability of states’ borders as a result of the 
globalisation of markets.  The thesis instead tells a story of enduring and vital 
differences, arguing against isomorphism. 
The analysis could be extended to other industrial sectors.  This could be fruitful 
as the thesis has adopted a case-oriented methodology to inquire deeply into a small 
number of cases in a particular industry.  Therefore, what has been uncovered is small 
‘t’ rather than large ‘T’ truth, in the sense that the insights gleaned may be applicable to 
the cases studied but not necessarily generalisable in all aspects of the conclusions they 
suggest.16  It is also true that by adopting a normative theoretical framework, the 
research might be said to have been in what rationalists such as Goldstein and Keohane 
term “murky territory” where any explanation is a matter of probability.17  In a similar 
vein, Hall notes that taking a normative approach means that “there is no neutral point 
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free of context, and universalism must accordingly be abandoned”.18  Although this 
point is worth conceding, it is also to some degree trivial, because the obverse would be 
to take a deterministic view, such as that inherent in rational choice-based theories, 
where the course and cause of action is 100 percent clear only by definition.19  But at 
the end of the day, the response to these two drawbacks is best summarised by Lake 
(who it should be noted takes an approach very much in the positivist, rationalist 
tradition).  He says: 
Significant theoretical work needs to be done.  Empirical research can best aid this process not 
by seeking decisive disconfirmation, but by clarifying questions, describing patterns of 
behaviour in need of explanation, assessing the plausibility of new theoretical predictions, and 
identifying apparent anomalies.20
In other words, it is to be hoped that future research in other industrial sectors will add 
to a cumulative stock empirical research that will assist in proving or disproving the 
insights of the VOC approach, and institutional approaches more broadly. 
However, it would perhaps be best to expand the field of inquiry to other non-
economic (or perhaps more accurately, non-material) issues, such as human rights, 
corporate social responsibility and ethical business practice, and to examine these across 
industrial sectors.  This would allow the insights gained in this thesis via studying one 
industrial sector in detail, to be applied more broadly to the role of MNCs in addressing 
such non-economic issues.  This is because there are implications for whether the 
institutional basis of different states’ capitalisms facilitates (or does not facilitate) 
addressing such aspects of economic activity, as well as how they are addressed.  It 
means that studies at the level of the firm and individual industrial sectors may, to some 
extent, be set aside for an analysis that focuses on the institutional structures of states 
and the environment they provide for their flagship corporations to address such 
concerns.  Far from being irrelevant, differences in states’ capitalist relations are 
institutionally embedded in their MNCs (as MNCs are in turn institutionally embedded 
in their home states) that disseminate the norms of their home state’s capitalist relations 
internationally with global effects. 
Taking an international perspective has implications for the second debate on 
private versus public authority.  Again, at the outset of the thesis it was noted that a 
significant implication of taking a normative institutional approach is that at some stage 
self-regulation may be effective for normative reasons, as opposed to the traditional 
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liberal economic view that it cannot for rationalist reasons.21  While the OECD observes 
that firms themselves are the primary source of new codes of conduct, suggesting that 
responsibility for regulation is moving from the private to the public sphere, the 
important question to ask is whether or not this really represents a shift of power to 
markets.22  The findings of this thesis would suggest that the institutional embedding of 
firms in their home states, and the manner in which this impacts on their strategic 
thinking, means that what we have is a case of “freer markets, more rules”,23 or perhaps 
that national institutional differences impact on the manner in which private authority is 
exercised for addressing the non-economic impacts of economic activity.24  Either way, 
it appears that national institutional differences do matter.  This means that it is 
important to investigate how they impact on firms when they develop their codes of 
conduct, what these contain, the relevance of national institutional differences which 
they may embody, and whether or not these differences mean that global codes of 
conduct can ever be effective.  In addition, from a more nuanced perspective, it raises 
questions of whether the various global codes of conduct proposed by international 
organisations represent attempts to homogenise rules in a manner that reflects more one 
institutional perspective than another, especially LME versus CME perspectives. 
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Appendix A: Questions Asked in the World Values Survey 
 
As a global survey, the World Values Survey (WVS) is useful for comparatively analysing 
attitudes to a range of social concerns across countries.  For the purpose of the analysis in 
this thesis, questions relating to respondents’ attitude to the environment are singled out for 
examination as they are of direct relevance to the questions asked in Chapter 5.  The WVS 
is also useful because it covers all the countries examined in this thesis, as well as the 
timeframe for analysis: 1990 to the present.  However, like any global survey conducted 
over time there are data gaps, and variations in questions asked and responses to them 
which cause problems.  There is no such thing as the perfect survey or dataset, so one must 
acknowledge and work within the limitations of what is available.   
Reponses to the second (1990-1993), third (1995-1997) and fourth (1999-2000) 
WVS waves are analysed given that this thesis is primarily concerned with developments 
from 1990 to 2004.  All questions on the environment asked in the WVS that relate to the 
three concerns here (i.e. concern for the environment; willingness to take direct action in 
markets; and willingness to take non-market action) are analysed in Chapter 5.  However, 
not all the questions were asked in all the waves of the WVS.  German respondents were 
not asked certain questions in wave 4 that were asked of United States (US) and Japanese 
respondents.  And in wave four one of the questions was asked in a different format to 
waves 3 and 4.  The waves in which they were asked, and where applicable the countries 
that were covered, are shown in Table A1. 
In addition, two categories of responses have been eliminated to enhance the clarity 
of the analysis: 
• For many questions, some waves included a category ‘don’t know’ as a possible 
response to the question posed, while in others such a category of response was not 
available.  Furthermore, waves that did include such a category did not include it 
uniformly for all countries covered (e.g. in wave three ‘don’t know’ was a possible 
response for Germany, but not for the US or Japan).  For the sake of comparison, all 
‘don’t know’ responses have been eliminated in percentage calculations.  
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• ‘Other’ was a possible answer for the question on preferencing protecting the 
environment versus economic growth.  ‘Other’ responses were eliminated, as it is 
not clear what answer was given when such a response is indicated.  It therefore 
cannot be said with any certainty what such a response indicates.  In addition, 
‘other’ responses accounted for under 10 percent of all valid responses for the 
countries analysed. 
The total number of ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’ responses has been subtracted from total 
responses and the calculation of response percentages made on the basis of this reduced 
total number of responses.   
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Table A1: Environmental Questions asked in the WVS 
Question Asked in 
Wave 2?
Asked in 
Wave 3?
Asked in Wave 4? 
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations; for each one, could you tell me whether you 
are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organisation? 
 
   
Environmental organisation YES YES YES, although the question was asked 
in two parts: respondents were asked 
whether they were a member, and then 
asked in another question if they had 
done unpaid work.  For the sake of 
analysis, doing unpaid work was taken 
as being equivalent to being an active 
member of an organisation. 
I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one I read out, can you tell 
me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly? 
 
   
I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental damage. 
 
YES YES 
 
YES 
I would buy things at 20% higher than usual prices if it would help protect the environment. 
 
NO YES 
 
NO 
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent 
environmental pollution 
 
NO NO YES. 
Government should reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost me any money NO NO YES 
Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. 
Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? 
1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and 
some loss of jobs. 
2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to 
some extent 
3. Other answer 
NO YES YES 
Which, if any, of these things have you done in the last 12 months, out of concern for the environment? 
 
   
Have you chosen household products that you think are better for the environment? 
 
NO YES 
 
NO 
Have you decided for environmental reasons to reuse or recycle something rather than throw it away? 
 
NO YES 
 
NO 
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Question Asked in 
Wave 2?
Asked in 
Wave 3?
Asked in Wave 4? 
Have you tried to reduce water consumption for environmental reasons? 
 
NO YES 
 
NO 
Have you attended a meeting or signed a letter 
or petition aimed at protecting the environment? 
 
NO YES 
 
NO 
Have you contributed to an environmental organization? NO YES 
 
NO 
For each of the following pairs of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views:  
1. Human beings should master nature; or 
2. Humans should coexist with nature. 
NO YES 
 
YES, but not for Germany 
Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that 
people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these 
things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it. 
 
   
Signing a petition 
 
YES YES YES 
Joining in boycotts 
 
YES YES YES 
Attending lawful demonstrations 
 
YES YES YES 
Joining unofficial strikes 
 
YES YES YES 
Occupying buildings or factories YES YES YES 
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Appendix B: Cross Tabulations for Social Attitudes 
 
This appendix presents the detailed cross tabulations performed for social attitudes 
summarised in Table 5.4 in Chapter 5.  The focus is on whether attitudes to the 
environment are associated with willingness to act in environmentally-friendly ways.  To 
do this, phi was used as a statistical test of association.  Phi was chosen as the appropriate 
test on the basis that all variables are nominal and the cross tabulations are in the form of 
two rows and two columns. 
Each cross tabulation is presented as follows: 
 
  Environment vs Economic Growth/ Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 
Response to question on 
willingness to act Environment/Master Nature Economic Growth/Coexist with Nature Total 
Country Agree a% b% c%
WAVE Disagree d% e% f%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=g% N=h% N=i% 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: (difference between a% and b%) 
Phi: 
(Not) Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
By convention, the assumed ‘independent’ variable is presented in columns and the 
assumed ‘dependent’ variable in rows.  Given this layout, the cross tabulations are 
methodically analysed in three stages: 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: The percentages in the rows 
pertaining to whether respondents have acted in environmentally friendly ways or 
would agree to are examined first (c% and f%).  These will mostly be very similar 
to the frequencies already examined in Chapter 5.  The analysis of them is reprised 
here to put the statistical tests of association in context and, where cross tabulations 
are possible over more than one wave of the WVS, to examine trends over time.   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: 
The percentage of respondents who are willing to act in environmentally friendly 
ways and who give priority to the environment/believe in coexisting with nature 
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rather than economic growth/mastering nature is considered next (a% and b%).  In 
particular, the magnitude of the difference between responses is considered (a% 
minus b% for environment versus economic growth and b% minus a% for master 
versus coexist with nature).  This shows the extent of the difference in willingness 
to act associated with a preference for the environment via the ‘independent’ 
variable, and hence the likelihood of association.  If the different between a% and 
b% is large, this suggests that an association is more likely.  If the difference is 
positive, an intuitive association is suggested between attitude to the environment 
and willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways, because a higher 
percentage of respondents are willing to act in environmentally friendly ways when 
they give priority to the environment/coexisting with nature rather than when they 
give priority to economic growth/mastering nature.  A counter intuitive association 
is suggested when the difference between a% and b% is negative because this 
suggests that respondents who give priority to economic growth/mastering nature 
are more willing to act in environmentally friendly ways.  The sample size of each 
column (N=g%, h% and i%) is also presented to indicate the number of responses 
associated with the percentages presented, and highlighted where this would seem 
appropriate (e.g. if the sample size is extremely small it is less likely that a 
statistically significant association is indicated). 
3. Statistical test of association:  The results in 1. and 2. are then used as the basis for 
the analysis of the statistical test, phi.  Despite ascribing ‘dependent’ and 
‘independent’ variables, these are largely assumed for intuitive reasons and have no 
basis in statistical analysis.  As noted in 2., a counter-intuitive association is 
possible.  What is actually measured by phi is the extent of association between the 
two variables.  This association is measured in light of the degree of statistical 
significance to be attached to it with the null hypothesis that there is no relationship 
rejected at a significance level of p<0.01.  Chi square measures of association such 
as phi are difficult to interpret.  They can show the relative strength of associations 
in different tables, but an absolute statement on how strong the association is 
difficult.1  Accepting this, for the sake of comparison here an attempt is made to 
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classify the strength of the association suggested by phi, if statistically significant, 
as follows: 
 
Value of phi, when statistically 
significant at p<0.01 
Strength of Association 
Phi<0.125 Very weak 
0.125<phi<0.25 Weak 
0.25<phi<0.375 Weak-moderate 
0.375<phi<0.5 Moderate 
0.5<phi<0.625 Moderate-strong 
0.625<phi<0.75 Strong 
0.75<phi<1 Very strong 
 
Some repetition may arise across the discussion under each of the cross tabulations, 
but this is because it is the author’s intention that each may stand alone and the reader may 
refer to each in isolation without the need to read the entire Appendix. 
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 Willingness to Take Direct Action in Markets 
 
Table B1: Buy Things at 20 Percent Higher Prices by Environment vs Economic Growth 
  Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Buy things at 20% higher prices Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Agree 71% 53% 61% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 29% 47% 39% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=751 N=909 N=1660 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 18% 
Phi: 0.186 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Agree 49% 24% 38% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 51% 76% 62% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=708 N=568 N=1276 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 25% 
Phi: 0.256 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 53% 24% 40% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 47% 76% 60% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=284 N=250 N=534 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 29% 
Phi: 0.293 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: Only a majority German 
respondents (61 percent) agree with buying things at 20 percent higher than usual prices 
if it would help protect the environment.  A sizeable minority of United States (US) and 
Japanese respondents agree with so doing (38 percent and 40 percent respectively). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of German respondents (71 percent) who gave 
priority to protecting the environment agreed to paying higher prices, as opposed to 
those who gave priority to economic growth.  This suggests that the two variables are 
intuitively associated.  This is similarly the case for the US and Japan, although the 
percentages are lower at 49 and 53 percent respectively.  However, the difference in the 
 337
‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ responses was significantly greater for the US and Japan than that 
for Germany at 25 percent (US) and 29 percent (Japan) by comparison to 18 percent for 
German respondents.  This suggests that US and Japanese respondent’s willingness to 
pay higher prices is more closely related to whether they give priority to protecting the 
environment than their German counterparts. 
3. Statistical test of association:  Phi is statistically significant in all cases and confirms 
what is suggested under 2., as it indicates a stronger association for the US and Japan 
than for Germany.  Phi is highest for Japan (weak-moderate association) followed by 
the US (weak-moderate association) and then Germany (weak association).   
 
Table B2: Buy Things at 20 Percent Higher Prices by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Buy things at 20% higher prices Master Coexist Total 
Germany Agree 48% 61% 60% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 52% 39% 40% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=89 N=1876 N=1965 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 13% 
Phi: 0.053 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Agree 32% 37% 36% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 68% 63% 64% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=177 N=1242 N=1419 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 5 
Phi: 0.035  
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 30% 35% 35% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 70% 65% 65% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=10 N=829 N=839 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 5 
Phi: 0.011 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: As in Table B1, only a majority 
German respondents (60 percent) agree with buying things at 20 percent higher than 
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usual prices if it would help protect the environment.  A sizeable minority of US and 
Japanese respondents agree with so doing (36 percent and 35 percent respectively). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of German respondents (61 percent) who 
believed in coexisting with nature agreed to paying higher prices, as opposed to those 
who believed in mastering nature.  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively 
associated.  This is similarly the case for the US and Japan, although the percentages 
are lower at 37 percent and 35 percent respectively.  The difference in the ‘agree’ to 
‘disagree’ responses was also significantly greater for Germany than for US or Japanese 
respondents (13 percent for Germany by comparison to 5 percent for both the US and 
Japan).  This suggests German respondents’ willingness to pay higher prices is more 
likely to be associated to a belief in coexisting with nature than their US and Japanese 
counterparts.  However, the small sample sizes for respondents who believed in 
mastering nature, particularly in the case of Japan, suggest that the associations are less 
likely to be statistically significant. 
3. Statistical test of association: Phi is not statistically significant in all cases and so the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship cannot be rejected. 
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Table B3: Have Chosen Household Products by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Have chosen household products Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Done 91% 85% 88% 
WAVE 3 Not done 9% 15% 12% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=747 N=907 N=1654 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 6% 
Phi: 0.104 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Done 82% 64% 74% 
WAVE 3 Not done 18% 36% 26% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=719 N=560 N=1279 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 18% 
Phi: 0.200 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Done 69% 52% 61% 
WAVE 3 Not done 31% 48% 39% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=290 N=248 N=538 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 17% 
Phi: 0.177 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in all 
countries have chosen household products that are better for the environment, with 
Germany having the highest percentage (88 percent) followed by the US (74 percent) 
and then Japan (61 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in all countries who gave 
priority to protecting the environment have chosen household products that are better 
for the environment, once again with Germany having the highest percentage (91 
percent) followed by the US (82 percent) and then Japan (69 percent).  This suggests 
that the two variables are intuitively associated.  However, the difference in the ‘done’ 
to ‘not done’ responses was significantly greater for the US and Japan (18 and 17 
percent respectively) than for Germany (6 percent).  This suggests that the association is 
stronger for the US and Japan than for Germany. 
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3. Statistical test of association: Phi is statistically significant in all cases and confirms 
what is suggested under 2., as it indicates a stronger association for the US and Japan 
than for Germany.  Phi is highest for the US (weak association) followed by Japan 
(weak association) and then Germany (very weak association).  
 
Table B4: Have Chosen Household Products by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Have chosen household products Master Coexist Total 
Germany Done 73% 89% 88% 
WAVE 3 Not done 27% 11% 12% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=90 N=1871 N=1961 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 16% 
Phi: 0.l03 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Done 66% 76% 74% 
WAVE 3 Not done 34% 24% 26% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=181 N=1245 N=1426 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 10% 
Phi: 0.076 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Done 82% 60% 60% 
WAVE 3 Not done 18% 40% 40% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=17 N=871 N=888 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: -22% 
Phi: 0.063 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: As in Table B3, a majority of 
respondents in all countries have chosen household products that are better for the 
environment, with Germany having the highest percentage (88 percent) followed by the 
US (74 percent) and then Japan (60 percent). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of German respondents (89 percent) who 
believed in coexisting with nature had chosen household products that are better for the 
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environment, as had 76 percent of US respondents.  This suggests that the two variables 
are intuitively associated.  However, counter-intuitively, a higher percentage of 
Japanese respondents (82 percent) who believed in mastering nature had chosen 
household products that are better for the environment.  The difference in ‘done’ to ‘not 
done’ responses is greatest for Japanese respondents (-22 percent) followed by 
Germany (16 percent) and then the US (10 percent).  This suggests that the association 
is strongest for Japan, although the association is counter-intuitive, followed by 
Germany and then the US.  However, the small sample sizes for respondents who 
believed in mastering nature, particularly in the case of Japan, suggests that the results 
are less likely to be statistically significant. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for Germany (very weak 
association) followed by the US (very weak association). 
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Willingness To Take Non-Market Action 
 
Civil Action 
 
Table B5: Confidence in Environmental Organisations by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environ vs Economic Growth   
 Confidence in environmental organisations Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Confident 79% 59% 68% 
WAVE 3 Not confident 21% 41% 32% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=748 N=896 N=1644 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 20% 
Phi: 0.215 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Confident 66% 41% 55% 
WAVE 3 Not confident 34% 59% 45% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=626 N=472 N=1098 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 25% 
Phi: 0.248 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Confident 66% 52% 61% 
WAVE4 Not confident 34% 48% 39% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=689 N=375 N=1064 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 14% 
Phi: 0.135 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Confident 72% 58% 65% 
WAVE 3 Not confident 28% 42% 35% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=301 N=262 N=563 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 14% 
Phi: 0.148 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Confident 64% 46% 57%
WAVE4 Not confident 36% 54% 43%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=428 N=278 N=706 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 18% 
Phi: 0.183 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
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1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in all 
countries are confident in environmental organisations, with Germany having the 
highest percentage (68 percent) followed by the US and Japan (around 60 percent on 
average for both over waves 3 and 4).  The percentage of respondents with confidence 
in environmental organisations increased over waves three to four in the US (from 55 to 
61 percent) but decreased in Japan (from 65 to 57 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in all countries who gave 
priority to protecting the environment are confident in environmental organisations, 
once again with Germany having the highest percentage (79 percent) followed by the 
US (66 percent for both waves three and four) and Japan (64 to 72 percent for waves 
three and four respectively).  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively 
associated.  The difference in the ‘confident’ to ‘not confident’ responses was also 
reasonably large at 14 to 25 percent across all countries, widening over waves three to 
four in the case of Japan and narrowing over waves three to four in the case of the US.  
This suggests that the is getting stronger over time in the case of Japan and weaker in 
the case of the US. 
3. Statistical test of association: Phi is statistically significant in all cases and confirms 
what is suggested under 2., as in all cases it indicates a weak association at relatively 
comparable levels.  The association is strengthening over time for Japan but weakening 
over time for the US.   
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Table B6: Confidence in Environmental Organisations by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Confidence in environmental organisations Master Coexist Total 
Germany Confident 48% 69% 68% 
WAVE 3 Not confident 52% 31% 32% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=85 N=1851 N=1936 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 21% 
Phi: 0.092 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Confident 33% 56% 54% 
WAVE 3 Not confident 67% 44% 46% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=141 N=1070 N=1211 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 23% 
Phi: 0.153 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Confident 46% 63% 60% 
WAVE 4 Not confident 54% 37% 40% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=172 N=980 N=1152 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 17% 
Phi: 0.122 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan     
WAVE 3 Confident 62% 65% 65% 
 Not confident 39% 35% 35% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=13 N=882 N=895 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: 3% 
Phi: 0.009 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan     
WAVE 4 Confident 69% 57% 58% 
 Not confident 31% 43% 42% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=16 N=1151 N=1167 
  
Difference in ‘confident’ responses: -12% 
Phi: 0.027 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: As in Table B5, a majority of 
respondents in all countries are confident in environmental organisations, with 
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Germany having the highest percentage (68 percent) followed by Japan (just over 60 
percent on average over waves 3 and 4) and the US (just under 60 percent on average 
over waves 3 and 4).  The percentage of respondents with confidence in environmental 
organisations increased over waves three to four in the US (from 54 to 60 percent) but 
decreased in Japan (from 65 to 58 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in all countries who believed in 
coexisting with nature are confident in environmental organisations.  This suggests that 
the two variables are intuitively associated.  The exception is the Japanese wave four 
result which is counter-intuitive because a higher percentage of respondents who 
believed in mastering nature are confident in environmental organisations.  Germany 
has the highest percentage of respondents who believed in coexisting with nature and 
are confident in environmental organisations (69 percent).  Japan comes next with 65 to 
57 percent for waves three and four respectively followed by the US with 56 and 53 
percent for waves three and four respectively.  The difference in the ‘confident’ to ‘not 
confident’ responses is smaller for Japan than for Germany and the US where it is 
around 20 percent, narrowing over waves three to four in the case of the US.  This 
suggests that a closer association is likely between the two variables for Germany and 
the US than for Japan.  The small sample sizes for respondents who believed in 
mastering nature, particularly in the case of Japan, suggests that the results are less 
likely to be statistically significant.   
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for Germany (very weak 
association) and the US (weak association in wave three and very weak association in 
wave four).  The association is weakening over time for the US.   
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Table B7: Member of an Environmental Organisation by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environ vs Economic Growth  
 Member of an environmental organisation Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Member 13% 5% 9%
WAVE 3 Not member 87% 95% 91%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=758 N=914 N=1672 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 8% 
Phi: 0.143 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Member 29% 22% 26%
WAVE 3 Not member 71% 78% 74%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=730 N=578 N=1308 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 7% 
Phi: 0.079 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Member 19% 10% 16%
WAVE 4 Not member 81% 90% 84%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=707 N=391 N=1098 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 9% 
Phi: 0.130 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Member 2% 3% 3%
WAVE 3 Not member 98% 97% 97%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=321 N=282 N=603 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: -1% 
Phi: 0.031 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
Japan Member 5% 2% 4%
WAVE 4 Not member 95% 98% 96%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=463 N=308 N=771 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 3% 
Phi: 0.069 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in all 
countries are not members of environmental organisations.  This is particularly striking 
in the case of Japan where nearly all respondents are not members of such organisations 
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(96 to 97 percent), but even in the US where membership is most likely it fell from 26 
to 18 percent over waves three to four.   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: 
Given that such a small minority of respondents were members of environmental 
organisations in all countries, a higher percentage of respondents who gave priority to 
the environment are members of environmental organisations in the US (29 percent in 
wave three and 19 percent in wave four), Germany (13 percent) and Japan (5 percent in 
wave four).  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively associated.  The 
exception is the Japanese wave three result which is counter-intuitive because a higher 
percentage of respondents who gave priority to economic growth are members of 
environmental organisations.  The difference in the ‘member’ to ‘not member’ 
responses is less than 10 percent for both the Germany and the US suggesting that the 
association between the two variables is probably quite weak.  For Japan the difference 
is only 1 percent in wave three (and then in the opposite direction to what one would 
intuitively expect) and 3 percent in wave four, and given the small percentages 
highlighted above for membership of environmental organisations generally this 
suggests that an association may not exist at all. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for Germany (weak 
association) and the US (very weak association in wave three and weak association in 
wave four).  The association is strengthening over time for the US. 
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Table B8: Member of an Environmental Organisation by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Member of an environmental organisation Master Coexist Total 
Germany Member 6% 8% 8%
WAVE 3 Not member 94% 92% 92%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=89 N=1890 N=1979 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 2% 
Phi: 0.021 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Member 23% 26% 26%
WAVE 3 Not member 77% 74% 74%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=185 N=1277 N=1462 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 3% 
Phi: 0.026 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Member 11% 17% 16%
WAVE 4 Not member 89% 83% 84%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=178 N=1010 N=1188 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 6% 
Phi: 0.059 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Member 0% 3% 3%
WAVE 3 Not member 100% 97% 97%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=17 N=981 N=998 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: 3% 
Phi: 0.023 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Member 6% 3% 3%
WAVE 4 Not member 94% 97% 97%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=18 N=1309 N=1327 
  
Difference in ‘member’ responses: -3% 
Phi: 0.015 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: As in Table B7, a majority of 
respondents in all countries are not members of environmental organisations.  Once 
again, this is particularly striking in the case of Japan where nearly all respondents are 
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not members of such organisations (97 percent for both waves), but even in the US 
where membership is most likely it fell from 26 to 16 percent over waves three to four. 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: 
Given that such a small minority of respondents were members of environmental 
organisations in all countries, a slightly higher percentage of respondents who believed 
in coexisting with nature were members of environmental organisations in the US (26 
percent in wave three and 17 percent in wave four), followed by Germany (8 percent) 
and Japan (3 percent in wave three).  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively 
associated.  The exception is the Japanese wave four result which is counter-intuitive 
because a higher percentage of respondents who believed in mastering nature are 
members of environmental organisations.  The difference in the ‘member’ to ‘not 
member’ responses is less than 5 percent in nearly all cases (the exception is the US in 
wave four where it is 6 percent) suggesting that the association between the two 
variables is probably extremely weak.  The small sample sizes for respondents who 
believed in mastering nature, particularly in the case of Japan, also suggests that the 
results are less likely to be statistically significant.  
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for all countries and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.   
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Table B9: Active Member/Unpaid Work for an Environmental Organisation by Environment vs 
Economic Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Active member/unpaid work for an environmental organisation Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Active/unpaid work 4% 0% 2%
WAVE 3 Inactive/no unpaid work 96% 100% 98%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=758 N=914 N=1672 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 
4% 
Phi: 0.121 
US Active/unpaid work 12% 6% 9%
WAVE 3 Inactive/no unpaid work 88% 94% 91%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=730 N=578 N=1308 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 
6% 
Phi: 0.100 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Active/unpaid work 10% 6% 9%
WAVE 4 Inactive/no unpaid work 90% 94% 91%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=707 N=391 N=1098 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 
4% 
Phi: 0.08 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Active/unpaid work 1% 1% 1%
WAVE 3 Inactive/no unpaid work 99% 99% 99%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=321 N=282 N=603 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 
0% 
Phi: 0.027 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Active/unpaid work 2% 1% 1%
WAVE 4 Inactive/no unpaid work 98% 99% 99%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=463 N=308 N=771 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 
1% 
Phi: 0.053 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
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1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: Commensurate with the data in B7 
and B8, the vast majority of respondents in all countries are not active members of 
environmental organisations nor did unpaid work for them.  This is particularly striking 
in the case of Japan where 99 percent of respondents were not active members nor did 
unpaid work, but also for Germany where the figure is 98 percent.  Even in the US, 
where such civil action was most likely, only 9 percent of respondents had done so.   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: 
Given that such a tiny minority of respondents were active in environmental 
organisations or did unpaid work for them, a higher percentage of respondents who 
gave priority to protecting the environment did so in Germany (4 percent) and the US 
(12 percent in wave three and 10 percent in wave four).  This suggests that the two 
variables are intuitively associated but given the small percentages, the association 
appears very weak.  There may not be any association at all in Japan’s case where in 
wave four 2 percent of respondents were likely to undertake such activity given a 
preference for protecting the environment.  In wave three there was an even 1 percent 
split each way for Japan in respondents who gave priority to protecting the environment 
or economic growth and were active/did unpaid work for environmental organisations.  
The difference in the ‘active/unpaid work’ to ‘not active/no unpaid work’ responses was 
also less than 6 percent in all cases.  This suggests overall that the association between 
the two variables is probably extremely weak in all cases, and potentially not present at 
all in the case of Japan. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for Germany (very weak 
association) followed by the US (very weak association in waves three and four).  The 
association is weakening over time for the US.   
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 Table B10: Active Member/Unpaid Work for an Environmental Organisation by Master vs Coexist with 
Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Active member/unpaid work for an environmental organisation Master Coexist Total 
Germany Active/unpaid work 2% 2% 2%
WAVE 3 Inactive/no unpaid work 98% 98% 98%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=89 N=1890 N=1979 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 0% 
Phi: 0.002 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Active/unpaid work 4% 10% 9%
WAVE 3 Inactive/no unpaid work 96% 90% 91%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=185 N=1277 N=1462 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 6% 
Phi: 0.064 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Active/unpaid work 6% 9% 9%
WAVE 4 Inactive/no unpaid work 94% 91% 91%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=178 N=1010 N=1188 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 3% 
Phi: 0.037 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Active/unpaid work 0% 1% 1%
WAVE 3 Inactive/no unpaid work 100% 99% 99%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=17 N=981 N=998 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 1% 
Phi: 0.014 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Active/unpaid work 0% 1% 1%
WAVE 4 Inactive/no unpaid work 100% 99% 99%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=18 N=1309 N=1327 
  
Difference in ‘active/unpaid work’ responses: 1% 
Phi: 0.013 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: Commensurate with the data in 
Tables B7-B9, a majority of respondents in all countries are not active members of 
environmental organisations nor did unpaid work for them.  This is particularly striking 
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in the case of Japan where 99 percent of respondents were not active members nor did 
unpaid work, but also for Germany where the figure is 98 percent.  Even in the US 
where membership is most likely, only 9 percent of respondents had done so. 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: 
Given that a tiny minority of respondents were active in environmental organisations or 
did unpaid work for them, a higher percentage of respondents who believed in 
coexisting with nature did so in the US (4 percent in wave three and 6 percent in wave 
four) and Japan (1 percent in waves three and four).  This suggests that the two 
variables are intuitively associated but given the small percentages, the association 
appears very weak.   No association is evident for Germany where 2 percent of 
respondents were active or did unpaid work whether they believed in mastering or 
coexisting with nature).  The difference in the ‘active/unpaid work’ to ‘not active/no 
unpaid work’ responses was 0 percent for Germany, 1 percent for Japan and 3 to 6 
percent in the US.  These are all very small numbers, and coupled with the fact that the 
sample sizes for respondents who believed in mastering nature are very small in all 
cases, a significant association is not expected.   
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for all countries and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  
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Table B11: Have Contributed to an Environmental Organisation by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Contributed to an environmental organisation Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Done 20% 10% 14%
WAVE 3 Not done 80% 90% 86%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=756 N=917 N=1673 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 10% 
Phi: 0.137 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Done 35% 15% 26%
WAVE 3 Not done 65% 85% 74%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=724 N=573 N=1297 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 20% 
Phi: 0.221 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
Japan Done 10% 7% 9%
WAVE 3 Not done 91% 93% 92%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=315 N=273 N=588 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 3% 
Phi: 0.039 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: Commensurate with the data in 
Tables B7-B10, a majority of respondents in all countries had not contributed to 
environmental organisations.  However, that majority is less sizeable than in these 
previous tables.   The US has the highest percentage of respondents who had 
contributed to environmental organisations (26 percent) followed by Germany (14 
percent) and then Japan (9 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case in all countries that a higher percentage of respondents who gave 
priority to protecting the environment had contributed to environmental organisations, 
with the US having the highest percentage (35 percent) followed by Germany (20 
percent) and then Japan (10 percent).  This suggests that the two variables are 
intuitively associated.  The difference in the ‘done’ to ‘not done’ responses is largest for 
the US (20 percent) followed by Germany (10 percent) but very small for Japan (3 
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percent).  This suggests that the association is likely to be strongest in the US followed 
by Germany.  The association appears very weak in the case of Japan. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for the US (weak 
association) followed by Germany (weak association).  
 
Table B12: Have Contributed to an Environmental Organisation by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Contributed to an environmental organisation Master Coexist Total 
Germany Done 9% 15% 15% 
WAVE 3 Not done 91% 85% 85% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=90 N=1892 N=1982 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 6% 
Phi: 0.037 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Done 14% 28% 26% 
WAVE 3 Not done 86% 72% 74% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=183 N=1263 N=1446 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 14% 
Phi: 0.109 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Done 27% 7% 8% 
WAVE 3 Not done 73% 93% 93% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=15 N=960 N=975 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: -20% 
Phi: 0.091 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: Commensurate with the data in 
Tables B7-B11, a majority of respondents in all countries had not contributed to 
environmental organisations.  However, like Table B11, that majority is less sizeable 
than in the previous tables.   The US has the highest percentage of respondents who had 
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contributed to environmental organisations (26 percent) followed by Germany (15 
percent) and then Japan (8 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents who believed in coexisting with 
nature in the US and Germany had contributed to environmental organisations, with the 
US having the highest percentage (28 percent) followed by Germany (15 percent).  This 
suggests that the two variables are intuitively associated.  For Japan the association a 
higher percentage of respondents (27 percent) who believed in mastering nature had 
contributed to environmental organisations.  This suggests that the two variables are 
counter-intuitively associated for Japan.  The difference in the ‘done’ to ‘not done’ 
responses is largest for Japan (-20 percent) followed by the US (14 percent) and then 
Germany (6 percent).  This all suggests that the association is likely to be stronger in 
Japan and the US and weaker in Germany.  The small sample sizes for responses who 
believed in mastering nature, particularly in the case of Japan, may reduce the statistical 
significance of the associations. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is statistically significant in all cases and demonstrates a very weak association in all 
cases, with the association being highest for the US followed by Japan (counter-
intuitive) and then Germany. 
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Table B13: Have Attended a Meeting or Signed a Letter or Petition by Environment vs Economic 
Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Attended a meeting or signed a letter or petition Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Done 40% 20% 29%
WAVE 3 Not done 60% 81% 71%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=755 N=909 N=1664 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 20% 
Phi: 0.228 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Done 26% 10% 19%
WAVE 3 Not done 74% 91% 81%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=725 N=579 N=1304 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 16% 
Phi: 0.210 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
Japan Done 18% 11% 15%
WAVE 3 Not done 82% 89% 86%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=314 N=273 N=587 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 7% 
Phi: 0.102 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: Commensurate with the data in 
Tables B7-B12, a majority of respondents in all countries had not attended a meeting or 
signed a letter or petition aimed at protecting the environment.  However, like Tables 
B11-B12, that majority is less sizeable than in the other tables relating to civil action.  
Germany has the highest percentage of respondents who had attended a meeting or 
signed a letter or petition (29 percent) followed by the US (19 percent) and then Japan 
(15 percent). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case in all countries that a higher percentage of respondents who gave 
priority to protecting the environment had attended a meeting or signed a letter or 
petition, with Germany having the highest percentage (40 percent) followed by the US 
(26 percent) and then Japan (18 percent).  This suggests that the two variables are 
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intuitively associated.  The difference in the ‘done’ to ‘not done’ responses is largest for 
Germany (20 percent) followed by the US (16 percent) and then Japan (7 percent).  This 
suggests that the association is likely to be strongest in Germany followed by the US, 
and then Japan. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for Germany (weak 
association) followed by the US (weak association).   
 
Table B14: Have Attended a Meeting or Signed a Letter or Petition by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs or Coexist with Nature  
 Attended meeting or signed a letter or petition Master Coexist Total 
Germany Done 24% 30% 30%
WAVE 3 Not done 76% 70% 70%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=87 N=1880 N=1967 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 6% 
Phi: 0.026 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Done 14% 19% 19%
WAVE 3 Not done 86% 81% 82%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=183 N=1274 N=1457 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 5% 
Phi: 0.042 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
Japan Done 13% 14% 14%
WAVE 3 Not done 87% 87% 87%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=15 N=957 N=972 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 1% 
Phi: 0.001 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: Commensurate with the data in 
Tables B7-B13, a majority of respondents in all countries had not attended a meeting or 
signed a letter or petition aimed at protecting the environment.  However, like Tables 
B11-B13, that majority is less sizeable than in the other tables relating to civil action.  
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Germany has the highest percentage of respondents who had attended a meeting or 
signed a letter or petition (30 percent) followed by the US (19 percent) and then Japan 
(14 percent). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case in all countries that a higher percentage of respondents who believed in 
coexisting with nature had attended a meeting or signed a letter or petition, with 
Germany having the highest percentage (30 percent) followed by the US (19 percent) 
and then Japan (14 percent).  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively 
associated.  However, the difference in the ‘done’ to ‘not done’ responses is very small 
in all cases: 6 percent for Germany, 5 per cent for the US and 1 percent for Japan.  This, 
coupled with small sample sizes for respondents who believed in mastering nature, 
particularly in the case of Japan, suggests that the association is likely to be quite weak 
in all cases. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant in all cases and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  
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Non-Market Financial Sacrifices 
 
Table B15: Increase in Taxes by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Increase in taxes Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Agree 76% 59% 67% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 24% 41% 33% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=755 N=907 N=1662 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 17% 
Phi: 0.172 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Agree 70% 41% 57% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 30% 59% 43% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=720 N=566 N=1286 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 29% 
Phi: 0.288 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Agree 71% 46% 62% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 29% 54% 38% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=702 N=389 N=1091 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 25% 
Phi: 0.251 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
   
Japan Agree 81% 60% 71% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 19% 40% 29% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=311 N=252 N=563 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 21% 
Phi: 0.237 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 77% 57% 69% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 23% 43% 31% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=425 N=265 N=690 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 20% 
Phi: 0.201 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
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1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in all 
countries agree with an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental damage, with Japan having the highest percentage (71 percent in wave 
three and 69 percent in wave four) followed by Germany (67 percent) and then the US 
(57 percent in wave three and 62 percent in wave four).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in all countries who gave 
priority to protecting the environment agree with an increase in taxes, once again with 
Japan having the highest percentage (81 percent in wave three and 77 percent in wave 
four) followed by Germany (76 percent) and then the US (70 percent in wave three and 
71 percent in wave four).  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively associated.  
The difference in the ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ responses is greatest for the US where it is 
above 25 percent and for Japan where it is above 20 percent for both waves three and 
four.  For Germany the difference is 17 percent.  This suggests that the association is 
stronger for the US and Japan than for Germany. 
3. Statistical test of association: Phi is statistically significant in all cases and confirms 
what is suggested under 2., as it indicates the strongest association for the US (weak-
moderate association for both waves three and four) followed by Japan (weak-moderate 
association for wave three and weak for wave four) and then Germany (weak 
association).  The association is weakening over time for both the US and Japan. 
 
 
 362
Table B16: Increase in Taxes by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Increase in taxes Master Coexist Total 
Germany Agree 53% 66% 66% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 47% 34% 35% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=90 N=1875 N=1965 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 13% 
Phi: 0.056 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Agree 37% 59% 57% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 63% 41% 43% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=179 N=1250 N=1429 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 22% 
Phi: 0.145 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Agree 43% 64% 61% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 57% 36% 39% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=178 N=1001 N=1179 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 21% 
Phi: 0.153 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 54% 67% 67% 
WAVE 3 Disagree 46% 33% 33% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=13 N=873 N=886 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 13% 
Phi: 0.034 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 64% 63% 63% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 36% 37% 37% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=14 N=1115 N=1129 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: -1% 
Phi: 0.004 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in all 
countries agree with an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
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environmental damage, with Japan having the highest percentage (67 percent in wave 
three and 63 percent in wave four) followed by Germany (66 percent) and then the US 
(57 percent in wave three and 61 percent in wave four). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in Germany and the US who 
believe in coexisting with nature agree with an increase in taxes, with Germany having 
the highest percentage (66 percent) followed by the US (59 percent in wave three and 
64 percent in wave four).  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively associated.  
For Japan, a higher percentage of respondents who believe in coexisting with nature 
agree with an increase in taxes in wave three (67 percent), but counter-intuitively in 
wave four a higher percentage of respondents (64 percent) agree with paying higher 
taxes when they believe in mastering nature.  The difference in the ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ 
responses is greatest for the US where it is above 20 percent for both waves and is quite 
large for Germany (13 percent).  For Japan the difference is the same as for Germany in 
wave three (13 percent) but very small for wave four (-1 percent).  This suggests that 
the association is stronger in the US, followed by Germany, and unclear in the case of 
Japan.  The small sample sizes for respondents who believed in mastering nature, 
particularly in the case of Japan, suggests that the association is likely to be quite weak 
in all cases and possibly not statistically significant for Japan. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Germany and Japan and so the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for the US 
(weak association for both waves) and the association is strengthening over time. 
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Table B17: Give Part of Income by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Give part of income Environment Economic Growth Total 
US Agree 78% 54% 69% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 22% 46% 31% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=705 N=388 N=1093 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 24% 
Phi: 0.245 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 85% 60% 75% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 15% 40% 25% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=412 N=264 N=676 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 25% 
Phi: 0.284 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
No cross tabulation is available for Germany because the question on giving part of income 
if you were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution was 
only asked in wave four whereas the question on priority to protecting the environment 
versus economic growth and jobs was only asked for Germany in wave three.   
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: The majority of US and Japanese 
respondents agreed to giving part of their income if they were certain that the money 
would be used to prevent environmental pollution, with Japan having the highest 
percentage (75 percent) followed by the US (69 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in both who gave priority to 
protecting the environment agree with giving part of their income.  Again Japan has the 
highest percentage (85 percent) followed by the US (78 percent).  This suggests that the 
two variables are intuitively associated.  The difference in the ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ 
responses is 24 and 25 percent in for US and Japan respectively.  This suggests that the 
association is similar in both. 
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3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is statistically significant for both the US and Japan, with the association strongest for 
Japan (weak-moderate association) followed by the US (weak association). 
 
Table B18: Give Part of Income by Master vs Coexist 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Give part of income Master Coexist Total 
US Agree 57% 72% 69% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 43% 28% 31% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=176 N=1001 N=1177 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 15% 
Phi: 0.114 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 79% 70% 71% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 21% 30% 29% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=14 N=1062 N=1076 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: -9% 
Phi: 0.020 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
No cross tabulation is available for Germany because the question on giving part of income 
was only asked in wave four whereas the question on mastering versus coexisting with 
nature was only asked for Germany in wave three.   
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: The majority of US and Japanese 
respondents agreed to giving part of their income if they were certain that the money 
would be used to prevent environmental pollution, with Japan having the highest 
percentage (71 percent) followed by the US (69 percent). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: A 
higher percentage of respondents in the US who believe in coexisting with nature agree 
with giving part of their income (72 percent).  This suggests that the two variables are 
intuitively associated.  However, a higher percentage of Japanese respondents who 
believed in mastering nature agreed with giving part of their income (79 percent).  This 
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suggests a counter-intuitive association.  The difference in the ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ 
responses is 15 percent for the US and -9 percent for Japan.  The lower difference in the 
‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ responses for Japan, coupled with the very small sample size for 
respondents who believed in mastering nature, suggests that an association between the 
two variables is more likely for the US than Japan. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi which is statistically significant for the US (very 
weak association). 
 
Table B19: Government should Reduce Environmental Pollution but it Should Not Cost me any Money 
by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth 
 
Government should reduce 
environmental pollution but it should 
not cost me any money Environment Economic Growth Total 
US Agree 52% 68% 58% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 48% 32% 42% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=700 N=388 N=1088 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: -16% 
Phi: 0.154 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 43% 64% 51% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 58% 36% 49% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=388 N=256 N=644 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: -11% 
Phi: 0.211 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
No cross tabulation is available for Germany because the question on whether the 
government should reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost any money was 
only asked in wave four whereas the question on priority to protecting the environment 
versus economic growth and jobs was only asked for Germany in wave three.  
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1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A slim majority of US and 
Japanese respondents agreed that the government should reduce environmental 
pollution at no cost to them, with the US having the highest percentage (58 percent) 
followed by Japan (51 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in both who gave priority to 
economic growth agree with giving part of their income.  For the US the percentage is 
68 percent and for Japan it is 64 percent.  This suggests that the two variables are 
intuitively associated because, conversely to the reasoning in other cross tabulations, it 
is intuitively logical that respondents who place a higher priority on economic growth 
should disagree with the idea of the government acting to reduce environmental 
pollution at a cost to them.  The difference in the ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ responses is -16 
percent for the US and -11 percent for Japan, large enough to think that the association 
between the two variables is significant.   
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is statistically significant for both the US and Japan, with the association strongest for 
Japan (weak association) followed by the US (weak association). 
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Table B20: Government should Reduce Environmental Pollution but it Should Not Cost me any by 
Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature 
 
Government should reduce 
environmental pollution but it should not 
cost me any money Master Coexist Total 
US Agree 70% 55% 57% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 30% 45% 43% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=177 N=997 N=1174 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: -15% 
Phi: 0.112 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Agree 33% 56% 56% 
WAVE 4 Disagree 67% 44% 44% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=15 N=1038 N=1053 
  
Difference in ‘agree’ responses: 23% 
Phi: 0.054 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
No cross tabulation is available for Germany because the question on whether the 
government should reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost any money was 
only asked in wave four whereas the question on priority to protecting the environment 
versus economic growth and jobs was only asked for Germany in wave three.   
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A slim majority of US and 
Japanese respondents agreed that the government should reduce environmental 
pollution at no cost to them, with the US having the highest percentage (57 percent) 
followed by Japan (56 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in the US who believed in 
mastering nature agreed that the government should reduce environmental pollution at 
no cost, as opposed to those who believed in coexisting with nature (70 percent).  This 
suggests that the two variables are intuitively associated because, conversely to the 
reasoning in other cross tabulations, it is intuitively logical that respondents who 
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believe in mastering nature should disagree with the idea of the government acting to 
reduce environmental pollution at a cost to them.  For Japan, a higher percentage of 
respondents who believed in coexisting with nature agreed that the government should 
reduce environmental pollution at no cost, as opposed to those who believed in 
mastering nature (56 percent).  This suggests that the two variables are counter-
intuitively associated because respondents who believe in coexisting with nature are 
less willing for the government to act towards this goal at a cost to them.  The 
difference in the ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ responses is -15 percent for the US and 23 percent 
for Japan, large enough to think that the association between the two variables is 
significant, except that in Japan in particular the sample size for respondents who 
believed in mastering nature is very small. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for the US (very weak 
association). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 370
Non-Market Other Action 
 
Table B21: Reuse or Recycle by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   Environment vs Economic Growth  
 Reuse or Recycle Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Done 87% 84% 85%
WAVE 3 Not done 13% 16% 15%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=746 N=902 N=1648 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 3% 
Phi: 0.042 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Done 91% 83% 88%
WAVE 3 Not done 9% 17% 12%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=733 N=580 N=1313 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 8% 
Phi: 0.119 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
Japan Done 76% 62% 70%
WAVE 3 Not done 24% 38% 30%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=317 N=274 N=591 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 14% 
Phi: 0.151 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in all 
countries have decided to reuse or recycle, with the US having the highest percentage 
(88 percent) followed by Germany (85 percent) and then Japan (70 percent). 
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in all countries who gave 
priority to protecting the environment have decided to reuse or recycle.  Once again the 
US is first (91 percent) followed by Germany (87 percent) and then Japan (76 percent).  
This suggests that the two variables are intuitively associated.  However, the difference 
in the ‘done’ to ‘not done’ responses varies significantly.  It is quite high for Japan (14 
percent) and lower for the US and Germany (8 and 3 percent respectively).  This 
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suggests that the association is likely to be stronger for the US and Japan than for 
Germany. 
3. Statistical test of association: Phi is not statistically significant for Germany and so the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically 
significant for the US and Japan.  It is highest for Japan (weak association) followed by 
the US (very weak association).   
 
Table B22: Reuse or Recycle by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master nature vs Coexist with Nature  
 Reuse or Recycle Master Coexist Total 
Germany Done 81% 85% 85%
WAVE 3 Not done 19% 15% 15%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=87 N=1861 N=1948 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 4% 
Phi: 0.029 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
US Done 75% 89% 87%
WAVE 3 Not done 25% 11% 13%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=186 N=1281 N=1467 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 14% 
Phi: 0.137 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
Japan Done 53% 71% 70%
WAVE 3 Not done 47% 29% 30%
 Total 100% 100% 100%
  N=17 N=957 N=974 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 18% 
Phi: 0.051 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in all 
countries have decided to reuse or recycle, with the US having the highest percentage 
(87 percent) followed by Germany (85 percent) and then Japan (70 percent). 
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2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: It 
is also the case that a higher percentage of respondents in all countries who believed in 
coexisting with nature have reused or recycled.  The US is highest (89 percent) 
followed by Germany (85 percent) and then Japan (71 percent).  This suggests that the 
two variables are intuitively associated.  However, the difference in the ‘done’ to ‘not 
done’ responses varies significantly. It is quite high for the US and Japan (14 and 18 
percent respectively) but very low for Germany (4 percent).  This suggests that the 
association is likely to be stronger for the US and Japan than for Germany.  In the case 
of Japan, the very small sample size for respondents who believed in mastering nature, 
particularly in the case of Japan, reduces the likelihood of the association being 
significant. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan and Germany and so the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for the US 
(weak association). 
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Table B23: Reduce Water Consumption by Environment vs Economic Growth 
   
Environment vs Economic 
Growth   
 Reduce water consumption Environment Economic Growth Total 
Germany Done 74% 69% 71% 
WAVE 3 Not done 26% 31% 29% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=755 N=911 N=1666 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 5% 
Phi: 0.052 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Done 64% 50% 58% 
WAVE 3 Not done 36% 50% 42% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=729 N=579 N=1308 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 14% 
Phi: 0.133 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Done 50% 44% 47% 
WAVE 3 Not done 50% 56% 53% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=310 N=268 N=578 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 6% 
Phi: 0.060 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in 
Germany and the US have tried to reduce water consumption, with Germany having the 
highest percentage (71 percent) followed by the US (58 percent).  However, a minority 
of respondents in Japan had done so (47 percent).   
2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: In 
all countries a higher percentage of respondents who gave priority to protecting the 
environment have tried to reduce water consumption.  Germany is highest (74 percent) 
followed by the US (85 percent) and then Japan (50 percent).  This suggests that the 
two variables are intuitively associated.   However, the difference in the ‘done’ to ‘not 
done’ responses is very small in the case of Germany and Japan (5 and 6 percent 
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respectively) and larger for the US (14 percent).  This suggests that the association is 
likely to be stronger for the US. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for Japan or Germany and so the null hypothesis that there 
is no relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi is statistically significant for the US (weak 
association). 
 
Table B24: Reduce Water Consumption by Master vs Coexist with Nature 
   Master vs Coexist with Nature  
 Reduce water consumption Master Coexist Total 
Germany Done 58% 72% 72% 
WAVE 3 Not done 42% 28% 28% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=88 N=1885 N=1973 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 14% 
Phi: 0.066 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
US Done 49% 58% 56% 
WAVE 3 Not done 51% 42% 44% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=183 N=1277 N=1460 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: 9% 
Phi: 0.060 
Not statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
Japan Done 82% 46% 47% 
WAVE 3 Not done 18% 54% 53% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
  N=17 N=928 N=945 
  
Difference in ‘done’ responses: -36% 
Phi: 0.096 
Statistically significant at p<0.01 
 
 
1. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways: A majority of respondents in 
Germany and the US have tried to reduce water consumption, with Germany having the 
highest percentage (72 percent) followed by the US (56 percent).  However, a minority 
of respondents in Japan had done so (47 percent).   
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2. Willingness to act in environmentally friendly ways and attitude to the environment: In 
Germany and the US a higher percentage of respondents who believed in coexisting 
with nature had tried to reduce water consumption.  Germany is highest (72 percent) 
followed by the US (58 percent).  This suggests that the two variables are intuitively 
associated.  However, for Japan a higher percentage of respondents who believed in 
mastering nature had trine to reduce water (82 percent).  This suggests that for Japan the 
two variables are counter-intuitively associated because less concern for the 
environment is associated with saving water.  The difference in the ‘done’ to ‘not done’ 
responses is quite small in the case of the US (9 percent) and larger for Germany and 
Japan (14 percent and -36 percent respectively).  This suggests that the association is 
likely to be stronger for Germany and Japan than the US, although, particularly in the 
case of Japan, the very small sample size for respondents who believed in mastering 
nature reduces the likelihood of the association being as strong as the difference would 
indicate. 
3. Statistical test of association: The values of phi bear out what is suggested under 2.  Phi 
is not statistically significant for the US and so the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship cannot be rejected.  Phi which is statistically significant for Germany and 
Japan.  The association is strongest for Japan (very weak association) followed by 
Germany (very weak association).   
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion, see J. Healey (1993), Statistics: A Tool for Social Research, 3rd edition, Belmont: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, chapter 14; A. Bryman (2004), Social Research Methods, 2nd edition, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 11; D. de Vaus (1991), Surveys in Social Research, 3rd edition, St 
Leonards: Allen and Unwin, chapter 10; and M. Norusis (1990), The SPSS Guide to Data Analysis for 
Release 4, Chicago: SPSS Inc, chapter 20. 
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Appendix C: Car Class Definitions 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, there are variations in the definition of car classes across the three 
territories.  The exact definitions are given here. 
 
European Union 
 
The data presented for the European Union (EU) is from the Association des Constructeurs 
Europeens (ACEA) which receives it in aggregated form from a private data collection 
agency.  Phone discussions with ACEA personnel indicated that data disaggregated by 
country is not available, nor a uniform definition for car classes across countries and 
manufacturers.  Furthermore, they were unsure how the private agency that aggregated the 
data into classes across EU member states did so.  However, the ACEA was able to provide 
examples of cars in each class which indicates the following:1
• ‘Small’ cars are cheap, economical four cylinder cars that correspond with the 
definition of mini and small Japanese cars (see below) – e.g. Peugeot 106 and 206; 
Ford Ka and Fiesta; Honda Logo and Civic; and Volkswagen Polo and Lupo. 
• ‘Lower-medium’ cars are more expensive, slightly larger cars – e.g. Renault 
Megane; Opel Astra and Tigra; Toyota Corolla; and Volkswagen Golf and Beetle. 
• ‘Upper-medium’ cars are larger cars – e.g. Citroen Xantia; Opel Vectra; and Subaru 
Legacy. 
• ‘Executive’ cars are generally larger, more luxurious models, although in some 
cases they are sports and performance vehicles – e.g. BMW 3 and 5 series; Alfa 
Romeo 166 and Spider; Opel Omega; Audi A8; and Toyota Lexus. 
• ‘Others’ are mostly four wheel drives, people-movers and cross-over vehicles – e.g. 
Jeep Grand Cherokee; Ford Courier; Honda CRV and HRV; Mitsubishi Pajero; and 
Toyota RAV4 and Land Cruiser. 
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Germany 
 
The data for the Germany was provided on request from the Verband der 
Automobileindustrie (VDA) which sources it from the Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA).  The 
classes are for passenger vehicles (personenkraftwagen) and are similar to those available 
for the EU, except that: 
• The ‘small’ class is disaggregated into ‘mini’ and ‘small’ classes. 
• The ‘others’ class is disaggregated into four wheel drives (gelandewagen), vans, 
utilities and cabriolets. 
• The disaggregation employed may, somewhat perversely, have undermined the 
explanatory power of the data.  For example, it is unclear whether a cabriolet is a 
large powerful car (e.g. a large Mercedes convertible) or a smaller compact car (e.g. 
a Peugeot 206).  It is similarly unclear whether a van is a ‘people-mover’ or a more 
utility-based vehicle, and its size is indeterminate. 
In phone discussions, both VDA and KBA personnel confirmed that aggregate car 
class data is only available from 1999 onwards.  The KBA was able to provide 
disaggregated data on a per-model sales basis before 1999.  However, it was unclear 
exactly which classes individual models sold should fall into, and the author was unwilling 
to risk arbitrary assignment of models to classes without detailed information on each 
model offered for sale. 
 
United States 
 
For the United States (US), the classes identified are those used by the US Environment 
Protection Agency (EPA) and US Department of Energy.  They classify cars on the basis of 
interior passenger and cargo volume as follows:2
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• ‘Small’ cars and wagons include the three EPA categories for cars of minicompact 
(under 85 cubic feet), subcompact (85-99 cubic feet) and compact (100-109 cubic 
feet) and for station wagons under 130 cubic feet. 
• ‘Mid-size’ cars and wagons includes cars of 110-119 cubic feet and station wagons 
of 130-159 cubic feet. 
• ‘Large’ cars and wagons includes cars of 120 or more cubic feet and station wagons 
of 160 or more cubic feet. 
US light trucks are classified on the basis of wheelbase length as follows:3
• SUVs: ‘small’ is less than 100 inches, ‘mid-size’ is 100-110 inches and ‘large’ is 
over 110 inches. 
• Vans: ‘small’ is less than 109 inches, ‘mid-size’ is 109-124 inches and ‘large’ is 
over 124 inches. 
• Pickup trucks: ‘small’ is less than 105 inches, ‘mid-size’ is 105-115 inches and 
‘large’ is over 115 inches. 
 
Japan 
 
For Japan, cars are classified according to the Road Vehicles Act.  These classifications are 
used for registration statistics and vehicle inspections.  For passenger cars, there are three 
categories:4
• ‘Mini’ vehicles are under 660cc in engine displacement, under 2 metres in height, 
under 1.48 metres in width and under 3.4 metres in length. 
• ‘Small’ vehicles are between 661-2,000cc in engine displacement, except for diesel 
engines, under 2 metres in height, 1.45-1.7 metres in width and 3.4-4.7 metres in 
length. 
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• ‘Ordinary/standard’ motor vehicles are over 2,000cc in engine displacement, over 2 
metres in height, over 1.7 metres in width and over 4.7 metres in length. 
The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) notes that cars are categorised 
primarily on the basis of engine displacement, so a car with less than 2000cc engine 
displacement that has a width greater than 1.7 metres is still classified as a small vehicle.5   
For four wheel drives, no definition is provided by JAMA for its categorisation of 
them in either the ‘mini’ or ‘other’ class of four wheel drives, but one may presume that 
this categorisation is along similar lines to that for passenger cars.  Another potential 
problem is that JAMA’s data for four wheel drives excludes sales of imported four wheel 
drives, but given the predominance of Japanese manufacturers in the Japanese market (i.e. 
nearly 94 percent of total sales) this is not a critical problem. 
 
                                                 
1 Information provided on request after discussions with ACEA personnel. 
2 K. Hellman and R. Heavenrich (2003b), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends: 
1975 Through 2003, Appendix A, United States Environment Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/r03006.pdf, accessed 17 February 2004; and US Department of 
Energy and US Environment Protection Agency (2004), ‘Introduction’, Fuel Economy Guide, 
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/FEG2004intro.pdf, accessed 12 July 2004.. 
3 K. Hellman and R. Heavenrich (2004c), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends: 
1975 Through 2004, Appendix A, United States Environment Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/420r04001.pdf, accessed 13 May 2004. 
4 JAMA (2004a), 2004: The Motor Industry of Japan, Tokyo: JAMA, p.64. 
5 JAMA (2004b), World Motor Vehicle Statistics Vol.3 2004, Tokyo: JAMA, p.168. 
 380
Appendix D: Text of Environmental Reports 
 
As noted in Chapter 6, text from executive statements, vision statements and environmental 
policy guidelines from firms’ environmental reports were coded.  The environmental reports 
the text is from are: 
• Volkswagen AG (2003), Environmental Report 2003/2004: Partners in Sustainability, 
Wolfsburg: Volkswagen AG.  In addition, Volkswagen’s environmental policy guidelines 
were included from Volkswagen AG (2001) Environmental Report 2001/2002: Mobility 
and Sustainability, Wolfsburg: Volkswagen AG.  This is because they are referred to and 
summarised in the 2003/4 report, but printed in full on the firm’s website and in the earlier 
report.  It was therefore thought prudent to include them. 
• BMW Group (2003), Sustainable Value Report 2003/2004: Innovation. Efficiency.  
Responsibility., Munich: Bayerischen Motoren Werke.  BMW’s environmental policy 
guidelines were included from BMW Group (2003b), Environmental Protection: BMW 
Group Environmental Guidelines, 
http://www.bmwgroup.com/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/5_verantwortung/5_4_publikati
onen/5_4_4_downloads/pdf/BMWGroup_Umweltleitlinen_E.pdf, accessed 13 January 
2005.  These are only available from the website, although the website address where they 
may be found was provided in the firm’s written report. 
• DaimlerChrysler (2004), 360 Degrees: Environmental Report 2004: Alliances for the 
Environment, Stuttgart: DaimlerChrysler Communications, including accompanying CD 
ROM. 
• Toyota Motor Corporation (2004), Environmental and Social Report 2004, Tokyo: Toyota 
Motor Corporation. 
• Honda Motor Company (2002), Honda Ecology, Tokyo: Honda Motor Company; and 
Honda Motor Company (2004), Honda Environmental Annual Report 2004, Tokyo: 
Honda Motor Company. 
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• Nissan Motor Company (2004a), Environmental Report 2004, Tokyo: Nissan Motor 
Company; and Nissan Motor Company (2004b), Sustainability Report 2004, Tokyo: 
Nissan Motor Company. 
• General Motors Corporation (2004), 2004 Corporate Responsibility Report, Detroit: 
General Motors Corporation 
• Ford Motor Company (2004), 2003/4 Corporate Citizenship Report: Our Principles, 
Progress and Performance: Connecting with Society, Dearborn: Ford Motor Company.   
The text extracted from these reports is provided below. 
 
Volkswagen 
 
Executive Statement 
 
Innovation Overcomes Obstacles to Growth 
 
More than almost any other company, Volkswagen and its past progress stand for an approach 
to business which looks beyond the company’s own products to take account of its social 
responsibility. And as we were well aware even before the Environmental Summit in Rio, we 
can only achieve lasting economic success if our business activities are guided not only by 
social considerations but by ecological aspects as well. 
Perhaps the most visible and convincing proof of our successful progress down the 
road to sustainable development is a lastingly satisfied customer base. As a globally active 
automobile manufacturer and employer, we are aware of the significance that our products and 
activities have for society. Safeguarding the future of personal mobility poses to a 
manufacturer of environmentally compatible products a challenge on a truly global scale – 
stretching from the conurbations of industrialised countries to the nascent transport 
infrastructures of emerging nations. 
The close relationship between our long-term corporate policy and the fields of activity 
associated with sustainable development is visible in our operations in China. Since the onset 
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of our activities in China in 1978, investments have progressively been made and expertise 
amassed, with the result that this flourishing economy has in the meantime become our second 
largest market after Germany in terms of unit sales. At the same time, through a process of 
dialogue with our local partners in the business and political sectors, we are endeavouring to 
play our part in making sustainable mobility a reality in China. 
As an automobile manufacturer, it is mainly through our products that we can help to 
meet the demands of sustainable development. The creation of the fifth-generation Golf is a 
case in point. When this model, which still lends its name to a whole class of cars, was being 
designed, our engineers systematically took account of the 7 Environmental Goals laid down 
by our Technical Development department. From 2004 onwards, we will be offering a diesel-
engined Golf with a particulate filter that works without a fuel additive. That said, our 
emissions reduction strategy is not restricted to particulate matter but targets all exhaust 
components. The TDI technology developed by Volkswagen has become the prototype of the 
clean diesel engine and was crucial to our ability to meet the requirements of the Euro 4 
exhaust emissions standard in advance. 
Closely related to this are our efforts to develop an innovative and sustainable fuel 
strategy. Substantial environmental benefits can be achieved by using synthetically 
manufactured fuels derived from natural gas (SynFuel) and biomass (SunFuel). What is more, 
we have already set automotive standards through the development of innovative fuel-
economy concepts: for the fourth year in succession, the 3-litre Lupo came overall top of the 
“Most Eco-friendly Cars” table compiled by the environmental institute ÖKO-TREND. In 
addition, the 1-litre car which we presented in April 2002 provided some insight into what 
state-of-the-art technology can now achieve. The experience we have accumulated with the 3-
litre and 1-litre cars is currently being channelled into the development of new low-
consumption models which we are aiming to bring to market in 2006. 
Volkswagen has always stood for a comprehensive view of social responsibility. 
Consequently we have never allowed ourselves to be tied down in our sustainability strategy 
to a purely environmental approach. In any workable sustainability model, the market 
acceptance of our vehicles is just as indispensable as a successful partnership in industry and 
with society at large. We are proud to say that Volkswagen has not only been among the 
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leaders in environmental protection for many years now, we have also regularly set new 
milestones with our innovative employment models which serve as benchmarks well beyond 
the company itself. 
 
Wolfsburg, December 2003 
Dr. Ing. e.h. Bernd Pischetsrieder 
Chairman of the Board of Management 
 
Sustainable Development – or “Foundations for the Future” 
 
Leaving behind a better basis for development for future generations than the one on which 
the present generation had to build – such is one hallmark of the far-sighted goals of 
sustainable development. We are not talking here about simply preserving the ecological 
foundations of life by conserving resources, but about making overall provision for the future. 
As such, sustainable development is at the same time a principle and a guideline. And 
sustainable development takes on special significance in the context of globalisation. For 
globalisation leads to mutual dependency in many respects, which in turn calls for a three-way 
balance between ecological provision for the future, economic performance and social 
responsibility, in order to assure a stable basis for development. As a company that transcends 
national borders, Volkswagen is both a “medium” of globalisation and a creative force in 
sustainable development. As such, it must also take account of codetermination and employee 
representation, and live up to its responsibilities in this respect as well. 
On this basis, the corporate bodies that stand for codetermination and employee 
representation see themselves as creative partners and innovation drivers, linking the future 
development of Volkswagen inseparably with ecological progress. That is why ecological 
topics are given due priority at the annual symposia on research and development into 
safeguarding jobs and corporate sites, initiated by the General Works Council. For without 
ecological sustainability there can be no reliable perspectives for the development of 
employment either. The same applies to social responsibility. Models and projects such as the 
“four-day week”, “5000x5000” and “AutoVision” are all based on a strategy for maintaining 
and improving the foundations of social development at the company. This includes avoiding 
redundancies as well as implementing the principle of lifelong learning in order to safeguard 
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the sustainable employability of the formerly unemployed. That said, social sustainability is by 
no means restricted to the national arena. With our European and Global Works Councils we 
have created platforms for dialogue which have, on the one hand, helped to formulate the rules 
of competition governed by social responsibility and, on the other, made possible the cross-
border transfer of innovative employment concepts, adapted in each case to the respective 
national conditions. At present, the focus in this respect is on models of more flexible working 
hours. Social sustainability must, however, always go hand-in-hand with economic 
performance as we safeguard jobs and assure the competitiveness of the company – two goals 
of equal importance. 
Sustainability demands that we consciously take account of the interplay between 
company, environment and society. For this reason, under the motto “One Hour for the 
Future”, Volkswagen’s Global Works Council has lent its support to projects helping street 
children, setting an example of socially responsible globalisation and providing a powerful 
symbol of sustainability in the sense of “Foundations for the Future”. It is good to note that, in 
the perception of a large proportion of the population, the name Volkswagen is inseparably 
linked with such principles.  
 
Klaus Volkert 
Chairman of the General and Group Works Council 
 
Dear reader, 
“Partners in Responsibility” is the motto at the heart of the latest Volkswagen 
Environmental Report. The idea is to underline the fact that, in a society marked by the 
division of labour, responsibility is never borne in isolation but always shared with others. Our 
appreciation of this fact has led to some decisive successes, not least in the field of 
environmental protection. As we have always been aware, such achievements are only 
possible with the support of external partners. 
Even as we move towards publishing our own full sustainability report, our focus 
today is still on environmental reporting. At the same time, we are working together with other 
organisations to put in place the methodological backdrop for sustainability reporting in line 
with the guidelines from the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the 
Global Reporting Initiative. 
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On the pages of this report, you will find a photography concept through which we 
have put a face to a selection of our partners: the lady who buys a 3-litre Lupo and is thus 
perhaps our most important partner; our partners at the environmental institutions with whom 
we regularly work together to draw up strategies and strive for solutions; or the suppliers who, 
through their innovations, support us on the road to sustainable mobility – but also the people 
who support our social commitment through their involvement in numerous projects. 
In order to keep this report as short as possible, we have networked its contents with 
our Internet portal www.mobility-and-sustainability.com. 
One major innovation in this year’s report is the inclusion of a chapter on the 
Volkswagen Group. While the report as a whole is largely focused on Volkswagen AG with 
the products, companies and sites of the Volkswagen brand, in this chapter you will find the 
figures representing the environmental performance of all of the Group’s brands. The Audi, 
Seat and ˇSkoda brands also publish their own environmental reports. 
Another new aspect is that, for the first time, the report has not been subjected to an 
external audit. Over the years, we have learned that our Environmental Management System 
and the monitoring methods we apply to acquire the key indicators ensure highly dependable, 
accurate data. We also take due account of the fact that the methods of recording the complex 
realities of sustainability are still in the development stage. 
One aspect which has not changed is that our Environmental Report represents an 
invitation for you to enter into dialogue with Volkswagen – be it as a partner or a challenger. 
Thank you for all your suggestions and constructive criticism in recent years. Finally, our 
sincere thanks go to everyone who has contributed thoughts, facts, figures and energy to the 
production of this issue of the Environmental Report. 
 
The Editorial Team of the Volkswagen Environmental Report 
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Vision Statement 
 
Back to the Future 
 
Volkswagen and sustainable development 
 
Not a day goes by without someone, somewhere on this planet discussing what a responsible 
and meaningful approach to shaping the Earth’s future might look like. Beyond any shadow of 
a doubt sustainability is “in” and has actually become one of our modern world’s buzzwords. 
But what does it really mean? Back in the 18th century, the term sustainable development was 
already being used to describe a careful and thoughtful form of forestry management in 
response to the growing demand for wood. The idea was to harvest no more timber than could 
be regrown. In 1987, the Brundtland Commission took up the term in its report to the United 
Nations, raising it to the status of a principle of social development which can be maintained 
over time: 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present, without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
As a result of the Brundtland Report and the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, the principle has become a global model; a model which calls 
for a responsible approach not only from society and politics but from companies, too. Today, 
sustainable development is by no means restricted to aspects of environmental protection. 
Instead, it is increasingly coming to be seen as an objective for any far-sighted social and 
economic policy. 
For the business sector, attaining sustainability has become an internal and external 
challenge. Social interest groups including consumer and environmental associations, and thus 
the political sphere, set the bar high for companies, be it at national or international level. As a 
result, large international companies with prominent global brands are today caught more 
firmly in the spotlight of public attention than ever before. It is a challenge which, like other 
major international players, we at Volkswagen have taken up from the outset – not least by 
making a voluntary commitment to enter into target agreements and reduce the fuel 
consumption of our cars. This opens up additional scope for the company to break new ground 
on its own initiative and at its own responsibility. With their two 3-litre cars (100 km on just 
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three litres of fuel), Volkswagen and Audi have generated new impetus, bringing to market 
alternative products with the highest energy efficiency without waiting for the state to 
introduce new legislation. We are convinced that long-term economic success can only be 
achieved if both social and ecological aspects form an integral part of corporate policy. The 
concept of the “triple bottom line” – economic, environmental and social accountability – 
which has been around for some time now, neatly encapsulates this three-dimensional 
perspective. 
Companies are obliged to act in line with economic considerations. Their primary 
function is to create economic value and satisfy the needs of their customers. In order to 
ensure that they can do so in the long term, however, companies must also be aware of the 
social and ecological impacts of their operations and wisely take these into account when 
shaping their policies. We see our commitment to sustainable development as an investment in 
the future. The shortterm costs will be offset by medium- and long-term benefits for the 
company’s shareholders and stakeholders. Examples of this strategic direction include our 
module strategy in the production sector (see page 16), the development of high efficiency 
engine technology such as TDI and FSI, and our expertise in lightweight design using 
aluminium. Then there are the fields of financial services, fleet management and car rentals, in 
which we offer vehicle-related services for your personal mobility. 
 
The challenge of globalisation 
 
As the sustainable development debate progresses, the notion of “globalisation” has become a 
topic of increasingly heated discussion. To be sure, the opening up of the world’s markets 
holds both risks and opportunities and stands for a new challenge for international trade. 
Companies from industrialised nations in particular are expected to play a model role in terms 
of both ecological and social aspects wherever their operations are based. Volkswagen is 
committed to living up to these expectations. 
Accordingly, we make local commitments by promoting socially-oriented initiatives, 
for example, or voluntarily introducing environmental and social standards which go beyond 
the requirements of the law. “If leading global companies profess to have firmly-anchored 
moral concepts, they cannot treat their workforce differently in Europe than in the USA, 
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Central or South America,” said Dr. Peter Hartz, Member of the Board of Management of 
Volkswagen AG at the signing of the “Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial 
Relationships” (see page 98). 
 
Hallmarks of the sustainability process at Volkswagen 
 
For Volkswagen, sustainability means having access to – and the long-term safeguarding of – 
resources at all levels: capital, employees, technology, raw materials, knowledge and 
reputation – among clients and the general public. As they manufacture products and provide 
services, companies make use of natural resources. A responsible approach to these resources 
is fundamental to sustainability. On the social side, companies are dependent upon qualified 
employees, a reliable legal system and an efficient research and scientific community. 
Consequently, companies not only provide jobs and pay taxes, they also take on social duties. 
This could be within the scope of economic or urban development measures, such as 
AutoVision (see page 93), or by advising the political sphere, as was the case with the Hartz 
Commission which advised the German government. 
The hallmarks of the sustainability process at Volkswagen are as follows: 
• evolution (continuous development) 
• integration 
• innovation 
• communication 
• learning 
 
 
Evolution 
 
The way we see it, sustainability is a continuous development process. In other words, basing 
our efforts on Volkswagen’s traditions, cultural values and operating environment, we follow 
our own company-specific route to sustainability. Long-term planning, a careful approach to 
natural resources, and displaying social responsibility in our dealings with employees and 
other partners in society have long been central to the way we work. 
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Integration 
 
When it comes to solving problems and taking decisions, we believe above all in taking an 
overall view. This means, for example, that when we consider strategic business issues, such 
as the planning of new facilities for Volkswagen, ecological and social viewpoints are 
invariably also considered. This policy finds expression in, among other things, the way we 
take account of the “worldwide environmental protection standards” for production operations 
and involve our experts on environmental protection and human resources in our discussions 
from the outset. 
 
Innovation 
 
This holistic perspective, together with the interests of external stakeholders, lead us to subject 
our current achievements to an ongoing critical review in search of improvements. The review 
process also includes active dialogue with stakeholder groups. In this way, Volkswagen’s 
sustainability culture also opens up new potential for innovation, leading to new ideas such as 
“the breathing company”, “Time Asset Bonds” (see page 92) or the world’s first 1-litre car 
(see page 50). 
 
Communication and learning 
 
Social interest groups such as the electorate and its representatives, companies, initiatives and 
associations need to reach consensus regarding their expectations and requirements of 
sustainable development and their own part in achieving it. For us, that means providing the 
public with important information voluntarily and in a credible manner. Through the life cycle 
assessments that we have drawn up for models such as the Golf and Lupo, we provide insight 
into the materials and energy that go into our products. Our environmental reports supply 
comprehensive and regular information on our activities in the fields of environmental 
protection and sustainable development. And we make use of the Internet to serve up a 
constant flow of information on the latest environmental activities at Volkswagen. 
Any process of fair dialogue presupposes mutual respect, a willingness to reach an 
understanding and the ability to deal with criticism. For Volkswagen, being open for dialogue 
means not only welcoming invitations to enter into discussions but also actively seeking out 
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direct contact to interest groups. In this way, we are aiming to lay the foundations for 
acceptance and trust, and enable a process of mutual learning. In this issue of our 
Environmental Report, we have provided several of our most prominent partners and critics 
with a platform from which to air their views in the shape of the Sustainability Partner items 
and Challenger Statements. Further examples of this constructive communications culture 
from which both sides benefit can be found in our environmental cooperation with the German 
Society for Nature Conservation (NABU) and the Institute of Applied Ecology (Öko-Institut), 
while our involvement in the work of associations and initiatives provides additional forums 
from which all concerned can learn. 
Volkswagen is an active founder member of the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) whose Sustainable Mobility project represents a major 
joint initiative of the automotive sector. The project brings together car manufacturers, oil 
companies and automotive suppliers, working to formulate a shared vision of global mobility 
in the year 2030 (see page 87). Volkswagen also cooperates with other international 
automobile manufacturers on aspects of global environmental protection and sustainable 
development within the Mobility Forum set up by the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP). At present, the Mobility Forum is focusing on automobile-specific 
indicators for external corporate reporting to complement the guidelines of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) – see opposite page. 
At European level, since 1995 Volkswagen has been involved in the work of the 
European business initiative, Corporate Social Responsibility Europe. The aim of CSR Europe 
is to support companies in their efforts to unite high profitability, sustainable growth and 
social progress (www.csreurope.org). Within Germany, Volkswagen is an active member of 
the sustainable mobility forum, econsense, an initiative of leading German companies and 
organisations which have integrated the vision of sustainable development into their corporate 
strategies. econsense was founded in the summer of 2000 under the auspices of the 
Confederation of German Industry (BDI) in Berlin (www.econsense.de) – see page 85. 
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Volkswagen’s model of sustainable development 
 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, in our 
declaration on the Global Compact we formulated Volkswagen’s model of sustainable 
development: 
This model is reflected in the company’s specific guidelines for the environmental and 
social sectors. For major international companies in particular, guidelines and principles are 
very important, because with diverse regional operating environments and cultures to contend 
with, a stronger focus on integration is called for. With its environmental policy statement 
issued in May 1995, Volkswagen laid down general principles for the protection of the 
environment. These are valid worldwide and have been modified to suit the needs of the 
individual brands and regions within the Group. 
Thus as early as 1995, Volkswagen declared that it would “work hand-in-hand with 
society and policy-makers to shape a development process that will bring sustainable social 
and ecological benefits”. 
Following the first Volkswagen Group Environmental Conference in 1998, the 
company issued globally applicable guidelines on environmental protection standards for the 
production sector. Through these guidelines, we are aiming to ensure that above-average 
uniform minimum standards are applied to the production process at all our plants. The 
guidelines also provide a point of reference for the construction of new facilities and for 
modernisation measures. At the same time, the Factory Agreement on Environmental 
Protection was concluded for the Volkswagen brand between management and the General 
Works Council, setting out the “rules of good environmental practice” 
With its “Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships”, in 2002 
Volkswagen became the first company in the automotive sector to agree globally applicable 
employee relations standards with its Global Works Council and the International 
Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF). Further information on this topic can be found at 
wwww.mobility-and-sustainability.com 
www.vw-personal.de 
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The Global Compact 
 
At international level greater things are expected of companies, as reflected in various external 
guidelines, codes and initiatives. While respecting these principles is entirely voluntary, they 
do act as beacons for companies such as Volkswagen. 
Since the World Summit in South Africa, the Volkswagen Group has been supporting 
the UN Global Compact (www.unglobalcompact.org). The Global Compact is an initiative 
triggered by UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan at the 1999 World Economic Forum in 
Davos. Within the Global Compact, companies commit themselves to a set of common, 
globally applicable values in the fields of human rights, labour and the environment. 
Volkswagen is one of those companies. Our commitment was confirmed in a letter to Kofi A. 
Annan from the Chairman of the Board of Management, Dr. Bernd Pischetsrieder. 
The Global Compact lists nine principles. Those which concern the environment state 
that businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges, and that 
they should encourage the development of environment-friendly technologies and of 
initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. The key objective is to improve 
living conditions in developing countries through joint initiatives of the UN and global 
companies. The actual wording of the nine principles is as follows: 
 
Human Rights 
• Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed 
human rights within their sphere of influence; and 
• make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
Labour Standards 
• Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of 
the right to collective bargaining; 
• the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
• the effective abolition of child labour; and 
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• eliminate discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
Environment 
• Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 
• undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and 
• encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. 
Through its Corporate Environmental Policy (1995) and its “Declaration on Social 
Rights and Industrial Relationships” (2002), Volkswagen has already complied with the 
Global Compact at the highest level. The exchange of information among the organisations 
associated with the Global Compact takes place at what are known as Global Compact 
Learning Forums which Volkswagen also attends. In December 2002, for example, we 
presented a paper on the subject of “The Global Works Council and Peaceful Conflict 
Resolution” at one such forum in Berlin. 
 
OECD-guidelines 
 
In June 2000, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
published its “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”. To date, these guidelines represent 
the only comprehensive code of conduct for companies that has been approved at government 
level, and they form the frame of reference for Volkswagen’s global activities (www.oecd.org). 
The guidelines challenge companies to champion compliance with internationally agreed 
human rights and rights of association, environmental protection and consumer protection, and 
the fight against corruption. Child labour and forced labour are condemned, as are 
discrimination with reference to the recruitment and remuneration of individual groups and 
races. Furthermore, companies are called upon to promote the training and development of 
their employees and to inform them of relevant decisions on the investment front. 
 
WBCSD and econsense 
 
Through its membership in the WBCSD and econsense, Volkswagen is supporting the 
principles and maxims of these organisations. 
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The aim of the WBCSD is not only to apply the influence of the business sector to 
drive progress towards sustainable development, but also to promote eco-efficiency, 
innovation and a responsible approach to business. The aim of the German business sector 
initiative econsense is, based on the tenet of commercial success, to offer ecologically and 
socially acceptable products and services, and to apply and continuously develop sustainable 
business practices. Member companies are committed to dealing with all resources in a 
manner aligned with the principle of sustainability, as well as to transparency and dialogue, 
and to gearing their activities to national and international codes of sustainability. Through the 
application of competence, initiative and innovation, the companies which have joined forces 
within the scope of econsense are out to play an active part in shaping sustainable 
development. 
Since 1991, Volkswagen has been supporting the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s Charta of Sustainable Development. The ICC Charta includes 16 principles of 
environmental management (www.icc-deutschland.de). 
 
A Never-Ending Story 
 
Volkswagen and environmental protection 
 
The Volkswagen brand’s environmental strategy – part of the company’s overall sustainability 
strategy – is based on the Volkswagen Group Strategic Principles described in Chapter 5 of 
this report. In 1995, the existing Environmental Guidelines were replaced by a new Group 
Environmental Policy, on the basis of which the individual brands within the Group, together 
with a number of international subsidiaries, then developed their own policies according to 
their particular corporate culture. Both the Guidelines and the Environmental Policy are thus 
the end result of a development dating back to the early 1970s, when Volkswagen’s very first 
Environmental Department was set up. German-speakers will find more details in a recent 
Volkswagen publication entitled “Wasser, Boden, Luft” (“Water, Soil and Air”, Historical 
Notes No. 5). In addition to the activities of the various plants and the development of fuel-
efficient vehicles like the 3-litre Lupo, the impact of Volkswagen’s environmental strategy can 
currently be seen in a wide variety of other areas set out in detail in this report (climate 
protection, fuel strategy, alternative drive systems, etc.) 
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Volkswagen’s Guidelines and environmental-protection measures are supplemented by 
the Factory Agreement on Environmental Protection, which defines the scope of the measures, 
describes the regulations at the level of individual companies and plants, and lays down 
“Environmental Good Practice Rules”. These contain principles that are binding for all 
members of the workforce, including a workplace code of behaviour and rules on how to 
handle resources such as energy (see page 63), raw materials and water (see interview on page 
31) as well as residual materials and waste. All matters related to environmental protection are 
regulated by the Environmental Management System. You can find details on Volkswagen’s 
Environmental Policy, the Factory Agreement on Environmental Protection and the history of 
environmental protection at Volkswagen on the Internet at www.mobility-
andsustainability.com 
 
Environmental Strategy 
 
The Volkswagen Group is out to set new automotive benchmarks, not least in terms of the 
environment. The “3-litre” and “1-litre” cars are the most high-profile examples of this 
commitment. To ensure that Volkswagen continues to play a leading role in the future, we are 
guided in our efforts by a number of key strategic considerations. 
 
Integration 
 
New standards call for new approaches. “End-of-pipe” environmental protection has its limits. 
Of course we will still need wastewater treatment facilities and catalytic converters in the 
years to come, but our goal is to prevent environmental impacts from occurring in the first 
place. That calls for intelligent solutions from the outset. At Volkswagen, it is not just the 
environmental department that has applied itself to the challenge: every division, every 
department and every employee is part of the team. 
 
Taking account of the full life cycle 
 
Volkswagen is concerned with every phase of a car’s life. Seeking solutions for a specific 
period of a vehicle’s life cycle makes little sense. Such an approach runs the risk of advances 
being made in one area whilst retarding progress in another. What is of prime importance is 
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that any environmental impact is minimised at every stage. This applies from the extraction of 
raw materials through the production process and the product’s service life all the way to 
disposal. That is why, for some years now, the Group has been drawing up life cycle 
assessments (see page 33). These consider not just the vehicle or specific components, but take 
fuel into account as well. The Volkswagen Group’s commitment to its products begins before 
the materials reach our plants and continues long after the vehicles have left the works. By 
way of example, we offer our customers information and courses that can help to cut their fuel 
consumption by up to 20 percent (see page 89). And we expect the same holistic approach 
from politicians and society as a whole. It is not sufficient, for example, to judge new fuels 
and suitably modified drive systems solely by the amount of CO2 they emit (see page 44). 
 
Market-oriented solutions 
 
The customer is at the heart of our environmental strategy because “eco-cars” which fail to 
find buyers are of no use to us or the environment. In the meantime, the general public too has 
realised that society’s environmental demands or declarations of environmental awareness 
alone will not create a market – a fact borne out, sadly, by our cautious projected sales figures 
for our “3-litre” models (the Lupo 3L TDI and Audi A2 1.2 TDI). But we are facing up to the 
challenge and working towards incorporating environmental requirements into attractive 
products in the best way possible. In the process, the Volkswagen Group is putting a great deal 
of faith in its technological expertise, and not least in TDI and FSI engines. Nor do we forget 
that protecting the environment can be fun. The negative associations – in the automotive 
industry and elsewhere – which in the past have linked environmental protection with self-
sacrifice or scaremongering have already put off far too many customers. 
 
Global differentiation 
 
Any globally active company like the Volkswagen Group must tailor its environmental 
commitment to a variety of conditions. Environmental protection involves very different tasks 
and responsibilities at international and regional levels. What proves successful in one 
community is not automatically the right solution for another. The situation facing a rural area 
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of Western Europe, for example, will be very different to that in a major city in a newly 
industrialising country. 
 
Taking the long view 
 
Environmental protection is no shortterm affair. On the contrary, it demands sustained 
commitment. Environmental topics may have faded from the front page headlines in recent 
years, but despite success stories like the reduction of vehicle- related emissions in 
industrialised countries, a great many tasks still need to be tackled. 
 
Sustainability in context 
 
One-off environmental solutions are doomed to fail if they do not take adequate account of 
economic and social aspects. That is why Volkswagen is actively engaged in the many 
different sectors of sustainability (see page 6). On the mobility and sustainability front, as part 
of the WBCSD Sustainable Mobility project, our Group is already concerned with how the 
world will look in the year 2030 (see page 87). 
 
Integrated production network 
 
Volkswagen is keen on the one hand to exploit synergies across the Group in the interests of 
environmental protection, and on the other to develop brand-specific solutions in keeping with 
our corporate vision. 
A good example of our plant-related activities can be found at the Group’s Czech 
brand, ˇSkoda. Long before the Czech Republic’s accession to the European Union, licensing 
procedures for the new paintshops in Kvasiny und Mladá Boleslav were already aligned with 
the latest and most advanced EU standards. One specific feature of these standards is the 
stringent upper limit set for solvent emissions from the painting process, a target nevertheless 
easily achieved by the process employed by ˇSkoda. In addition, in the course of the licensing 
procedures it was ensured that not only atmospheric emissions but the overall environmental 
impact was minimised. This integrated approach helps to achieve optimum environmental 
protection in all areas. 
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We use a variety of tools to control and monitor our Groupwide activities. The Group 
Task Force – Environment (GTFE) provides a forum for the cross-functional exchange of 
information and for coordinating the various measures. In addition, international audits are 
carried out and solutions developed at regional conferences which take into account both local 
circumstances and the Group’s high standards. 
 
The strategic debate on sustainability 
 
Our Group’s strategic direction receives important stimuli from external initiatives and 
organisations, as well as from guidelines originating outside the company. In addition, we aim 
to contribute our own experience to the strategic debate. Given the complexity of the problems 
in the field of sustainability and the global economy as a whole, this debate provides an 
important means of setting landmarks that will keep companies on course towards sustainable 
development. At the same time, the debate serves to document the growing demands on an 
international level that globally active companies are expected to meet. 
In the past, we have joined forces with various initiatives and today we take account of 
several key codes of practice in our strategic planning. The most important of these are the 
OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000), the UN Global Compact (2002), the 
ICC’s Charta of Sustainable Development (1992), the UNEP Mobility Forum (2002), 
Volkswagen’s Environmental Policy (1995) and our Declaration on Social Rights and 
Industrial Relationships (2002) (see Chapter 1). Ensuring the meaningful integration of the 
sustainability process is the task of various cross-brand and cross-divisional steering groups, 
such as the Environmental Brand Committee and the Group Task Force – Environment (see 
page 30). 
Faced with so many different ecological challenges, each of our brands has its own 
approach to finding solutions. Volkswagen, Audi, Seat and Skoda regularly provide details in 
their own publications. 
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Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
Volkswagen’s Model of Sustainable Development 
 
• At Volkswagen, our model of sustainable development is the benchmark for a long-term 
corporate policy which squares up not only to economic challenges but ecological and 
social ones as well. 
• Together, commercial success, far-sighted environmental protection and social 
competence enhance the global competitiveness of the Volkswagen Group. 
• The Volkswagen Group develops, manufactures and markets automobiles and services 
throughout the world in order to provide its customers with attractive solutions for their 
personal mobility. 
• It is Volkswagen’s goal to make advanced technologies available across the globe while 
taking account of environmental protection and social acceptability considerations. 
• Along with economic success, the primary objectives of Volkswagen’s corporate policy 
include the continuous improvement of the environmental acceptability of its products and 
the reduction of its consumption of natural resources. 
• Volkswagen is a company with German roots, European values and global responsibility. 
The rights, personal development, social security and economic participation of its 
employees are core elements of corporate policy. 
• A spirit of cooperation and partnership forms the basis of successful collaboration between 
management and employee representatives, in Germany, in Europe and around the world. 
• For Volkswagen, globalisation is a decisive factor in securing international 
competitiveness and safeguarding the future of the company. Shaping globalisation to be 
environmentally and socially compatible is the task of a modern and responsible corporate 
policy. This same policy serves the long-term interests of Volkswagen’s customers, 
stakeholders, employees and partners. Globalisation must not be based on exploitation. 
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• Volkswagen also actively promotes an environmentally and socially compatible approach 
to business among its suppliers. 
• Wherever it operates, Volkswagen considers itself a partner to society and the political 
sphere. 
Environmental Policy and Management for the Volkswagen Marque (from 2001/02 report, 
also available on the web with instruction to the reader to refer to it as indicated in the firm’s 
vision statement)  
 
In 1995, Volkswagen replaced its Environmental Guidelines with a Corporate Environmental 
Policy. As practical implementation of this policy can only be achieved through ongoing 
dialogue with the workforce and its representatives, a Factory Agreement on Environmental 
Protection was also concluded with the Company Works Council. 
Our efforts in the direction of the widely debated concept of “sustainability” are based 
on our Corporate Environmental Policy. Right now, in what is a fascinating process for us all, 
we are considering how to make better use in this context of the particular expertise and 
experience developed at Volkswagen in the fields of work and social responsibility. 
 
Preamble to Volkswagen’s Environmental Policy 
 
Volkswagen develops, manufactures and markets motor vehicles worldwide with the aim of 
safeguarding personal mobility. The company accepts responsibility for the continuous 
improvement of the environmental compatibility of its products and for the increasingly 
conservative use of natural resources, with due regard to economic aspects. Accordingly, the 
company makes environmentally efficient, advanced technology available worldwide and 
brings this technology to bear over the full life cycle of its products. At all its corporate 
locations, Volkswagen works hand-in-hand with society and policy-makers to shape a 
development process that will bring sustainable social and ecological benefits. 
 
Basic Principles 
 
1. It is the declared aim of Volkswagen in all its activities to restrict the environmental 
impact to a minimum and to make its own contribution to resolving environmental 
problems at regional and global level. 
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2. It is Volkswagen’s aim to offer high quality automobiles which take equal account of the 
expectations of its customers with regard to environmental compatibility, economy, safety, 
quality and comfort. 
3. In order to safeguard the long term future of the company and enhance its competitive 
position, Volkswagen is researching into and developing ecologically efficient products, 
processes and concepts for personal mobility. 
4. Those responsible for environmental management at Volkswagen shall, on the basis of the 
company’s environmental policy, ensure that in conjunction with suppliers, service 
providers, retailers and recycling companies, the environmental compatibility of its 
vehicles and production plants is subject to a process of continuous improvement. 
5. The Volkswagen Board of Management shall, at regular intervals, check that the 
company’s environmental policy and objectives are being observed and that the 
Environmental Management System is working properly. This shall include evaluation of 
the recorded environmentally relevant data. 
6. Providing frank and clear information and entering into dialogue with customers, dealers 
and the public is a matter of course for Volkswagen. Cooperation with policy-makers and 
the authorities is based on a fundamentally proactive approach founded on mutual trust 
and includes provision for emergencies at each production site. 
7. In keeping with their duties, all Volkswagen employees are informed, trained and 
motivated in respect of environmental protection. They are under obligation to implement 
these principles and to comply with statutory provisions and official regulations as these 
apply to their respective activities. 
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BMW 
 
Executive Statement 
 
Sustainable action is firmly anchored in the BMW Group’s corporate management. The 
company’s economic success and the efficient use of resources in the entire value added chain 
depend on one another. In this respect, it is an economic necessity to sparingly use resources 
in a value cycle and to consider the later impact of this use. The experience of the BMW 
Group shows that economic efficiency and sustainability can be compatible with one another. 
In recent years, the company has generated excellent sales, revenues and profits. This is 
largely the result of our sustainable, long-term corporate strategy. 
A company also needs the strength to carry out its plans while having the long-term 
results in mind as well. Positive financial results are essential for above-average investment – 
investment in the training and know-how of our employees, in products and production plants, 
and in the BMW Group’s ambitious research and development projects. The company’s future 
thus depends in every respect on responsible action. 
In our company, we pursue a corporate culture that combines the determination to 
achieve economic success with cosmopolitanism, trust, transparency and responsibility for our 
environment. This attitude is reflected in all areas of the company and is absolutely essential if 
we are to put the BMW Group’s current product and market offensive successfully into 
practice and thus safeguard the future of the BMW Group on a sustainable basis. 
 
Dr. Helmut Panke 
Chairman of the Board of Management 
 
In a competitive world, it is extremely important to be one of the most attractive employers. 
Only then can we recruit the most suitable and dedicated employees. We want to achieve this 
objective through high social standards, a climate of mutual trust and the active promotion of 
our employees by creating unique individual perspectives. Measures to safeguard continued 
employment and different models for flexible work time which reconcile the requirements of 
the company and its employees, contribute to our success. These measures create a success-
oriented corporate culture that is based on the principle of performance and reward. 
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Ernst Baumann 
Board Member, Human Resources and Industrial Relations Director 
 
The BMW Group’s economic success depends on us managing not only to satisfy our 
customers, but also to generate enthusiasm and make them customers for life. In addition to 
strong brands and excellent products, we offer our customers premium service throughout the 
product’s life. This ranges from purchase consultation and service for new and used cars to the 
recycling of end-of-life vehicles. With innovative technical concepts, such as Condition Based 
Service, or sophisticated recycling technologies, we create real value added for the customer 
(convenience) and conserve resources and the environment.” 
 
Dr. Michael Ganal 
Board Member, Sales and Marketing 
 
Innovations create success and safeguard the future viability of companies. They are also 
essential for sustainable development. That is why we have concepts to manage innovations. 
They focus not only on the development of our products, but also on production, sales, service 
and the recycling of end-of-life vehicles. We think consistently in product life cycles with 
overall responsibility. 
 
Dr.-Ing. Burkhard Göschel 
Board Member, Development and Purchasing 
 
Responsible, sustainable corporate activities and profit and growth-oriented business 
operations depend on one another. This is clearly evident in the development of shares of 
particularly sustainable companies at the international stock exchanges and in the attention 
that investors pay to corresponding share indices for sustainable and ethically responsible 
activities. Thus, stakeholder and shareholder value are inseparably linked. Investors and other 
stakeholders, such as our customers, employees and business partners, all benefit from our 
growth. 
 
Stefan Krause 
Board Member, Finance 
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Uniformly high standards of quality, work safety and environmental protection apply 
throughout our production network worldwide. Thus, we ensure that all our products live up to 
the BMW Group’s premium claim. At the same time, we guarantee that the sparing use of 
resources as guiding principle in production planning and sequences in the BMW Group has 
our full attention. The most recent example is the development of the world’s most modern 
automobile plant in Leipzig with flexible architecture, work and production structures. 
 
Dr.-Ing. Norbert Reithofer 
Board Member, Production 
 
Vision Statement 
 
The world is mobile, because people are. We want it to stay that way, while taking into 
account the needs of people and the environment alike. As a result, it is essential today to 
develop ideas that others do not dare to think. For the mobile society of the 21st century – for 
future viability, with passion and responsibility. This is the way we understand sustainability – 
in the interest of our company, our customers, our employees and our shareholders. In the 
interest of future generations and of tomorrow’s world. 
The BMW Group’s strategy is geared to longterm, profitable growth. Our goal is to be 
the most successful premium manufacturer in the automobile industry with a comprehensive 
product range in all the relevant segments of the automobile market. In order to achieve this 
goal the company is carrying out the largest product and market offensive in its history. 
The BMW Group’s value and asset management is characterised by sustainability. By 
gearing its policy to economic sustainability, resources are used more efficiently, the 
reputation of the BMW Group and the image of its brands are increased and risks are 
minimised. 
 
1.1 Economic success and responsibility. For the BMW Group, long-term economic success 
provides the basis for its activities. It is only on this basis that the company can assume 
responsibility permanently and sustainably. 
 
In the coming years, the BMW Group aims, with new models, to capture new market 
segments, develop business on the existing triad markets and, when the opportunity arises, 
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expand on new markets. With its current product and market offensive the company will grow 
to a new dimension. By 2008, the sales of the BMW Group are expected to increase to more 
than 1.4 million cars. 
The year 2003 shows the scale of the product and market offensive. The new Rolls-
Royce Phantom started off the year. A diesel-powered MINI was added to the existing model 
range. The BMW brand launched the new BMW 5 Series. In addition, the BMW Z4 was 
introduced in Europe and Asia, and three revised versions of the BMW 3 Series were 
presented. Two new models, the BMW 6 Series Coupé and the BMW X3, will also be 
introduced. They will be followed next year by the BMW1 Series, the new BMW 5 Series 
Touring and the BMW 6 Series Cabrio. 
By consistently serving the premium segments of the car market, the BMW Group 
creates the right conditions for profitable, long-term growth.  According to market researchers 
both inside and outside the company, the premium segments will grow almost twice as much 
as the mass segments in the next few years. At the same time, above average growth in Asia 
will stimulate demand. The BMW Group recorded the highest growth rates there in 2002. 
 
Internationalisation continues resolutely. 
 
In Asia, the BMW Group pursues a long-term strategy that dates back to 1981. The BMW 
Group was at that time the first international car manufacturer to have its own subsidiary in 
Japan and thus laid the foundations for its long-term commitment in the region. Subsidiaries in 
South Korea and the Philippines followed. In 2003, the BMW Group continued this strategy 
resolutely with the extension of the assembly plant in Rayong, Thailand, and the establishment 
of a subsidiary in Malaysia. In 2003, the first BMW to be made in China will roll off the 
assembly line in Shenyang in northern China. There the BMW Group will manufacture up to 
30,000 BMW 3 and 5 Series cars a year as part of a joint venture with its Chinese partner 
Brilliance China Automotive Holdings. 
Thus, the BMW Group is taking a second major step forward in the company’s 
internationalisation and is continuing the strategy that had led ten years earlier to the 
establishment of the Spartanburg plant in the United States: production follows the market. 
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The strength for this growth course is generated by the company itself. The BMW Group’s 
capital expenditure is entirely financed out of the cash flow. 
 
Success and responsibility belong together. 
 
For the BMW Group, economic success is both the prime objective and stable basis for 
assuming responsibility – for the company, its employees, its shareholders and business 
partners, as well as for the environment and society. In addition, the BMW Group helps to 
safeguard its own future by assuming social, economic and ecological responsibility. 
Sustainability is a management task and a success factor. 
The economic relevance of sustainability management is seen in three elements: 
resources, reputation and risks. 
 
Sustainability is resource management. 
 
The BMW Group’s resource management includes finance and human resources, as well as 
the use of materials and energy and their influence on the environment. The aims of 
sustainable use of resources are efficiency and future competence in finance and human 
resources, as well as in product development and production. Frequent cost reductions, 
increases in productivity and sustainable products enhance the company’s future viability. 
 
Sustainability enhances reputation.  
 
The BMW Group’s commitment to social, economic and ecological responsibility as an 
international company is in keeping with its performance as a corporate citizen. Thus, 
reputation management serves to develop the company as a responsible partner in the global 
community. A company that is firmly anchored in society as a reliable partner creates 
acceptance for its products. This acceptance is particularly important for a premium supplier, 
such as the BMW Group with its brands BMW, MINI and Rolls-Royce. 
 
Sustainability reduces risks.  
 
Companies that act responsibly take account of the economic and social interests of various 
stakeholders: from the interest of employees in an attractive and secure workplace to the 
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interest of society in environmental protection and compatibility in both production and 
product design. At the same time, company activities should be transparent and calculable. 
This helps to build up trust in the company among employees, customers, shareholders, 
investors, 11 suppliers, business partners and the general public – a trust that reduces risks. 
 
Sustainability as management task. 
 
The BMW Group recognised at an early date the connection between resources, reputation and 
risks as the economic dimension of sustainability. According to a resolution by the Board of 
Management in 2000, “Sustained development is becoming the main guiding principle for 
economic and social prosperity, as well as for the interaction of market and democracy.” 
With this commitment to sustainability, the BMW Group supported Kofi Annan’s 
“Global Compact” from the start. This international initiative by the Secretary General of the 
UN aims to create an alliance between the spheres of business and politics in order to establish 
and strengthen worldwide the role of companies as the advocates and promoters of 
sustainability. Kofi Annan’s voluntary initiative is based on nine principles for the observation 
of human rights, labour standards and a far-sighted, cautious approach to the environment. 
The BMW Group supports Kofi Annan’s initiative with its long-term corporate 
strategy, which includes not only business targets but also social and ecological aspects, and 
with concrete examples in the Global Compact’s worldwide “Learning Forum”. This is the 
place where the newly developed Sustainability Management System and Clean Energy are 
discussed as the concept for introducing alternative hydrogen-based fuels for automobiles. 
 
Shareholder value through stakeholder value. 
 
The world of finance increasingly honours corporate activities that are geared to the long term. 
And for good reason: it is now generally accepted that sustainability is a suitable concept for 
increasing and positively influencing a company’s value. The development of the Dow Jones 
World Composite Sustainability Index, considered an important benchmark in the field of 
sustainable investment, was compared over many years with the development of the Dow 
Jones World Stock Index, compiled according to conventional economic criteria. The 
comparison shows a yield advantage for sustainability oriented investors. This also applies to 
 408
the recent past, which brought significant price losses on the international stock markets 
because of continuing uncertainty about world economic and political development. Growth 
rates for investment guided by principles are still high, suggesting that in the near future we 
shall see a further increase in demand for shares in companies whose management decisions 
are based not only on economic but also on social and ecological criteria. 
In September 2002, the BMW Group was included for the fourth time in succession in 
the family of the world’s leading sustainability indices of Dow Jones, STOXX Limited and 
SAM Group. In the SAM Group’s ranking for the Dow Jones Sustainability Index World the 
analysts found that the BMW Group had above-average ratings for 27 out of a total of 33 
different criteria. The company also qualified for the FTSE4Good Europe 50 Index of the 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange as well as for the German Sustainability 
Index of Oekom Research. The new sustainability internet platform of the Institute for 
Ecology and Corporate Management at the European Business School ranks the BMW Group 
with a listing in seven sustainability indices among the leaders in this field. 
 
Transparent activities, open communications. 
 
The policy that the BMW Group has adopted is confirmed by UNEP and the international 
business consultancy SustainAbility. The BMW Group’s Sustainable Value Report 2001/2002 
ranks among the top fifty sustainability reports worldwide on UNEP’s and SustainAbility’s list. 
In the car industry segment, the BMW Group achieved one of the top rankings. 
 
Excellent capital market communications. 
 
The BMW Group’s communications with shareholders and investors are marked by 
transparency and fairness. According to the results of a survey by the investor magazine 
“Börse Online”, private investors appreciate the outstanding credibility and comprehensibility 
of the BMW Group’s capital market communications. In 2003, the company was awarded the 
new Prize for the Best Investor Relations in Germany (BIRD). 160 large German stock 
corporations were included in the survey. 
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Corporate Governance Code for BMW Group. 
 
In view of the growing responsibility of companies with international operations and the 
discussion about corporate governance, transparency plays an important role for the BMW 
Group. The company supports the recommendations and suggestions made in this code and, 
using the German Corporate Governance Code as a basis, has developed its own code to take 
account of the company’s specific circumstances. In addition, a coordinator for all corporate 
governance issues reports regularly to the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board. 
However, exemplary corporate governance is not achieved simply by obeying rules. It 
is also important to promote trust in the company. For the BMW Group, corporate governance 
is an all-embracing issue that affects all areas of the company. Taking responsibility for our 
actions, transparency and trust in others have long been the principles of our corporate culture. 
This corporate culture is essential for the success of the BMW Group both today and in the 
future 
 
Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
Environmental Protection.  BMW Group Environmental Guidelines (from the website address 
provided in the 2003/04 report).  
 
Responsibility for our Environment.  
 
We are all responsible for sustaining and protecting our natural environment. The BMW 
Group is called upon to conduct responsible and sustainable environmental policies, which are 
also economically viable. This is an obligation we have taken upon ourselves through our 
competence as a manufacturer of highly technological products and as an employer of a highly 
qualified workforce around the world. To this end, we strive to reconcile the interests of 
people and nature, technology and progress with the right of future generations to an intact 
environment. These BMW Group environmental guidelines are the basis of how we conduct 
our daily operations:  
 
1. Objectives.  
 
We use resources in a responsible and efficient manner, and hereby undertake to protect our 
environment for the long term. All Divisions of the BMW Group are guided by the 
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international environmental charter (ICC Charter for Sustainable Development), signed by 
BMW AG, and the principles outlined in Agenda 21.  
 
2. Corporate commitment and responsibility.  
 
Responsibility for environmental protection lies with all members of the Group. Our managers 
and executives, in particular, are called upon to implement these Environmental Guidelines, 
motivating our employees through their own example to act in the same spirit and assume the 
same responsibility.  
 
3. Responsible implementation of objectives.  
 
We will consistently review the success of our environmental protection measures and make 
further improvements as necessary. In our Group operations, we comply with laws, 
regulations, official standards and directives. Wherever the technical, scientific and 
managerial know-how for reducing environmental impact can achieve economically viable 
standards, which exceed those, required by law, we will apply such know-how accordingly.  
 
4. Group-wide environmental protection.  
 
In the areas of development, design, production, the operation of facilities and when 
conducting other activities, we use appropriate technical and economic means for conserving 
resources and minimising the environmental impact.  
It is of particular importance, when introducing new production processes and methods, 
to consider their environmental compatibility in the context of technical, commercial and 
economic decisions. BMW Group’s objective is therefore, as stated in the ICC Charter, to take 
into consideration the efficient use of energy and raw materials, the sustainable use of 
renewable resources, the minimisation of all adverse environmental impact and waste 
generation, and the safe and responsible disposal of residual wastes. We implement 
environmental management systems in order to assess in advance all significant environmental 
aspects.  
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5. Emergency precautions.  
 
In the event of an emergency, our first priority is the protection of health and the environment. 
We maintain contingency plans for emergencies and other incidents, making allowances for 
effects extending beyond our facilities. These contingency plans are consistently updated to 
reflect latest developments.  
 
6. Vehicle compatibility with the environment.  
 
Being fully aware of our responsibility for human health and our natural habitat, we 
consistently apply advanced technology to enhance safety and to minimise exhaust emissions, 
noise emissions, and fuel consumption. Through the optimum design of our products we 
ensure that any environmental impacts are kept to a minimum. We further support this process 
by providing information to our customers regarding the use and maintenance of our vehicles.  
 
7. Recycling.  
 
In order to avoid waste generation, we are developing solutions for recycling old vehicles, 
applying these technologies systematically. Our objective is to promote recycling optimised 
product design and to make use of secondary raw materials. This effort decreases overall 
consumption of energy and resources in production and operation while completing the cycle 
for the reuse of materials.  
 
8. Alternative propulsion concepts.  
 
In our quest to preserve resources and improve the environmental compatibility of our 
vehicles, we are developing alternative propulsion technologies, which are constantly 
improved and upgraded. We are also committed to the development of infrastructure aimed at 
the production and distribution of alternative energy sources required by these vehicles.  
 
9. Mobility for the future.  
 
By jointly planning and cooperating with all areas of politics, society and government 
administration, the BMW Group is able to offer perspectives for the future where mobility and 
responsibility for the environment no longer represent a contradiction in terms. We are 
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therefore developing transport concepts and technologies with the overriding objective of 
maintaining mobility without undermining the quality of life.  
 
10. Suppliers.  
 
With regards to efficient use of resources and the sustainability of our environment, we 
consider ourselves responsible to include our suppliers in these corporate objectives and to 
therefore encourage and promote this environmental policy. Our suppliers are required to 
adhere to relevant BMW Group norms and standards pertaining to product environmental 
performance. In order to ensure that the integrated environmental compatibility of our 
processes is maintained, we expect our suppliers to introduce and maintain effective 
environmental management systems. 
 
DaimlerChrysler 
 
Executive Statement 
 
In times of increasing globalisation, adopting a socially responsible approach to business has 
become a challenge of the first order. Today, the practical implementation of sustainable 
development means far more than compliance with environmental principles. In this respect 
too, DaimlerChrysler — with its more than 115-year tradition of technological leadership and 
innovation in the automotive sector — is out to set new standards in the industry. We know 
that we can only attain such future-oriented development through active cooperation with our 
partners in what we call “Alliances for the Environment.” Consequently, DaimlerChrysler is 
committed to organisations and initiatives such as the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), the United Nations (UN) Global Compact, and the Forum for 
Sustainable Development of German Business (Econsense). 
What dedicated “Alliances for the Environment” can achieve and how they can 
contribute to this development process is documented in our 2004 Environmental Report. For 
the first time ever, DaimlerChrysler has geared its environmental reporting to the guidelines of 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
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Our commitment to sustainable development is at its most effective when we can 
combine it with our core competencies in automotive engineering. Our aim is to safeguard 
future mobility and secure a competitive edge by developing innovations and future-oriented 
technologies that benefit the environment, safety, and comfort. In the ongoing pursuit of new 
benchmark technologies, this year alone we will invest 5.6 billion euros in research and 
development. By 2006, that number will have risen to 16.4 billion euros 
We have already taken some decisive steps for the future. Over the past ten years 
DaimlerChrysler has cut CO2 emissions from its passenger car fleet in Europe more than any 
other automaker. Over the same period, through the application of common rail direct 
injection, the fuel consumption of our diesel-engined cars has fallen by one quarter. And in 
mid 2003 we presented the world’s first synthetic fuel derived from biomass. When burned, 
this fuel only releases the same amount of carbon dioxide as the plants took up from the air. 
Achieving a further reduction in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions is the central topic as 
we strive for sustainable mobility. The first step down this road is the ongoing optimisation of 
conventional gasoline and diesel engines, whose potential is far from exhausted. Other aspects 
include the production of improved fuels and new synthetic ones. And finally, we are 
continuing our intensive work on alternative powertrains. In this respect we consider hybrid 
drive systems an important interim step en route to fuel cell drive — the technology of the 
long-term future. 
Today, 30 Mercedes-Benz fuel cell buses are out and about in ten major European 
cities, and three more will be shipped to Perth, Western Australia, in the course of this year. 
The first of 60 Mercedes-Benz A-Class “F-Cell” models have also been handed over to 
customers for trials in day-to-day use. As a result, DaimlerChrysler has the largest fuel cell 
fleet in everyday operation of any automaker — documenting our expertise in the 
implementation of future-oriented technologies. On the following pages you will find our 
environmental balance sheet for the past year. As in the past, we have asked expert 
contributors to engage in an open dialogue with us on these pages, and we cordially invite you 
to join in the debate. We would be interested to hear your views. 
 
Prof. Jürgen E. Schrempp 
Chairman of the Board of Management of DaimlerChrysler AG 
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Dr. Thomas Weber 
Member of the Board of Management of DaimlerChrysler AG, responsible for Research and 
Technology and the Development of the Mercedes Car Group 
 
Vision Statement 
 
In 1987 the Brundtland Report defined "sustainable development" as "development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs." 
Sustainability, a concept formulated for the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, has 
now become a practical objective, as well as a benchmark for the performance of industry, 
government, associations and social interest groups.
 
Why sustainability is so important for us. 
 
As a global automobile group, DaimlerChrysler bears far-reaching responsibility. Several 
hundred thousand people are involved in manufacturing and marketing our products around 
the world. Our vehicles are part of the street scene in almost every nation on earth. They meet 
people’s need for personal mobility and provide a flexible means of freight transportation. 
However, the production and use of our vehicles also impact on the natural environment. And 
as important factors in the fields of commerce, transportation and infrastructure, our vehicles 
also have a wide-ranging influence on society. For our part, we must live up to our 
responsibility for this complex interplay of impacts and influences. Consequently, in order to 
safeguard the future of the company and increase its acceptance in society at large, we have 
committed ourselves to the principle of sustainable development. 
 
What sustainability means to us. 
 
For DaimlerChrysler, the vision of sustainability is defined by responsibilities in three main 
areas: 
• Responsibility for the economic performance and the long-term business success of the 
company; 
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• Responsibility for the sparing use of the resources available on our planet and for 
maintaining an intact environment – for present and future generations; 
• Responsibility for the people involved in or affected by the activities of our company, 
and for society – which the company sees itself helping to shape. 
At the same time we gear our activities to the long term, because we know that what we do 
today will influence the backdrop for our business in the future. 
 
How we strive for sustainability 
 
Securing the long-term success of the company
 
By producing high-quality products and sophisticated technologies that take account of and 
drive the market trends of the future, we boost our competitiveness and extend our global lead 
among automobile manufacturers. 
 
Designing sustainable mobility
 
Through a wealth of different activities we actively shape the future of the automobile and 
prepare the ground for the further enhancement of its environmental compatibility. In order to 
minimise any negative impact on humankind and the environment, we always consider the 
bigger picture: the complete road transportation scenario, and the full value-added chain in the 
vehicle production process. For example, we do not focus exclusively on the powertrain in our 
efforts to reduce fuel consumption and CO 2 emissions, because we are convinced that the 
only route to sustainable solutions leads via the optimisation of the entire system of high-
efficiency powertrain and environmentally compatible fuel. On-board telematics systems also 
help make optimum use of the existing transportation infrastructure. And driver assistance 
systems help avoid accidents and protect all road users. In our mobility service portfolio we 
are also testing the efficiency of links between the automobile and other means of 
transportation. 
 
 
 
 
 416
Key topics and central fields of activity  
 
1. Climate protection: Reducing the fuel consumption and CO 2 emissions of our vehicles, 
fostering the development of alternative fuels; development of alternative powertrains. 
2. Air pollution control: Reducing the emissions of our vehicles during production and use. 
3. Resource conservation: Design for environment; sparing use of resources and increasing 
the efficiency of energy use in production. 
 
Bearing global social responsibility 
 
Through our support for the UN Global Compact and the formulation of Social Responsibility 
Guidelines for the DaimlerChrysler Group, we have laid the foundations for the social 
behavior of our company. We consider our commitment to the interests of our employees and 
of society at large not an obligation but an investment in the future of DaimlerChrysler 
 
Key topics and central fields of activity 
 
Participation in the development of fair framework conditions for globalisation, dialog with 
social groups, implementation of the Social Responsibility Guidelines valid throughout the 
Group and ensuring appropriate working conditions for employees; support for local and 
regional social initiatives 
 
Corporate governance: how we stay on course
 
How does DaimlerChrysler manage and control the implementation of corporate policy in 
terms of the goal of sustainability? Central control elements in the social and ecological 
sectors are:  
 
Our Environmental Protection Guidelines 
 
Our Environmental Protection Guidelines define the environmental policy of the 
DaimlerChrysler Group and describe our commitment to the kind of integrated environmental 
protection that assesses in advance the ecological implications of production processes and 
products, and takes these findings into account in corporate decision-making. The 
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Environmental Protection Guidelines are binding for all of the Group's employees and at all 
corporate locations.  
PDF FILE: ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES 
 
Our certified environmental management systems 
 
The vast majority of DaimlerChrysler facilities throughout the world are validated or certified 
in accordance with the European EMAS directive or the international standard ISO 14001. 
Each of our facilities pursues a clearly defined environmental protection strategy which also 
takes account of plant-specific needs and has appropriate control instruments and 
organisational structures in place with which to implement that strategy.  
 
Our Integrity Code 
 
The Integrity Code has been in force since 1999. It lays down a binding framework for the 
activities of all employees worldwide. Among other things, it contains rules of conduct 
concerning international transactions, conflicts of interest, the issue of equality, the role of 
internal monitoring systems, the right to the fulfillment of statutory standards, as well as other 
internal and external regulations.  
PDF FILE: INTEGRITY CODE 
Our Social Responsibility Guidelines
In these Guidelines, DaimlerChrysler acknowledges its social responsibility and commits itself 
to the principles of the United Nations Global Compact initiative. The Corporate Social 
Responsibility Guidelines, which apply worldwide, were agreed by DaimlerChrysler corporate 
management and the company’s World Employee Committee in 2002. These guidelines, 
which are based on the conventions of the International Labor Organisation (ILO), have now 
been integrated into the DaimlerChrysler Integrity Code.  
PDF FILE: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY GUIDELINES
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Code of Ethics
As a company listed on a US stock exchange, DaimlerChrysler has adopted a code of ethics 
applicable to Board members and other senior officers in accordance with the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act.  
PDF FILE: CODE OF ETHICS 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
These international guidelines for multinational companies, which have now been ratified by 
33 countries, represent an important framework for the activities of DaimlerChrysler.  
Clear targets at all levels
Ecological and social aspects are also an integral part of the targets agreed between managers 
and employees. This approach, which is adopted at all levels of the Group's organisation, not 
only ensures that all employees concentrate on mutual targets but also provides a basis for the 
remuneration system for all management levels.  
More information, greater transparency
 
Corporate governance issues have rightly attracted considerable attention and are now the 
subject of wide-ranging public debate. DaimlerChrysler supports the various initiatives for 
improving corporate governance. Many of the principles that have been developed by these 
initiatives have been common practice within the DaimlerChrysler Group for some time. As a 
Group with roots in both Germany and the USA, it is one of the key objectives of 
DaimlerChrysler to ensure the international orientation of its corporate governance system and 
to make the system transparent. This is why we provide comprehensive information on this 
subject both in our 2003 Annual Report and on the Internet. 
Environmental Protection and Sustainability in the Product Sector 
 
Our strategy for the sustainable mobility of the future  
 
The finite nature of our fossil fuel reserves, their concentration in politically unstable regions, 
the global increase in energy consumption, and the resultant ongoing rise in the concentration 
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of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are among the biggest challenges 
facing our society in the 21st century. As an automobile manufacturer, DaimlerChrysler is 
committed to making a decisive contribution to the realisation of an environmentally 
acceptable and sustainable form of mobility.  
Our core objective is clear: reducing CO2 emissions and consumption of fossil fuels, 
while maintaining a leadership role in the reduction of exhaust and evaporative emissions. In 
order to reach this goal we are focusing on two fields of activity: technical innovations in the 
vehicle and powertrain sectors on the one hand (core activities), and fuels on the other 
(support activities).  Only by tackling both fields can the full potential of the overall 
vehicle/fuel system be exploited. Through our technical innovations in the vehicle and 
powertrain sectors we are also pursuing another goal: We are out to achieve a further 
reduction in exhaust emissions from our products.  
 
Sound Reasons for Good Deeds 
 
In common with many other leading companies, DaimlerChrysler is squaring up to its social 
responsibilities well beyond the workplace. But there is far more to it than a charitable spirit. 
In the rush to become good corporate citizens, companies are rapidly discovering that 
there is more to the role than doling out the dollars. “DaimlerChrysler’s commitment to good 
corporate citizenship is built upon making positive contributions to society, both in terms of 
traditional philanthropy and in terms of minimising the impact of our business on the 
environment,” says Rob Liberatore, Global External Affairs and Public Policy. “If you’re 
going to impress people with your products, you also have to convince them with your 
philosophy.” 
As they make their decisions, companies are bound up in an intricate web of 
relationships with employees, customers, business partners, shareholders, law-makers and 
society as a whole. Showing commitment to this outside world is about more than supplying a 
Mercedes-Benz Sprinter van for an aid convoy, or handing over funds to support a local 
theater. “Over and above our commercial status as an automaker, we are very much a part of 
the society in which we operate,” says Michael Inacker, a member of the leadership team at 
the External Affairs and Public Policy department. Companies across the board are now 
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honing their skills in this relatively new role. “Corporate citizenship,” “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) — call it what you will, for any organisation that takes this aspect 
seriously, standing still is not an option. Companies need to play a proactive part. To this end, 
DaimlerChrysler is committed to a process of dialogue with politicians, trade associations and 
social interest groups. 
Klaus M. Leisinger is Professor of Development Sociology at the University of Basle 
in Switzerland. As he sees it, “the sphere of corporate social responsibility extends beyond 
measures stipulated by law.” Michael Inacker agrees: “It’s all about voluntary commitment,” 
he says, and nowhere is that commitment more relevant than for companies with locations all 
over the world. “CSR is particularly important in developing countries, where in many areas 
the appropriate legislation doesn’t go far enough or is not adequately enforced,” Leisinger 
points out. And that’s why UN Secretary General Kofi Annan set up the Global Compact 
initiative. Since he did so, more than 1,100 companies, including DaimlerChrysler, have 
signed up to this universal drive to promote human rights, improve labor conditions, and push 
forward environmental protection. “In 2002 we published our group-wide Principles of Social 
Responsibility, principles based on the key elements of the Global Compact. We now expect 
our suppliers to respect similar principles,” adds Inacker. The automaker has been working 
closely with its World Employee Committee to uphold equal opportunities, safety standards, 
and minimum wage legislation for employees, and to clamp down rigorously on any violations. 
Companies have long recognised that a stable socio-political environment is a key 
factor in securing commercial success. DaimlerChrysler South Africa is currently facing the 
potentially devastating consequences of HIV/AIDS. At stake are not only the lives of its 
employees, but also the long-term social stability of the entire region. The automaker has 
joined the fight against the epidemic, setting up an employee education program to deal with 
both the social and economic implications. “If we don’t take decisive action now, we risk 
losing valuable employees, with all the negative human and commercial consequences that 
implies,” says Inacker. 
“We see corporate social responsibility as a networked concept,” he explains, “one that 
combines the interests of society as whole with ecological, commercial, and entrepreneurial 
considerations.” Projects already up and running in Germany, Brazil, India, and South Africa - 
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soon to be joined by an initiative in the Philippines - prove that such ambitious threefold 
targets are not beyond the company’s capabilities. DaimlerChrysler has effectively put in 
place a “global sustainability network” which not only explores new sources of energy but 
also processes natural fibers for Mercedes-Benz vehicles. Thus the company creates skilled 
jobs in poor regions, helps preserve the environment by growing and using renewable raw 
materials, and opens up new options on the production front. On top of which, using coconut, 
sisal or abaca fibers also makes economic sense. And that’s important, because companies 
have to be profitable, otherwise they will not be able to meet their social responsibilities. 
Further details can be found in the DaimlerChrysler Corporate Social Responsibility 
Report 2004. Copies can be ordered from www.daimlerchrysler.com. 
 
Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
Environmental protection is one of our fundamental corporate objectives. 
 
DaimlerChrysler is committed to enhance the quality of life and the environment in the 
communities and societies we serve. Environmental protection is one of the fundamental 
corporate objectives of the DaimlerChrysler Group. In this context, environmental protection 
is an integral component of the corporate strategy, designed to ensure long-term value creation. 
DaimlerChrysler's goal of maximum product quality includes compliance with 
stringent environmental standards and careful treatment of the natural foundations of life. 
Accordingly, our approach to environmentally acceptable product design requires careful 
consideration of the entire product life cycle from design, production and use to disposal or 
recycling. 
The Environmental Protection Guidelines approved by the Board of Management 
define the environmental policy of the DaimlerChrysler Group and describe the commitment 
to integrated environmental protection that addresses environmental impacts at their roots, 
assesses in advance the ecological implications of production processes and products, and 
takes these findings into account in corporate decision-making. Appropriate control and 
monitoring procedures and measures have been implemented. Responsibility for the 
implementation of and adherence to environmental protection measures has been assigned to 
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specific employees in all functional areas, from development and production to sales and 
service, and at all corporate staffs. 
The Environmental Protection Guidelines are binding for all the Group's employees 
and at all corporate locations. Accordingly, the Group supports and encourages all employees 
to put environmental protection into practice at the workplace at his or her own initiative. 
Measures implemented at the various corporate locations are regularly assessed and subject to 
a process of continual improvement. In order to comply with its self-imposed environmental 
protection standards, the DaimlerChrysler Group draws up its own environmental goals. The 
ecological programs required to meet these goals are monitored through a comprehensive 
auditing process aimed at measuring compliance with procedures and regulations, and when 
necessary, corrective actions are taken to improve performance. 
The underlying environmental management system is coordinated by the Chief 
Environmental Officer, who reports to the Board of Management on these matters at regular 
intervals. A verifiable environmental report, published annually, documents the Group's 
activities and achievements. We also will endeavor to ensure that our Environmental 
Protection Guidelines are accepted in joint venture partnerships. Our responsibility for the 
environment does not stop at our Group's doors. Accordingly, in addition to our own 
environmental protection activities, DaimlerChrysler will promote the development of 
intelligent ecological solutions and encourage the international development of environmental 
technology. Our objective is to retain and further develop transportation products and systems 
which cater equally to the requirements of the individual, society and the environment. 
 
1. We face the environmental challenges of the future by working continuously to improve the 
environmental performance of our products and our operations. 
 
Compliance with environmental legislation and regulations is a matter of course for 
DaimlerChrysler. To ensure sustainable development, the Group is also committed to the 
active and ongoing development of environmental protection. This includes the manufacturing 
processes and our products. DaimlerChrysler also contributes its expertise to non-corporate 
scientific, technical and governmental activities designed to improve the environment. The 
Environmental Protection Guidelines of the DaimlerChrysler Group are binding for all 
employees and at all corporate locations. Particular responsibility rests with managerial staff: 
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through their example, they make an active contribution to the further development of our 
environmental policy and of ecological awareness among the Group's employees, as well as 
helping to anchor environmental protection in our corporate culture 
 
2. We strive to develop products which in their respective market segments are highly 
environmentally responsible. 
 
Our approach to environmentally acceptable design covers the entire product spectrum of the 
DaimlerChrysler Group, taking into account the product life cycle from design through 
disposal or recycling. Continuously improving the environmental performance of our products 
is one of our important goals. DaimlerChrysler is committed to the ongoing pursuit of this 
objective, especially in its research and development activities 
 
3. We plan all stages of manufacturing to provide optimal environmental protection. 
 
DaimlerChrysler sees itself as a leader in the ongoing development of environmentally 
responsible production technology which minimises the burden on the environment. This 
includes proactive behavior to prevent or minimise the impact of accidents which may 
adversely affect the environment. Particular emphasis is given to the application and 
continuing development of technologies which save energy and water, and which are 
characterised by minimal emission and waste levels. This includes the development of 
effective environmental assessments, emission controls, reuse and recycling strategies. 
DaimlerChrysler aims to achieve closed-loop material cycles. Our ultimate goal is waste-free 
production. DaimlerChrysler requires its suppliers and contractual partners to comply with all 
applicable laws and regulations and encourages them to pursue proactive environmentally 
responsible practices. Contractors working on DaimlerChrysler properties also must comply 
with the location's own standards and requirements 
 
4. We offer our customers ecologically oriented service and information. 
 
Our customers should be able to use the DaimlerChrysler Group's products in an 
environmentally acceptable manner. DaimlerChrysler therefore provides its customers with 
products with a long service life in an effort to conserve natural resources. Our service outlets 
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work to provide optimal information and expert service on environmental matters. Customers 
also receive comprehensive and competent advice on eco-friendly motoring. 
 
5. We endeavor to achieve exemplary environmental performance worldwide. 
 
DaimlerChrysler manufactures and markets its products internationally. The Group endeavors 
to behave in an exemplary manner in environmental protection at all of its plants and service 
outlets around the world and to continually enhance environmental protection through the 
application of progressive environmental management. For a global player, however, taking 
responsibility for environmental protection seriously also means looking beyond our 
boundaries. At its locations around the world, DaimlerChrysler supports and encourages the 
cooperative development of environmentally superior technology and management methods 
throughout industry and the public sector. In addition we cooperate with authorities to develop 
technically and financially sound, environmentally responsible laws and regulations 
 
6. We provide our employees and the public with comprehensive information on 
environmental protection. 
 
At DaimlerChrysler we believe that only a policy of openly providing information on 
environmental protection measures and reporting on achievements and problems in the 
implementation of these measures will motivate employees and create credibility in the 
general public. The Group employs the available personnel development, employee training 
and information measures to transform environmental awareness into specific employee 
behavior. As a corporate member of the community, DaimlerChrysler actively seeks dialogue 
with the public on important environmental issues and works cooperatively with other groups, 
institutions and parties to protect and conserve the environment. Employees, customers and 
the general public are provided with the information they need to understand the ecological 
impact of the products and corporate activities of DaimlerChrysler. 
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Toyota 
 
Executive Statement 
 
From Toyota’s standpoint as a member of the Japanese automotive industry, I have often 
emphasised our “desire to work hard so that we will be able to point to the various 
contributions that Japan’s automotive technology has made toward alleviating the impact 
automobiles have on the environment.” 
The second generation Prius, which was launched in September of 2003, was 
developed on the basis of this idea. Since its launch, the Prius has received high acclaim and 
support in markets around the world, and sales are increasing steadily. The success of the new 
Prius has provided us with a great deal of confidence in our stance of making environmental 
issues a central management issue. 
Toyota hopes to bring the benefits of mobility offered by automobiles to as many 
people as possible, and is striving to contribute to society by further expanding the appeal of 
automobiles throughout the world. To accomplish this, one of the most important tasks for 
Toyota to address involves environmental issues. 
Toyota adopted the Global Vision 2010 as a medium- to long-term management plan 
that puts forward the corporate image Toyota should strive to attain. As one objective, “Toyota 
will strive to become a leader and driving force in global regeneration by implementing the 
most advanced environmental technologies.” I have already mentioned the new Prius above, 
but Prius sales still account for only a very small percentage of Toyota’s total sales. We will 
seek to achieve class-leading environmental performance for our other vehicle series as well. 
Considering that the automobile industry generates a certain level of environmental impact in 
all areas of its operations, Toyota reaffirms the importance of carrying out top-level 
environmental action in all countries and regions at the development and design, production, 
sales, and disposal stages of a vehicle’s life cycle. 
As another aspect of the corporate image Toyota is pursuing, the Global Vision 2010 
states that, “Toyota seeks to become a truly global enterprise that is respected by all peoples 
around the world.” We would be extremely happy if Toyota’s environmental initiatives are of 
use in the various regions and countries where they are carried out. At the same time, being 
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able to contribute to society through such activities instills pride and courage among the 
numerous Toyota employees who are steadily working in various areas of Toyota’s operations 
around the world. 
Finally, Toyota places great importance on the idea of “good faith.” Good faith means 
acting with sincerity and without betraying the confidence and expectations of others, keeping 
one’s promises, and fulfilling one’s duties, and this is embodied in the following way in the 
Guiding Principles at Toyota Motor Corporation: “Undertake open and fair corporate activities 
to be a good corporate citizen around the world.” True to the idea of good faith, Toyota will 
consider the interests of all stakeholders, and contribute to the sustainable development of 
society and Earth at large through its business activities. 
 
Fujio Cho 
President, Toyota Motor Corporation 
Chairman, Toyota Environment Committee 
 
In FY2003, Toyota’s main environmental achievements were the confirmation of the prospect 
of achieving the Third Toyota Environmental Action Plan goals through an interim review, the 
launch of the new Prius, start of FCHV bus operations, the introduction of the comprehensive 
environmental impact assessment system Eco-VAS, the creation, announcement, and 
expansion of the Toyota Recycle Vision, progress in responses to the Automobile Recycling 
Law, and incorporation of recyclable designs in the Prius, Raum, and other new vehicles. 
The section on social aspects, which was begun in FY2003, discusses Toyota Motor 
Corporation’s fundamental thinking concerning its relationship with customers, society, 
business partners, and employees, and lists the progress of initiatives over the course of the 
previous fiscal year. The focus is on Toyota’s activities in Japan, but also included are reports 
on best practices that overseas affiliates have taken in other countries and regions in response 
to local conditions. 
In the future, Toyota intends to further enhance the content of the section on social 
aspects. 
 
Kosuke Shiramizu 
Executive Vice President, Member of the Board, Toyota Motor Corporation 
Vice Chairman, Toyota Environment Committee 
 427
Vision Statement 
 
Creating a Prosperous Society Together by Making Things and Making Automobiles 
 
Toyota hopes that the 21st century will be truly prosperous for society, and aims to grow as a 
company together with its stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, business partners, 
and employees, through making things and making automobiles, while seeking harmony with 
people, society, the global environment and the world economy. 
In order to put this management philosophy into practice, the “Guiding Principles at 
Toyota Motor Corporation” were established as the fundamental management policy (Please 
see p. 5). These principles were adopted in 1992 to codify the business spirit handed down 
since the company’s foundation, and revisions including the stipulation of legal compliance 
were made in 1997. Each of the seven items is a cornerstone of Toyota’s business activities. 
 
Contribute to the Realisation of a Prosperous Society in the New Century through Global 
Vision 2010 
 
In April 2002 Toyota adopted the Global Vision 2010 which proposes the corporate image 
which Toyota should strive to achieve in 2010 and beyond. (Please see p.5) Centered on the 
basic theme of “Innovation into the Future — A Passion to Create a Better Society,” and with 
a view toward what society is expected to be like in the medium to long term, the Vision sets 
the course for the multi-faceted roles to be played by Toyota vis-à-vis society, people and the 
Earth. 
Specifically, Toyota has made internal and external commitments to: lead a recycling-
based society; to develop the age of ITS and the ubiquitous network society; promoting 
motorisation on a global scale; and becoming a presence that is respected in a mature society. 
Toyota plans on making specific proposals in tangible form concerning the realisation 
of a prosperous society in the new century by participating in and displaying exhibits at the 
World Congress on ITS in October 2004 and at the 2005 World Exposition, Aichi, Japan 
(EXPO 2005) opening in March that year. 
Toyota believes that to realise the corporate image that it is striving to achieve in the 
future, without complacency, it is important to undertake a paradigm change from the 
 428
following three perspectives: Technology development/Product development; Management; 
and Profit structures. 
As inter-company competition intensifies on a global scale, Toyota is working to 
strengthen its business foundations further. 
 
Environmental Management 
 
In the twentieth century, although the automobile played an important role in the development 
of society, it has also imposed a certain impact on the environment. If the automobile is to 
remain a beneficial tool in the twenty-first century, environmental responses are essential. 
Without environmental responses, the automobile industry has no future, and Toyota is 
convinced that only automakers that succeed in this area will be acceptable to society. 
To ensure that its products are accepted and well received around the world, Toyota 
has positioned the environment as a priority management issue and seeks to become a leader 
of global regeneration through its outstanding environmental technologies. In order to achieve 
this, Toyota is implementing environmental responses at the highest levels in all regions 
around the world and in all areas. Toyota also believes that it is important to conduct continual 
and constant follow-ups. 
Toyota conducts meticulous environmental management in all areas and in each stage 
of the vehicle life cycle, including production, logistics, use, disposal, and recycling. Toyota 
also implements integrated environmental responses from the production to disposal stage. 
 
2010 Global Vision 
 
Innovation into the Future 
 
A Passion to Create a Better Society: To contribute to society through the manufacturing of 
automobiles. We must now move forward with renewed passion and even higher aspirations, 
to create a more prosperous society in this new century. 
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A New Corporate Image for Toyota to Pursue 
 
Kind to the Earth 
 
Become a leader and driving force in global regeneration by implementing the most advanced 
environmental technologies. 
Arrival of a Revitalised, Recycling-based Society 
• Global movement toward a “Revitalised Society.” 
• Shifting from an age of mass production and mass consumption to a “Recycling-based 
Society.” Reduction, Reuse and Recycling of Resources. 
 
Comfort of Life 
 
Become a leader in creating automobiles and an automobile-based society in which people can 
live in ease, safety and comfort. 
Age of ITS and the Ubiquitous Network Society 
• Advanced communication technology and automobile IT technologies. 
• Dramatic improvement in information services accessible while driving. 
• Improved driving safety, coordinated with the traffic structure. 
 
Excitement for the World 
 
Promote the appeal of cars throughout the world and strengthen the Toyota brand image. 
Expansion of Motorisation on a Global Scale 
• People all over the world will benefit from the car’s mobility. 
 
Respect for all People 
 
Be a truly global company that earns the respect and support of people all over the world. 
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Advent of a Mature Society 
• Society will move toward greater respect for people from other nations and cultures. 
• In international companies, people from different nations and ethnic groups will work 
together. 
 
The Paradigm Change to Achieve our Vision 
 
1. Technology Development / Product Development 
(1) Technology Development 
(2) Product Development 
 
2. Management 
1) Transnational management 
(2) Group strategic management 
(3) Changing the way we work 
 
3. Profit Structures 
(1) Create a balanced global structure 
(2) Focus on stakeholders and efficient use of capital 
 
Leading to: 
Paradigm Change 
We must adopt a new corporate structure paradigm and improved 
business practices. 
 
Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
The Spirit of the Toyoda Precepts Passed on since Toyota’s Foundation 
 
The Toyoda Precepts, passed on from the time of Toyota’s foundation up to the present day, 
have acted as the core of Toyota management. The precepts capture the thinking of the 
 431
founder of the Toyota Group, Sakichi Toyoda, and have become the basis of the Guiding 
Principles at Toyota Motor Corporation. 
Initially this did not have a definite shape. However, with the growth of the scope of 
the company, the need arose for the principles to be codified so that they could be propagated 
among employees. Risaburo Toyoda and Kiichiro Toyoda, in the pioneer days of the company, 
gathered together the teachings of Sakichi Toyoda and published them in the form of the 
Toyoda Precepts on October 30, 1935, the fifth anniversary of his death. From that time, the 
precepts have played the role of a spiritual support for employees as the principles of the 
company. This spirit of the Toyoda Precepts can still be felt today. 
 
The Toyoda Precepts 
 
1. Be contributive to the development and welfare of the country by working together, 
regardless of position, in faithfully fulfilling your duties. 
2. Be at the vanguard of the times through endless creativity, inquisitiveness and pursuit of 
improvement. 
3. Be practical and avoid frivolity. 
4. Be kind and generous; strive to create a warm, homelike atmosphere. 
5. Be reverent, and show gratitude for things great and small in thought and deed. 
 
Guiding Principles at Toyota Motor Corporation 
 
1. Honour the language and spirit of the law of every nation and undertake open and fair 
corporate activities to be a good corporate citizen of the world 
2. Respect the culture and customs of every nation and contribute to economic and social 
development through corporate activities in local communities 
3. Dedicate ourselves to providing clean and safe products and to enhancing the quality of 
life everywhere through our all activities 
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4. Create and develop advanced technologies and provide outstanding products and services 
that fulfil the needs of customers worldwide 
5. Foster a corporate culture that enhances individual creativity and teamwork value, while 
honoring mutual trust and respect between labor and management 
6. Pursue growth in harmony with the global community through innovative management 
7. Work with business partners in research and creation to achieve stable, long-term growth 
and mutual benefits, while keeping ourselves open to new partnerships 
 
Toyota Earth Charter 
 
I. Basic Policy 
 
1. Contribution toward a prosperous 21st century society 
Contribute toward a prosperous 21st century society.  Aim for growth that is in harmony with 
the environment, and set as a challenge the achievement of zero emissions throughout all areas 
of business activities. 
 
2. Pursuit of environmental technologies 
Pursue all possible environmental technologies, developing and establishing new technologies 
to enable the environment and economy to coexist harmoniously. 
 
3. Voluntary actions 
Develop a voluntary improvement plan, based on thorough preventive measures and 
compliance to laws, that addresses environmental issues on the global, national, and regional 
scales, and promotes continuous implementation. 
 
4. Working in cooperation with society 
Build close and cooperative relationships with a wide spectrum of individuals and 
organisations involved in environmental preservation including governments, local 
municipalities, related companies and industries. 
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II. Action Guidelines 
 
1. Always be concerned about the environment 
Challenge achieving zero emissions at all stages, i.e. production, utilisation, and disposal. 
1. Develop and provide products with top-level environmental performance. 
2. Pursue production activities that do not generate waste. 
3. Implement thorough preventive measures. 
4. Promote businesses that contribute toward environmental improvement. 
 
2. Business partners are partners in creating a better environment 
Cooperate with associated companies. 
 
3. As a member of society 
Actively participate in social actions. 
1. Participate in the creation of a recycle-oriented society 
2. Support government environmental policies 
3. Contribute also to non-profit activities 
 
4. Toward better understanding 
Actively disclose information and promote environmental awareness. 
 
III. Organisation in Charge 
 
Promotion by the Toyota Environment Committee which consists of top management (chaired 
by the President) 
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Honda 
 
Executive Statement 
 
Striving to Become a Company that People Will Want to Exist 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2003, at the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (COP 9) in Milan, Italy, discussions were held on establishing detailed 
rules on implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Also the framework to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions on a global scale is advancing steadily. However, in certain regions of the world a 
rapid growth of the economy or of the population is expected. Therefore it will be more urgent 
but also more difficult to resolve the diverse environmental issues surrounding us. 
Honda has long been involved in environmental conservation activities. In 1992, we 
created the Honda Environment Statement, which clarifies our view on environmental 
conservation. Based on this statement, we conduct various activities that address 
environmental issues at every phase of our products’ life cycle. Honda is conducting 
environmental conservation activities not because it is obligated to comply with regulations 
but because it wishes to preserve the environment for future generations. This reflects the 
Company’s belief that continuing environmental conservation activities on a global scale is an 
important management responsibility. 
 
Review of Activities in Fiscal 2003 
 
In 1999, Honda released numerical targets to lower the exhaust emissions and improve the 
fuel economy of its products as well as the year in which these figures were to be attained. In 
fiscal 2003, Honda succeeded in achieving the targets it set for 2005, i.e., an approximate 75% 
reduction in total exhaust emissions of HC and NOx for automobiles and an approximate 30% 
improvement in the average fuel economy for motorcycles. Of the nine targets it set, Honda 
has achieved six of them earlier than planned. 
We were the first in the world to apply electronic fuel injection technology to 50cc 
scooters, which were subsequently introduced into the market. We were able to achieve 
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technical breakthroughs and thus numerical targets a year or more in advance. We will 
accelerate efforts to improve exhaust emissions and fuel economy by further applying the 
technology to many of our small motorcycles. 
We established the Green Factory Project, which aims by the year 2010 to reduce our 
factories’ energy consumption per unit at our factories by 30% of the 1990 levels. In fiscal 
2003, the energy consumption per unit at our factories decreased approximately 18.9% 
illustrating that our efforts have brought about a significant benefit. 
For those targets that were achieved earlier than expected, we will continue our efforts 
to realise further improvements. 
As for exhaust gas from automobiles, all of our automobile models comply with the 
newly established 2005 exhaust emission regulations as of the end of March 2004, one or 
more years earlier than the required year. Six of our automobile models were approved as 
“**** low emission vehicles,” which means that their exhaust emissions are 75% less than the 
exhaust emissions standards. As for improvement in fuel economy, 25 out of 31 models that 
were marketed in fiscal 2003 conformed to 2010 target standards for fuel economy, and the 
fuel economy of 18 of those 25 models was better than the 2010 target standards by 5% or 
more. 
Honda is a company that pursues better mobility. In fiscal 2003, the HondaJet 
succeeded in an experimental flight. The fuel economy of the HondaJet, which has a self 
developed airframe equipped with a self-developed turbofan engine, was improved 
approximately 40% compared with conventional airplanes. Thus, Honda is positively making 
an effort to improve mobility in new fields while paying attention to environmental 
conservation. 
 
Toward the Future 
 
Honda has continued efforts to create a new power train in place of internal combustion 
engines with an objective of realising sustainable mobility. Twelve FCX fuel cell vehicles, 
which Honda started selling in 2002, were leased in Japan and the United States. Honda 
succeeded in developing the next generation of high-powered fuel cells, called the Honda FC 
STACK, which are significantly smaller and enable cars to be started below freezing point, 
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something that was considered impossible in the past. Thus, Honda is making a positive effort 
to put such fuel cells into practical use. 
To contribute to the realisation of a recycling-oriented society. Honda started 
experimenting with a home energy station. This station can generate hydrogen fuel using 
natural gas and has a cogeneration function to generate heat and electricity. In addition, Honda 
applied self developed next-generation thin-film solar cells to a water electrolysis hydrogen 
station that uses solar energy. We believe that these thin-film solar cells, which can be 
manufactured using a minimum amount of energy, will be one of core technologies for a 
recycle-oriented society. The aim of these efforts is to generate electricity using highly 
efficient solar cells, generate hydrogen from water using such electricity, and drive fuel cell 
vehicles using such hydrogen (these vehicles emit water only). This is a challenging effort to 
pursue the ultimate system to save energy. 
 
Passing down a Clean Environment to Future Generations 
 
Honda is engaged in various activities to become a company that people will want to exist. To 
pass down a clean environment to future generations, Honda has made positive efforts in 
conserving the environment. Honda will continue its efforts to help solve those environmental 
issues that may change with the times by creating unique ideas. Honda will strengthen its 
efforts in various fields to meet the expectations of customers and society. 
This report summarises the achievements of our activities in each fiscal year and is 
published annually to keep the public informed of our efforts. We would greatly appreciate it 
if you would read through this report and give us your frank opinion or comments that would 
help us continue to improve. 
 
June 2004 
Takeo Fukui 
President and C.E.O 
Michiyoshi Hagino 
Director in charge of environment 
Senior Managing Director 
 
Global environmental problems represented by global warming, resource depletion, and the 
disposal of waste began to be internationally recognised as common problems for everyone in 
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the 1990s. At the Kyoto Conference held in 1997, targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions were set and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held at 
Johannesburg in 2002, the Johannesburg Declaration was adopted to promote sustainable 
development and environmental conservation at the same time. 
Since the 1960s when pollution was recognised as a serious problem, Honda has been 
aggressively striving to solve environmental problems by promoting technological 
development, including the development of CVCC engines, towards a goal of ensuring a “blue 
sky for children.” Honda’s strenuous efforts for environmental conservation also includes the 
development of world-leading exhaust emission reducing technology, and the hybrid 
technology to achieve the world’s highest fuel efficiency. As a result of such effort, the users 
of Honda products, including motorcycles, automobiles, and power products, exceeded 12 
million people around the world in fiscal 2001. 
By the year 2010, Honda is determined to become a company that all people can look 
up to. To attain this goal, and to be a leader in environmental conservation, we have always 
promoted our efforts in the environmental field. As a result, the Honda FCX has become the 
world’s first fuel cell vehicle to obtain U.S. government approval for commercialisation. We 
would like to further our commitment to the environment throughout our corporate activities 
and to provide customers with products that totally satisfy them. 
This booklet is published separately from the Honda Environmental Annual Report, 
and is revised every three years to promote a wider understanding of our ideas, past efforts, 
and future projects concerning environmental conservation. 
We would be very pleased if this fully revised edition gains more readers, and look 
forward to receiving the frank opinions and reactions of our readers. 
 
December 2002 
Hiroyuki Yoshino 
President and CEO 
 
Michiyoshi Hagino 
Senior Managing Director 
Director responsible for 
environmental activities 
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Vision Statement 
 
Fundamental Principle and Vision 
 
Honda, under the slogan “Blue Sky for Children”, has long been conducting environmental 
activities. In the 1990s, we improved our organisational structure step by step and created the 
Honda Environment Statement to clearly describe our attitude towards environmental issues. 
Since then, Honda has been improving its environmental conservation activities, regarding 
them as one of our most important themes. 
Looking towards the future, Honda has set out its vision for 2010, based on a corporate 
culture of “freedom and openness, challenge and cooperation.” As mentioned in our vision 
statement, in order to pass on our joys to the next generation, we will strengthen our measures 
to achieve the challenging environmental improvement goals that we have set for ourselves. 
Through these activities, we aim to become a company that people want to exist. 
 
To Share Our Dreams and Joys with More Customers 
 
Handing down “Joy” from one generation to the next 
 
Honda has long been engaged in environmental conservation, aggressively undertaking 
measures suitable for the time. In the 1990s, amid the increasing momentum toward 
environmental conservation and the acceleration of environmental measures all over the world, 
we improved our organisational structure and system step by step (see page 54) and made our 
“Honda Environment Statement” as guidelines for our attitude towards the environment (see 
page 10). 
In the 21st century, Honda is accelerating its environmental activities to create new 
joys for its customers through giving full consideration to the global environment. Also, it is 
aiming to become a company that all people can look up to, by aggressively communicating 
with local people and with its customers throughout the world and sharing its joys with them. 
 
Towards higher goals 
 
For the effective promotion of environmental conservation activities and for the steady 
achievement of results, we are always setting higher goals. For example, for every product 
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domain, we announce the quantitative targets for cleaner exhaust gases and for fuel economy, 
with time limits, and disclose information about the achievement of these targets in the Honda 
Environmental Annual Report and at our website. 
 
For global and social sustainability 
 
Honda thinks it important to deeply understand what impacts companies have on the world’s 
environment, society, and economy and to act based on this understanding. To share joys with 
a greater number of customers, we will search for ways to enable the development of society 
in harmony with the environment. 
 
Creating new values of joy 
 
We continuously strive to be a leader in bringing forth new values and creating joy. 
 
Expanding joy 
 
Honda will seek to expand the circle of joy by putting down roots in the communities in which 
it operates while maintaining its position as a global corporation. 
 
Joy for the next generation 
 
In order to pass on joy to future generations while sustaining social development, Honda will 
do its part to solve environmental challenges on a global scale. 
 
A company that people can look up to  
 
Meeting the Challenges of the Age and Making Progress towards the Next Age 
Honda’s History of Environmental Conservation 
 
Honda’s history of environmental conservation: this means to meet the challenges of the time 
and to make progress towards the future. Honda has always wanted to pass on the beautiful 
natural environment to the next generation, and will continue its environmental conservation 
activities, meeting the high goals that it has set independently. 
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Taking Steady Measures to Share Joy with People All over the World 
 
Honda has been delivering its products to its customers all over the world to share its joys with 
them, while at the same time making every effort to solve environmental problems, 
recognising the impact it has on the global environment. We are now determined to continue 
to fulfill our environmental responsibilities, which are increasing in their importance, while 
endeavoring to obtain more than 20 million customers by fiscal 2004. 
 
Ongoing Technological Developments to Attain Higher Goals for the Next Generation 
 
It is important for us to improve the environmental performance of our products to enable our 
customers to use the products without being concerned about the impacts caused by these 
products to the global environment. In their lifecycles, our products tend to cause the largest 
environmental impacts while they are in use, and we need to reduce such impacts. To meet 
this requirement, Honda is striving to build a better relationship between people, the earth, and 
our products by setting severe voluntary standards for environmental conservation, including 
cleaner exhaust gases and higher fuel efficiency. 
Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
As a responsible member of society whose task lies in the preservation of the global 
environment, company will make every effort to contribute to human health and the 
preservation of the global environment in each phase of its corporate activity. Only in this way 
will we be able to count on a successful future not only for our company, but for the entire 
world. 
 
We should pursue our daily business interest under the following principles: 
1. We will make efforts to recycle materials and conserve resources and energy at every 
stage of our products’ life cycle from research, design, production and sales, to 
services and disposal. 
2. We will make every effort to minimise and find appropriate methods to dispose of 
waste and contaminants that are produced through the use of our products, and in every 
stage of life cycle of these products. 
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3. As both a member of the company and of society, each employee will focus on the 
importance of making efforts to preserve human health and the global environment, 
and will do his or her part to ensure that the company as a whole acts responsibly. 
4. We will consider the influence that our corporate activities have on the regional 
environment and society, and endeavor to improve the social standing of the company. 
 
Established and announced in June 1992 
 
Nissan 
 
Executive Statement 
 
For Nissan, our corporate vision of “Enriching People’s Lives” embraces protecting our 
environment. We firmly believe that a sound environmental policy is at the core of a sound 
business practice. 
There is a strong interest in the world today about how to balance economic 
development with environmental protection. Economic growth does not necessarily threaten 
the environment. To the contrary, investments in technology can greatly benefit our 
understanding of the world we live in and how to preserve it. Collaboration among 
corporations, civic organisations, governments, and society in general will help move the 
world toward an effective balance between a healthy environment and healthy growth. 
As a global corporation, Nissan places a high priority on sound environmental 
management. Our approach is twofold: we take actions to provide real-world value today, and 
we develop actions to create cleaner products and a cleaner world in the future. 
Today, our efforts to fulfill our responsibilities to protect and sustain the environment 
are far-reaching. Within our company, we promote the highest levels of practice in every 
region and in every area of our operations. Eliminating landfill waste, reducing waste 
emissions, conserving natural resources, and enhancing recycling activities are a daily 
emphasis in our manufacturing and sales/service operations. We take care to reduce 
environmental impacts at every stage of our products’ lifecycle–from production, sales, 
service, and use through disposal and recycling. At present, 90% of a new Nissan vehicle is 
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recyclable, and efforts from the earliest stages of development emphasise making all our 
vehicles easier to disassemble and recycle. 
In our products, we continue to work on cleaner exhaust emissions and increased fuel 
economy. More and more Nissan models are offered with continuously variable transmissions 
(CVT), which provide better fuel economy and better performance. Approximately 90% of 
new Nissan vehicles sold in Japan and, increasingly, in other parts of the world, are certified 
as ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEV), and we are pushing our lead further with super ultra-
low emission vehicles (SU-LEV). Our Bluebird Sylphy was the first car ever to be certified as 
a SU-LEV. 
Aside from its contribution to cleaner air, perhaps the greatest benefit of U-LEV 
technology is its affordability. We recognise that if the price of a vehicle ends up being higher 
than the value perceived by the customer, then even the best of new technologies will fail in 
the market. ULEV technology is efficient, affordable, and widely available to consumers, 
providing a real improvement in air quality today. 
All these actions, and many more, are important for the world we live in today, but that 
is only half the story. We are pressing forward on research and development for future benefits 
as well. 
Our investments span numerous technologies. We are working with several research 
institutions on solutions to the issue of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, a major contribution 
to global warming. In 2003, we launched the X-TRAIL fuel cell vehicle in Japan, and our 
FCV research continues on many fronts. We are also developing hybrid electric vehicle 
technologies with Toyota, and our first model, an Altima Hybrid, will be introduced to the 
United States market in 2006. We are continuing to invest in improving gasoline engines and 
diesels, in alternative fuels and other technologies so that we will be ready to respond quickly 
when the market moves in any given direction. 
For today and for the future, our commitment is to create products that our customers 
will value even as we make real and lasting improvements that will benefit the earth we all 
live in. Keeping that commitment is both good citizenship and good business. 
 
Carlos Ghosn 
President and chief executive officer 
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. 
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I am pleased to introduce Nissan’s first Sustainability Report. 
Sustainability is an integral part of what Nissan is and does. In every decision we make, 
we aim for consistency between short-term goals and actions and long-term strategy. Whether 
the topic is product design, technology, brand identity, profitability, or environmental and 
social measures, we systematically look at both the short- and long-term consequences of our 
decisions. We will not accept short-term gains if it means compromising our future needs or 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
 
Three areas of focus: environment, governance, and corporate citizenship 
 
To Nissan, contributing to sustainable development means taking proactive action in three 
primary areas – the environment, governance, and corporate citizenship. 
Especially in the field of the environment, there is a need to take measures that allow 
for compatibility among economic growth, human development, and respect for the natural 
environment. We share public concerns about major environmental issues such as global 
warming, and we agree that precautions are needed to allow economic development to 
continue. In our view, protecting the environment is the single most important aspect of 
sustainability. 
In addition to disciplined environmental management at all our plants and operations, 
Nissan develops environmental technologies and solutions that are feasible in the market. 
Customers want environmentally friendly cars, but they expect a sound value proposition, so 
we have to find solutions that are affordable to ensure that they will be adopted. One 
successful solution is our offer of ultralow emission vehicles, or U-LEVs in Japan. U-LEVs 
help keep the air clean, and they also make sense to customers in economic terms. Introducing 
super ultra-low emission vehicles (SU-LEVs), such as the Bluebird Sylphy introduced on the 
market in 2003, was a natural extension of our U-LEV strategy. Nissan is continuing research 
and investment in other environmental technologies, such as hybrids and fuel cells, but we 
realise that economic viability – or, from the customer’s point of view, affordability – is 
crucial to the acceptance and success of new technologies. 
You will find an overview of our environmental activities in this report, and detailed 
information is published in a separate Environmental Report. 
 444
A second area of focus for Nissan is governance. At a time when corporate governance 
is under scrutiny and greater transparency is being requested from businesses around the world, 
I am proud of the fact that Nissan has achieved every single commitment made in the business 
plans we have implemented since 1999. We present clear plans for the future direction of the 
company and, with the Nissan Management Way, we have established a clear governance 
system. Transparency is a priority, not only in our business plans, but also in our commitments 
to shareholders. Nissan is the only global automotive company that has provided a dividend 
policy offering three years of visibility. Making and keeping commitments is important, both 
for motivating people inside our company and for building trust and respect among people 
around our company. We are convinced that operating with a high level of integrity and 
transparency makes us a more competitive company. 
Sound corporate citizenship is our third area of focus, but we recognise that it is 
impossible for us to deliver on every item that interests our various stakeholders. We have 
chosen three main areas of corporate citizenship action – namely, education, the environment, 
and providing humanitarian relief when necessary. Young people inherit the future, so 
investing in education clearly contributes to sustainable development. Environmental research 
is also future-oriented. If we devastate the earth’s resources, progress will not happen. And 
assisting communities in times of great need is another priority. We want to use resources to 
help relieve the pain and difficulty of people who are struck by disaster. 
 
A baseline for progress 
 
This Sustainability Report presents a new and integrated look at our approach to the issue of 
sustainable development and the ways in which we are carrying out our corporate 
responsibilities. We think this report will serve as a baseline for further progress in the years to 
come. Even though Nissan is making progress in many of the areas we are addressing as a 
company, we are continually learning, listening, and making improvements. We realise that 
we are far from reaching our full potential, and we still have a lot of work to do. 
I am not a pessimist when it comes to the future. Amazing technological advances 
have been made in the last few decades, and greater advances are sure to continue. The real 
challenge for the future is to develop technologies and to work on regulations to allow all 
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people on the earth to enjoy a positive lifestyle without compromising future sustainability. 
This is a race where technology must go first and open horizons to allow more people to 
participate in economic development. This is an area where global corporations such as Nissan 
can make a great contribution to society. 
“Enriching People’s Lives” is our vision. This means building a sustainable future for 
all our stakeholders today and for future generations to come. As you read this report, I hope 
you gain a greater understanding of what our company stands for and how we conduct our 
business. I am committed to ensuring that we at Nissan keep our motivation high and use our 
knowledge, skills, and resources wisely. I invite you to share with us your thoughts about this 
report, and I welcome your constructive comments. 
 
Carlos Ghosn 
President and chief executive officer 
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. 
 
Vision Statement 
 
Nissan’s Perspective 
 
Global environmental issues that surround the automobile are complex and diverse. In this 
section, we discuss Nissan’s perspective on global environmental issues and our level of 
awareness in approaching these issues. Nissan’s perspective is to look toward the future, 
aiming to attain a symbiosis of people, vehicles, and nature. 
 
Providing Cleaner Vehicles to More Customers 
 
Our mission is to provide safe and comfortable mobility. At the same time, we cannot deny 
that vehicles have an impact on the environment. Given this, we at Nissan believe that we 
must steer the vehicle itself in a direction that is in better balance with the environment. 
After careful consideration of how to address the environmental impact of automobiles, 
we chose to make more than 80% of our gasoline passenger vehicles sold in Japan ultra-low 
emission vehicles (U-LEV). 
U-LEV is a low-emission vehicle that by definition has achieved emissions 75% below 
year 2000 emissions standards for nitrogen oxide (NOx) and hydrocarbon (HC). Achieving the 
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U-LEV standard for 80% of our gasoline passenger vehicles would have almost the same 
effect regarding NOx and HC reduction as selling 400,000 zero emission vehicles, such as fuel 
cell vehicles or electric vehicles, every year in Japan. 
We believe that Nissan’s most effective means of solving environmental issues is 
through the rapid application of this highly effective technology, to provide more customers 
with clean energy vehicles at a more affordable price. Our continuous adoption of these types 
of realistic approaches is a dominant characteristic of Nissan’s environmental management. 
Finding solutions to present-day global environmental issues is of course important, 
but also we must look ahead to the future. Nissan is putting effort into the research and 
development of fuel cell vehicles, electric vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles, and natural gas 
vehicles. 
While we cannot predict what the major trends in mobility will be for the coming 
generations, we believe that the future will be multifaceted. Therefore, we are determined to 
make technological advancements while visualising every possible future scenario. 
 
Nissan’s Environmental Approach - From the Time of Rapid Growth and Onward 
 
Nissan’s environmental efforts date back to the company’s period of rapid growth. It was 
during this time, from the 1960s to the 1970s, when pollution problems, the downside of rapid 
growth, began to come under close scrutiny. 
In 1972, Nissan established an environmental management department at our head 
office and an environmental management division at each plant in order to manage the 
disposal of substances with an environmental impact. 
In 1973, when the oil shocks swept across the globe, energy management and 
improvements in fuel economy inevitably became topics of concern. We made full use of our 
technological capabilities to improve the fuel efficiency of our cars and worked to improve the 
efficiency of our manufacturing systems. 
After the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Summit), we 
established an Environment Management Committee in 1993 and created a Mid-term 
Environmental Action Plan. We then established an Energy Conservation Committee and a 
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Waste Reduction Committee, putting increased efforts into finding ways to tackle 
environmental issues. 
In 1994, the United Nations University (Tokyo, Japan) launched the Zero Emissions 
Research Initiative. Zero emissions is not limited to the recycling and reuse of waste produced 
through business activities. This concept also captures the idea of infinitely bringing the 
amount of waste produced closer to zero by creating cycles between corporate sectors. Nissan 
has since adopted the concept of life cycle assessment (LCA). 
In 1997, Japan made a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 6% through 
the Kyoto Protocol adopted at the Third Conference of Parties to the UN Convention on 
Climate Change (COP3). For Nissan, curbing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions has become a 
top priority. 
Within this history, a big challenge for Nissan came with the implementation of the 
exhaust emissions regulations that accompanied rapid motorisation in the 1970s. Beginning in 
the US, followed by Japan, demands from society regarding exhaust emissions became 
increasingly strict. 
In view of this major issue, Nissan gathered its technical capabilities and moved 
forward in developing technology to reduce exhaust emissions. In 1965, five years earlier than 
the government-mandated deadline, Nissan completed the production of a vehicle with an 
installed emissions reduction device. 
Even more strict emissions regulations were established in the 1970 Muskie Act in the 
US and in the Japanese version of the Muskie Act, which is a 1976 regulation announced in 
Japan in 1975. How would Nissan satisfy the regulations criteria without diminishing 
performance? To meet this challenge, improvements were gradually made to engine and 
oxidation catalyst technology. 
Through the accumulation of technology over the years, Nissan’s clean exhaust 
technology has reached world class levels. For instance, the 2000 Sentra CA sold in the US 
was the first gasoline vehicle to receive PZEV＊certification by the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB). 
Especially because social conditions are always changing, we have improved the 
technological capacities in the production of our vehicles and have continued to pursue 
 448
voluntary initiatives in seeking the best road to take as an automobile manufacturer, while 
understanding the influence that our products have on society and the environment 
 
Three Key Issues 
 
And now, in what is being called the “Environmental Century,” we are reflecting upon our 
efforts to tackle environmental issues. There are many environmental issues that we must deal 
with as an automobile manufacturer; for instance, reducing vehicle noise or protecting the 
ozone layer through air-conditioner refrigerant emissions controls. In recognition of this, 
Nissan has identified three key issues which we regard with particular importance. They are: 
curbing global warming; protection of the air, water, and soil; and resources recycling. 
Our focus is evolving: from better energy management triggered by the oil shocks to 
the “curbing of global warming” promoted by the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol; from 
efforts in meeting pollution measures as well as exhaust emissions regulations to the 
“protection of the air, water, and soil”; and from the concept of zero emissions, issues 
concerning locations for waste disposal, and the introduction of LCA to “resources recycling.” 
Starting on page 19 of this report, we attempt to convey Nissan’s intentions regarding 
these three key issues. 
 
Overcoming Dilemmas in Creating a Society with a Symbiosis of People, Vehicles, and 
Nature 
 
Nissan is now faced with a new situation. 
First of all, society is demanding a shift from conventional environmental management 
to consolidated environmental management, to include our consolidated subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, this is not only restricted to related companies, but Nissan must take 
responsibility for management practices at all points in the supply chain. As Nissan is moving 
toward global management, we are still coming to grips with the full scope of our 
responsibilities. 
In addition, environmental issues affecting automobile manufacturers are much more 
diverse today than in the past. One example is the issue of biodiversity. Until now, we have 
taken ecological factors into consideration in the construction of our plants. However, how are 
we to handle the destruction of ecology during road construction, or accidents related to our 
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vehicles coming into contact with animals? Nissan has not yet been able to come up with 
solutions to fully address these problems. 
Out of the complex and continually more diverse environmental issues, we must 
identify those of particular importance to Nissan and then work toward their solution. To do 
this, Nissan has started two activities. One is a dialogue with our stakeholders. Another is our 
participation in the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 
For an automobile manufacturer, development of technology to control CO2 emissions 
during vehicle use is crucial. At the same time, we believe that it is extremely important for 
our customers to be conscious about conserving energy when driving. We want to see 
automobile manufacturers, customers, and society as a whole come together in tackling 
environmental issues. Nissan held the first stakeholder dialogue in 2003. Opinion leaders from 
various fields have given us insight into perspectives that are new to Nissan and have provided 
us with constructive feedback. 
What will be expected of Nissan in the future? In what way will Nissan be expected to 
contribute to the development of future society? Nissan would like to learn and take in as 
much information as we can through stakeholder dialogues and apply the knowledge gained to 
our next challenges. 
In addition, Nissan is a participant in the WBCSD Sustainable Mobility Project. 
Together with other member companies, we have been engaging in discussions regarding the 
future of mobility. The results of the discussions have been compiled into the report, “Mobility 
2030: Meeting the Challenges to Sustainablity,” which proposes seven targets including the 
reduction of exhaust emissions and the control of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although sustainable mobility is beyond the scope of a single company, we realise that 
the role that technology plays is extremely important, and that one company also has a 
tremendous responsibility. 
Nissan’s stance on environmental issues is not pessimistic. We are facing 
unprecedented hardships, but these are also new, valuable opportunities to take on challenges 
of an unprecedented scale. 
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As we face global environmental issues, we will act with a sense of volition. We will 
turn every issue we face into a motivating force for improvement as we aspire for a society 
with a symbiosis of people, vehicles, and nature. 
Respecting the global environment is the most important aspect of our journey toward 
sustainable development. At the same time, in order to allow all people across the world to 
enjoy a prosperous lifestyle, further industrial development is a necessity. 
Continued innovation is crucial to achieve a balance between economic development 
and the protection of the natural environment. At Nissan, we view this as a major challenge. 
Innovation is taking place in many areas. The birth of the super ultra-low emission 
vehicle, with exhaust gas that is almost as clean as the air, is one example of innovation. 
Environmentally friendly products can become effective when they are more widely 
popular. But for that to happen, it is essential that customers are satisfied with the price of 
these products. To meet this requirement, we have focused our efforts on realistic 
technological  developments while taking on a multitude of technological innovations. 
Keeping nature and industry in balance while opening the way to the future through the 
development of credible technologies: at Nissan, we view this as our mission. 
 
Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
The foundation of Nissan’s environmental protection initiatives 
 
Based on our environmental philosophy and policies, Nissan’s environmental initiatives work 
toward the creation of a sustainable society. To this end, Nissan is developing environmental 
systems and structures that serve as the foundation for our global environmental initiatives. 
 
Nissan’s Environmental Philosophy and Policies 
 
At Nissan, we developed our vision and mission in 2002 with the goal of sharing our mid- to 
long-term vision of the ideal company with all employees, which we are now sharing with all 
Nissan group companies worldwide. Our vision, “Enriching People’s Lives,” demonstrates 
one of our longstanding corporate values, while our mission demonstrates the role the 
company should play in pursuing it. Furthermore, we established guiding principles to help 
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our employees understand the actions and behaviours they should take in pursuit of our 
mission. Nissan works to create a corporate culture that inspires the entire company to join 
together in meeting common goals based on our vision, mission, and guiding principles. 
(Please refer to page 2 for our vision, mission, and guiding principles.) 
To realise one of our guiding principles, to be “customer focused and environmentally 
friendly,” we developed our environmental philosophy and environmental policy. We believe 
it is our social mission to conduct our business based on our philosophy and guiding principles 
to help build a sustainable and recycling-based society. 
 
Nissan’s Environmental Philosophy  
 
Symbiosis of people, vehicles and nature. 
It is our view that the basis of environmental protection lies in the human capacity to 
show kindness and concern. Along with striving to understand the environment better, all of us 
at Nissan bring a shared concern for people, society, nature and the Earth to bear on our 
activities.  
This commitment and concern are embodied in every Nissan product and throughout 
all of the company's operations as the driving forces of Nissan's ongoing contributions to the 
advancement and enrichment of society.  
 
Action Policy 
 
1. To promote creative activities 
2. To advance comprehensive activities 
3. To foster cooperative activities 
 
Environmental Policy  
 
Nissan is taking the initiative to promote wide-ranging activities aimed at improving the 
environment both globally and localy in line with the guidelines noted here. These efforts are 
being pursued in all areas of the company’s operations, including product development, 
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manufacturing, sales and service, in order to make Nissan’s Environmental Philosophy a 
reality.  
 
1. Achieving a cleaner automotive society 
 
Nissan aims to reduce the environmental impact at every stage of the vehicle life cycle, 
namely product development, manufacturing, use and disposal, in order to create a cleaner 
living environment. Besides working to improve vehicles themselves, Nissan also contributes 
to the improvement of social systems involving vehicle use. 
 
2. Conserving natural resources and energy 
 
Because the earth’s natural resources and energy supplies are finite, Nissan is advancing 
efforts to minimise their consumption at every stage of the vehicle life cycle. 
 
3. Expanding and continuously improving Nissan’s environmental management system 
 
Nissan is implementing an in-house environmental management system that conforms to the 
environmental management system standard formulated by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO). 
Preventing environmental issues in the first place and observing laws and regulations. 
• Observing laws and regulations is the first step toward environmental protection. 
Nissan’s environmental measures go far beyond simple compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements to address the actual environmental circumstances of the local 
area. 
• Prior environmental impact assessments are conducted when mapping our new plans 
for product development projects or manufacturing processes. In this way, every effort 
is made to prevent environmental issues in the first place. 
Cultivating a corporate culture dedicated to environmental protection. 
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• Extensive educational activities are conducted in-house with the aim of cultivating a 
corporate culture in which everyone from senior management on down is positively 
committed to the resolution of environmental concerns. 
Undertaking cooperative activities with subsidiaries and affiliates. 
• Nissan works closely with its subsidiaries and affiliates at home and abroad on ways to 
address environmental issues. 
Strengthening communications and cooperation with customers. 
• The cooperation of customers is indispensable to environmental protection at the stage 
where Nissan products are used. In line with this understanding, Nissan provides 
information and undertakes educational activities as part of its efforts to work closely 
with customers on protecting the environment. 
4. Issuing reports on environmental activities  
 
Nissan regularly issues announcements and publications explaining the company’s efforts to 
address environmental concerns. 
 
General Motors 
 
Executive Statement 
 
Chairman's Message 
 
The global auto business grows more competitive every year. To succeed, to continue leading 
the industry as we have for the last 73 years, we at General Motors must work to be the best in 
every facet of our business, including the way we conduct our business. At GM, we are 
committed to leading not only with our products and business results, but economically, 
socially, and environmentally, as well. 
Economically, we believe in participating as a good corporate citizen in every market 
where we do business - creating jobs, seeding technology, contributing tax revenues, 
improving standards of living, supporting sustainable economic development. In 1977, we 
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were proud to become the first company to adopt Rev. Leon Sullivan’s “Sullivan Principles” 
and help hasten the end of apartheid in South Africa. Now, in 2004, we are thrilled to be 
returning full-time to South Africa to help build the nation‘s auto industry and the promise it 
represents for the citizens of South Africa. 
Socially, GM has a long history of supporting the communities where we do business, 
including minority communities. In 1968, GM established the auto industry’s first supplier 
diversity program. Since then, we have purchased more than $44 billion in goods and services 
from minority suppliers, including $7.2 billion in 2003 alone. In 1972, we were the first 
domestic automaker to institute a minority dealer development program. Today, we’re proud 
to have more than 400 minority-owned dealerships, more than any other company in the 
business. 
Environmentally, we continue to minimise the impact of the automobile on the world 
around us. In the US., we’ve launched a hybrid propulsion program focused on larger vehicles, 
like full-size trucks and SUV’s, because that’s where most of the fuel is consumed in the U.S.  
We’re currently conducting pilot programs in nine U.S. cities with our innovative GM hybrid 
transit buses, and in May 2004, delivered the first of 235 of these buses to King County, 
Washington. Our hybrid buses can deliver up to 60 percent better fuel economy than 
traditional transit buses, and could save as much as 750,000 gallons of fuel every year for 
King County. We continue to invest heavily in the development of hydrogen fuel cells. In June 
2004, our HydroGen3 demonstration vehicle established a new distance record for fuel-cell 
technology, travelling more than 6,000 miles in a 38-day marathon drive across Europe. And 
we continue to improve the environmental performance at our plants and facilities by 
increasing recycling and reducing waste generation, water and energy use, and emissions. We 
have established a goal of reducing our global greenhouse-gas emissions from our facilities by 
eight percent between 2000 and 2005, and we are making steady progress toward that target. 
At GM, we will continue to work toward innovative solutions to our society’s 
economic, social, and environmental challenges. We invite you to review our progress in this 
report, and to join us as we extend our practice of doing business the right way. 
 
Rick Wagoner 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
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Public Policy Centre Welcome 
 
Automakers, like all consumer product companies which compete on a global scale, flourish 
when economies are growing, societies are progressing, and people are constructively engaged 
in finding solutions to our present and future challenges. As people find work and live in 
stable, peaceful societies, there are increased opportunities for education and personal 
betterment. The rule of law is more likely to advance and prevail. Society, as a consequence, is 
better able to organise and address the wide range of inevitable challenges that require 
farsighted action. 
It is in our interest to work toward that type of world. There is much cooperation and 
effort required from all sectors of our world, national and local communities, to achieve and 
sustain this vision. 
Four elements comprise General Motors’ commitment to being a constructive 
corporate citizen globally, wherever we have operations or market our products and services. 
The first is our values and policies. We gladly subscribe to the Global Sullivan 
Principles for corporate conduct and encourage our business partners to do likewise. Our core 
values beckon us to match our words with our deeds. Our guidelines for employee conduct, 
called Winning With Integrity, inform our actions as we strive to conduct our business 
honestly, responsibly, and successfully. 
The second element is our conduct - our deeds, since we know we will be measured by 
what we do, and often the perception of what we do, much more than by what we say. Given 
our scale of operations, there is much to review in this area. But, a report on our behaviour 
must start with delivery on our promise to design, build and offer great cars and trucks that 
meet the full range of consumer needs and preferences in the markets where we compete. 
Great cars and trucks mean vehicles which offer outstanding value in terms of quality, 
reliability, performance, convenience and other attributes valued by our customers. General 
Motors is delivering on its promise, as evidenced by increasingly high marks being accorded 
for its product leadership. 
There are many other very important aspects of our business conduct that bear on our 
performance in the areas of corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. We 
monitor and measure the productivity and efficiency of our plants, what they emit into the 
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environment, and how well we are doing in eliminating waste from our processes and products. 
We challenge ourselves to innovate and are an industry leader in emissions technologies, 
safety enhancements, and future propulsion systems, including hybrids and fuel cells. Our 
record in protecting the health and safety of our workers is the best in the industry and among 
the best in the world. We also try to enrich the communities of which we are a part through 
investments in facilities, participation in civic projects, and support for philanthropic and 
humanitarian causes, especially ones that are related to our business or which affect the 
vitality of these communities. These and other aspects of our performance are summarised in 
this report. 
A third element of our program is engagement- with business partners, other 
corporations, NGOs, civic and charitable groups, and, of course, governments. Our recent joint 
activities and projects range from participation as a co-chair of the Sustainable Mobility 
Project of the World Business Council for Sustainable Mobility, to participation in many safe 
driving initiatives such as National Safe Kids and MADD, to regular dialogues with 
organisations such as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) and 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
These engagements influence our conduct. This 2004 Corporate Responsibility Report 
of General Motors has been prepared in accordance with the 2002 GRI guidelines. It 
represents a balanced and reasonable presentation of our organisation’s economic, 
environmental, and social performance. By cooperating with others to develop a common 
framework for balanced corporate reporting and selecting the guidelines under which we 
report through dialogue with various stakeholders, we become more transparent to the world 
which is the fourth element of our work in this area. 
I know General Motors and its many employees strive to be constructive influences in 
the community and to act responsibly in ways that consider the interests not only of our 
shareholders and employees, but the interests of all those impacted by what we do and say. 
This report provides our assessment of our progress and will enable the reader to be more 
informed of GM’s record of performance in being a force for a better world. 
 
Tom Gottschalk 
Executive Vice President - Law and Public Policy 
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Vision Statement 
 
At General Motors, we have been left an important legacy by those who went before us - a 
legacy of doing business the right way. This tradition represents a great asset for our company, 
but it also brings with it a tremendous responsibility. 
 
Vision 
 
GM’s vision is to be the world leader in transportation products and related services. We will 
earn our customers’ enthusiasm through continuous improvement driven by the integrity, 
teamwork and innovation of GM people. Becoming the best is an unending journey, a 
constantly changing destination. But that’s where we’re determined to drive - one car, one 
truck, one customer at a time. 
 
Values 
 
We have defined six core values to guide our global business conduct: 
1. Customer enthusiasm 
 
2. Integrity 
 
3. Teamwork 
 
4. Innovation 
 
5. Continuous improvement 
 
6. Individual respect and responsibility 
Our employees conduct their day-to-day business with the strong foundation of our 
core values. Integrity is one of our core values; we live it every day, with each decision we 
make and each action we take. Integrity transcends borders, language and culture; it’s all about 
creating an environment that supports, and demands, proper business conduct. Doing the right 
thing is not always convenient, but it’s essential to sustaining our culture of integrity and our 
leadership position in corporate responsibility. It means honest and accurate reporting of our 
performance, both internally and externally. It means competing - and succeeding - by the 
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rules, whether they are laws, regulations, or simply GM policy. It means making our actions 
match our words. 
 
Communicating Values Internally 
 
All six core values are outlined in a series of information booklets that we have circulated to 
all of our staff called .Winning with Integrity - Our Values and Guidelines for Employee 
Conduct. These guidelines demonstrate our global commitment to achieving business success 
with integrity, and cover personal integrity, integrity in the workplace, marketplace, society 
and its communities. We publish the guidelines in nine languages and also deploy them 
electronically via the GMability website. Each booklet discusses aspects of “Winning with 
Integrity” explaining our policies and expectations, with examples of situations employees 
might face, and suggestions of how they ought to deal with them.  “Winning with integrity” 
also describes four cultural priorities that we consider to be critical to the success of our 
business, they are: 
1. Enhance product and customer focus 
 
2. Act as one company 
 
3. Embrace stretch targets 
 
4. Move with a sense of urgency 
See the “Winning with Integrity” guidelines (only available online in English). 
 
Responsibility Vision 
 
At General Motors, we have long recognised the importance of government policies, 
international relations, environmental performance and labor and community responsibilities 
to our business. Recently, these issues have increased in visibility as the public, government, 
and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have looked to corporations and the private sector 
to play a leading role in addressing the impact of globalisation on living standards, economic 
development and environmental improvement.  
This makes our commitment to corporate responsibility more important than ever. Our 
values are clear and reflected in our Guidelines for Employee Conduct, as well as our 
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commitment to the Global Sullivan Principles. The principles, developed under the guidance 
of the late Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, are a guide for responsible corporate behavior, emphasising 
the common goals of human rights, social justice and economic opportunity. We use the 
principles as the foundation for our corporate responsibility initiatives and measure our 
performance against the principles using the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines.  
Innovation is a long-standing priority at GM, and our renewed commitment, our drive, 
is to build on that heritage. We’ve led in introducing innovative new technologies to the mass 
market. We focus on thinking beyond “the way it’s always been done” to new ways - better 
ways – it can be done. Working as a team, building a collective passion for new ideas, we 
strive for automotive innovation that stands out from the competition and results in great cars 
and trucks. 
We are also using innovation to reduce the environmental impacts of our plants. GM 
has reduced energy consumption from our facilities, eliminated the use of many materials in 
our production processes and developed innovative new approaches for reducing waste. We 
have also reduced the amount of material going to landfill in our North American operations 
by increasing the recycling and reuse of our waste materials as new useable products. In 
addition, we have initiated land-management initiatives in partnership with local governments 
to redevelop former GM manufacturing facilities and sites. Our goal is to convert these sites 
into productive, job-creating complexes that benefit local communities. 
We continue our focus on health and safety initiatives, and on developing the skills and 
capabilities globally of our workforce. We also are expanding our education initiatives at the 
community level.  Our long history of building strong partnerships with our employees, 
customers, investors, governments, communities, our dealers and others helps us to be 
responsive to the needs of our various stakeholders. By working with other businesses, 
governments and NGOs, we are making significant progress toward a responsible and 
sustainable future.  
GM realises its vision of industry leadership by operating our business the right way 
worldwide. Our responsibility lies in building great cars and trucks, and in balancing the 
environmental, social and economic impacts of our industry.  
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Our Products 
 
At GM, we are committed to providing our customers with “gotta have” products that are high 
quality and visually appealing, and to being leaders in fuel economy and safety. Every day our 
employees are looking for new and innovative ways to improve the products we manufacture. 
Whether it is using fuel cells to virtually eliminate emissions, or developing safety 
systems that can help drivers avoid crashes, GM is working to provide products that meet the 
needs of both our customers and society as a whole. 
 
Overview 
 
GM Global Technology Strategy 
 
Automotive leadership is demonstrated by companies that have applied and continue to apply 
the most innovative and appropriate technologies in ways that define and meet local customer 
and societal needs around the world. At GM, we approach the application of new technology 
to our vehicles with three simple and direct principles in mind: 
GM needs to offer vehicles that people want to buy. If no one buys the product, the 
new technology has no real impact. 
GM must meet basic business objectives. Technology cannot be sustained if 
automakers must heavily subsidise it.  In today’s competitive market - with razor-thin profit 
margins -success only comes from selling vehicles at a price customers will pay and by 
keeping production costs in line with those prices. 
GM has a responsibility to continue improving vehicle emissions and fuel economy. 
 
Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
The GM Environmental Principles, adopted in 1991, apply to our facilities, products and 
employees worldwide, and provide guidance in the conduct of daily business practices. Each 
of our plants have local environmental guidelines that build on and implement GM’s 
Environmental Principles. 
As a responsible corporate citizen, General Motors is dedicated to protecting human 
health, natural resources and the global environment. This dedication reaches further than 
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compliance with the law to encompass the integration of sound environmental practices into 
our business decisions. 
The following environmental principles provide guidance to General Motors personnel 
worldwide in the conduct of their daily business practices. 
1. We are committed to actions to restore and preserve the environment. 
2. We are committed to reducing waste and pollutants, conserving resources, and 
recycling materials at every stage of the product life cycle. 
3. We will continue to participate actively in educating the public regarding 
environmental conservation. 
4. We will continue to pursue vigorously the development and implementation of 
technologies for minimising pollutant emissions. 
5. We will continue to work with all governmental entities for the development of 
technically sound and financially responsible environmental laws and regulations. 
6. We will continually assess the impact of our plants and products on the environment 
and the communities in which we live and operate with a goal of continuous 
improvement. 
 
Ford 
 
Executive Statement 
 
Letter from Bill Ford 
Chairman and CEO 
 
Moving Our Vision from Concept to Reality 
 
When I became Chairman of Ford Motor Company five years ago, I pledged that we would 
distinguish ourselves as a great company through our efforts to make the world a better place. 
Shortly after that, we published our first Corporate Citizenship Report, which sketched the 
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broad outline of an expanded definition of corporate citizenship. In it, we made a public 
commitment to strengthen our connection with society and play an active role in bringing 
about the transition to greater economic, social and environmental sustainability. 
In the last five years we’ve had many successes and a few setbacks as we explored 
these new ideas and worked to turn them from aspiration to action. One thing that has not 
changed is my belief that improved sustainability performance is not just a requirement, but a 
tremendous business opportunity. I want our Company to be a leader in driving the transition 
and to be in a position to benefit from it. 
My family connects me to the automotive business in a unique way. I feel a special 
responsibility and pride in the contributions Ford makes to the quality of life of our employees, 
customers, business partners and neighbors worldwide. I am dedicated to ensuring that we are 
the best automotive company in the world, by any measure. 
 
Commitment to Candor 
 
Our Corporate Citizenship Reports are an ongoing account of our efforts to make that vision a 
reality. In our 1999 report, we were the first automaker to publicly acknowledge 
environmental and other concerns related to sport utility vehicles. In our 2000 report, we were 
among the first automakers that attempted to understand and estimate the global greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with the entire lifecycle of our vehicles, both new and those already 
on the road. And last year, we acknowledged and discussed not meeting our goal of improving 
SUV fuel economy by 25 percent by 2005. 
Such transparency is still uncommon in our industry. I view it simply as an 
acknowledgement and explanation of changing business realities. But some see it as an 
admission of failure, while others use it to question our intentions. Transparency and open 
dialogue can be uncomfortable at times, but I believe these are prerequisites for building the 
trust required to move forward. 
Dialogue presents an opportunity to understand other perspectives and approaches to 
issues. When we find ourselves disagreeing with people whose points of view we respect – 
which is inevitable – we need to offer viable alternatives. We must continue to work hard to 
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improve both our communication and our constructive participation in the search for workable 
and effective solutions to the important problems we face. 
On April 16, 2004, Ford Motor Company was presented with a North American 
Sustainability Reporting Award from the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (CERES) and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). The 
award was in recognition of excellence in sustainability reporting for our Corporate 
Citizenship Report released in 2003. It noted our candor in addressing our challenges as well 
as describing the progress we made. 
This award is one indication of how far we’ve come in the last five years. But we’ve 
done much more in that time than just write about the issues we face. Many of the concepts we 
sketched out when we began this process are becoming reality, and our business is changing in 
new and exciting ways. 
 
Five Years of Progress 
 
In recent years, by necessity, much of our focus has been on the economic dimension of 
sustainability. In January 2002, I announced a comprehensive, long-term plan to return Ford 
Motor Company to profitability. The first phase of our plan – stabilising our business and 
getting it back on a sound operational and financial foundation – is done. As a result of our 
continuing efforts, our overall financial results have improved by about $5 billion in two years, 
which is ahead of plan. Our employees, dealers and suppliers all contributed to this 
achievement, and each of us should feel proud of our accomplishments. 
Because of difficult economic conditions, it was important that we concentrated on 
short-term business issues. However, even as we worked to improve on the basics of our 
business, we did not ignore or forget about our long-term commitment. As a result, many of 
the projects that we embarked on when I became Chairman have already been completed or 
will be shortly. 
Our new Ford Escape Hybrid, which will reach dealer showrooms later this summer, is 
the cleanest and most fuel-efficient SUV in the world. It uses a combination of gasoline and 
electric power to deliver more than 35 miles per gallon in city driving without compromising 
versatility or performance. The hybrid system also meets the strictest emissions standards. 
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New technology that offers customers no-compromise solutions to concerns about fuel 
prices and greenhouse gases is becoming a major competitive advantage in our industry. The 
fastest way to bring about the transition we are seeking is through the market and competition.  
We plan to be at the forefront and differentiate ourselves in an industry in which this is 
becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. 
In addition to the Escape Hybrid, we will market a hybrid version of the Mercury 
Mariner compact SUV in 2006, and a hybrid midsize car after that. We are also developing a 
range of advanced technologies to help us move to the next step.  We are developing a full 
range of production and research vehicles intended to help chart a course to a hydrogen-
powered future. Our research fleet includes vehicles powered by hybrid and nonhybrid 
hydrogen internal-combustion engines and dozens of Focus fuel cell vehicles that we are 
deploying in the United States, Canada and Germany. 
To secure their role in providing mobility to a growing and changing world, 
automobiles of the future must have dramatically lower smog-forming and greenhouse gas 
emissions. That future will become a reality, and we will be driving that change. I have asked 
a group of our senior leaders to develop a sensible approach to the issues of climate change, 
energy security and fuel economy. Some of their viewpoints are shared in this report. Their 
work will drive our product development. It is a key element in building our Company for the 
next 100 years. 
Another recently completed project that points toward our vision of the future is the 
renovation of the Ford Rouge Center in Dearborn, Michigan. The goal of what we called the 
Heritage Project was to transform our Rouge complex – which was built more than 85 years 
ago as the world’s first totally integrated manufacturing site – into a model of sustainable 
manufacturing. To do that, we combined advanced environmental technologies within a 
world-class lean manufacturing center. 
The renovations included a new lean and green manufacturing facility, the Dearborn 
Truck Plant, which recently began producing F-150s. It is the first all-new assembly plant built 
in the Rouge complex since it was first developed, and our first anywhere in the United States 
in more than 25 years.  We built it on an existing site because of our legacy at the Rouge and 
our strong commitment to our employees and the local community. 
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Dearborn Truck, which is the flagship of our all-new, next-generation flexible 
manufacturing system, is also clean, energy efficient and environmentally friendly. It features 
the world’s largest “living roof,” with more than 10 acres of sedum plants that help to clean 
the air, generate oxygen and manage stormwater runoff. 
In renovating the Ford Rouge Center, we drew on the inspirations of our past and our 
aspirations for the future. In a way it has become a very real symbol of where Ford Motor 
Company is going – building on our heritage, but reinventing and redefining it for the 21st 
century. 
We are eager to share this new icon of sustainable manufacturing with the world. To 
do that, we are reinventing another great tradition from our past – the Rouge tour. In 
partnership with The Henry Ford, America’s Greatest History Attraction, we are once again 
inviting the world to come to Dearborn and see how automobiles are made. 
We have made real progress in a number of other areas. To clarify our intentions 
internally and externally, we developed a comprehensive set of Business Principles. The 
Principles are now being embedded into our planning processes and performance scorecards, 
making explicit our high standards regarding products and customers, the environment, safety, 
community, quality of relationships, financial health and accountability. To address human 
rights in our facilities and our supply chain, we engaged with internal and external partners to 
develop the most stringent Code of Basic Working Conditions in the automotive industry, 
which we are now in the process of implementing. 
We are taking our philosophy of being profitable and responsible to other emerging 
markets around the world. Projections show that the Asia- Pacific region will be the fastest-
growing market for the automotive industry in the coming decade, with China accounting for 
the largest part of that growth. We have plans to be aggressive in participating in that growth 
and strengthening our presence in the region. I believe that more sustainable business practices 
are critical in realising those goals. 
 
Looking Ahead 
 
Our ultimate goal is to build great products, a strong business and a better world. As with the 
vehicles we create, this goal is evolving over time from initial concept to final product. We 
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know that true leadership will require strong vision and values, as well as perseverance and 
patience. It also will require dedicated leaders and active partners. 
This report includes the perspectives of some of the pioneers, from inside and outside 
the Company, on the transformation that is occurring and how we are responding. I invite you 
to read their comments, learn about the steps we are taking and join us in bringing our 
commitment from concept to reality. 
 
Vision Statement 
 
There is no clear, distinct section that outlines the vision of Ford in the 2003-04 report.  The 
(long) Chairman’s letter appears to be the vehicle for this.  Reporting is then done against 
Ford’s Business Principles (see below).  Therefore, the rest of the report examines how the 
company is meeting its business principles and objectives, so that the ‘vision’ is never really 
expressed in one place, other than in the business principles.  However, throughout the report a 
variety of ‘voices’ from within the firm as well as external to it are quoted in the relevant 
sections.  The ones commenting on environmental factors are copied below. 
 
Susan Brennan 
Director, Manufacturing – Vehicle Operations 
 
As part of the yearly business planning process, Vehicle Operations does a “gap analysis” to 
see how our actions and results stack up against the manufacturing scorecard. In 2003, we 
added a check and balance against each of the seven Business Principles. We wanted to make 
sure there was alignment among the Business Principles, what we do and what we measure – 
both on paper and in intent. 
The scorecard integrates well with the Principles. Take the Community Principle, for 
example. Our plants have a major impact. If we are not the largest employer in any given 
community, we are one of them. Our employees contribute a great deal to the community. We 
are responsible for providing a safe and healthy environment for both employees and 
community members. So, in practice, there is strong integration among the Community 
Principle, the scorecard measures and our actions. That gives us accountability. Now we must 
continue to support our plants with tools that enhance what they are doing. 
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Beyond manufacturing, I’ve been part of a team looking at climate change and the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This is an area where we need greater alignment 
between our aspirations and actions. Times are changing; I hear more questions about fuel 
economy. It’s an attribute that is being placed higher on our customers’ decision tree – and our 
own. 
Given Ford’s strong problem-solving culture, our team has spent time first defining the 
problem before we start fixing it. This approach holds as true for greenhouse gas emissions as 
it does for critical business issues like quality. 
The product side is where this gets exciting, because one way of shifting the internal 
culture is getting people to recognise fuel economy – as J.D. Power already does – as a quality 
issue. This discussion inside the Company couldn’t have happened at a better time. As the 
culture and opinions evolve, we’re finally hitting the wall with the concept of “bigger is 
better.” 
Ford Motor Company is at a crossroads. We must choose the right path on climate 
change. Our customers are demanding accountability from us in this area. It’s a leadership 
choice that should not be dictated to us by the government, because sound business drivers are 
in place. We must deliver, and I am convinced that we’re going to do just that. 
 
Fran Leedham 
Group Environment Manager, Jaguar and Land Rover 
 
“Sustainable development” is a priority at Jaguar and Land Rover, and appears in our 
corporate business plan and scorecard. This enabled us to begin to develop a comprehensive 
and balanced set of sustainability requirements. 
It is essential that Jaguar and Land Rover balances and integrates its economic, social 
and environmental responsibilities. This is highly cross-functional, requiring all areas to make 
a contribution. Our internal governance structures support implementation and monitor 
delivery of the requirements. 
Our scorecard process, with the identification of business priorities and creation of 
supporting deployment actions and clear metrics, enables recognition at all levels. It elevates 
performance in the area of sustainable development to sit alongside other business imperatives. 
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A key element of business integration is the Ford Business Principles, which provide 
strategic direction and a framework of global and corporate values. The Principles establish 
the highest levels of operation across the Ford family of brands. The development of our 
scorecard and, in particular, the sustainable development priority, is linked to the Principles. 
Through 2004, we will continue to map our activities to demonstrate alignment and to identify 
gaps and opportunities. One of the benefits of the Business Principles is that they offer high-
level values without being overly prescriptive, thereby enabling the brands to develop the most 
appropriate delivery mechanisms. 
However, integration is more than just lining up what we are currently doing against 
the Business Principles and communicating it. We must recognise the responsibilities that 
come with being a major, global organisation and the influences we have, both positive and 
negative. Adopting a set of principles means we must uphold these values in our decisions and 
our actions to make the commitment real. This is the challenge sustainable development 
presents. While I’m certain we’ll get there, it’s going to take time and creativity. 
 
Phil Martens 
Group Vice President, Product Creation 
 
As a company operating in markets around the world, we have the advantage of a global 
perspective. One of our challenges is to effectively apply what we learn from that perspective 
across the entire Company. 
Having spent considerable time in Europe and Japan, I’ve had the opportunity to see 
how different societal and environmental conditions influence attitudes towards fuel economy. 
Congestion, high fuel prices and public awareness have resulted in a stronger demand for fuel-
efficient vehicles in these places. The technology to improve efficiency and reduce emissions 
differs, however. In Europe, diesels are approaching half of all new car sales, and four-
cylinder engines dominate the landscape. In Japan, hybrids are making headway. There is no 
single global solution. 
In North America, there are mixed and often conflicting signals from the market. On 
the one hand, our customers want better fuel economy to benefit their pocketbook and the 
environment, as well as address concerns they have about energy security. However, 
horsepower, handling and performance capture imaginations and influence purchases. 
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The competitive and technological landscape is changing this dynamic. Today, fuel 
efficiency and environmental performance are significant competitive battlegrounds. 
Technologies like hybrids and clean diesels are beginning to resonate. 
It’s not that our customers want these environmental benefits at any expense. Quite the 
opposite. They’re saying they want it all at little additional cost. They don’t want tradeoffs 
between environmental performance and the power, comfort and safety they’ve grown to 
expect. Our products must reflect this “no compromises” attitude. Look no further than the 
Ford Escape Hybrid to see how well this view actually fits with our brands and culture. 
We learned a great deal about product development through engineering the Escape 
Hybrid. We developed our own leading-edge hybrid system to build our technology 
capabilities in-house. We figured out how to marry the primary demands of our customers for 
performance, features and value with their desire for environmental benefits. 
The market isn’t standing still, and neither are we. Our re-energised product-creation 
process is providing a true competitive advantage. This is key to our product-led future. 
 
Jim Gouin 
Vice President and Controller 
 
In finance, various groups and institutions are starting to discuss and quantify how climate 
change and greenhouse gas emissions might affect the income-producing power, and therefore 
value, of assets. This is particularly relevant for industries and firms like ours that currently 
rely on carbon intensive processes or products. 
Research is emerging that analyzes the nature and magnitude of potential risks to 
corporate value related to greenhouse gas emissions. Key financial service sectors are 
beginning to factor the potential effects of climate change into their decision making. This 
includes risk avoidance as well as opportunities for investment in new technologies that can 
reduce greenhouse gases. Pension fund managers and administrators globally, including a 
number of U.S. state and local treasurers convened by CERES, have joined together to discuss 
the financial risks they may face because of investments in companies whose products and 
services have an adverse effect on climate change. 
The growth in this activity is understandable. Mechanisms to measure and ultimately 
control greenhouse gas emissions are starting to emerge, including schemes to “trade” carbon 
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credits. While currently voluntary in nature, these schemes could become real constraints with 
mandatory compliance. If that happens, companies will need strategies to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to succeed in an increasingly “carbon-constrained” world.  
Compelling evidence exists to support the conclusion that global warming will 
continue. The challenge for Ford is to identify strategies and actions that can deliver 
meaningful improvements in greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining sustainable and 
acceptable financial returns. Often these objectives are at odds – which is one of the primary 
reasons we cannot always move as fast as we might like. Looking ahead, one of our key roles 
will be to ensure that Ford’s decision models and reporting metrics provide an appropriate 
balance between both the short-term costs and long-term benefits related to actions that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
There is often a risk for strategic issues like this to be “overshadowed” by pressing 
near-term traditional business issues. However, we at Ford realise that starting early and 
regularly monitoring our progress on the issue of climate change is critical to our long-term 
corporate viability and financial success. 
 
Dave Szczupak 
Vice President, Powertrain Operations 
 
Hybrid electric vehicles are grabbing plenty of attention these days. They offer an exciting 
alternative – one that does not sacrifice performance or convenience. The early interest in our 
Escape Hybrid has been so encouraging that we will be offering full hybrid powertrains in two 
more models – the Mercury Mariner and our new midsize sedan. These vehicles will help us 
create a mass market for hybrids and continue to make them more affordable. 
But hybrids aren’t the only game in town. We are in various stages of bringing to 
market advanced gasoline, clean diesel, hydrogen and fuel cell powertrains. No one is sure 
which combination of technologies will ultimately prevail, but we are confident that 
alternatives to traditional gasoline engine powertrains will continue to emerge. Winning 
technologies will need to have significantly better fuel economy and lower lifecycle emissions 
while meeting customer expectations of safety, availability, reliability, driveability and cost. 
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So we are working along several different paths – advancing the science, improving 
the engineering and working with others on broader issues. We want to ensure that we prepare 
for changing markets and also help bring about the change. 
As we began to consider a comprehensive strategy on climate change, we asked 
several environmental organisations and activist groups to work with us, provide advice and 
exchange points of view. Some of us in the operational side of the business did not know what 
to expect, though we knew we would be talking with some of our toughest critics. And we 
genuinely wanted to hear the perspective they bring to the issue. 
We sat at the table and listened to – and learned from – views quite different from our 
own. We didn’t – and still don’t – agree on everything: how far, how fast and how much. But 
we do agree that climate change is real and requires significant change across many industries, 
including our own. We found common ground around the need to build markets for the new 
technologies we’re developing. And we agreed on a range of issues that must be addressed to 
develop viable solutions. 
We will continue to engage with external groups in our plans going forward. I believe 
the exchange will result in better plans and better products. 
 
Sheri Shapiro 
Marketing Manager, Escape Hybrid 
 
There are many preconceived notions as to who is interested in purchasing hybrids. We’re 
learning that these customers are “opinion influencers.” They are the go-to people, the ones 
most often asked for opinions or advice. They are naturally curious about technology and its 
benefits and thus, research products more than the average customer. They care about leaving 
the world a better place for their children and grandchildren. They tend to be leaders in their 
communities. 
These consumers want to buy products from companies that share their values. They 
are asking us, “What else are you doing environmentally?” So we’re reaching out and 
communicating about our commitment, inviting people to do things like drive the vehicles, 
tour the Rouge facility or sign up for our e-newsletter to receive the most up-to-date 
information on the Escape Hybrid and other environmental initiatives. 
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We’ve had positive impressions so far. People love the look of the vehicle – that it 
doesn’t look different – just a few key visual cues tell you it’s a hybrid. They find it 
comfortable and roomy. They enjoy the on-board display and seeing which mode the 
 
Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
(These are Ford’s Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines, Available in total from 
http://www.ford.com/en/company/about/corporateCitizenship/report/overviewPrinciples.htm, 
accessed 4 January 2005, also broken down and reported against in separate sections in the 
2003/04 Corporate Citizenship Report)  
 
Ford Motor Company is committed to creating value for our shareholders over the long term 
through the delivery of excellent automotive products and services and to do so ethically and 
responsibly. These Principles will guide our decisions and actions globally. As a whole, they 
set the standards by which we judge ourselves and by which we hope to be judged by others.  
 
Products and customers 
 
We will offer excellent products and services.  We will achieve this by: 
• Focusing on customer satisfaction and loyalty and keeping our promises. 
• Using our understanding of the market to anticipate customer needs. 
• Delivering innovative products and services that offer high value in terms of function, 
price, quality, safety and environmental performance. 
 
Safety 
 
We will protect the safety and health of those who make, distribute or use our products.  We 
will achieve this by: 
• Working to create the safest possible workplace. 
• Striving to continuously reduce the risk of accidents, injuries and fatalities involving 
our products. 
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• Striving to protect people and property. 
 
Financial health 
 
We will make our decisions with proper regard to the long-term financial security of the 
Company.  We will achieve this by: 
• Striving to create value for our shareholders that is sustainable over the long term. 
• Seeking enhanced stakeholder loyalty as a route to competitive advantage and long-
term growth. 
 
Environment 
 
We will respect the natural environment and help preserve it for future generations.  We will 
achieve this by: 
• Working to provide effective environmental solutions 
• Working to continuously reduce the environmental impacts of our business in line with 
commitment to contribute to sustainable development 
• Measuring, understanding and responsibly managing our resource use, especially 
materials of concern and nonrenewable resources 
• Working to eliminate waste 
 
Community 
 
We will respect and contribute to the communities around the world in which we work.  We 
will achieve this by: 
• Respecting and supporting, in line with the legitimate role of business, the basic human 
of all people within our businesses and throughout our entire value chain. 
• Being sensitive to, and engaging in, the cultures of the communities in which we 
participate. 
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• Making responsible and mutually beneficial investment in the communities we serve. 
 
Quality of relationships 
 
We will strive to earn the trust and respect of our investors, customers, dealers, employees, 
unions, business partners and society.  We will achieve this by: 
• Building and maintaining a caring culture of partnership and mutual benefit. 
• Developing individual and team skills so employees may reach their full potential and 
contribute to the success of the Ford Motor Company. 
• Creating a business climate that encourages innovation, learning and exceptional 
performance. 
• Actively pursuing the benefits derived from a diverse workforce, as well as those from 
the diversity of perspectives provided by our stakeholders. 
 
Accountability 
 
We will be honest and open and model the highest standards of corporate integrity.  We will 
achieve this by: 
• Being responsive to stakeholders’ concerns on the impact of our operations, products 
and services through public disclosure and regular reporting. 
• Making accurate and forthright statements, competing ethically, avoiding conflicts of 
interest and having zero tolerance for the offer, payment, solicitation or acceptance of 
bribes. 
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Appendix E: Coding of Environmental Reports 
 
The text of firms’ environmental reports was analysed using QSR NVivo 2.0 qualitative 
analysis software.  This software allows codes to be applied to the text for recurring 
concepts expressed.  Coding was applied to those sections of environmental reports where 
rationales for action are outlined, rather than the action itself.  Thus, codes were applied to 
executive statements at the front of reports, sections on the company’s ‘vision’ vis a vis the 
environment, and the firm’s actual environmental policy guidelines. 
The rules employed for coding are summarised below.  Following this, tables 
presenting the detailed results of coding are provided.1
 
Coding Rules Applied 
 
The following coding rules were applied: 
• Paragraphs were regarded as the maximum unit for coding.  No coding was applied 
across paragraphs for the reason that each represents a new idea, or a new idea on 
the same subject.  Therefore, a separate code is warranted. 
• Sometimes a code was applied twice or more within a paragraph if separated by a 
sentence/sentences that represent another idea.  Where contiguous sentences express 
a rationale for action based on the same idea, these were not coded separately, but 
were coded once together. 
• Because product and product development is the area of analysis, with 
environmental impact of passenger cars in use the focus rather than manufacturing 
processes, no coding was applied to passages relating to manufacturing. 
• All coding was based on rationales for action, not on the action itself unless this is 
in some way attached to the rationale (e.g. a reference to emission reductions 
expressed in reference to state regulatory requirements).  Statements that were 
coded answer the question of why action is being taken, rather than the fact that 
action is being taken per se. 
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Many passages were coded more than once.  For example, statements that relate to 
the codes for responsibility to the company’s direct stakeholders and the code for broader 
responsibility to society in general are often found in the same statements, along with 
others, such as in the following statement from Volkswagen’s environmental report: 
For Volkswagen, sustainability means having access to, and the long term safeguarding of, resources 
at all levels: capital, employees, technology, raw materials, knowledge and reputation among clients 
and the general public.2
This statement was coded for environmental sustainability (the concept that starts the 
sentence); brand value (i.e. “reputation among clients”); responsibility to society – 
unspecified (i.e. “the general public”); and responsibility to stakeholders (i.e. “capital”, 
“employees” and “clients”).  Thus, this is a complex statement that includes several 
rationales for action, all of which require coding. 
 
Detailed Results of Coding 
 
When compiling the following tables, the coding of Nissan’s Environmental Report and 
Sustainability Report were combined, and likewise for Honda’s Environmental Annual 
Report and Ecology.  The rationale for doing so is that these companies intend the reports 
to be complementary and inform one another, and therefore they should be read together.3
For the sake of comparison, percentages are primarily used when comparing coding 
applied to the text between firms.  The intention in so doing is to avoid the spurious effects 
of using raw frequencies of codes from passages of different lengths, or from passages that 
do not offer as many rationales for action as others.  What is of interest is the relative 
emphasis on different rationales for action, not the total number of codes applied for each.  
However, the coding frequencies from which percentages were calculated is also made 
available here, and is consulted where the frequency of coding on individual codes is so 
low that it produces more ‘extreme’ percentages than might be warranted (e.g. if only one 
code is applied for a given factor, this would result in a percentage of 100 percent for this 
code within that factor), or when the frequency on a given code is so high that it deserves 
comment. 
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Executive Statement 
 
Table E1: Material Factors – Market Forces 
  Competition Safeguarding Financial Returns Proactive Action 
  Consumer 
Demand 
Competitive 
Pressure from 
Other Firms 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Profits 
and Sales
Shareholder 
Value 
Risk 
Management 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Market 
Share/ 
Leadership 
Business 
Opportunity 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 BMW 1 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 
 DaimlerChrysler 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
JAPAN Toyota 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 
 Honda 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Nissan 4 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
US General Motors 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 0 3 
 Ford 1 1 2 3 0 0 3 3 3 6 
TOTAL  11 1 12 9 2 0 10 10 4 15 
 
 
Table E2: Material Factors – State Regulation 
  International Regulation National Regulation General TOTAL 
  Meetings Voluntary 
Agreements 
Protocols Input to 
Policy/ 
Regulations 
Voluntary 
Agreements 
Legislation 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 1 1 0 0 0 1-exceeding 0 3 
 BMW  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 2 0 0 1 0 1-exceeding 4 
JAPAN Toyota  0 0 0 0 0 1-complying 0 1 
 Honda 2 1 2 0 0 1-exceeding 0 6 
 Nissan 0 0 0 1 0 1-complying 0 2 
US General Motors 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 5 
 Ford 0 1 0 0 0 0 1-complying 2 
TOTAL  4 9 2 1 1 4 2 23 
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Table E3: Material Factors – State Regulation in terms of Voluntary Agreements, Legislation and Policy Input 
  National and 
International 
Voluntary 
Agreements  
National and 
International 
Legislation  
Input to the 
Policy Process 
TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 1 1 1 3 
 BMW  0 0 0 0 
 DaimlerChrysler  2 1 0 3 
JAPAN Toyota  0 1 0 1 
 Honda 1 3 2 6 
 Nissan 0 1 1 2 
US General Motors 4 0 1 5 
 Ford 1 0 0 1 
TOTAL  9 7 5 21 
Note: This table is similar to Table E2 but with the focus not on international versus national regulation, but instead on the type of regulation (i.e. voluntary agreements, 
legislation or policy input).  National and International Voluntary Agreements = national and international voluntary agreements.  National and International Legislation = 
international protocols, complying with or exceeding national legislation, and complying with or exceeding general regulations.  Input to the Policy Process = international 
meetings and national input to policy/regulations.  There are some discrepancies in totals between Tables E2 and E3 due to double coding being eliminated in the latter (e.g. 
some sentences in the text may have referred to both national and international voluntary agreements so in Table E2 they were coded for both to recognise national and 
international dimensions, but in Table E3 there is only one code given as the statement refers to voluntary agreements generally). 
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Table E4: Normative Factors – Social Attitudes 
  General Social 
Concern/Raised 
Awareness 
Firm Image Responsibility to society Responsibility 
to 
Stakeholders 
   Brand 
Value
Building 
Trust 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(unspecificed) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(global) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(nation) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 0 0 1 1 4 3 1 8 3 
 BMW  0 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
JAPAN Toyota  0 1 2 3 0 2 1 3 1 
 Honda 2 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 Nissan 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 
US General Motors 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 3 
 Ford 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 
TOTAL  4 5 9 14 9 5 2 16 12 
 
Table E5: Normative Factors – Internal Company Strategies 
  Corporate Policy History/Path 
Dependence 
Leader’s Vision 
  Corporate 
Belief 
Guiding 
Principle 
TOTAL (no 
multiple coding)
  
GERMANY Volkswagen 3 1 4 4 0 
 BMW  3 0 3 0 0 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 0 0 1 0 
JAPAN Toyota  2 3 5 0 1 
 Honda 3 1 4 2 0 
 Nissan 4 0 4 0 1 
US General Motors 3 1 3 0 0 
 Ford 3 1 4 1 6 
TOTAL  21 8 27 8 8 
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Table E6: Environmental and Economic Sustainability  
  Environmental 
Sustainability 
Environmental and Economic 
Sustainability Linked 
TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 19 2 21 
 BMW  4 6 10 
 DaimlerChrysler  3 0 3 
JAPAN Toyota  1 0 1 
 Honda 2 0 2 
 Nissan 8 4 12 
US General Motors 2 0 2 
 Ford 4 1 5 
TOTAL  43 13 56 
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 Vision Statement 
 
Table E7: Material Factors – Market Forces 
  Competition Safeguarding Financial Returns Proactive Action 
  Consumer 
Demand 
Competitive 
Pressure from 
Other Firms 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Profits and 
Sales 
Shareholder 
Value 
Risk 
Management 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Market Share/ 
Leadership 
Business 
Opportunity 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 4 0 4 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 
 BMW  0 0 0 2 6 5 13 2 1 3 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 3 
JAPAN Toyota  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
 Honda 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 
 Nissan 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
US General Motors 5 1 6 1 0 0 1 5 0 5 
 Ford 9 2 11 1 1 1 2 3 3 5 
TOTAL  20 5 25 6 8 6 19 19 7 25 
 
Table E8: Material Factors – State Regulation 
  International Regulation National Regulation General TOTAL 
  Meetings Voluntary 
Agreements 
Protocols Input to 
Policy/ 
Regulations 
Voluntary 
Agreements 
Legislation 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 6 9 0 2 2 1-exceeding 1-exceeding 21 
 BMW  0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 DaimlerChrysler  2 5 0 1 0 0 1-complying     
1-exceeding 
10 
JAPAN Toyota  0 0 0 0 0 0 1-complying 1 
 Honda 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-exceeding 1 
 Nissan 3 2 2 0 0 4-complying     
1-exceeding 
1-complying 13 
US General Motors 0 1 0 0 0 0 1-complying 2 
 Ford 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
TOTAL  12 20 2 3 4 6 7 54 
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Table E9: Material Factors – State Regulation in terms of Voluntary Agreements, Legislation and Policy Input 
  National and 
International 
Voluntary 
Agreements  
National and 
International 
Legislation  
Input to the 
Policy Process 
TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 11 2 8 21 
 BMW  4 0 0 4 
 DaimlerChrysler  5 2 3 10 
JAPAN Toyota  0 1 0 1 
 Honda 0 1 0 1 
 Nissan 2 8 3 13 
US General Motors 1 1 0 2 
 Ford 1 0 1 2 
TOTAL  24 15 15 54 
Note: This table is similar to Table E8 but with the focus not on international versus national regulation, but instead on the type of regulation (i.e. voluntary agreements, 
legislation or policy input).  National and International Voluntary Agreements = national and international voluntary agreements.  National and International Legislation = 
international protocols, complying with or exceeding national legislation, and complying with or exceeding general regulations.  Input to the Policy Process = international 
meetings and national input to policy/regulations.  There are some discrepancies in totals between Tables E8 and E9 due to double coding being eliminated in the latter (e.g. 
some sentences in the text may have referred to both national and international voluntary agreements so in Table E8 they were coded for both to recognise national and 
international dimensions, but in Table E9 there is only one code given as the statement refers to voluntary agreements generally). 
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Table E10: Normative Factors – Social Attitudes 
   Firm Image Responsibility to Society Responsibility 
to 
Stakeholders 
  General Social 
Concern/Raised 
Awareness 
Brand 
Value 
Building 
Trust 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(unspecificed) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(global) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(nation) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 4 2 1 3 3 2 0 5 5 
 BMW  0 4 5 8 3 0 0 3 3 
 DaimlerChrysler  1 1 1 2 8 0 0 8 5 
JAPAN Toyota  1 3 2 5 3 1 0 3 2 
 Honda 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 
 Nissan 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
US General Motors 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 3 2 
 Ford 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 
TOTAL  14 13 12 24 20 4 0 23 23 
 
Table E11: Normative Factors – Internal Company Strategies 
  Corporate Policy History/Path 
Dependence 
Leader’s 
Vision 
  Corporate 
Belief 
Guiding 
Principle 
TOTAL (no 
multiple coding)
  
GERMANY Volkswagen 3 5 8 2 0 
 BMW  2 0 2 1 0 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 7 7 0 0 
JAPAN Toyota  4 2 6 1 0 
 Honda 4 3 6 4 0 
 Nissan 4 1 5 7 0 
US General Motors 2 2 4 3 0 
 Ford 0 3 3 0 0 
TOTAL  19 23 41 18 0 
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Table E12: Environmental and Economic Sustainability  
  Environmental 
Sustainability 
Environmental and Economic 
Sustainability Linked 
TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 36 3 39 
 BMW  21 6 27 
 DaimlerChrysler  13 4 17 
JAPAN Toyota  0 2 2 
 Honda 2 2 4 
 Nissan 2 2 4 
US General Motors 1 0 1 
 Ford 5 4 9 
TOTAL  80 23 103 
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 Environmental Policy Guidelines 
 
Table E13: Material Factors – Market Forces 
  Competition Safeguarding Financial Returns Proactive Action 
  Consumer 
Demand 
Competitive 
Pressure from 
Other Firms 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Profits and 
Sales 
Shareholder 
Value 
Risk 
Management 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Market Share/ 
Leadership 
Business 
Opportunity 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 BMW  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
JAPAN Toyota  1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 Honda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Nissan 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 
US General Motors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Ford 1 0 1 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 
TOTAL  4 1 5 1 2 3 6 2 1 3 
 
Table E14: Material Factors – State Regulation 
  International Regulation National Regulation General TOTAL 
  Meetings Voluntary 
Agreements 
Protocols Input to 
Policy/ 
Regulations 
Voluntary 
Agreements 
Legislation 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 0 0 0 2 0 0 1-complying 3 
 BMW  0 1 0 1 0 0 1-complying     
1-exceeding 
4 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 0 0 2 0 0 2-complying 4 
JAPAN Toyota  0 0 0 0 0 0 3-complying 3 
 Honda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Nissan 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-complying     
1-exceeding 
2 
US General Motors 0 0 0 1 0 0 1-exceeding 2 
 Ford 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL  0 1 0 6 0 0 11 18 
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Table E15: Material Factors – State Regulation in terms of Voluntary Agreements, Legislation and Policy Input 
  National and 
International 
Voluntary 
Agreements  
National and 
International 
Legislation  
Policy Process TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 0 1 2 3 
 BMW  1 2 1 4 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 2 2 4 
JAPAN Toyota  0 3 0 3 
 Honda 0 0 0 0 
 Nissan 0 1 0 1 
US General Motors 0 1 1 2 
 Ford 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL  1 10 6 17 
Note: This table is similar to Table E14 but with the focus not on international versus national regulation, but instead on the type of regulation (i.e. voluntary agreements, 
legislation or policy input).  National and International Voluntary Agreements = national and international voluntary agreements.  National and International Legislation = 
international protocols, complying with or exceeding national legislation, and complying with or exceeding general regulations.  Input to the Policy Process = international 
meetings and national input to policy/regulations.  There are some discrepancies in totals between Tables E14 and E15 due to double coding being eliminated in the latter (e.g. 
some sentences in the text may have referred to both national and international voluntary agreements so in Table E14 they were coded for both to recognise national and 
international dimensions, but in Table E15 there is only one code given as the statement refers to voluntary agreements generally). 
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Table E16: Normative Factors – Social Attitudes 
   Firm Image Responsibility to Society Responsibility 
to 
Stakeholders 
  General Social 
Concern/Raised 
Awareness 
Brand 
Value 
Building 
Trust 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(unspecificed) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(global) 
Responsibility 
to Society 
(nation) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 3 5 
 BMW  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
 DaimlerChrysler  0 0 1 1 2 1 0 3 2 
JAPAN Toyota  0 0 1 1 1 2 1 4 3 
 Honda 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 
 Nissan 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 2 
US General Motors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Ford 0 2 4 6 1 0 0 1 4 
TOTAL  1 2 8 10 11 5 1 17 19 
 
Table E17: Normative Factors – Internal Company Strategies 
  Corporate Policy   
  Corporate 
Belief 
Guiding 
Principle 
TOTAL (no 
multiple coding)
History/Path 
Dependence 
Leader’s 
Vision 
GERMANY Volkswagen 5 4 9 0 0 
 BMW  0 1 1 0 0 
 DaimlerChrysler  6 1 7 0 0 
JAPAN Toyota  4 2 6 2 0 
 Honda 1 0 1 0 0 
 Nissan 7 2 7 1 0 
US General Motors 2 0 2 0 0 
 Ford 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL  25 10 33 3 0 
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Table E18: Environmental and Economic Sustainability  
  Environmental 
Sustainability 
Environmental and Economic 
Sustainability Linked 
TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 3 3 6 
 BMW  5 3 8 
 DaimlerChrysler  1 0 1 
JAPAN Toyota  2 0 2 
 Honda 0 1 1 
 Nissan 2 0 2 
US General Motors 0 0 0 
 Ford 2 0 2 
TOTAL  15 7 22 
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 Total Codes  
 
Table E19: Summary of all Codes 
  Material Factors Normative Factors Over-arching Concerns  
  Market 
Forces 
State 
Regulation 
Social 
Attitudes 
Internal 
Company 
Strategies 
Environmental 
Sustainability 
Environmental and Economic 
Sustainability Linked 
TOTAL
GERMANY Volkswagen 13 27 39 27 58 8 172 
 BMW  20 8 23 7 30 15 103 
 DaimlerChrysler  8 17 23 15 17 4 84 
JAPAN Toyota  10 5 26 21 3 2 67 
 Honda 7 7 13 17 4 3 51 
 Nissan 12 16 18 25 12 6 89 
US General Motors 17 9 13 12 3 0 54 
 Ford 33 3 22 14 11 5 88 
TOTAL  120 92 177 138 138 43 708 
 
Table E20: Summary of all Codes – Percentages 
  Material Factors Normative Factors Over-arching Concerns  
  Market 
Forces 
(%) 
State 
Regulation 
(%) 
Social 
Attitudes 
(%) 
Internal 
Company 
Strategies 
(%) 
Environmental 
Sustainability 
(%) 
Environmental and Economic 
Sustainability Linked (%) 
TOTAL 
(%) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 8 16 23 16 34 5 100 
 BMW  19 8 22 7 29 15 100 
 DaimlerChrysler  10 20 27 18 20 5 100 
JAPAN Toyota  15 7 39 31 4 3 100 
 Honda 14 14 25 33 8 6 100 
 Nissan 13 18 20 28 13 7 100 
US General Motors 31 17 24 22 6 0 100 
 Ford 38 3 25 16 13 6 100 
TOTAL  17 13 25 19 19 6 100 
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Table E21: Summary of Material versus Normative Factors - Percentages 
    Market 
Forces 
(%) 
State  
Regulation (%)
 TOTAL 
MATERIAL 
(%) 
Social 
Attitudes (%)
Internal 
Company 
Strategies (%) 
 TOTAL 
NORMATIVE (%) 
ALL MATERIAL 
AND NORMATIVE 
CODES (%) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 12 25 38 37 25 62 100
  BMW  24 14 48 40 12 52 100
  DaimlerChrysler  13 27 40 37 24 60 100
 GERMAN AVERAGE 18 23 41 37 22 59 100
JAPAN Toyota  16 8 24 42 34 76 100
  Honda 16 16 32 30 39 68 100
  Nissan 17 23 39 25 35 61 100
 JAPAN AVERAGE 16 16 32 32 36 68 100
US General Motors 33 18 51 25 24 49 100
  Ford 45 5 50 30 19 49 100
 US AVERAGE 40 10 51 28 21 49 100
ALL FIRMS   23 18 40 34 26 60 100
 
 
Table E22: Summary of Over-Arching Concern for Sustainability - Percentages 
    Environmental 
Sustainability (%)
Environmental and Economic 
Sustainability Linked (%) 
ALL CODES (%) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 88 12 100
  BMW  67 33 100
  DaimlerChrysler  81 19 100
 GERMAN AVERAGE 80 20 100
JAPAN Toyota  60 40 100
  Honda 57 43 100
 Nissan 67 33 100
  JAPAN AVERAGE 63 37 100
US General Motors 100 0 100
  Ford 69 31 100
 US AVERAGE 74 26 100
ALL FIRMS   76 24 100
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Table E23: Material Factors – Market Forces in Detail 
  Competition Safeguarding Financial Returns Proactive Action TOTAL 
  Consumer 
Demand 
Competitive 
Pressure from 
Other Firms 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Profits 
and Sales
Shareholder 
Value 
Risk 
Management 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
Market 
Share/ 
Leadership 
Business 
Opportunity 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 7 1 8 1 1 0 2 2 1 3 13 
 BMW 1 0 1 4 7 5 15 3 1 4 20 
 DaimlerChrysler 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 2 6 8 
JAPAN Toyota 1 1 2 2 0 1 3 5 0 5 10 
 Honda 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 3 0 4 7 
 Nissan 7 0 7 1 0 2 3 0 2 2 12 
US General Motors 6 1 7 1 1 0 2 8 0 8 17 
 Ford 11 3 14 5 3 1 8 6 6 11 33 
TOTAL  35 7 42 16 12 9 35 32 12 43 120 
 
 
Table E24: Material Factors – Market Forces in Detail - Percentages 
  Competition Safeguarding Financial Returns Proactive Action TOTAL 
  Consumer 
Demand 
(%) 
Competitive 
Pressure from 
Other Firms 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
(%) 
Profits 
and Sales 
(%) 
Shareholder 
Value (%) 
Risk 
Management 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
(%) 
Market 
Share/ 
Leadership 
(%) 
Business 
Opportunity 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(no 
multiple 
coding) 
(%) 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 54 8 62 8 8 0 15 15 8 23 100 
 BMW 5 0 5 19 33 24 75 14 5 20 100 
 DaimlerChrysler 0 13 13 13 0 0 13 50 25 75 100 
JAPAN Toyota 10 10 20 20 0 10 30 50 0 50 100 
 Honda 33 0 29 17 0 0 14 50 0 57 100 
 Nissan 58 0 58 8 0 17 25 0 17 17 100 
US General Motors 35 6 41 6 6 0 12 47 0 47 100 
 Ford 31 9 42 14 9 3 24 17 17 33 100 
TOTAL  28 6 35 13 10 7 29 26 10 36 100 
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Table E25: Material Factors – State Regulation 
  International Regulation National Regulation General TOTAL 
  Meetings Voluntary 
Agreements 
Protocols Input to 
Policy/ 
Regulations 
Voluntary 
Agreements 
Legislation 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
(complying/ 
exceeding) 
 
GERMANY Volkswagen 7 10 0 4 2 2 2 27 
 BMW  0 4 0 1 1 0 2 8 
 DaimlerChrysler  2 7 0 3 1 0 5 18 
JAPAN Toyota  0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 
 Honda 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 7 
 Nissan 3 2 2 1 0 6 3 17 
US General Motors 1 5 0 1 0 0 2 9 
 Ford 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 4 
TOTAL  16 30 4 10 5 10 20 95 
 
Table E26: Material Factors – State Regulation – Percentages 
  International Regulation National Regulation General  ALL STATE 
REGULATION 
CODES (%) 
   Meetings (%) Voluntary 
Agreements 
(%) 
Protocols 
(%) 
Input to 
Policy/ 
Regulations 
(%) 
Voluntary 
Agreements 
(%) 
Legislation 
(complying/ 
exceeding) (%) 
Legislation 
(complying/ 
exceeding) (%) 
  
GERMANY Volkswagen 26 37 0 15 7 7 7 100
 BMW  0 50 0 13 13 0 25 100
 DaimlerChrysler 11 39 0 17 6 0 28 100
JAPAN Toyota  0 0 0 0 0 20 80 100
 Honda 29 14 29 0 0 14 14 100
 Nissan 18 12 12 6 0 35 18 100
US General Motors 11 56 0 11 0 0 22 100
 Ford 25 25 0 0 25 0 25 100
TOTAL   17 32 4 11 5 11 21 100
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Table E27: Summary Material Factors – State Regulation in terms of Voluntary Agreements, Legislation and Policy Input 
  National and 
International 
Voluntary 
Agreements  
National and 
International 
Legislation  
Input to the Policy 
Process 
TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 12 4 11 27 
 BMW  5 2 1 8 
 DaimlerChrysler  7 5 5 17 
JAPAN Toyota  0 5 0 5 
 Honda 1 4 2 7 
 Nissan 2 10 4 16 
US General Motors 5 2 2 9 
 Ford 2 1 1 3 
TOTAL  34 32 26 92 
 
Table E28: Summary Material Factors – State Regulation in terms of Voluntary Agreements, Legislation and Policy Input - Percentages 
  National and 
International 
Voluntary 
Agreements (%) 
National and 
International 
Legislation (%) 
Input to the Policy 
Process (%) 
TOTAL (%)
GERMANY Volkswagen 44 15 41 100 
 BMW  63 25 13 100 
 DaimlerChrysler  41 29 29 100 
JAPAN Toyota  0 100 0 100 
 Honda 14 57 29 100 
 Nissan 13 63 25 100 
US General Motors 56 22 22 100 
 Ford 50 25 25 100 
TOTAL  37 35 28 100 
 
Note: These tables are similar to Tables E25 and E26 but with the focus not on international versus national regulation, but instead on the type of regulation (i.e. voluntary 
agreements, legislation or policy input).  National and International Voluntary Agreements = national and international voluntary agreements.  National and International 
Legislation = international protocols, complying with or exceeding national legislation, and complying with or exceeding general regulations.  Input to the Policy Process = 
international meetings and national input to policy/regulations.  There are some discrepancies in totals between Tables E25 and E27 due to double coding being eliminated in 
the latter (e.g. some sentences in the text may have referred to both national and international voluntary agreements so in Table E25 they were coded for both to recognise 
national and international dimensions, but in Table E9 there is only one code given as the statement refers to voluntary agreements generally). 
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Table E29: Normative Factors – Summary Social Attitudes 
  General Social 
Concern/Raised 
Awareness 
Firm 
Image 
Responsibility to 
Society 
Responsibility 
to Stakeholders 
TOTAL
GERMANY Volkswagen 5 5 16 13 39 
 BMW  0 12 4 7 23 
 DaimlerChrysler  1 3 12 7 23 
JAPAN Toyota  1 9 10 6 26 
 Honda 3 6 2 2 13 
 Nissan 5 1 6 6 18 
US General Motors 1 3 4 5 13 
 Ford 3 9 2 8 22 
TOTAL  19 48 56 54 177 
 
Table E30: Normative Factors – Summary Social Attitudes - Percentages 
  General Social 
Concern/Raised 
Awareness (%) 
Firm 
Image 
(%) 
Responsibility to 
Society (%) 
Responsibility to 
Stakeholders (%) 
TOTAL 
(%) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 13 13 41 33 100 
 BMW  0 52 17 30 100 
 DaimlerChrysler  4 13 52 30 100 
JAPAN Toyota  4 35 38 23 100 
 Honda 23 46 15 15 100 
 Nissan 28 6 33 33 100 
US General Motors 8 23 31 38 100 
 Ford 14 41 9 36 100 
TOTAL  11 27 32 31 100 
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Table E31: Normative Factors – Summary Internal Company Strategies 
  Corporate 
Policy  
History/Path 
Dependence 
Leader’s 
Vision  
TOTAL 
GERMANY Volkswagen 21 6 0 27 
 BMW  6 1 0 7 
 DaimlerChrysler  14 1 0 15 
JAPAN Toyota  17 3 1 21 
 Honda 11 6 0 17 
 Nissan 16 8 1 25 
US General Motors 9 3 0 12 
 Ford 7 1 6 14 
TOTAL  101 29 8 138 
 
Table E32: Normative Factors – Summary Internal Company Strategies - Percentages 
  Corporate 
Policy (%) 
History/Path 
Dependence 
(%) 
Leader’s 
Vision 
(%) 
TOTAL (%) 
GERMANY Volkswagen 78 22 0 100 
 BMW  86 14 0 100 
 DaimlerChrysler  93 7 0 100 
JAPAN Toyota  81 14 5 100 
 Honda 65 35 0 100 
 Nissan 64 32 4 100 
US General Motors 75 25 0 100 
 Ford 50 7 43 100 
TOTAL  73 21 6 100 
 
                                                 
1 The literature informing the approach undertaken for coding and qualitative analysis includes P. Bazeley and L. Richards (2000), The NVivo Qualitative Project Book, London: 
SAGE Publications; G. Gibbs (2002), Qualitative Data Analysis: Explorations with NVivo, Buckingham: Open University Press; A. Bryman (2004), Social Research Methods, 
2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press; M. Denscombe (1998) The Good Research Guide for Small Scaled Social Research Projects, Buckingham: Open University Press; 
R. Yin (2003a), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; and R. Yin (2003b), Applications of Case Study Research, 2nd 
edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
2 Volkswagen AG (2003), Environmental Report 2003/2004: Partners in Sustainability, Wolfsburg: Volkswagen AG, p.8. 
3 Honda Motor Company (2002), Honda Ecology, Tokyo: Honda Motor Company; Honda Motor Company (2004), Honda Environmental Annual Report 2004, Tokyo: Honda 
Motor Company; Nissan Motor Company (2004a), Environmental Report 2004, Tokyo: Nissan Motor Company; and Nissan Motor Company (2004b), Sustainability Report 
2004, Tokyo: Nissan Motor Company 
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Appendix F: Participant Information Statement and Interview 
Questions 
 
Participant Information Statement 
 
Dear [INSERT NAME OF INTERVIEWEE] 
 
Research Study on The Car Industry and the Environment 
Participant Information Statement 
 
Aim and purpose of the study  
I am inviting office holders in selected major car firms to participate in interviews on their 
attitudes and perceptions with respect to environmental concerns.  Taking an increase in 
concern for environmental sustainability generally in the last ten years as the backdrop 
for research, the study will look at attitudinal change within the car industry on the 
environment.  This is the first detailed academic study of this kind, and I believe that it 
will potentially be of value to the industry as well as academic audiences.  
 
What will be involved 
• An interview about the vehicles produced by your firm and how they perform with 
respect to the environment (ie. how ‘clean’ or ‘green’ they are and how this has 
changed over the last ten years).  The interview will include questions on: major 
initiatives being undertaken by your firm and why they are being undertaken, the 
role of government regulations, the role of market forces, and the challenges facing 
your firm with respect to the environmental performance of the vehicles it produces. 
• The interview will last for about an hour and, with your permission, it will be audio 
taped.  
• The entire transcript of the interview will not be used in any publications, and will 
only be seen by me.  However, selected quotations will be used in publications and 
these quotations may identify you because of your unique position in the company.  
• You will be sent a copy of the interview transcript for your own records; you will 
also be sent a copy of the written report detailing this research. 
• You have the right to withdraw from the research study and the interview process, 
if the need arises, at any stage and without any repercussions.  
I am a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney.  Please feel free to contact me at any 
time with questions about this research project. My telephone numbers are XXXX XXXX 
or XXXX XXX XXX and email: XXXXXXXX@mail.usyd.edu.au. 
If you are willing to be interviewed please return the enclosed Consent Form.  I will then 
phone your office to arrange the time and place for the interview at your convenience. 
 
John Mikler
Interview Questions 
 
Interviews were conducted with key personnel in major German, US and Japanese 
companies.  They were semi-structured in order to guide interviewees, but not so rigid as to 
prevent interviewees from deviating from the exact question asked in order to express a 
view they thought important.  In particular, time was made at the end of interviews for 
interviewees to express any views they may have felt pertinent that were left out in the 
course of the interview process. 
Nine interview questions asked.  These were designed to allow the possibility of 
reflection on the part of interviewees.  The questions asked were as follows: 
1. What would you say are the major initiatives your firm is taking in producing 
vehicles that are more environmentally friendly?  Why has your firm taken these 
initiatives? 
2. In a business sense, how do you believe improvements in the environmental 
performance of the vehicles produced by your firm may be encouraged: government 
regulations, consumer preferences (market forces), internal company strategies?  
Please feel free to expand on your answer. 
3. Do you believe the approach of government on environmental issues has changed in 
the last ten years?  How? 
4. What do you think the role of government should be in encouraging the production 
of more environmentally friendly vehicles? [PROMPT: standards, taxes, subsidies, 
penalties, rewards] 
5. Does government policy shape the strategic direction taken by your firm with 
respect to the environment?  If so how?  Has this changed the strategic direction 
taken by your firm over the last 10 years? 
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6. What major market conditions, if any, have prompted your firm to improve the 
environmental performance of the vehicles it produces? 
7. What changes have you noticed in consumer attitudes or demand in the last ten 
years with respect to the environment?  Has this changed your firm’s business 
significantly?  How? 
8. Which is most important in shaping your firms’ long-term planning: consumer 
attitudes or actual consumer demand? 
9. What do you believe are the major challenges facing your firm in the next ten to 
twenty years with respect to the environmental performance of the vehicles it 
produces?  How do you think your firm will respond to these challenges? 
Questions 1 and 2 are in the form of open questions that seek interviewees’ opinions 
on what their company is doing and why.  It allows them the opportunity to state, up front, 
the activities of their firm is taking with respect to the environment and the rationale for 
environmental strategies that have been adopted. 
Questions 3 to 8 are designed to allow the interviewee to reflect on the statements 
made in questions 1 and 2.  They broadly cover two themes.  Questions 3 to 5 probe, from a 
variety of angles, the interviewee’s conception of the role of government vis a vis the 
company’s environmental strategies in product development, and how the company 
operates in the light of government action.  Questions 6 to 8 are designed to elucidate 
opinions in a similar manner with respect to market forces.  Hence, these two sets of 
questions go to examining how personnel in different companies from different countries 
perceived their firms’ strategies as related to exogenous material factors, or the ‘lens’ 
through which such factors are interpreted. 
Question 9, like questions 1 and 2, is an open question that seeks interviewees’ 
opinions on what their company is likely to do in future and why.  Coming at the end of the 
interview, it is designed to produce a response on what is likely to be the strategy of the 
company in future and the challenges it will face, ‘coloured’ by the issues and the 
perspectives on them already covered in the preceding questions.  Posing a ‘crystal ball 
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gazing’ question at the end of the interview also gives interviewees an opportunity to reflect 
on what they have said in the course of the interview and add anything they believe is 
important that they may not have already highlighted.   
Apart from questions 1, 2 and 9, there are no questions where interviewees were 
asked specifically about firm strategies that are not associated with external forces.  In fact, 
only in question 2 is the possibility that firm strategies may have been generated internally 
with no relation to government regulations or market conditions raised, although the 
possibility for answering in this way is implicit in questions 1 and 9.  The reason for this is 
twofold.  First, the hypothesis that firms can generate such strategies independently should 
be spontaneously given rather than suggested in order to avoid confirmation bias.  Secondly, 
this thesis is not so much concerned with the possibility that material factors are irrelevant 
(it would be incredibly naive to believe this) but that their importance and how they are 
perceived differs between different companies on the basis of their nationality. 
In almost all cases, questions permitting simple ‘yes’ or ‘no answers were avoided, 
and where they were asked (questions 3 and 5) this was done to get a clear response to the 
influence of government on business strategies, given that a key aspect of this thesis is 
whether regulation is a key factor in the internalisation of environmental externalities and 
because the Varieties of Capitalism approach, which strongly focuses on the role of 
government and government-business relations, underpins the institutional analysis 
conducted. 
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Appendix G: Key Aspects of the Firms Involved in Interviews 
 
In Chapter 7, the point was made that the firms which granted access for interviews are key 
representatives of their national industries.  The following presents a brief summary for the 
interested reader as to what characterises them, and therefore provides further details on just how 
they are representative of the industry from their respective territories. 
 
Volkswagen 
 
The Volkswagen Group is the major German volume producer and dominates the European 
market.  In 2003, the company had the highest share of the European diesel market (23 percent), 
and diesel vehicles accounted for more of the company’s European sales than any other 
company’s European sales (55 percent).  It also overwhelmingly makes its profits in Europe.1   
Volkswagen has volume brands including Volkswagen, Skoda and Seat.  Audi is its major 
premium brand.  Fifty percent of the company’s sales are from the volume Volkswagen brand, 
and 29 percent from Audi.  Both are strong brands that manage to extract price premiums from 
consumers, to the extent that Volkswagen is sometimes seen as a ‘sub-premium’ brand with 
connotations of prestige for its products in many markets despite being the ‘people’s car’.  Both 
are seen as technologically-advanced brands that offer a quality product with expertise in 
advanced diesel engines.2
 
BMW 
 
As a premium rather than volume brand, BMW is a bit different from a company like 
Volkswagen.  BMW’s brand image is: prestige, sporty, quality.  Its premium brand image allows 
it to extract high price margins and consumer loyalty for its products.  As the leading global 
premium car brand, along with DaimlerChrysler’s Mercedes, it is more internationally focused 
and internationally dependent for its revenues – e.g. 27 percent of its revenues and 35 percent of 
its profits are from US sales.  Even so, the firm’s most important markets are Germany and 
Europe which together account for 47 percent of its sales and 45 percent of its profits.3
 
Ford 
 
Ford is an established, large volume-driven American firm that has a similar market profile to the 
other major US firm, General Motors.  It relies on the North American market for 60 percent of 
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its revenues and virtually all of its profits.  By contrast, the company makes losses in Europe, its 
other major market.  In terms of its product line-up, 66 percent of its revenues and 80 percent of 
its profits are accounted for by sales of light trucks.  Of the remaining 20 percent of its profits, 
nearly half of these (8 percent) are accounted for by the sale of luxury cars.  In addition, the 
profitability of its automotive operations is slim.  Virtually all its profits are derived from its 
finance operations, despite the fact that the finance division only accounts for 16 percent of its 
revenues.  The company is dependent on sales of light trucks in North America to drive its 
finance operations.4    
Ford has research and product development, manufacturing and sales operations in 
Australia and produces unique vehicles for the Australian market.  In common with its general 
market profile these are larger vehicles.  They include six cylinder passenger cars such as the 
Falcon, a light truck/cross-over vehicle called the Territory, and luxury V8s such as the Fairlane. 
 
Toyota 
 
Toyota is the largest Japanese volume manufacturer, and second largest car manufacturer in the 
world after General Motors.  It is characterised by leading-edge technology, quality and 
reliability.  It is the world leader in developing and selling cars featuring hybrid petrol-electric 
drivetrains, the first of which was the Prius.  It is therefore also perceived as an innovator and 
risk-taker.  Japanese firms make money from selling cars internationally more than German or 
US firms.  Like Honda and Nissan, Toyota makes profits in every region of the world where it 
sells cars.  The North American market, responsible for 28 percent of its sales, is particularly 
important to the firm and like other Japanese firms it continues to increase its market share in the 
US and Europe.  Even so, like its Japanese counterparts Toyota dominates its home market more 
than German or US firms do theirs.  Toyota depends on Japan for 51 percent of its sales.5
Like Ford, Toyota has research and product development, manufacturing and sales 
operations in Australia where it is the number one brand on the basis of sales volume. 
                                                 
1 Deutsche Bank (2004), The Drivers: How to Navigate the Auto Industry, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bank AG, 
p.72 and pp.147-151. 
2 Ibid., pp.147-151. 
3 Ibid., p.112. 
4 Ibid., pp.153-157. 
5 Ibid., pp.201-205. 
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